



CONFLICT, CULTURE, & HISTORY

REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

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Foreword

The essays presented in this volume suggest that, in the foreseeable future, the spectrum of conflict will encompass war in forms and on levels of intensity that render ineffectual conventional means to resolve them. In many cases, the reasons for a growing spectrum of conflict are directly related to the ideological and civilizational factors present in rapidly evolving cultures under the impact of internal and external political, economic, and social forces.

For the Soviet Union such conflict takes the form of the classical problem of disaffected minorities unable to satisfy their demands for autonomy within a federated structure without destroying the structure itself. On the other hand, in the Far East the cultures that underlie Sinic societies are well meshed with the state. The majority of Middle Eastern political communities, founded on the Western concept of the nation-state, coexist tenuously with a politicized religious culture ready at any moment to wage war against them in the name of extirpating their secular European roots.

Although Africa leads the world in the number of prolonged struggles, there is little evidence that such conflicts are motivated by the war-like African cultures. What most prolonged conflicts in Africa share in common is the degree of external intervention, whether such intervention comes in the form of funds, weapons, training, refuge, or leadership. In the contemporary era Latin American conflicts have been fueled by external ideologies rather than by purely internal cultural tensions. Negotiations, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation have been the hallmark of Latin American foreign policy initiatives for nearly two centuries.

As diverse as their approaches to the issue of culture and conflict may be, the authors all agree on one important point: that without basic research into the sociocultural causes of

strife, the understanding of what constitutes the spectrum of conflict will fail to include the kinds of war that we may expect to see in the foreseeable future. And this cannot help but affect adversely the development of political and military means for their solution.

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Preface

The nation-state is the concept from which the modern Western political order has been constructed. This political order accounts, in turn, for the particular ways countries relate to each other, ideally under a regime of international law which, by delimiting the boundaries between war and peace, has established a theoretical and practical measure for the stability of nations. Because these boundaries have been institutionalized by law, the modern Western political order has evolved in an atmosphere of relative peace. At least such has been the case until the latter part of this century. Under the influence of the third-world independence movements and the breakup of the communist monolith, the absolute validity of the concept of the nation-state may have been reaffirmed for the creation of durable political communities. Yet many European countries still remain uncomfortable with the concept of the nation-state as an organizing principle for the *polis* and have reverted to older ethnic and religious ways of defining national life. As a result, the boundaries determining war and peace among peoples and between nations are becoming progressively more fluid. It is a supreme historical irony that the concept of the nation-state, with its demand that loyalty to the state supersede loyalty to narrower ethnoreligious identities, has been generalized to areas of the non-Western world where the nation-state is sometimes an alien proposition but where it, nevertheless, constitutes the basis for international relationships.

The recognition that conflict may have more enduring roots in ethnic and religious culture than in the quarrels of nation-states over issues of relative standing in the international political order has received its seminal treatment by Professor Adda B. Bozeman in her article, "War and the Clash of Ideas." The essays of this volume expand Professor Bozeman's thesis

and attempting to pinpoint where peace ceases and war begins. The results of the following research are as wide as they are variable, but they add to a more comprehensive cultural perspective on this important issue.

In his contribution Stephen Blank argues that since 1917 the concept of the nation-state and its related notion of a stable, legitimate international order has been under attack by the Soviet Union. The perversion of the nation-state concept has suited the Soviet need to lead a revolutionary international movement upon which the USSR has founded its imperial claim to world domination. Until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, this entailed the reconceptualization of international politics and conflict to accommodate the idea of a militarized, permanent “state of siege” between the USSR and the rest of the world. The state of siege overlapped the cold war and provided an ongoing threat to both the emerging nation-states of the third world and to the spread of substate ethnic and religious nationalisms, even within the Soviet Union itself. Because the political future of Gorbachev’s initiatives may be in doubt today, the possibility for further attacks on Western political concepts is by no means exhausted.

Lewis Ware explores the evolution of an Islamic concept of conflict by tracing the function of jihad—as a legal means of accommodating the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds—from earliest Islamic times to the latter days of political Islamism. He finds that not only does the function of jihad change over time according to the intensity of the historical exchanges between West and East, but jihad also reflects the cultural views toward war of the various peoples to whom Islam was preached—but in ways that do not compromise the immutable tenets of Islamic dogma and religious culture. Thus a tension exists between the concept of perpetual conflict dictated by a religious culture unaffected by time and the concept of conflict as a relative phenomenon dependent on historical change. This tension gives jihad its characteristic shape and provides the

environment for the contemporary struggles of political Islamism with Western-inspired secular Muslim regimes.

In his essay Lawrence Grinter applies the two principal Bozeman theses to China, Japan, and Vietnam: that the state, with its Western legal characteristics and boundaries, has a greatly reduced influence compared to culture in explaining the causes and conduct of conflict in Sinic Asia; and that, unlike Western societies in which force and violence are viewed as aberrations, conflict in Sinic societies is viewed as politically legitimate. Grinter first treats China, Japan, and Vietnam in terms of their historical experience with internal and external warfare and then examines the particular styles of war, the historical security concerns, and the conflict goals of each society.

Bynum Weathers's article claims that Latin America has accepted the concept of political and social integration under the nation-state system. Latin American society is homogeneously Christian where the clash of ideas has resulted not from within, through cultural competition, but from exterior sources. During the past century, Latin America has employed measures for pacific settlement of disputes and has relied on regional security organizations to avoid war. This has permitted the strength of the nation-state to increase and leads to the observation that political and economic rather than cultural factors have been the primary cause of Latin American conflicts.

Finally, Karl Magyar's essay poses a number of questions which address the particular challenges of studying African conflicts in their cultural context. The primary challenge is that of conflict definition: whereas social strife in developed societies is frequently labeled "ethnic conflict" the same kind of conflict in Africa is called "tribal warfare." This somehow connotes that Africa's conflicts are not as "civilized" as ours. Thus the paramount question regarding African conflict culture concerns the reasons for its endemic violence. Magyar ponders whether Africans are particularly prone to war and whether the fundamental nature of their conflict culture has changed over

history. The answers he gives consider the external impact of Arab Islam, European Christianity, and the competitive international economic environment on the continent's many cultures. He focuses especially on the problems of fragile political units in their early consolidative stage of evolution.

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Introduction

War and the Clash of Ideas

by

Adda B. Bozeman*

“The War of All Against All” is the title of an analytical review of papers that were published in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* from 1957 to 1968.¹ Within the protective covers of these volumes, contributors contend for different causes; yet the clash of their ideas is significantly muffled by basic accord on two great issues. The scholars are at one, the reviewer notes, in regarding international war as the category of central interest, and they are united also in stressing conflict control rather than conflict itself. Moreover, they are found to be nearly unanimous in assuming that violence is something to be avoided if at all possible, and in attaching connotations of illegitimacy to the phrase “organized violence.”

Given these shared dispositions, it is not surprising to learn, then, that arms control is a heavily favored research subject and that the literature on this topic is pervaded by several common impulses, among them the following: repugnance for

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“untraditional” methods of warfare or for weapons “which a given nation has not yet had a chance either to arm itself with or to develop counterweapons against”;² disdain for “sham bargaining” and psychological warfare, the latter generally being viewed as sneaky and immoral; the strong conviction that humane-ness ought to be accepted as an important criterion in the evaluation of weaponry; a deep commitment to the distinction between “just” and “unjust” wars; and considerable preoccupation with guilt and responsibility with regard to the actual resort to violence or war.

The same exhaustive survey also instructs us that *JCR* authors have not paid much attention to the relationship between the cause of national survival, on the one hand, and arms control, on the other, and that inquiries into the antecedents of military aggression have been conspicuously absent. In fact, the preferred time dimension has very definitely been the present, amplified by strong overtones of futurist concern. The historical approach is missing, and statistical treatment is stressed; what is more, the data considered relevant to such statistical processing are drawn almost exclusively from American and European records. And finally, it appears that findings by specialists in military science and strategy have been seldom exploited.

Analogous trends have been found to dominate international relations research. Chadwick Alger, in a research review published in 1970,³ pointed out that concern with the causes of war had given way to study of the causes of peace and the construction of “alternate futures,” and that knowledge of the destructive power of nuclear weapons had sparked a revival of interest in disarmament and arms control. He also noted that the peace research movement has been “international in composition, being comprised mainly of North Americans and Western Europeans,” that these participants have had high value-commitments to the nonviolent solution of international conflicts and have endeavored to do work with policy

relevance, and that they have stressed “scientific work,” including systematic data collection techniques and rigorous methods of analysis. Here, however, as in the field of conflict resolution, the demands of rigorous analysis can obviously be satisfied without methodically utilizing data from non-Western societies.

The processes of theory- and model-building that have been perfected in recent years are certainly impressive, and so are many of the actual mental constructions that have issued from these labors. Yet it is questionable whether objective validity can be claimed for much of this work, if only because it is permeated by paradox. It is necessary, then, to note that most scholarly architects profess to be value-neutral social scientists. This is true even though they admit, directly or indirectly through the medium of their accomplishments, that the major motivation for their sustained efforts clearly originates in the compelling force of their own feelings, impulses and values, notably those that feed their hopes for, and images of, a peaceful world society.

Now there is no reason why social scientists should not have values; nor is there any reason that they should not be concerned with the improvement of the lot of man. But in this case, we discover that personal value preferences have not been checked out objectively before they were judged to be appropriate building blocks for theory. More important, perhaps, few modern theorists in the fields of international relations or conflict resolution have bothered to explore the value content of conflict, war and violence. The configuration of the enemy they profess to fight is thus not clearly rendered—a circumstance that may explain why this “war against war” can be perceived by others as a kind of shadowboxing. Indeed, explicit definitions are missing for both war and peace, perhaps because the ruling supposition is that the one is everywhere known to be the opposite of the other, war being universally

disclaimed as a thoroughly bad idea and peace being just as generally accepted as mankind's natural state and birthright.

The clash of ideas over how to control conflict, avoid war and build the structures of peace seems to have proceeded in the calm of an academic environment within which the clash of arms and the clamor of war-affirming rhetoric are not readily heard. Some future nonacademic parliament of man, however, may well entertain the motion that these theorists fiddled while nations burned. Whether an armed conflict today is classified as an insurrection, a civil war, a war of national liberation, a guerrilla war or a war-by-proxy, a UN war to preserve the peace, an international socialist war to serve the cause of revolution, or a traditional interstate war—and the lines of differentiation are becoming increasingly blurred in response precisely to the high incidence of violence and the steady proliferation of types of warfare—the fact remains that the post-1945 world can fairly be viewed as a conglomerate of theaters of war, some self-contained and localized, others contiguous and interdependent.

A simple inventory of bare and incontrovertible facts is revealing: Irish groups seem bent on changing the political order of the island by resort to indiscriminate violence; relations between Israel and the Arab states and peoples have been characterized from 1948 onward by warfare; factional, national and international affairs in the Islamic Middle East have been marked by bloody revolutions, armed interventions, takeovers and ethnic uprisings; several North African Muslim regimes have consistently warred against the non-Islamic populations to their south; Africa south of the Sahara has been convulsed by interstate and intertribal violence, civil wars, coups d'état and political assassinations, as well as by military and paramilitary activities on the part of anti-white liberation armies and their Rhodesian and Portuguese opponents; Greeks and Turks cannot resist fighting over Cyprus; the armies of the Soviet Union have crushed numerous national uprisings among

the allegedly sovereign states of Eastern Europe; India has chosen force over available peaceful methods in order to establish or retain her dominion over Hyderabad, parts of Kashmir, Goa, Sikkim and such non-self-governing territories as those occupied by the Naga hostiles; India and Pakistan have not had any scruples about settling their conflicting claims and interests on the field of battle; there would have been no Bangladesh had there not been ruthless warfare; it was China's armed might that subdued Tibet and successfully asserted control over the Paracel Islands; generations of Koreans have known nothing but the actuality or the threat of civil and international war; the destinies of all peoples in the vast Southeast Asian region have long been molded by war, whether in the form of armed uprisings and revolutions, jigsaw movements of insurgency and counterinsurgency, belligerent confrontations between neighbors, or military interventions by great powers; terrorist organizations of one hue or another operate freely throughout Latin America; the United States, which is the academic center of the search for a warless world, has not only warred against communist forces in Korea and Indochina but is itself the troubled scene of terrorist activities by self-styled liberation armies, urban guerrilla bands and other violence-espousing groups.

War's overwhelming and variegated presence would seem to be at odds with some of the major assumptions relayed explicitly or implicitly by leading theorists of international relations and conflict resolution. Doubt may thus be cast on the proposition that "international war," the category of foremost concern, can be convincingly extricated from the maze of other types of warfare in which modern nations are enmeshed. Likewise, and for the same reasons, it is questionable whether distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, or between humane and inhumane weapons, can be maintained effectively, or whether one can endorse the proposition that clear-cut lines between aggression and defense (and thus

between just and unjust wars) are always readily discernible. Specialists in military science have closely studied just such issues; however, as the aforementioned analyses suggest, their findings do not seem to have had a vital impact on present trends in political science, peace research, arms control or conflict resolution.

Other incongruities between theory and reality are suggested by the raw evidence of modern war and violence. A glance at the embattled and conflict-ridden regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and parts of Europe leaves one with the strong impression that human dispositions toward stress, violence and death are by no means everywhere the same, and that basic orientations toward war and peace are therefore greatly various also. For example, nowhere outside North America and Northern Europe does one encounter the overriding desire to avoid armed conflict and to seek peaceful settlement of disputes that leading peace-minded scholars in our society assume to be generally present.

Furthermore, evidence is totally missing that recourse to armed force evokes feelings of guilt and self-recrimination among the intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or that the high incidence of organized and unorganized violence induces doubts about the appropriateness of ruling moral or political systems. Indeed, the strife-filled records of the past twenty-five years, together with the conflict-laden language so often employed by spokesmen for African, Asian and communist societies, point to the possibility that conflict and violence may well be accepted in most areas outside the Occidental world as normal incidents of life, legitimate tools of government and foreign-policymaking, and morally sanctioned courses of action.

Propositions such as these have not been thoroughly tested in the laboratories of peace research, perhaps because they relate, in the final analysis, to values; and values may resist the kind of "rigorous analysis" that has been aimed at by scholars.

At any rate, it is noteworthy that eminent theorists in the fields here under review have refrained altogether from probing the mental and psychocultural roots of war, that they have not been much interested in the historical antecedents of actual conflict situations, and that they have not thought of war as a complex of possibly quite disparate, even irreconcilable, norms, values and ideas. Just why these matters have not surfaced in the mainstream of their investigations is in itself a significant thematic motif in the clash of ideas detonated by modern warfare, and as such it should be scrutinized before going any further.

II

Several learned commentators on conflict and its resolution have drawn attention to the fact that today's scholars are uneasy in the face of *all*, not merely armed, conflict. They are inclined to view it negatively—as an unfortunate interruption of the normal flow of social life, a failure in communication, an unregulated and hence possibly illegitimate transaction, or an aberration from patterns of rational behavior that should be and can be reduced, transformed or eliminated because it is situational rather than instrumental, pathological rather than sane.⁴ The exact norms, patterns and models against which motives and actions are judged normal or abnormal are not usually set out. The argument in almost every case appears to be that they are generally known or, to put it differently, that we are here in the presence of some universal givens that need only be implied.

Moreover, and in striking contrast to scholars from an earlier time (notably, Georg Simmel and Robert McIver), conflict today is generally not associated with sentiments, values or psychic states of being. The stress is rather on concrete struggles or overt episodes in which individuals or groups

contend for tangible rewards. Thus conceived in terms of antagonistic poles representing two or more mutually incompatible positions, conflict is suspect at the very start, for it is presumed to spring from some kind of discord that could have been avoided.

This neglect of psychological and intellectual factors in situations of social stress seems to have attached itself almost automatically to scholarly thought about those international conflicts that fall short of military war, known in history as cold wars or wars of nerves. Here again, the premise is widely accepted today that clashes of ideas are somehow either irrational departures from the ground rules of normal behavior or ruses to cover up peace-defying policies. In either case it seems to be supposed, particularly in so-called revisionist academic circles, that the Cold War between this country and the communist states was somehow officially initiated in much the same way that hot wars have been declared, and that it could therefore be called off by political authorities in an equally expeditious manner. In other words, conflict is presented as a willed event, rather than a process or relationship, perhaps in deference to the controlling conviction that "war" and "peace" are always absolutely polarized, mutually exclusive, strictly factual conditions, and that total peace must naturally take over when the fighting stops.

It is difficult to find precedents for this modern, chiefly American orientation toward chronic international discord. The history of Europe, which is very much a history of ideas, and therefore also one of *clashing* ideas, is replete with such wars of nerves. None has been more protracted or more richly documented than the uneasy coexistence of Christian and Muslim in the lands of the Mediterranean, for which contemporary Spaniards coined the term *guerra fria*. This early model of the clash of ideas in international relations has obviously not been examined by today's schools of peace and conflict studies. Nor have they taken note of the unremitting,

politically and intellectually poignant collision of beliefs in the minds of statesmen, scholars and ordinary citizens that was set off by the French Revolution and continued unabated long after the smoke had cleared. There is thus considerable justification for describing this state of affairs as “the case of the missing historian.”⁵

Explanations for the absence of this dimension of inquiry may range from a lack of interest in history and doubt about its relevance for future-directed peace research to the premonition that rigorous historical research would not support some of the theorists’ most favored visions. And, no doubt, they also include the related inclination to treat each and every conflict as a clearly discernible, and hence definable, factual circumstance that can be undone as quickly and purposively as it has been conjured up.

At any rate, few present-day specialists in conflict resolution seem prepared to associate conflict with mobility and flux, or to think of it as a process not always easily defined or arrested by decisive action. Not many among them, then, would agree with Jessie Bernard, who in 1949 argued that conflict may exist in latent form for years before there is a formulation of issues, a showdown or a crisis. Bernard believed that it is therefore a mistake to limit our thinking about conflict to its overt phase; we should instead accustom ourselves to think of conflict as going on day in, day out in varying degrees of intensity, whether the issues are clearly formulated or not.⁶ Yet it is this explication of social conflict, rather than the ultramodern one, that can be translated convincingly into the language of international relations to cover that indeterminate continuum of “no war/no peace” commonly known as cold war.

Furthermore, as later sections of this paper suggest, the Bernard concept comes close to explaining the types of discord and disorder most commonly found in the local and international affairs of non-Western societies. Finally, and most important from the humanist’s perspective, it captures

certain constant motifs in Occidental biography and history, among them the proposition eloquently stated by Ortega y Gasset in his meditations on *Don Quixote*, namely, that life *is* uneasiness.

The discomfort experienced by many social scientists in the presence of cross-national ideological strife is paralleled by deep apprehension when their thought turns to what, in the language of the trade, is known as international war. Analysts of research trends in disarmament, arms control and peace studies see this reaction as a function of their preoccupation with the awesome specter of nuclear war.⁷ This preoccupation is understandable; but the fact remains, first of all, that millions of lives have been extinguished since 1945 not by nuclear weapons but by conventional arms employed in all manner of warfare, terrorism and outright massacre and, second, that political theorists are not nearly as troubled about these actualities as they are about possible future horrors.

To justify their concern, analysts often point to the use of the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, and their argument is usually heavily encumbered by an insistence on America's "guilt"⁸—an indictment, incidentally, that is seldom softened by the reminder that conventional bombs had in fact visited even greater devastation on some European cities during the same war. Some of this literature thus leaves one with the uncomfortable impression that the fear of that which *may* be, and feelings of guilt over that which *was*, have come close to paralyzing analysis of that which *is*.

Further reflections on the tangle of sentiments and cerebrations in which so much of our supposedly value-neutral work on war is imbedded confirm this impression. Thus we see that today's intense academic concern about the morality of military operations was activated by the war in Indochina, and not any other past or present war, and that ever since it has expressed itself almost exclusively in revulsion against the war-related policies of the United States and some of her allies.

Nor has this massive volume of accumulated professorial indignation been strained and sifted in an objective, methodical manner in order to salvage those elements germane to theory. In fact, there are indications that the opposite tendency is being favored, in the sense that sentiment is being allowed to drift. For now that the international war in Indochina is officially terminated, and now that it is possible, in virtue of spellbinding legal or moral fictions, to view military activities in Asia as “unofficial” or “illegitimate,” scholarly offensives are directed against noncommunist Asian governments, which continue to be embattled.

A group of renowned American experts on East Asian history, government and culture has thus felt justified, “in the name of humanity and human rights,” to protest “the injustice and the inhumanity” of certain judicial and administrative measures that South Korea has taken against some of her citizens.⁹ Since similarly severe protests have not been lodged against the dictatorships of North Korea, North Vietnam or the People’s Republic of China, one can only conclude that some private bias is at work here. In this case, as in others,¹⁰ the “missing historian” is an important factor—particularly puzzling here since the changes are formulated with the consent of East Asian historians who must be presumed to know that human rights and civil liberties are not part and parcel of traditional administration in Korea, China or the states of Southeast Asia.

The overwhelming presence of private sentiments and values that one detects in war-related literature today does not favor the refinement of ideas into reliable, universally applicable theories about the place of war in human existence. Yet it is definitely theory that students of international relations, war and conflict want most fervently. Indeed, the search for this type of intellectual certainty has been so ardent and compulsive in recent decades that the nontheorist is left with the intriguing image of war-weary troops of academics beating a hasty

retreat—away from the unnerving uncertainty of life on the fields of battle and back to the secure shelters of ideationally perfect castles in the mind. But here the refugees are also faced with most demanding problems. After all, social science theory is best attained today if the number of variables is reduced as starkly as possible and if only readily quantified data are considered. Primary attention is therefore usually directed to specific yet sufficiently simple events that can be counted, compared and categorized with relative ease.

Is modern war susceptible to this kind of academic processing? If it is true, as the UNESCO Charter states, that “wars begin in the minds of men” and that “ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause . . . of that suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war,” should it not follow that one must probe the minds of men in search of all the images, beliefs, sensations, values, concepts and modes of reasoning that relate to war?

The data thus collected would of course be infinitely various as well as precarious—the kind not easily stored in data banks as these are now constructed. For just how does one quantify pride, prestige or prejudice, moral outrage, insistence on survival, vanity and vengeance? What does one do with killing in obedience to spirits of the earth or living ancestors? Where in the theoretician’s charts and models is there a place for hatred of the enemy or love of country? Are tools available for a rigorous analysis of self-discipline, cowardice, disaffection or daring? And what are the criteria for an objective, transnational comparison of human inclinations or capacities to inflict violence and sustain war-induced uncertainty, suffering and death? If we have no answers to questions such as these, should we then assume that the meanings of war carried in the minds of the Sudanese and the Bengalis, the Israelis and the Kurds, the Arabs and the Poles, the Hutu and the Greeks are one and

the same? Or would it be more prudent not to wonder what men think of war and why they fight?

The latter course seems to be the favored response today in that intense quest for generally valid norms and standards to which priority is being attached. Ultimately, the challenge implicit in the task of theory-building calls for the reduction rather than the addition of variables; and on balance one can say that this challenge has been met. It may well be that the decision to overlook sentiments, beliefs and values—in short, the intangibles that resist quantification—explains why international conflict, including war, is now being treated by so many theorists as a special case of social conflict whose paradigm is economic conflict, the category most amenable to data-processing techniques. This choice of emphasis, again, can be traced to the simple but ruling supposition that the norm for the organization of all societies is the modern industrial society of the West, and that the typical human being is therefore rightly envisaged as a man functioning rationally in such an economic environment.

In this kind of theoretical scheme, Hans Morgenthau explains, nations confront each other not as living historic entities, with all their complexities, but as rational abstractions after the model of “economic man”—playing games of military and diplomatic chess according to a rational calculus that exists nowhere but in the theoretician’s mind.¹¹ Nor is it surprising, in light of such pervasive assumptions, that past and present data from non-Western societies have not been analyzed on their intrinsic merits and that a recent volume containing no substantive references to non-American or non-European manifestations of human conflict could yet be entitled *The Nature of Human Conflict*.¹²

This strong trend to constrict the frames of inquiry for the study of modern war has been reinforced in recent years by the steady impact of other firmly held beliefs: trust in the territorial, democratic nation-state as the prototype for political

association everywhere on earth; trust, therefore, in the existence of an organizationally unified world society of essentially equal and analogous political units; and trust in the compelling logic and validity of laws of interstate behavior that assign authoritative meanings to all transactions regarding peace, war, neutrality and conflict resolution.

Now, these propositions have had a rather brief and geographically restricted history. They matured in Europe from about 1648 onward in the vortex, it is interesting to note, of almost continuous war. But there, under the auspices of what later became known as the "modern European states system," they did not carry the fixed, exclusive connotations assigned to them today. International history instructs us, too, that our modern, systematized approaches to war, peace, diplomacy and conflict resolution have no precedents in classical, medieval or Renaissance Europe, or in the traditional realms of Africa and Asia. Finally, the actualities of present world affairs strongly suggest that the supposedly pivotal concepts in international relations—that is, the nation-state, the unified world society and international law—are either in need of radical revision or beyond repair, casualties as it were in the endless war of ideas on which life appears to feed.

The implications of this obsolescence for any reasoned view of war can be seen most clearly by concentrating one's analysis on the state. It is doubtful indeed whether we are justified in thinking that the territorially delimited, independent nation-state is still universally accepted as the core norm of political organization and, therefore, as the measure by which one distinguishes different types of violence. Surely, nothing comparable to this particular associational form had existed in pre-seventeenth century Christian Europe (which supplied the framework for the coexistence of numerous, quite disparately fashioned, politically active units), in precolonial Africa south of the Sahara, in the Arab/Islamic realm, or in the different civilizations of South, East and Central Asia. Lines of

demarcation between local and international milieus of conflict, and between internal and international warfare, were not clearly drawn in traditional societies before the installation, from the nineteenth century onward, of nation-states and legal systems modeled on Western prototypes.

These unifying grafts have atrophied in recent decades under the impact of the following developments: the waning of Western influence and power; the reactivation, in the Orient and Africa, of older, locally respected focuses of authority and communal solidarity; and the successful diffusion of communist doctrines of statecraft, in the context of which the “bourgeois” state is appreciated as a tactical device rather than a value or norm. In short, the concept of the state as a sovereign community, unified politically, morally and territorially, is being subjected to processes of erosion in all parts of the world—not excluding Western Europe and North America. Its substance is being worn away by fragmentation and separatism along narrow ethnic or linguistic lines; by civil disobedience and a faltering faith in law; and by internal war, covert foreign interventions or military aggression from without.

Singly or in combination, these trends account for the dismantlement, division or satellitization of numerous formerly unified and independent polities, on the one hand, and for the creation of new, fully operational political units, on the other hand, which are antithetical to the state in terms of both intention and activity. This is true, for example, of the national and international liberation front, the “provisional” government that functions year in, year out, or the “independent national authority”—the latter a Middle Eastern guerrilla term denoting the embryo of a future Palestinian state. Each of these organizational types is mobile and fluid in the sense that it has no fixed territorial boundaries and no determinate human substance. Furthermore, each exists in virtue of its commitment to violence and war.

The term “international war,” then, no longer refers exclusively to violent conflicts between states. Rather, as suggested earlier, it now stands also for a broad spectrum of armed belligerence within the state, ranging from sporadic urban guerrilla activities to civil wars, wars of liberation and secession, insurrections and other revolutionary uprisings, many of which are initiated and maintained in behalf of causes espoused by foreign principals. Moreover, this interpenetration of the domestic and foreign environments effaces altogether the conventionally accepted lines between legitimate and illegitimate force, and puts in question the theoretically established distinctions between war and peace. These interlocking conditions support the conclusion that the state, having forfeited important controlling functions customarily ascribed to it in world affairs, can no longer be regarded as a reliable medium for realistic differentiation among types of war and between the conditions of war and peace.

Next, the erosion of the state as the fundamental, shared norm of political organization, together with general acquiescence in the coexistence of states and anti-state bodies as equal actors in foreign policy arenas, has gradually but ineluctably led also to the devaluation of the two state-based superstructures that provide the context for official foreign relations: (1) the world society of sovereign, equal states and (2) the law of nations, which stipulates the rights and obligations of these states.

Theoreticians in the field of war and peace studies have made scant allowance for these revolutionary developments. Some proceed as if the situation had not changed at all in past decades, while others, heartened by a belief in progress, retreat into the security of self-made legal and political systems that *will* be actual, they think, in the future. For as the late Martin Wight notes in his essay “Why Is There No International Theory?” the conviction usually precedes the evidence in progressivist international theories. “And when the conviction is analysed or disintegrates,” he continues, “one is apt to find at the centre of

it what might be called the argument from desperation.” In modern times, Wight suggests, this may well be the fear of nuclear war.¹³ The argument that the hydrogen bomb has made war impossible thus usually contains two propositions: first, war waged with the new weapons will destroy civilization; second, it is therefore too horrible to happen.

Thus confined, discussion cannot move on either to international actualities or to history, where corrective evidence is readily available. For example, the indisputable fact that the flood tide of modern *non*nuclear war has washed away the categories reserved for it by international law and the UN Charter is seldom, if ever, recognized by theorists. Likewise, belief in the polarity of war and peace is still widespread, even in policymaking circles, and many thoughtful men believe that every war must end—a proposition negated by the reality of continuous armed struggles. Furthermore, it is astonishing that international theorists, notably those committed to the cause of international law, see no purpose in consulting the records of diplomatic and intellectual history.

The international environment to which American and European theorists address themselves today is certainly more vast and diversified than that of either the seventeenth or nineteenth century, when Grotius and Clausewitz, respectively, reflected on the world. And yet, a comparative study of theories then and now leaves the definite impression that war was both being perceived more keenly and explained more accurately by earlier observers, and that the major findings registered in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries are in harmony with today’s reality, whereas those set out most recently are not.

Grotius, writing in a time when the outlines of the modern European states system were becoming apparent, concluded from his reflections on classical, Jewish and Christian thought and action that war *per se* is not condemned either by the voluntary law of nations or the law of nature, that states may well reduce each other to subjection, that the boundaries of

states, kingdoms, nations or cities can often be settled by the laws of war, that wars must employ force and terror as their most proper agents, and that the arguments in favor of war are as numerous as those for the rule of law. "For where the power of law ceases," he writes, "there war begins."¹⁴

Enduring international peace, by contrast, is presented by this pioneering theorist of international law as a remote condition. The prophecy of Isaiah that the time shall come when "nations shall beat their swords into plowshares, and turn their spears into pruning hooks," when "nation shall not lift up sword against nation" nor "learn war any more," is in Grotius' opinion (as in that of the Jewish prophet) irrelevant insofar as the justice of war is concerned. In the Grotian perspective, the passage merely describes the state of the world that will result if all nations would submit to the law of Christ. Pending consummation of this utopian dream, peace is perforce limited in time and space.

In fact, a significant passage in *De jure belli ac pacis* suggests that it may not always be easy to distinguish between war and peace. War, Grotius notes, is a term for a situation that can exist even when warlike operations are not being carried on. Belligerent powers may agree on a cease-fire or truce in the course of war, and no period need be fixed for the continuance of such an arrangement, described by one of his classical authorities as "a transitory peace, in travail with war." "And I shall add," Grotius writes, "that [truces] are made too for years, twenty, thirty, forty, even a hundred years."¹⁵ In other words, a state of belligerency may well be semipermanent or protracted.

Theorists after Grotius held rather steadfastly to his major axioms. Clausewitz, whose work *On War* laid the basis (in the Occidental world of thought) for the systematic study of war as a field of human knowledge, thus restated Grotius when he defined war as the conduct of political intercourse by other means, a form of human enterprise belonging to social

existence, and a conflict of great interests that is settled by bloodshed. But he also inveighed against the folly of viewing war as an act of unrestrained violence, a mere passion for daring and winning, or “an independent thing in itself.” To Clausewitz, it was quite clear that war is a serious means to a serious end, only a part of political intercourse, and therefore always subject to the political design. And this design, whether understood as referring to a particular foreign policy or to the realm of politics in general, is here decidedly not being viewed as “war by other means”—a theoretical construct in communist conflict doctrine that was to be elaborated several decades later by Lenin, when he stood Clausewitz “on his head.”

All histories of diplomacy and the law of nations point to the conclusion that modern Occidental war- and conflict-related thought favors the rule of law and peace. However, they also fully bear out Clausewitz’ conclusion: “Peace seldom reigns over all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world.” ¹⁶

III

The image of the world that is being rendered today by those social and political scientists with a strong interest in war, peace and conflict resolution is one of a global order of states that are structurally alike in essence or destined to become so under the impact of irresistible leveling forces. In the logic of this tight and finite scheme, all international relations—including belligerent confrontations—are seen as manifestations of national interests that converge on three main unifying themes: the survival of the state, the maintenance of the international system and the avoidance of war. Most of the leading educational texts, syllabuses, and gaming or simulation exercises in the field are therefore elaborations of truths and abstractions that the theoreticians have worked out as if with one mind—and that they therefore seldom question. Thus, since

there is no essential difference between State A and State B, there can be none between A's war and B's war.

This explains why conflicts and wars can be added up rather simply to yield some grand total that in turn will point to another universally valid, generally accepted proposition—a process of fact-finding illustrated in the following passage by Robert McNamara:

In the eight years through late 1966 alone there were no less than 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence, each of them specifically designed as a serious challenge to the authority or the very existence of the government in question. Eighty-two different governments were directly involved, and what is striking is that only 15 of the 164 significant resorts to violence were military conflicts between two states, and not a single one of the 164 conflicts was a formally declared war. Indeed, there has not been a formal declaration of war anywhere in the world since World War II.

The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on not merely because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large number of *de facto* conflicts and because the trend of such conflicts is growing rather than diminishing. At the beginning of 1958 there were 23 prolonged insurgencies going on around the world. As of February, 1966, there were 40. Further, the total number of outbreaks of violence has increased each year: in 1958 there were 34; in 1965, there were 58.¹⁷

The exclusive reason for this increase in international violence, we are told, is the obvious fact that so many new states are still economically underdeveloped, a premise evidently no longer subject to verification, as earlier references in this paper have suggested. Again, no allowance is made for the possibility that war-related phenomena are also, perhaps even predominantly, aspects of locally prevalent values, images, traditions and mental constructions. Indeed, explorations of the ways of thought that make or do not make for war, or of the meanings assigned to war and violence in culturally different parts of the world, would quite logically be out of place in the conceptually closed circuit of modern war and peace studies; for how can cultural diversity be perceived

if “culture” (or “civilization”) is not accepted as a relevant variable or factor?

The student embarking on war and peace studies today will look in vain for rigorous analyses of Occidental, Oriental or African philosophies, ideologies, myths and religions. Each volume he consults is likely to contain scores of cross-references to the works of other Western theorists of our era, and scarcely any (in most cases none) to source materials that would tell him how the Chinese or the Indians or the Persians have related to war in the millennia preceding the present moment. Missing, then, are referrals to the writing, for example, of Han Fei Tzu and Mao Tse-tung; to the Mahabharata, which our contemporaries in India continue to read with veneration; to the Koran, which is replete with commentaries on warfare that are eternally relevant for Muslims; or, in the case of Africa south of the Sahara, to the memoirs of modern literate Africans, oral history and the field work of anthropologists.

Anyone interested in uncovering the roots of war-related policies and practices will thus search in vain among today’s works on political science or international relations, for access to primary sources is not being stressed anymore. The student in search of authenticity must look elsewhere in the academic universe—notably, it is here suggested, to the humanities, where the uniqueness of men, events and ideas is still recognized and where clashing ideas on war can still be disentangled. Furthermore, in the pursuit of this kind of learning, he may come to accept the world as a “manifold of civilizations” even as he continues to perceive it as a “manifold of states.”¹⁸

“Culture,” or “civilization” if one prefers, has been variously defined. Here it will be considered to be all that is fundamental and enduring about the ways of a group; that is to say, it comprises those norms, values, institutions and modes of thinking in a given society that survive change and remain

meaningful to successive generations. This point is well illustrated by Paul Verhaegen's discussion of the relation between the "basic psychology" of an African people, on the one hand, and the effects of "cultural transition," on the other. Those characteristics are basic to a culture, he writes, that are dominant in the bush and that remain obvious in even the most Westernized Africans.¹⁹ Similar formulations can be devised for the Islamic realm, notably its Middle Eastern nucleus, India, Southeast Asia, China, Japan and possibly Mongolian Central Asia, including Tibet. Other areas in which distinct norms and values have developed in counterpoint to those brought forth in the West include the communist orbit of the Soviet Union and the Latin American region.

Today, several factors combine in support of civilization as the proper focal point of war research. As preceding comments on the variegated forms of war and violence throughout the modern world have suggested, the Occidental model of the state has ceased to be a reliable indicator or measure of such phenomena as international war and internal war. Indeed, a survey of actually functioning power centers makes it doubtful whether one can still legitimately view the nation-state as the politically controlling, and hence unifying, organizational norm in international relations. Observations such as these, together with reflections on the conspicuous failure of recent American war-related policies, imply rather that we have entered an era in which the interacting, independent units are so disparate that references to an "international order" are invalid. These symptoms of the erosion of the state seem to make it mandatory that we find other or additional ways to determine the configuration of an alien society.

Civilization recommends itself in this respect because it is more comprehensive as an ordering concept than the state: it can cover a host of political formations—armed bands, liberation fronts or empires; anarchies or despotisms; transterritorial commonwealths of commodity producers,

financiers or religionists; as well as multinational political parties. Next, also in contrast to the state, a civilization is more enduring in time, even as it is usually less precisely defined in space. And finally, civilization is today a more neutral reference than the state because, contrary to the latter, it is not associated with typically Occidental norms and values. In short, there continues to be great truth in Alfred North Whitehead's remark that a political system is transient and vulnerable by comparison with the principles and forces of the society and culture that have produced it. These principles and forces require explicit recognition before the elements of the political system—in our case, war—can be understood.²⁰

It is much harder for Americans than for other peoples to accept such a worldview because the United States, almost by definition, stands for the denial of cultural differences and the neglect or irrelevancy of the past. America long ago departed from the European tradition—inaugurated by Herodotus when he explained the Persian Wars as a confrontation between the rival civilizations of Europe and Asia—and today is reluctant to differentiate between wars fought within a culturally unified sphere and those between societies of disparate cultures or idea systems. In fact, after allowance is made for occasional romantic infatuations with insurgencies and wars of liberation in Africa and Asia, it appears that American suspicion of the role of ideas in international relations and foreign-policymaking is so widespread that few wars in either category are accepted as reflecting a clash of ideas.

The voluminous literature on war in the traditional world provides some contrasting perspectives on this age-old human contrivance and, at the same time, yields explanations for the incidence and tolerance of war in each non-Western region. The following brief summaries of culturally and historically basic ideas about war are confined

to sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Since traditional Africa has not produced an organizational form comparable to the Occidental state, “foreign relations” have consisted in interaction among a number of differently organized but self-sufficient units: tribes, clans, villages and other subgroups or divisions. To the extent that so-called empires, hieratic chiefdoms and kingdoms were merely conglomerates of these communities, they were also the scenes of “foreign relations” in which each socially cohesive group was apt to pit itself against the other, even though the “other” would appear to have been part of the “self” from the non-African point of view. This state of affairs, along with the absence of writing and other reliable communications, explains why the radius of intercommunity relations has always been very limited. Furthermore, no widely shared, regionally valid Pan-African institutions for conducting intercommunity relations—along the lines of the modern European states system—could develop here, for each small community projected its own social order onto the stage of what we call foreign relations. Black Africa, however, is unified by its culture and a mode of thinking not found elsewhere in the world, and it should therefore not be surprising that we can identify certain uniquely African dispositions with regard to war and peace.

Ethnographers have found that warfare was endemic in all regions of sub-Saharan Africa and that it did not elicit moral qualms. In fact, resort to warfare was logical and necessary in terms of certain deeply held beliefs. War, and organization for war, thus assured the continuous identity of the group as it had coalesced around its own ancestors, origin myths, customs and rites. Moreover, warfare contributed to continual displacements

and migrations, resulting in a lack of interest in strictly territorial jurisdiction and thus inhibiting the evolution of a reliable political structure on the order of the European state. Furthermore, war and martial activities embodied the meaning of manhood in tribal life and symbolized the workings of the universe, which was envisioned throughout the continent as the abode of constantly contending, essentially malevolent forces.

Two additional factors need be considered if the role assigned to war and violence in this culture is to be appreciated on its own terms. First, death was not personalized as it is in thought systems that regard the individual as an entity transcending the bounds of the community to which he belongs. Second, death was not objectified as it is in the Western system of causality: in the common African understanding, death was always occasioned by superior, surreal causes, not by a physical weapon; the paramount frame of reference in life was power, particularly magical power, which was associated with ancestral spirits, witchcraft or other supernatural forces.

All traditional structures of African political organization, whether associated with empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms, "anarchies," villages, secret societies or *sub rosa* governments based on fetishism, have been grounded firmly in the view that death is an aspect of society rather than biography, and that conflict, properly staged and manipulated, helps maintain the mythic charter by which a community is ruled. These motifs as well as their organic interaction have found different local expressions, but in certain areas of government—notably the succession to authority and the allocation of power—the separate records converge on a common pattern of institutionalized hostilities, intrigues and internal wars. For example, since it was rare in Africa to find rules that clearly indicated a single heir, succession usually raised rival claimants, resulting in wars for the kingship after an incumbent's death. Whether in the tribal societies of southern Africa, the conquest states of the Interlacustrine

Bantus, the kingdoms of the savanna, or among the Mossi and Yoruba in West Africa—just a few of the recognized political systems—ruling circles were rent by quarrels, jealousies and intrigues that were expected to erupt in dynastic, fratricidal or civil wars, and to lead to prolonged periods of anarchy, during which the contest for power would be temporarily resolved.

Not only was this violence often preceded by institutionalized regicide, but internal peace did not necessarily follow once the issue of succession had been decided. Since revolts by subordinate princes and chiefs were always expected in East Africa's kingdoms, for example, potential rebels or aspirants to power were routinely murdered or banished. Violent internecine conflict was customary also in Nuba country; among the Nuer, the Kamba, the Masai, the Nandi and other East African peoples; as well as among such territorial groups as the Zulu, the Swazi and the Barotse in southern Africa. Likewise, war was waged regularly by the central governments of most of the imperial domains of West Africa, in order to quell unruly behavior on the part of subordinate regimes.

No agreement exists among specialists in African social organization on just what constitutes rebellion, in which circumstances one can speak of civil war, which episode is properly described as a mere raid or which qualifies as full-fledged aggression. There is general agreement, however, on the proposition that peace was not regarded necessary for the maintenance of the inner order in traditional Africa, that conflict was allowed to express itself in violence, and that warfare among component units of a community was accepted as an organic part of the inner law—provided, of course, that it was employed for purposes considered permissible in a given society. But whether the allowable end was cattle, slaves, women, vengeance or punishment, grazing or water rights, aggrandizement, or the allocation or reshuffling of power, the fact remains that violence has been endemic almost

everywhere. Sanctioned by value and belief systems, violence provided, in one form or another, the structural principles for the education of men and the administration of society. Indeed, one might justifiably conclude that internal war was more likely to sustain than to disrupt existing organizational schemes.

Relations between socially or tribally united communities reflect the same fundamental dispositions. Military power, even when wielded by formidable armies, was thus always closely associated with magical power; although concrete rewards such as the capture of cattle or slaves were as prized in the extended martial contest as in the limited engagement, it was the sensation of success left by the investment of superior power that mattered most. And success, again, savored of the enjoyment of a situation in which the enemy of the day was slain or routed and his habitat reduced to ruin. That is to say, victory here was not controlled by expectations of permanent aggrandizement, redemption of lost territories, the extension of a way of life or—with a few exceptions—the installation of a moral system. For those who fought, the end of war was war itself.

All this was in strict accordance with the logic of nonliterate, essentially behavioral thought, present-centered time concepts, and the spatial characteristics of African societies. Shrewd calculations of advantage are certainly not missing from the historical records, and particular campaigns, such as the nineteenth-century Ashanti wars, which culminated in the siege of Kumasi, are known to have been planned most methodically. But this sort of comprehensive, long-range planning was not the rule, if only because the future was not seen as separate from the present or the past, and because political identity did not depend on territorial boundaries. Thus strategic thinking, if the term is applicable at all, did not aim at the consolidation of victory by rehabilitating devastated areas, integrating conquered peoples or establishing definite frontiers.

The same ways of thought naturally obtained in defeat since the vanquished were at one with the victors in their basic understanding of the meaning of war in life. Generals might be expected to commit suicide if they lost a battle and warriors might have to be instantly dispatched if they returned home without their spears, as was the custom among the Matabele, but the governments for which they had fought were rarely moved by the calamities of battle to refashion their defensive posture or redesign their fundamental orientation. Not every society was as totally confident, for example, as the Sukuma of present-day Tanzania, who believed that a victorious enemy could not defeat the spirits of the conquered group or alter their enduring influence on the land, no matter how great the devastation or loss. Yet all accepted with equanimity the ebb and flow of endless war.

Today, Africans in all walks of life continue to be guided by many of these traditional values and institutions, even as they affirm new interests and commitments associated with the lifestyle of the modern age. Intellectually persuasive syntheses of the traditional and the new orders are still rare in African politics. In fact, scholarly analyses of events throughout black Africa (that is, coups d'état, mutinies, guerrilla operations, revolutions and civil wars) suggest that the two frames of reference may not be easily reconcilable. As Aristide Zolberg rightly notes, "values, norms and structures have survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized during the colonial era."²¹

The Middle East

Twentieth-century Jews and Arabs are probably more closely tied to traditional religious beliefs than most other literate peoples. Furthermore, their holy texts are different from other sacred literature in an important way: they are not merely intended to be depositories of religious truth, but also serve as

comprehensive manuals of instruction in all secular matters. In other words, they are primary and definitive value-references and major resources of normative thinking and policymaking for their respective communities; and in this general context, one cannot read the Old Testament or the Koran and its attendant Islamic traditions without being overwhelmed by the prominence given to the subject of war.

According to the Old Testament, which is accepted by the faithful not only as the official history of the Jews but also as a timeless sanction or constitution for the establishment of a Jewish state, there is only one Chosen People; all others are subservient outcasts, subject if necessary to extermination. In Isaiah, chapter 60, the tribal deity advises (in its most benign mood) that “the sons of strangers shall build up thy walls and their kings shall minister unto thee.” But elsewhere (Deuteronomy 7, 12, 20; Joshua 1–3, 6, 8; Judges 21; II Kings 3; Psalm 135; and Isaiah 61), we find injunction after injunction on how best to cast out, smite, utterly destroy and extirpate the many “others,” great and small, especially those in the region adjoining the River Jordan.

In all the literature exhorting and ennobling war, nothing comes to mind that is quite so chilling as these passages from Deuteronomy, chapter 7:

5. But thus shall ye deal with them: ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire;

6. For thou *art* a holy people unto the LORD thy God: the LORD thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that *are* upon the face of the earth.

16. And thou shalt consume all the people which the LORD thy God shall deliver thee; thine eye shall have no pity upon them; neither shalt thou serve their gods; for that *will be* a snare unto thee.

22. And the LORD thy God will put out those nations before thee by little and little; thou mayest not consume them at once, lest the beasts of the field increase upon thee.

23. But the LORD thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed.

24. And he shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven: there shall no man be able to stand before thee, until thou hast destroyed them.

25. The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire; thou shalt not desire the silver or gold *that is* on them, nor take it unto thee, lest thou be snared therein: for it *is* an abomination to the LORD thy God.

26. Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest thou be a cursed thing like it: *but* thou shalt utterly detest it, and thou shalt utterly abhor it; for it *is* a cursed thing.

These guidelines for methodical genocide are repeated in Deuteronomy (chapters 12 and 20). With regard to the total destruction of cities delivered by God's will and sword to his people, we read: "Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: But thou shalt utterly destroy them, namely, the Hittites, and the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites; as the LORD thy God hath commanded thee" (Deut. 20:17). The same divinely sanctioned policy is given expression in II Kings, chapters 22 and 23, where King Josiah is told to break down the enemy, reduce the land to desolation, defile the sepulchers and impoverish all who refuse to acquiesce in the rule of the Chosen Race, and again in Judges 21, where the Chosen are ordered to smite all, including women and children, who do not join them.

Traditional Jewish attitudes toward war and its pursuit must be seen in the context of Near Eastern culture as a whole: throughout the long centuries of ancient history, few if any nations differed from the Jews in their ideas about the conduct of international relations. In other words, war, enslavement and imperialism, unmitigated by considerations of "collective security," "peaceful coexistence" or the "balance of power," combined to make up the real as well as the ideal or preferred system.

In the vast Arab/Islamic domain of West Asia and North Africa, war was idealized and institutionalized in many forms,

notably in the *jihad*, or “holy war.” Defined in one *hadith* (tradition) as the “peak of religion,” the *jihad* is part and parcel of Koranic sacred law. In particular, it denotes the mandate incumbent on each believer to prepare his way to paradise by exerting all his power, including that of the sword, in the service of Allah and the Islamic creed, which is universalist in contrast to the ethnocentric Judaic faith. Consequently, one may view a Muslim’s entire life as “a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political, if not strictly military,” and conclude that Islamic precepts advance a doctrine of permanent war regardless of whether or not believers are actually engaged in military activities.²² And, in fact, as the power of the Arabized and Islamized states declined, this doctrine became largely dormant, leaving Muslims in a condition roughly comparable to what is known in international law as a “state of insurgency.”

In the context of normative thought, value orientation and foreign-policymaking, then, war is a dominant motif in this culture. Peace, by contrast, being associated with essentially otherworldly, metaphysical concerns, has no overriding positive meaning in temporal affairs, except perhaps as a description of that time when the world will have become Islamized. Pending this outcome of the historic struggle, mankind is divided into the Realm of Peace, whose denizens are engaged in rightful combat at the service of Allah, and the Realm of War, which is the abode, by definition, of all unbelievers regardless of their actual conduct or intentions. It follows logically that diplomacy is viewed more readily as an auxiliary to war, a device serving the cause of belligerence and expansion, rather than an avenue leading toward peace.

Islamic theory grew out of and confirmed the lifestyle of the Bedouin nomads, as shown so convincingly by the biography of the Prophet, the Koran itself, and Charles Doughty’s masterful *Travels in Arabia Deserta*. The dominant masculine image or heroic ideal in this harsh world was the warrior,

engaged in both great and petty ventures. Camel raids, brigandage, attacks on the despised world of the sedentary and the sown, tribal wars, far-flung military expeditions and, above all, endless wanderings in a hostile environment—all this epitomized the allure and excitement of life that was to compensate for the stark and tedious task of eking out a livelihood. What could peace on earth mean here except sheer boredom, sterility and stagnation?

The political history of the Arabic-speaking peoples from the seventh century to the present corroborates the value system that inhabits their lifestyle and doctrine. Vast expanses of the *dar al-harb* (Realm of War)—in Europe, Africa and Asia—were conquered by force of arms to become integral parts of the Islamic Realm of Peace. Furthermore, Islamic administrations, civil and military, reinforced and perfected their own understanding of the function of diplomacy, borrowing heavily from the sophisticated “warrior diplomacy” of the Persians and Byzantines. This type of statecraft relied on psychological warfare, espionage and subversion in its relentless pursuit of victory over neighboring lands and rulers. In short, nowhere in this region was “peace” accepted as a realizable goal in the conduct of international relations.

The inner order of the Realm of Peace, meanwhile, has also been rent by continual violence and war, even though the ruling idea-system calls for, indeed assumes, peace and unity. The major source of this incongruity has been, and continues to be, the absence of effective fundamental principles of political organization. The caliphate, vaguely conceived by the Prophet’s successors, notably the learned ulema (that is, the scholarly divines trained in Muslim law), as the exclusive, indivisible administrative scheme for the governance of the entire community of believers, actually never got off the ground. Instead, commensurate with the swift extension of the faith and culture, we have had multiple caliphates, sultanates and emirates, competitive dynasties, ambitious and contentious

aspirants to power, plots and counterplots, assassinations and revolts.

The establishment by conquest of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1453 brought a respite in the divisiveness and anarchy, but its dissolution in 1918–1919 has returned the Arabized Near Eastern Muslims (Turks and Persians can draw from cultural reserves in political organization that are not at the disposal of the Arabs) to more familiar patterns of political thought and action. Contemporary possessors of executive power are thus always tempted to foment or condone violence and intrigue in inter-Arab relations in order to protect their tenuous personal positions or promote their particular dreams of a unity to come.

India

India has experienced the impact of the Middle East (as have parts of Southeast Asia) in a variety of ways, most poignantly perhaps in the fields of statecraft and international relations. Northern India, after all, had been a satrapy of the Persian Empire, and even more extensive portions of the subcontinent were ruled for many centuries by Persianized Mongols. In addition, Islam penetrated through diverse channels to find political expression in the Sultanate of Delhi, the Mogul Empire and, more recently, the Islamic republics of Pakistan and Bangladesh. And yet, many prominent members of the Anglicized elite continue to insist in their scholarly discussions of India's political system that the pre-Islamic Hindu order is still the principal influence, despite massive borrowings—first from the Near East; then, in modern times, from Anglo-Saxon Europe. One of the most ardent Indian nationalists, the late diplomat and historian K. M. Panikkar, thus never tired of reminding his contemporaries in the East and the West that “the society described in the Mahabharata is not essentially different from what holds its sway today in India,” and that if the “Indian administration of today is analysed to its bases, the doctrines

and practices of Chanakya [or Kautilya] will be found to be still in force.”²³

Kautilya's Arthasastra, to which Panikkar refers, has been acclaimed as the greatest piece of literature surviving from the Maurya dynasty (322–185 B.C.?). Although other treatises in the same genre exist, the Mauryan chancellor's text is considered exemplary because it explains in systematic fashion how Hindus must think and behave when they are engaged in government, economics and foreign relations. In all these activities, summarily described as the domain of *artha* (defined by Kautilya as that science which treats of the means of acquiring and maintaining the earth), winning is all that counts. *Artha* norms are thus carefully set apart in Hindu logic and metaphysics from the codes of conduct mandatory in the pursuit of the three other major ends of life: namely, *kama* (pleasure), *dharma* (duty, especially as it relates to caste regulations) and *moksa* (the assiduous quest for release from life and its illusions). In government and foreign relations, however, the precepts of *artha* are inextricably enmeshed with the *dharma* obligations of the warrior caste, for this caste supplies the kings and other secular officers of state, including the armed forces.

The fundamental question—how should men be governed?—was answered in traditional Indian thought and practice by unqualified recourse to *danda*, the rod of punishment. According to the theory of coercive state authority, the king must wield *danda* if he is to enjoy prosperity and acquire not only this world but also the one to come. The Dharmasastras, or Books of the Law, notably the remarkable compendium assigned to Manu;²⁴ the Arthasastras; the Mahabharata (India's great national epic); and the popular, didactic beast-fables (the best known collection of these being the Pancatantra) thus converge on the doctrine of *matsyanyaya*—the Principle or Law of the Fishes—in accordance with which the king must enforce his government and punish those who deserve it, lest the strong torment

the weak as fish are fried on a pike or as in water they devour each other. In deference to the same pessimistic view of human nature, the royal administration relied on espionage as its major agency. As explained in the Mahabharata, a kingdom has its roots in spies and secret agents; therefore, as the wind moves everywhere and penetrates all created beings, so should the king penetrate everywhere by sending his spies to report disloyalty among subjects, ministers and heirs.

Danda, then, rules all; *danda* is awake while others are asleep; and *danda* insists that warriors fight to acquire spiritual merit. These truths are relayed by all the sacred texts (which continue to be widely read), but most eloquently by Krishna's discourse with Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita section of the Mahabharata. The exchange takes place immediately before the great battle at Kurukshetra. We read that Arjuna, on reaching the battlefield, was so distressed at the thought of having to fight and kill revered members of his family, whom he saw ranged on the opposite side, that he resolved to forsake war. Krishna then turned him from this resolution by reminding him of the inexorable law of his caste: a *ksatriya* (member of the warrior caste) must fight and kill his enemy, and the attainment of victory requires total concentration on the task at hand, including total disregard of other moral or emotional restraints.

The same moral teachings have been passed on through the centuries by other sages and authorities on *artha* and *rajadharma* (royal duties). The king is created to commit cruel acts, we learn from Bhishma, legendary guru in the Mahabharata; whereas ordinary men, not made of such stern stuff, seldom succeed in worldly affairs. Like a snake that devours creatures living in holes, the earth swallows up the king who does not fight and the Brahman who does not go abroad (for study).²⁵

The history of interkingdom relations before and after the Muslim conquests faithfully reflects the dictates of the *artha* philosophy; its annals speak of endemic anarchy and warfare.

True to the law, inequality was postulated as the everlasting condition of political existence, power as the only measure of political worth, and war as the normal activity of the state. On the authority, again, of the Mahabharata:

Might is above right; right proceeds from might. . . . Right is in the hands of the strong. . . . Everything is pure that comes from the strong. . . . When thou findest thyself in a low state, try to lift thyself up, resorting to pious as well as to cruel actions. Before practicing morality wait until thou art strong. . . . If men think thee soft, they will despise thee. [Book XII 134:5–7, 2–3; 140:38; 141:62; 56:21].

A king or politician who has no power is a conquered king, the Arthasastra tells us, and in such a lamentable state of inferiority he is reduced to peace—defined in the Hindu world as stagnation.

Each king, then, was to chart his course of aggression and withdrawal scientifically and realistically. He was to view his own domain as the center or target in the *mandala* (a design symbolic of the universe) of concentric rings of states. His immediate neighbors were by definition his worst enemies; the kings in the second circle were to be viewed as natural friends. The third ring included his enemy's friends, while the fourth was composed of the friends of his allies, and so forth. The science of *artha* instructed the king to be particularly careful when he measured his distance from the dominant state—that is, the state ruled by the king who had the capacity to fight without allies and who was known therefore as the “neutral” king.

Neither the *mandala* nor the particular positions and relations abstracted from it were ever to be trusted completely, however. An arsenal of intelligence tricks and diplomatic techniques, together with a standing and alert army, were regarded as the best security. *Artha* taught the king how to bribe his ally or enemy by gifts, promises and decorations; how to lull him into a sense of false security through conciliation, negotiation and other forms of appeasement, while systematically preparing a military attack on him. Simultaneously, he was of course

expected to sow dissension in the frontier provinces of his enemy, in order to soften resistance when he was ready to stage the final armed invasion. In fact, the skills of intrigue were more highly prized by theoreticians and rulers than was material power, as this passage from the Arthasastra illustrates:

He who has the eye of knowledge and is acquainted with the science of polity, can with little effort make use of his skill for intrigue and can succeed by means of conciliation, and other strategic means, by spies and chemical appliances in over-reaching even those kings who are possessed of enthusiasm and power.²⁶

Under such general headings as "Government Based on Deceit," "The Administration of Subversion" and "The Work of an Invader," no subject is given more detailed and devoted attention than that of espionage and "dirty tricks." Brahmans, widows, individuals trained to pose as cripples, saucemakers, dwarfs, eunuchs, courtesans posing as high-class ladies, and merchants are only some of those listed as potential spies or experts in the art of infiltration and sabotage; and complete instructions are provided for their specialized training and deployment. The most favored and talked about category of personnel in this conspiratorial system is that comprising the "shaven heads," ascetics, monks and holy men who have license to conspire and kill in the holy places, and who know how to foment rebellions among the enemy and create other "annoyances in the rear." In "The Battle of Intrigue," it is interesting to note, the Arthasastra makes special mention of "fiery spies"—Asia's earliest guerrillas—who conceal "weapons, fire and poison" under their various disguises. Trained "to take advantage of peace and friendship with the enemy," they were charged with the elimination of supply stores, granaries and commanders-in-chief.

To summarize, war was the normal state of affairs in Indian interstate relations until the British unified and pacified the subcontinent. But this episode of Occidental imperialism was a mere moment in the Asian reckoning of time. Hence, many

thoughtful and knowledgeable Indians express doubt whether the alien rule of law, including international law, will or should prevail over traditional law.

Southeast Asia

In the course of the fascinating process of cultural diffusion known as the “Indianization” of Asia, the principles of *artha* penetrated much of Southeast Asia. One might even characterize the phenomenon as “cultural imperialism,” at least if one were to adopt the parlance currently used by some to describe the impact of European/American culture on the rest of the world. This vast region, which now encompasses Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, was previously dotted with separate kingdoms, each remarkable in its commitment to deeply rooted indigenous beliefs as well as in its talent for integrating appropriate motifs from Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian or Islamic idea-systems.

In pre-nineteenth-century times, the most important regionally unifying themes were the cults of the *devaraja*, or god-king, who could do no wrong so long as he was successful, and the acceptance of rebellion, subversion, war and the threat of war as a normal part of everyday life. Scholars specializing in Southeast Asian history have pointed out that political identity was nowhere a function of secure frontiers, concrete material power, a unifying legal system, or even legitimate royal succession; rather, it depended on an individual ruler’s compliance with the cosmo-magical “constitution” of his realm. What mattered in this context—whether in Java, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand-Siam or Burma—was physical possession of the capital, the palace and symbolically significant royal regalia; and these sources of prestige could be rightfully seized by cunning or by such acts of violence as the murder of an incumbent prince.

The traditional coexistence of the principles of divine kingship and insurrection explains why the usurper was entitled to obedience and respect, why the idea of the state was associated in the final analysis with the successful ruling personality, and why these kingdoms were locked for centuries in combat of one type or another. Full-scale wars, limited invasions or guerrilla fighting thus marked relations among the rulers of Thailand, Burma, Laos and Khmer-Cambodia, as well as between those of Java and Sumatra. Kingdoms rose and fell, and empires crumbled, only to be resurrected later in some other form. Cambodia, for example, was once part of a Vietnamese empire; the Mekong Delta was constantly in contention; Assam was part of an aggressive Burmese state; and the Khmers, probably the most martial of all these warrior-peoples, tirelessly staked out their claim to what is today Burma. While most principalities and empires were racked by domestic rebellion and subversion, some (notably in present-day Indonesia) are reputed, in modern nationalist texts, to have had vassals as far afield as Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. Other allegedly unified kingdoms—Laos and Burma, in particular—were actually conglomerates of separate, warring states.

In this region, then, as in the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara, internal war merged with external war to form intricate webs of conflict and violence. Hallowed by myth, sanctioned by religion, accepted by the people, and celebrated in legend, art and architecture, this theme has been oft repeated in recent history—in the 1933 “Royalist Rebellion” of Siam, the reinstallation in Burma of the traditional Buddhist trappings of power politics, the elaborate staging by Indonesia’s Sukarno of confrontations with Malaysia and the Philippines, and the complex, ongoing interplay of animosities among Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam.

To be sure, one can point to a few nonintervention agreements; for example, in the twelfth century an accord was

concluded between Tonkin and the Indianized state of Champa. (It was conceived, by the way, as a reinsurance device that would permit Champa to capture and destroy with impunity the temple of Angkor.) But here, as elsewhere in southern Asia, enmity remained the norm in interkingdom relations. This was true even when China's persistently aggressive policies could have been checked by the organization of collective security measures; instead, each kingdom usually offered separate, ferocious resistance when Chinese forces interfered too blatantly. In short, peace, as a value, had no place either in the metaphysical order of ideas from which these societies derived their identities or in the intricate, artistic processes of statecraft that issued from the royal palaces.

Two thoughts, in particular, impose themselves as one follows the relentless seesaw movements of attack, victory and defeat that have passed like the forces of nature over this culturally complex area. First, in the context of comparative history and religion, there seems to be no doubt that recourse to warfare and palace revolution was hallowed as an integral principle of the ruling cosmic order. And second, this ancient civilization has indeed been the theater in which numerous rival ideas about war—emanating, above all, from India and China—have clashed throughout recorded time. With respect to modern world politics, meanwhile, it is as irresistible as it is ironic to note that American ideas about war were thoroughly discredited precisely here.²⁷

China

The *Pax Sinica* that in recent decades has been descending on Tibet and elsewhere in Central Asia, on the Himalayan region of the Indian subcontinent, and on parts of Southeast Asia is a function both of traditional Chinese statecraft and of Mao Tse-tung's adaptations of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism to the needs of revolutionary China. Contrary to the view held in

some American intellectual circles, there is no gulf of discontinuity²⁸ between the old and the new China when it comes to the politics of war and peace.

With respect to ancient China, as with India, Westerners have long pleased themselves in imagining a spiritually superior civilization, anchored in Confucianism and Taoism, in which men shunned violence and all things uncouth, if only because their attention was riveted on etiquette, sincerity, civility, humanism and the search for harmony. Just why such exalted views of Oriental society should have become so fixed in the Western mind may well be a question that only ethno-psychiatrists can answer as they become adept at dealing with the symptoms of pathology in intercultural relations. Suffice it to say, "[T]here was never a Taoist State as conceived by Chuang Tsu, nor a Confucian State as conceived by Mencius."²⁹ Indeed, the source materials—which have long been available in excellent translations—teach something else entirely: namely, that China, whatever its geographic configuration and official ideology, has traditionally depended heavily on a judicious investment of war effort, both at home and abroad.

Ping-ti Ho, an authority on Confucian China, and Lucian W. Pye thus agree that the Chinese state has always derived its ultimate power from the army—a circumstance that has largely predetermined its authoritarian character from the days of empire to the rule of Mao Tse-tung.³⁰ History also instructs us that dynasties usually came to power through armed force; that revolts—and they were commonplace—were staged and smashed by military means; that the science of besieging walled cities was highly developed even in very early times;³¹ and that the conduct of all these military operations was organically linked not only to the perfection of weaponry but also, and more importantly, to such official nonmilitary pursuits as the cultivation of crops, the organization of hydraulic works, and the building of walls—occupations without which war could not have proceeded as successfully as it did.³²

War and agriculture, in fact, have consistently been viewed in China as two fundamental, mutually dependent occupations, perhaps never more so than in the Epoch of the Warring States (ca. 450–221 B.C.) and in the Maoist Period.

Accounts from the earlier period can thus be cited to the effect that successive generations of Chinese were decimated by war with methodical regularity, that breathing spaces were allowed only so that the peasant armies might be replenished after having been cut to pieces, and that the army was made to labor on public projects and “in the countryside” when not campaigning.

All-under-Heaven, which consisted of numerous separate provinces, was thus in total disarray during the Epoch of the Warring States; big states ate up lesser ones as systematically as silkworms eat mulberry leaves. Yet China—her contours forever indeterminate—survived mainly, it appears, because the art of war had here reached a mature form by the beginning of the fourth century B.C. By this time, Samuel Griffith notes, the Chinese possessed weapons not at the disposal of other societies and were absolute masters of offensive and defensive tactics and techniques that would have enabled them to cause Alexander the Great a great deal more trouble than did the Greeks, the Persians or the Indians.³³

All Chinese schools of thought accepted the idea of war, usually as part of the *fa* dimension of government, which existed to supplement what rule by benevolence (*li*) could not accomplish. As Arthur Waley explains, the duty to punish badly ruled states, or to chastise unruly barbarians on the frontiers of the Middle Kingdom, was emphasized consistently by the Confucians and was acknowledged also by their rivals, the Mohists.³⁴ Just as the principle of filial piety could rightfully be enforced by the killing or mutilation of offspring who resisted paternal guidance, so might the art of persuasion in the community of unequal states be supplemented by the rod of war. In contrast to the domain of internal and family affairs,

however, for which legal codes were periodically promulgated by the imperial keeper of Heaven's Mandate, there was no international law and no court or arbitral commission to indicate which state was "badly ruled," or to compose differences impartially. The principle of the "righteous war" thus usually served as a moral cloak for open acts of aggression, which often occurred after atrocity stories had been spread concerning the society singled out for punishment.

The theoreticians and generals who perfected this side of Chinese statecraft, and who then succeeded in bringing about the first unification of China in 221 B.C., are collectively known as the Legalists or Realists. The essence of their science, discernible as early as the seventh century B.C., but which is seen fully developed in the fourth and third centuries in the writings of Sun Tzu, Lord Shang and Han Fei Tzu, is the uncompromising recognition that war and organization for war are the mainstays of government. "How to get the people to die" is the problem that continually occupies the Realists. According to this school of martial thought, it is a misfortune for a prosperous country not to be at war; for in such a state of peace the country will breed the "Six Maggots." In *The Book of Lord Shang*, the parasites that attack in peacetime are enumerated: "rites and music, odes and history, moral culture and virtue, filial piety and brotherly love, sincerity and faith, chastity and integrity, benevolence and righteousness, criticism of the army and being ashamed of fighting. If there are these . . . things, the ruler is unable to make people farm and fight, and then the state will be so poor that it will be dismembered."³⁵ Vagabonds and draft dodgers, merchants and artisans who deal in nonessential goods, scholars who spread doctrines at variance with Legalist teachings—these are the "Vermin of the State," we learn from Han Fei Tzu.³⁶ As such, they must be unmercifully quashed so that the people can be kept in ignorance and awe while the king extends the frontiers of the state.

Han Fei Tzu's and Lord Shang's admonitions—that the ruler must make certain everyone within his borders understands warfare, that there can be no private exemptions from military service, and that the people must be concentrated on warfare—were faithfully followed by China's first unifier, Shih Huang Ti. The notorious Burning of the Books in 213 B.C. was thus conceived and executed as “the logical last step in unification,” as Derk Bodde puts it,³⁷ and it may now be seen as the precedent for numerous other “cultural revolutions” in imperial and Maoist China.

From time to time, subsequent generations of Chinese scholars have professed to be shocked by these doctrines, but there has never been an age when the martial classics, especially the works of Sun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu, have not been read. Not only did imperial edicts in later dynasties prescribe the study of these works for the aspirant to an army commission, but Sun Tzu's *Art of War* alone stimulated more than fifty commentaries and interpretative studies between 1368 and 1628. Western nations were long ignorant of the treatise's existence, and when it did become known in the West, the reception was one of neglectful scorn. Japan, by contrast, took Sun Tzu's work most seriously, as did Russia after the Mongol-Tatars brought it there.

In China proper, *The Art of War* continues to be considered a classic to this very day.³⁸ Conceptually, Maoist strategic doctrine is closely related to the thought of the great master, and Mao Tse-tung's most elegant maxims and most poetic metaphors—which may be found in *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War*, *On Guerrilla Warfare* and *On the Protracted War*—recall those formulated in *The Art of War*. Indeed, reflection on the continuity of Chinese history and ideas about war lead to the conclusion that the Sinification of Leninism could proceed as swiftly and smoothly as it did primarily because of the pervasiveness of Legalism.

Legalist and Maoist ideas converge; they do not meet by chance. And Maoist elites make use of Legalist references deliberately, not in a casually metaphorical way. The struggle between the Legalists, openly identified today with progressive forces in China's past, and the followers of Confucius, who stand for all that is reactionary and regressive in the country's affairs, is thus mentioned in the most improbable contexts. For example, a lengthy stricture on the seemingly mundane subject of traffic safety (broadcast in September 1974 from Haikow, Hainan Island) begins as follows:

In order to raise traffic-safety work in Hainan to a new level, it is necessary first of all to do a good job of criticism of Lin [Piao] and Confucius. It is necessary to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought seriously and unfold activities to evaluate [sic] the Legalists and criticize the Confucianists.³⁹

And nothing in Chinese intellectual history suggests that the Chinese communist digestive system would be overburdened by this governmental linkage of traffic-safety work to criticism of Lin and Confucius. After all, as one of the foremost students of Chinese military, political and psychological strategy has pointed out, the present system is only the latest manifestation in more than 2,000 years of Chinese strategic thought—a continuity found nowhere in the West.⁴⁰

Chinese commissars, however faithfully schooled in Leninism-Maoism, can thus be expected to use traditional military philosophy to justify both their worldview and the roles assigned them in warfare and society.⁴¹ The easy congruence of these frames of reference is nowhere more impressively demonstrated than in Mao Tse-tung's own writings. Here, elaborate expositions of communist dialectics and discourses on the tactical and strategic doctrines employed during the revolutionary war mingle freely with allusions to Mao's favorite classical novels, traditional boxing precepts, the rules of the ancient game of *wei-ch'i* (in Japanese, *go*) and, above all, to the

writings of Sun Tzu, the most esteemed of the Legalist philosophers of war. A few illustrations must suffice.

The Maoists and the Legalists share a militarist, militant vocabulary—one that conveys the unqualified thesis that organization, whether of the village or the world, is war organization, to be established and maintained by the same tactical and strategic rules that apply to the battlefield. Mao thus writes: “In China the main form of struggle is war and the main form of organisation is the army. Other forms, like organisations and mass struggles are also extremely important . . . but they are all for the sake of war.”⁴² The pervasiveness of this conviction explains the stress consistently placed by Legalist and Maoist alike on the need to create agromilitary communes and to maintain rural base areas under strict military control. It also explains the striking concurrence of certain poetic metaphors: “The people are like water, and the army is like fish,” Mao writes, and the tactics of Chinese statecraft “constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.” The challenge, as Mao sees it, is “to drown the enemy in the ocean of a people’s war . . . [to] lure him into the deep,”⁴³ just as it was when Sun Tzu wrote:

Now the shape of an army resembles water. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; attack him when he does not expect it; avoid his strength and strike his emptiness, and like water, none can oppose you. . . .

Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must be flexible.⁴⁴

Whoever or wherever the enemy is, says Mao, he must be moved “to help in his own destruction,” or, as the party chairman puts it elsewhere, he must contribute to his own encirclement. Eventually, “a worldwide net will be formed from which the fascist monkeys can find no escape.”⁴⁵ Just as “tunneling operations”—vividly described in Sun Tzu’s and Mao’s manuals—are designed to undermine the physical foundations of the enemy’s military position, so are

psychological offensives meant to subvert his moral and intellectual bases. Confuse the enemy's leaders; if possible drive them insane, advised Sun Tzu. Costly battles would then become unnecessary. And among the techniques employed to achieve these ends, none has received so much careful elaboration in Legalist and Maoist strategy as the art of dissimulation, simulation and deception. Indeed, as Scott Boorman notes, this concept of stratagem goes far beyond mere attempts to outwit the enemy: it involves the much more sophisticated task of directly manipulating his perception of reality, particularly the values he attributes to various outcomes of the conflict.⁴⁶ Sun Tzu's exhortation to "hit the enemy's mind" has thus traditionally been viewed as the prerequisite of victory.

The Legalist master's axiom that "war is based on deception"⁴⁷ has been paraphrased often by Mao Tse-tung, who also advocates the intricate, indirect approaches to successful combat and maneuvering outlined in *The Art of War*. Mao's instructions to guerrillas, for example—that they must be as cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits, mobile and forever changing in appearance—are prefigured in some of Sun Tzu's verses, notably those dealing with offensive strategy and the use of spies and double agents. Furthermore, Sun Tzu's rule that the enemy must be deceived by "creating shapes" or by concealing one's own shape from him is paralleled in Mao's commitment to the consummate skill of creating "illusions":

Illusions and inadvertence may deprive one of superiority and the initiative. Hence, deliberately to create illusions for the enemy and then spring surprise attacks upon him is a means . . . of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are illusions? 'Even the woods and bushes on Mount Pakung look like enemy troops'—this is an example of illusion. And 'making a noise in the east while attacking the west' is a way of creating illusions for the enemy. . . . It is therefore extremely important . . . to seal off his information, . . . keeping the enemy in the dark . . . and thus laying the objective basis for his illusions and inadvertence. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have

no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war. In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them distracted.⁴⁸

History suggests that the fundamental ideas in a given civilization are often conveyed better by *homo ludens*—"man the game-player"—than by "man the theory-maker." In China, the idea of war is eloquently expressed in *wei-ch'i*, the game of strategy favored by Chinese statesmen and literati from the early Han dynasty to modern times.⁴⁹ Quite unlike the Occidental game of chess, in which the goal is total victory through the capture of a single figure, *wei-ch'i* involves a protracted attempt to extend control slowly over dispersed territory. Play is diffused, and the similarity between this pastime and Maoist guerrilla warfare is quite obvious. The basic strategy in *wei-ch'i* is encirclement and counter-encirclement—all aimed at setting up spheres of influence within enemy territory in order to undermine the opponent gradually by attacks from within. Maoist tactics of "enclosing" or "forming" territory (in the psychological as well as geographic sense) are thus readily comparable to what counts in *wei-ch'i*. Chairman Mao explains:

Thus the enemy and ourselves each have imposed two kinds of encirclement on the other, resembling in the main a game of *weich'i*: campaigns and battles between us and the enemy are comparable to the capturing of each other's pieces, and the enemy's strongholds . . . and our guerrilla base areas . . . are comparable to the blank spaces secured on the board.⁵⁰

In the Maoist theory of insurgency, as in *wei-ch'i*, time is long, the grid is large and warfare is continuous, shifting from one sub-board to the next. In either case, success in combat hinges squarely on abiding by Sun Tzu's rule:

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.⁵¹

Or, if one prefers to be up-to-date, by observing Mao Tse-tung's dictum:

... war is nothing supernatural, it is one of the things in the world that follow the determined course of their development; hence, Sun Tzu's law, "know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster," is still a scientific truth.⁵²

IV

The foregoing reflections on war and the clash of ideas support certain general propositions in the fields of international relations and foreign-policymaking.

(1) There are different cultures in the world. Consequently, there are different modes of thinking, value systems and forms of political organization.

(2) Within a given society, norms, normative ideas, and notions about what is normal evolve from a continuous interaction between the ruling value system, on the one hand, and the society's perception of social and political reality, on the other.

(3) A society is virile and effective if it can count on stable patterns of perception, judgment and action. If, by way of contrast, the interaction between the commitment to certain values and the common perception of reality is seriously disturbed, the normative system becomes unreliable; in such circumstances, the society is apt to be morally confused and politically ineffective.

(4) For any society, success in the conduct of international relations turns on two characteristics: (a) confidence in the norms and values that control the inner order of the society and (b) accurate perception of the world in which the national interest must be defined and furthered. Failure ensues when confidence in the nation's integrity is eroded and when the vision of the international environment becomes defective.

(5) In the multicultural environment of the twentieth century, foreign-policymakers must recognize and analyze multiple, distinct cultures as well as political systems that differ from each other significantly in their modes of rational and normative thought, their value orientations, and their dispositions in foreign affairs.

(6) The fundamental foreign policy-related themes running through the histories of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China converge on conflict and divisiveness as norm-engendering realities. The evidence shows, in particular, that peace is neither the dominant value nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from being perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively.

(7) This broad concurrence of non-Western traditions stands in marked contrast to the preferences registered in modern Western societies. It is also at odds with the priorities officially established in the charters of the United Nations and affiliated international organizations. To the extent, then, that the United Nations is supposed to reflect universally valid norms, it is a misrepresentation of reality. And insofar as the United Nations was conceived as a norm-creating agency, it has been unsuccessful, particularly with respect to the incidence of war. What is normal in world politics should in these conditions have been inferred pragmatically from the facts.

The challenge of understanding the multifaceted nature of modern warfare has not been met by the academic and political elites of the United States. This failure in the perception of reality has been aggravated by a widespread acquiescence in essentially irrational trends—the inclinations, namely, to dissociate values from facts, to treat values as if they were norms, and to assume that privately or locally preferred values are also globally valid norms. These intellectual developments have contributed not only to many recent foreign-policy errors but also to widespread uncertainties about America's role in world affairs. They also suggest that the United States has

begun to resemble Don Quixote: like the Knight of the Mournful Countenance, it is fighting windmills and losing its bearings in the real world.

Notes

1. Elizabeth Converse, "The War of All Against All: A Review of *The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957-1968*," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (hereafter cited as *JCR*), December 1968, pp. 471-532.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 479.

3. Chadwick F. Alger, "Trends in International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance," in Norman D. Palmer, editor, *A Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Monograph No. 10, October 1970), pp. 7-28. Also see Philip P. Everts, "Developments and Trends in Peace and Conflict Research, 1965-1971: A Survey of Institutions," *JCR*, December 1972, pp. 477-510. Everts shows (p. 499) that "Peace research itself," "United Nations problems" and "International organization" scored highest as research topics (67%, 66%, 65%, respectively). Cf. Berenice A. Carroll, "Peace Research: The Cult of Power," *ibid.*, pp. 585-616: "If there is any distinguishing common feature among the highly varied works in the field of peace research, it is an avowed commitment to 'peace'." (p. 599.) Carroll's remarks on "conceptions of power" are particularly interesting.

4. See Converse. Also Norman A. Bailey, "Toward a Praxeological Theory of Conflict," *ORBIS*, Winter 1968, pp. 1081-1112. Further see Clinton F. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict," *JCR*, December 1968, pp. 412-460. Fink defines social conflict as "any social situation or process in which two or more social entities are linked by at least one form of antagonistic psychological relation or at least one form of antagonistic interaction." (p. 456.) For another flexible approach, see Robert A. Levine, "Anthropology and the Study of Conflict: Introduction," *JCR*, March 1961, pp. 3-15. Levine distinguishes among intrafamily, intracommunity, intercommunity and intercultural conflict, and points out that there are pervasive conflict types that spread to several levels.

5. Converse, pp. 476-477.

6. Jessie Bernard, *American Community Behavior: An Analysis of Problems Confronting American Communities Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1949), p. 106. For an early commentary critical of conflict theory, see Raymond Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis

of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis," *JCR*, June 1957, pp. 212–248.

7. Converse, p. 479; Alger, p. 13.

8. See above, notes 1–4.

9. "U.S. Urged to Cut South Korean Aid: Group Calls for a Protest on Seoul's 'Inhumanity'," *New York Times*, July 15, 1974.

10. See the scholarly surveys of the literature on war and conflict cited previously.

11. Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Relations: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches," in Palmer, p. 70.

12. Elton B. McNeil, editor, *The Nature of Human Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

13. Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, editors, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 17–34.

14. Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations* (Washington: Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901); translated by A. C. Campbell; Book I, Chap. 2, pp. 4, 8; Book II, Chap. 1, p. 2; Book III: Chap. 1, p. 6; Chap. 8, p. 1; Chap. 21, p. 1; Chap. 25, p. 1.

15. Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace: De jure belli ac pacis* (New York: Classic Club, 1949); translated by Louise Ropes Loomis; Book III, Chap. 21, p. 1.

16. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Modern Library, 1943); translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles; Book I, Chap. 8, p. 57.

17. Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 145.

18. See Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, a new edition with afterthoughts by the author (New York: Viking Press, 1960), p. 240 ff., for a discussion of the state as a "manifold of events."

19. Paul Verhaegen, "Study of the African Personality in the Belgian Congo," in F. R. Wickert, editor, *Readings in African Psychology from French Language Sources* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1967), pp. 242–248.

20. For an extended discussion of the nature of civilization and intercultural relations, and of the historical impact of war on the identity of particularly significant cultures, see my "Civilizations Under Stress: Reflections on Cultural Borrowing and Survival," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter 1975, pp. 1–18.

21. Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, March 1968, p. 70 ff. My own analysis of African orientations to war and conflict is set

forth in *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

22. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955); pp. 55 ff., 62 ff., 144 ff.

23. K. M. Panikkar, *A Survey of Indian History* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1954), pp. 2, 29.

24. The Books of the Law and the later didactic portions of the Mahabharata may be taken to represent the post-Mauryan Brahmanic renaissance. Müller dates this code later than the fourth century A.D.; Bühler places it in the second century.

25. Upendra N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas: The Ancient Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 188 ff, 235.

26. B. Shamasastri, editor, *Kautilya's Arthasastra* (Mysore: Sri Raghuvver Press, 1951), Book IX, Chap. 1, p. 368.

27. But see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962* (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 453–454, for the text of a speech in which this interaction of different ideas about war was intimated, albeit faintly.

28. See, for example, John K. Fairbank, "China's World Order: The Tradition of Chinese Foreign Relations," *Encounter*, December 1966, pp. 14–20; also, by the same eminent scholar, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank, editors, *Chinese Ways in Warfare* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). In Professor Fairbank's view, all Chinese warfare, traditional and modern, is strictly defensive, quite in contrast to that waged throughout the centuries by the Occidental nations, especially the United States, which—he alleges—is invariably aggressive and expansionist. The other essays in this collection provide contrasting views.

29. Arthur Waley, *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1939), p. 248; also see pp. 175, 141.

30. Lucian W. Pye, in the foreword to William W. Whitson with Chen-Hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. xiii.

31. Numerous references may be found in Kierman, Jr., and Fairbank; note especially Herbert Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," pp. 151 ff., 192, for a summation of the technical, administrative and psychological aspects of siegecraft and for comments on the continuity of military strategy and technology in Chinese history. In the same volume,

see Charles O. Hucker, "Hu Tsung-hsien's Campaign Against Hsü Hai, 1556," pp. 273 ff., 305 ff.

32. Edward L. Dryer notes that the regions of China were administered from walled cities, which were centers of government as well as places in which large grain reserves were stored. Administrative control of the land was a precondition for further conquest, yet such control could be gained only by capturing the walled cities. These cities thus became the principal military objectives in wars fought within China. The authority of the government over the peasantry, then, extended downward from the walled cities. "Military Continuities: The PLA and Imperial China," chapter 1 in William W. Whitson, editor, *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 15.

33. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffith, p. 38.

34. Waley, pp. 141, 152 ff.

35. Yang Kung-sun, *The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese School of Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928); translated with introduction and notes by J. J. L. Duyvendak, p. 256. For the proposition that "an intelligent prince . . . strives for uniformity, . . . restrains volatile scholars and those of frivolous pursuits and makes them all uniformly into farmers," see p. 194.

36. Han Fei Tzu, *Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); translated by Burton Watson, pp. 96–117.

37. Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as Seen in the Life of Li Ssu 280?–208 B.C.* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1967), pp. 11, 80 ff.

38. See Franke, p. 192. Also see Griffith's remarks on the diffusion of this work, p. 45 ff. and appendix III.

39. Joseph Lelyveld, "In China, It's Politics by Allegory," *New York Times*, September 30, 1974. Further see the laudatory essays on the Legalists in *Selected Articles Criticising Lin Piao and Confucius* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974). This collection includes a "Publisher's Note" to the effect that Lin Piao, being "an out-and-out devotee of Confucius," opposed the Legalist school and attacked the "First Emperor" of the Ch'in dynasty.

40. Scott A. Boorman, *The Protracted Game: A wei-ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 182.

41. Whitson with Chen-Hsia Huang, p. 438.

42. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (Revised edition; London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958), Vol. II, p. 224. And Mao adds: "Every Communist must grasp the truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be

allowed to command the Party. . . . Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war'; yes, we are, we are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist." Ibid., p. 228.

43. Ibid., pp. 158, 180.

44. Sun Tzu, pp. 89, 43; see Griffith's editorial comments ("Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung"), pp. 45 ff.

45. Mao Tse-tung, pp. 100, 186 ff. The concept of "encirclement," or *wei-ch'i*, relates to the physical as well as the psychological annihilation of the enemy; see Boorman.

46. Scott A. Boorman, "Deception in Chinese Strategy," in Whitson, editor, *The Military* . . . , pp. 313–314. Boorman also points out that current strategic thinking in the United States places comparatively little stress on stratagem.

47. See Sun Tzu, pp. 66–67, 93–94, 97, 106.

48. Mao Tse-tung, pp. 172–175. Also see Samuel B. Griffith, *Peking and People's Wars* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 33, for a discussion of Mao's advice to guerrillas that they be as cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits, and for this general approach to tactics: "When you want to fight us we won't let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to fight you, we make sure you can't get away and we hit you squarely on the chin and wipe you out." Cf. Sun Tzu, p. 140.

49. Boorman, *The Protracted Game* . . . , p. 6; for historical references to the pervasive influence of this game, and the suggestion that Sun Tzu's theories bear a distinct similarity to *wei-ch'i* dicta, see p. 208 (note 8). Boorman's thesis is significant: Chinese communist policies and *wei-ch'i*, he argues, are products of the same strategic tradition—one without a parallel either in Occidental military tradition or in the Western game of chess—and *wei-ch'i* is an important, if little recognized, model of the Maoist system of insurgency.

50. Mao Tse-tung, pp. 151–152.

51. See Sun Tzu, pp. 84–129.

52. Mao Tse-tung, p. 171.

Class War on a Global Scale

The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict

Dr Stephen J. Blank

Today's international order is undergoing a profound transformation, and any such transformation in the world's order issues from and engenders deep-going transformations in the component parts of the system, the so-called nation-state of classical diplomatic history in the West. In both Europe and the third world, new and old nations and communities are either coming together or splitting apart or demanding the breakup of larger units in which they are found. Examples are the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Lebanon, and ethnic unrest in Israel, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

These revolutionary movements and trends constitute a standing challenge to theories or policies of order and liberalism in world politics as well as to the American-led effort to construct a system whose point of departure is Wilsonian liberalism or some variant thereof. The crisis shaking these states is of such magnitude as to suggest to some (an American official in the Defense Department asserted this point outright) that in the nineties the lack of governability of many third-world states (one could include Yugoslavia and suggest tentatively the USSR as well) will be so great as to cause their disappearance as functioning nation-states.

The foregoing observations highlight a cardinal point of Professor Adda Bozeman's work,* that is, the enduring and profound challenge to the existence of the nation-state, that

*Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976), 61-102.

classical avatar of Western political theories. That challenge exists due to the conflicts launched by various revolutionary theorists and practitioners of international politics. One of the primary axes of their challenge has been an effort to overcome, diminish, transcend, or break up the existing order to make room for new formations whatever their provenance. In most cases, these revolutionaries have been inspired by Leninist and Soviet practices of political conflict, what the strategists call low-intensity conflict (LIC). We, however, can call such political warfare class conflict on the global scale, or, as was popular a generation ago, the strategy of protracted warfare, or still again, revolutionary war.

However one labels it, there can be no doubt that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 institutionalized a schism in world politics that World War I had already created and perpetuated it in the form of an ideological as well as political war against liberalism. Without exculpating Hitler and Mussolini, it is safe to say that bolshevism provided both the techniques upon which they built and the ostensible threat as well as the model that they were both drawn to and fought against. Since then this global schism has been expanded into first, the cold war and second, the techniques of threatened warfare by or against states in the third world. In other words, the instrumentalities used in the practice of this war have long since become transnational—not an illogical conclusion when one considers Leninist strategies of the national question. Indeed, Lenin's earliest adversaries in the Russian socialist movement complained that he had introduced a "state of siege into the movement" (their terms). That phrase is a convenient metaphor for post-1917 developments because it combines the protracted and all-encompassing nature of the warfare with the harassment of "enemy supply lines" in the third world and the use of constant psychological warfare and even "fifth columns" inside the besieged fortresses as major tools of this war.

Although the literature on the Soviet style of armed and political conflict is immense and Professor Bozeman has made a distinguished and acute contribution to it, this study will pursue a seemingly eccentric course in the beginning, but one that has lasting significance for the present period. I intend to look at the multiple uses made of the concept of the nation-state as the actor in world politics and as an axial point of the Soviet struggle to unhinge the entire international order built up by liberalism and European political thought.

Erosion of the Nation-State System

Soviet thought and practice made for a transnational, that is, multistate challenge to the international order—a challenge whose salience is growing, not diminishing, despite the euphoric tone of some that history and international politics appear to be over. Quite the opposite is the case. New challenges to our values and interests are dawning which make liberal use of those techniques and ideas originated by Lenin and refined by his epigone, and which combine them with their own indigenous traditions—Arab, Vietnamese, Cuban, and so forth. Even the Soviet challenge is not dead; rather its previous incarnations are bankrupt. But new challenges to the status quo are by no means ruled out. In fact, Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" calls for collective security in Asia and Europe and calls for primacy of human interests. The deideologization of interstate relations poses clear ideological/political challenges to the international order—even if we do not fully grasp the implications that these programs present.

Indeed, the fundamental purpose of Leninist doctrine is to seize the intellectual initiative in world politics and influence the conceptualization of an emerging world order that Moscow cannot influence except by force—whose scope for

use has narrowed dramatically. What is going on here is a largely successful attempt by the Soviet Union to insinuate itself into the ongoing Western security dialogue and obtain a legitimate position. In other words, whether the cold war is or is not dead, the global struggle for power, influence, and resources will continue in changed circumstances, and it will be conducted by multiple actors with their own cultural tradition of sanctified conflict and their experience of Leninist and other totalitarian modes of political struggle. One of the advantages bequeathed by the Soviet Union to its clients and emulators is precisely this method of confusing the issues surrounding the viability of nations and states and thereby destabilizing them. Thus, Leninist models of political and armed struggle, including the unhinging of states by using the nationalism issue, have become transnational. This is an appropriate irony for an ideology that billed itself from the outset as supranational and which is now threatened again by nationalism as well as by Pan-Islamic calls for Muslim self-determination and exclusivity over minorities in their territories (*Pan-Islamic* here means across the areas of Muslim majority, not the political doctrine of the same name).

Professor Bozeman has presciently fastened upon these aspects of international conflict. In her lecture to CADRE on 17 October 1989 she observed that the concept of the state is becoming a worn-out reference point in international relations. Traditionally the state was a sovereign, independent, territorially limited entity and, in Western thought, a more or less ethnically homogenous one, as for example England or France. One state ended where another began. Thus the concept implied boundaries and was a limiting one as it developed out of the works of Grotius and the practical construction of Europe—after religion failed by 1648 to embrace all of the European world under a single concept. Therefore the concept of the state is not particularly relevant to non-West European experience. That includes

Russia, which was a kind of Caesaro-papist regime onto which Western concepts of natural law and enlightened absolutism were grafted in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An example of this tradition is not just the multiconfessional nature of the Russian state from its inception as it manifested its abiding imperial vocation. Equally telling is the fact that until the revolution, Russian public law, with few exceptions, recognized as Great Russians members of any ethnic group that adopted Orthodox Christianity. In short, Russian citizenship denoted a creedal, ideological conception of the state. This notion was revived in secularized form by the Bolsheviks after a modernizing nationalism began to erode those ancient distinctions starting with the freeing of the serfs in 1861.

Professor Bozeman's lecture also noted that war, like all human contests, is, in the final analysis, a mental and psychological struggle in which victory goes to whomever best understands and penetrates the enemy. In our time the concept of war has taken on attributes that render it no longer a military conflict. Instead we live in an era of total war, largely, but not by any means exclusively, manifested by so-called low-intensity conflicts. These are long-term continuing acts of intentional violence and resistance across the entire spectrum of conflict. These wars last for years (e.g., the Arab-Israeli conflict, the cold war, or the Eritrean-Ethiopian struggle, to name three widely differing ones) and continue in both military and nonmilitary forms of action.

Conflict, in this situation, is no different from peace; indeed the concepts of peace and war have been turned inside out by foreign dialecticians. Since 1775 every major internal war or revolution has been one in which foreign intervention played, or threatened to play, a major role as well—a fact that has led to the erasure of the formally delimited boundaries among states. Thus domestic and foreign origins of and participation

in wars are not easily, if at all, separable. Nor does conflict resolution and mediation become easier; if anything quite the opposite. Those too go on for a long time until a solution is reached.

As Professor Bozeman observes, increasingly, movements claiming to be states in embryo, operating transnationally across recognized borders, and often behind fronts or dummy organizations, act as challengers to the state system. The concept of the state is impaired because it is used promiscuously to cover new types of multinational and multi-confessional political organizations whose leadership, as in the Soviet case till now, has insisted that its boundaries, internal and external, are merely provisional. Or, as was previously the case in Eastern Europe, states acting under conditions of externally diminished sovereignty claimed and received full recognition of their statehood.¹ Therefore the result is a system of clashing political entities all claiming the attributes of statehood but also being incommensurate with each other. In Bozeman's view, this condition makes it impossible to systematize and generalize about the international system.²

Mainly, but not exclusively in the third world, wars are going on over decades in which continuing efforts are made to define and then overthrow established political boundaries. This brings about a situation of political arrangements that are mobile, fluctuating, and susceptible to any territorial boundary. Moreover, every one of these movements exists "in virtue of its commitment to violence and war."³ Accordingly, as Bozeman states, the concept of international war has also been rendered invalid; it no longer pertains solely to interstate conflicts that are violent. Rather the term now connotes a broad spectrum of "conflict acts" ranging from sporadic guerrilla strikes to civil wars, wars of liberation, secessionist movements, invasions, or insurrections, among

others. Often foreigners are the inspirers, supporters, and occasionally the intended beneficiaries of these conflicts.

Moreover, this interpenetration of the domestic and foreign environments effaces altogether the conventionally accepted lines between legitimate and illegitimate force [as well as between legitimate and illegitimate polities], and puts in question the theoretically established distinctions between war and peace. These interlocking conditions support the conclusion that the state, having forfeited important controlling functions customarily ascribed to it in world affairs, can no longer be regarded as a reliable medium for realistic differentiation among types of war and between the conditions of war and peace.⁴

Finally the erosion of the state as the fundamental form of political organization, alongside the acquiescence in the coexistence of states with “antistate bodies” as equal and legitimate actors in world politics, has led to the devaluation of the world society of sovereign and formally equal states and the law of nations that stipulates their rights and obligations.⁵ Examples of the latter events abound in today’s world. The acquiescence of the international community in the Anschluss, the Munich accords, and the Stalin-Hitler Pact of 1939 signified the easy devaluation of sovereignty and the legitimation of antistate bodies on the grounds of ideology or national attributes. Similarly, the 1975 Zionism-Is-Racism Resolution of the United Nations (UN) demonstrated the renewed viability of such ideological delegitimization of states. In short, we live in a time when the plain meaning of our political vocabulary has been dialectically distorted to the degree that, as in *Alice in Wonderland*, “words mean what I want them to mean.” And these words have become the context and subject of violent belligerent wars and conflicts that show no sign of really abating—the current euphoria to the contrary.

Lenin's Revolutionary Approach

Confucius demanded of the good ruler that he rectify the language. Lenin's entire political career testified to his belief that politicizing the language and forcing an ideologically driven perspective on all sociopolitical events was the rightful *modus operandi* of a Marxist leader. By rearranging the cognitive map and by means of relentless political and military warfare he hoped to overthrow the bourgeois order, not only in Russia, but globally. Remember that until 1985 Lenin's successors still advocated his belief (1) that the shape of world politics revolved around Soviet Russia's global struggle with imperialism, (2) that all political events (and their definition was vastly expanded and extended) must be viewed in this light, (3) that this struggle (war until 1956) was fatalistically inevitable, (4) that in the period of nuclear weaponry this struggle was diverted into political and military struggles in the third world, and (5) that all means which served socialism were of themselves good. In Lenin's own words the Communist party was the "mind, honor, and conscience" of the contemporary world. Thus all means the party sanctioned were ethical since they advanced socialism.

As stated, a principal means of advancing socialism was the use of the national question to unhinge opposing states and communities whose existence blocked the advance of Soviet Russia. Lenin's attitude to the question of nationality as it pertained to questions of internal and foreign policy was wholly instrumental. In 1915 he quoted Engels on the subject.

The whole thing (the national principle) is an absurdity, got up in a popular dress in order to throw dust in shallow people's eyes and to be used as a convenient phrase, or to be laid aside if the occasion requires it.⁶

In his theses on the national question in 1913, Lenin was even more explicit in laying out the principles that governed subsequent Soviet approaches to the issue.

The recognition by Social Democracy of the right of all nations to self-determination by no means signifies negation by the Social Democrats of an independent evaluation of the expediency of state separation of this or that nation in each individual case. On the contrary, Social Democrats must give just this independent appraisal, considering how, under the conditions of developing capitalism and oppression of the proletariat of various nations by the united bourgeoisie of all nationalities, such that in the general tasks of democracy and at the head of them the most important of all will be the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism.⁷

More succinctly, he wrote elsewhere that “we must unite the revolutionary struggle against capitalism with revolutionary programs and tactics in relation to all democratic demands” (including self-determination).⁸ In effect the entire national question was regarded as a combat instrument to be wielded and deployed where a profound assessment of its political context dictated either supporting or opposing its placement on the international agenda.⁹

Moreover, Lenin and his followers were never able to shake the idea that self-determination only applied to the proletariat of each nation (an idea that became incarnated in the Communist party) and not to the rest of the nation. In 1903 Lenin stated that self-determination applied only to the proletariat and that the party must, as a rule, aspire to the closest possible union of workers. Only in exceptional circumstances was the party permitted to support demands for a new class state.¹⁰ The idea that self-determination was a class phenomenon rather than a national one was adopted by Stalin in his report to the III Congress of Soviets in January 1918 and served as the basis upon which he carried out Lenin’s directive to sovietize the borderlands after October 1917.¹¹

In practice this idea denied the concept of the nation and its substitution by a class or a vanguard party masquerading under cover of Marxism as the embodiment of a class. Such a concept and the attempt to conduct foreign policy by revolutionary propaganda abroad ensured that in foreign states or non-Russian communities the “center of gravity” of the struggle for socialism would be the national-political cohesion and legitimacy of the government in question. In multiethnic or homogeneous areas, the organizational weapon and the appeal to a domestic “fifth column” made certain that the struggle for socialism would be a total one conducted by all means. But given Soviet military weakness, Soviet leaders naturally preferred all means short of war.

Under conditions where national statehood, self-determination, autonomy, or federation were viewed as tactical instruments of war, we can readily understand how Clausewitz fascinated Lenin and Stalin. Simply put, his doctrines gave them a theoretical justification for extending the definition of war to the international theater of class struggle.¹² By subjecting nationality phenomena to purely political criteria as to whether they benefited socialism, Lenin reduced nationality issues to the role of a tactic in this new form of warfare. In Lenin’s 1906 work on partisan warfare he stated that

Marxism asks that the various types of struggle be analyzed within their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside of its historical and concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectical materialism. At various junctures of the economic evolution, and depending upon changing political, national, cultural, social, and other conditions, differing types of struggle may become important and even predominant. As a result of those (sociological) transformations, secondary and subordinate forms of action may change their significance. To try and answer positively or negatively the question of whether a certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying the concrete conditions confronting a given moment at a precise point of its development, would mean a complete negation of Marxism.¹³

Two immediate conclusions readily emerge from the foregoing statements and discussion. Firstly, the call for self-determination—the proclamation of one group or another as the authentic bearer of the revolution—was a tactic to be used as circumstances demanded. Secondly, the significance of resorting to that or any other tactic—political or military—was the aim of retaining in all circumstances a free hand to advance in any direction deemed necessary and possible. In other words, the legendary tactical flexibility of the Soviet regime derives from their conceptualization of conflict as being waged on all fronts or across the board—whence the internal structure of the protagonists becomes the center of gravity. The Bolshevik vision of politics as another form of warfare endowed its practitioners with the maximum feasible number of instruments with which to wage their struggle even in the face of superior enemy military power. Politically, Bolshevik acumen, determination, and resolution backed up by propaganda and the appeal to internal constituencies in the enemy’s “rear” made up for much of the deficiency or blinded enemies to the real military strength of the Soviet Union.

Having at its disposal a multitude of new and relatively unused instruments for the conduct of political warfare, Lenin and his successors lost no time in consolidating the concept and deployment of those instruments. Lenin’s 1920 work on “Left-Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder” insisted that communist parties make use of every possible tactic and exploit every conceivable rift in the world. Rifts occurring within bourgeois society between political factions and between bourgeois states—contradictions in his terms—as well as tensions between imperialist states and their colonies in the third world must be exploited out of ideological conviction and practical necessity.¹⁴ Moreover, this struggle must be joined on the world scale.

Even before coming to power, Lenin had discovered the potential for conflicts in the third world to inhibit resolute bourgeois action if led by a Russian socialist regime. The same result derived from the interimperialist contradiction based on the then leading powers (Germany and England), each of whom strove for domination of Europe. In June 1917 Lenin expressed his certainty that Germany and Britain could not combine against bolshevism because of their own antagonism, just as a year later he saw salvation in the Pacific from the fact of American-Japanese rivalry there—a penetrating insight for those times. In this same address of June 1918 he expressed his fundamental insight concerning the potential relationship that should inhere between revolutionary Russia and the colonies.

The Russian Revolution, which as early as 1905 led to revolutions in Turkey, Persia, and China, would have placed the German and British imperialists in a very difficult position if it had begun to establish a truly revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants of the colonies and semi-colonies against the despots, against the khans, for expulsion of the Germans from Turkey, the British from Turkey, Persia, India, Egypt, etc.¹⁵

By 1920 in his theses to the Communist International, an organization established to disseminate revolution and subversion on a global scale and to bring about this militarization of politics abroad, these insights had both deepened and become sharper. Lenin now contended that the pivotal point of all world politics was the struggle between socialist Russia and the rest of the world, thereby legitimating a Russocentric and doctrinally paranoid view of the world. To break the enemy it was the bounden duty of all parties to ally themselves with anti-imperial forces in the colonies even if they were merely “bourgeois nationalists” because objectively they spelled the doom of the capitalist order. At the same time this alliance, founded on the sheerest realpolitik, ultimately had to provide for the freedom of

Communist parties in these countries to maneuver freely and win control over the liberation movements taking shape there. To achieve this end, these parties had to cooperate in the most intimate form of union with the Soviet party around which they were grouped and whose revolution had a general significance (an implicit avowal of its model-building potentialities) for all peoples.¹⁶

The rigorous consistency of this approach to world politics continued in the period of the new economic policy (NEP). Soviet spokesmen since 1956 proclaim this period—when Russia sought to reenter the state system on equal grounds without yielding on its prerogatives—one of peaceful coexistence. However, Lenin's speeches on the issues of foreign economic concessions to capitalists agree with the previous outlook. In a major speech of 21 December 1920 on foreign policy, he stressed that capitalists approached Russia out of fear of their rivals and that Moscow must exploit these contradictions and make them the cornerstone of its policies. Moreover, the policy of economic concessions was a new kind of war; indeed, the very existence of the capitalists constituted an anti-Socialist war.¹⁷ Hence we see the breakdown between the realms of international economic intercourse and international war. It is out of this kind of thinking by a potentially chauvinistic Russia, which saw itself conducting a global war of liberation on all fronts, that the cold war materialized. As early as 1915 Lenin called for transforming the First World War into an international civil war; ever since then, the world has experienced just that kind of strife with episodes of conflict occurring either concurrently in many places or sequentially. Frequently the participants in these conflicts have resorted to or are resorting to an increasingly wide array of means that has obliterated the distinction between front and rear, war and peace, and nation and class.

Regarding the national question, this scenario was already utilized during 1918–21. Not only did the Soviet regime

foment revolutions abroad, it also shamelessly manipulated sovereignty and republican borders in the Soviet state in order to undermine Polish claims to sovereignty and territory in the wake of Polish independence after 1919.¹⁸ Thus Wiktor Sułcecki observed that after the October Revolution, the Ukraine was treated in a fourfold way: (1) as part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), (2) as a state having federal relations with the RSFSR, (3) as a state confederated to the RSFSR, and (4) as an independent state.¹⁹

The attitude that the sovereignty of any given Soviet republic is a flexible, transitory, and malleable phenomenon has persisted down to Gorbachev. This attitude has been fundamental to the Soviet experience, which has sought to exploit all the manifold possibilities opened up by international law and its own ideology for the manipulation of fictitious entities. Certainly during the border settlements of the 1920s between Moscow and its neighbors, Moscow sought to craft the settlements in such a way as to incite possibilities for irredentist pressure against Romania and Poland.²⁰ In this vein, the attempt in 1920 to substitute a rump, Polish workers government, organized from the Polish Communists serving the Soviet regime, and present it as an authentic Polish group became the basis for a theoretical postulate of strategy in the international revolution. The 1949 *Historicus* article commented on the now-established Stalinist theory of foreign revolution.

Support is not confined to the boundaries of one country, [and] the local bourgeoisie must to a considerable degree be isolated internationally; while the proletariat receives direct or indirect support from the proletariat of other capitalist countries and from the proletarian state already in existence in the USSR. Hence a further condition for successful revolution is that the balance of outside aid for revolution as against potential outside aid for counterrevolution must be sufficiently favorable.²¹

This point was confirmed by an interested Western observer, Ivo Ducachek, a former high official in the postwar

Czechoslovakian government. Writing after the Soviet invasion of 1968, he observed that

for a successful revolution, the Communists must have, among other things, a clearly favorable balance of potential outside aid. The democratic majority must feel isolated *internationally*, while the Communist minority is sure of direct or indirect support from Soviet Russia or other Communist states.²²

Countless Soviet writers have invoked the Leninist solution of the national question as a guide to the resolution of fundamental international tasks and as a model of Soviet–East European relations until 1989. Until 1985, the national question as conceived by Lenin and Stalin was not only an instrument for socializing Russia; it was a lever with which to unhinge the worldwide international political order. The Leninist conceptualization of nationality problems abroad was and remains, in altered form, a major instrument of the continuing global civil war that Lenin inaugurated in 1917.

Yet this was an international or civil war with a difference. The main weapons were not those of the conventional set piece battle or large-scale conventional war. Precisely because it is the hallmark of Soviet thinking to introduce novel refinements into their traditional meaning, so too has the Soviets’ practical approach to international issues of global civil war been unlike any previous conceptions. This is true for all the borrowing from the tsarist state (invocation of religious and national liberation in the Balkan Wars after 1711) or other models like imperial Germany’s “*Revolutionspolitik*”—revolutionizing policy vis-à-vis tsarist Russia in World War I.

The Conceptual Realignment of International Politics

The totality of Soviet thinking on war since 1917 would form a magnum opus; there are, nevertheless, significant commonalities across time which affect Soviet thinking even in today's era of new thinking. These commonalities are of interest to us mainly in the political sphere. One can already find them in Lenin and Trotsky. Trotsky's prerevolutionary military writings are mainly on the revolution of 1905 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. There are indications he grasped that in such situations the center of gravity of the country is the army's and government's morale and will.²³ Here strikes and incitement to revolutionary activity could neutralize or counter the technological advantages of industrialization.

Trotsky also gave considerable thought to the problem of revolutionary military action against the enemy. Should such action take place, it would be a direct result of the masses' psychological influence motivated by economic and political considerations rather than purely military ones. Thus, the requirement not to engage in a trial of strength with superior forces might be overridden, and the revolutionary leadership might not be able to choose the time and place of their action. Indeed, reliance upon purely military actions of a guerrilla nature might not lead to victory but rather to defeat.²⁴ These reflections as of 1906 did not lead out of the impasse involved in devising revolutionary strategy then, especially as Trotsky intuited that the revolutionary army must always be on the offensive to keep up its morale. Under such conditions, the resort to force became decidedly problematic.

Though Trotsky continued to believe in the superiority of class solidarity as a morale builder, by 1913, owing to his experience as war correspondent in the Balkans, he came to see the success of nationalist antienemy indoctrination as a means of mobilizing peasants. Here, too, the importance of

morale for a modern army was crucial.²⁵ Through this experience he began to disdain the activity of uncontrolled partisan groups as having merely local significance as opposed to the effect of regular armies.²⁶ Lenin, too, later viewed the matter in this light. Political morale was fundamental to military success, and precisely because partisan groups could not be controlled adequately, Soviet military policy had to concentrate on building up a regular military as fast as possible. This was the source of major convergence of causes for the creation of the political commissar system to this day.

Trotsky and Lenin posed the dilemma of how a revolutionary force contends for power at home and abroad in the face of superior force and technology. Both men realized that a revolutionary movement must remain on the offensive lest its morale collapse. Moreover, the likelihood of the struggle being a protracted one, whatever its venue, imposes on the leadership the utmost caution before going to war. Indeed, during the Brezhnev era, writers argued that going to war is an invitation to a popular referendum on a regime.²⁷ In Soviet terms, the political objective and goal in the resort to war is always the fundamental defining characteristic. Thus the brandishing of the Leninist ideological tactic with regard to the national question allows a group or movement to believe with perfect sincerity that it alone constitutes the real nation fighting for its liberty and self-respect, a condition which habitually can inspire the utmost sacrifice.

Lenin, Stalin, and their successors all insisted upon the morale or political consciousness of the troops and the masses—Stalin's concept of stability of the rear—as essential to victory. Indeed, this concept of the centrality of the political consciousness of the troops posed the way out of the conundrum facing Lenin and Trotsky. If the party could maintain its morale-building and ideological leadership capability intact, it could inspire and organize a mass

movement that could fight a protracted war on any scale necessary. The ideological redefinition of the universe and its reshaping by a consciously organized vanguard, an example of which is the approach to issues of nationality, was a force multiplier. These related processes of thought and practice even allowed in advance for retreats and defeats which were visualized as having only tactical or temporary significance.

Therefore the first and fundamental question that Soviet leaders asked themselves was, What is the political character of the war? Similarly, the first question Soviet leaders asked concerning a national movement or phenomenon was, What is its political character? That character is the major criterion for defining war and nationality issues and is the basis of the Soviet attitude towards war. In Brezhnev's time this outlook had grown substantially, but its roots were the dilemmas that faced the founding fathers of the USSR. These dilemmas were severe ones; at the same time as the USSR declared war on the international order, the Soviets had to fight a desperate civil war. After winning that war, the leadership remained convinced that it lived in the perpetual shadow of capitalist encirclement, which could only temporarily remain peaceful. War, which was inevitable, would be a large-scale theater conventional war of machines where Russia was technologically backward and where Stalin was deeply unconvinced of the loyalty of his people. The lessons of Russian history demonstrate that long wars—victorious and unsuccessful ones alike—strain the social fabric to the point of revolt if not revolution. Thus war must be avoided without giving the appearance of weakness. Soviet options were limited since this war was inevitable.

Diplomacy could only keep enemies off balance for a time; it could not effect lasting solutions. Indeed, its purpose, as stated by Soviet specialists under Stalin and after, was only a limited one in the overall conduct of foreign policy. Every state's foreign policy and diplomacy were class ones.

Accordingly, Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy were class ones that aimed to perpetuate, strengthen, weaken, terminate, expose, or suppress international conflicts as the situation required.²⁸ Foreign policy's purpose—the protection of Soviet security—entailed the perpetuation of conflict everywhere else; rather than being an instrument for the resolution or adjustment of conflicts, it was a tactic in a never-ending struggle. For Stalin, diplomacy was synonymous with deceit. Everywhere the term *diplomacy* is mentioned in his published works, it is in a context of deceit that he took for granted as the norm of bourgeois and Soviet diplomacy.²⁹

This unfavorable “correlation of forces” facing the USSR imposed certain requirements. Foreign policy, not just diplomacy, had to cause trouble and stir up conflicts everywhere but near the USSR in order to exploit imperialist contradictions and impose an ideologically dictated conception of the world upon foreign actors. At the same time, the Soviet military had to be strong enough to deter outsiders from launching a war. Thus Soviet deep-strike operational planning in the thirties was more a doctrine of the counteroffensive than of the offensive. In effect it stated that if you start a war, you will be digging your own grave because it will lead to a revolution in your own lands backed up by our triumphant counteroffensive. During and after the interwar time, the main political purpose of the Soviet army—for all of its offensive, military-technical, and operational doctrine—has been to deter outsiders from invasion and to intimidate them.³⁰ Even under Brezhnev, when the military arm was most enhanced, Moscow never intervened militarily when it thought this would lead to wider conflict. As Ken Booth points out, if Moscow were to go to war, it would be the result of accident, miscalculation, or direst necessity, not rational choice.³¹ That has been the case.

The Soviet war upon the international system has been one that deliberately avoided force against its main enemy in favor of an attritional, low-intensity, global struggle while simultaneously mobilizing a deterrent capability on the scale of conventional and nuclear war. Having chosen to compete on all fronts simultaneously, Stalin and his successors had to maintain in perpetuity what the socialist economist Oskar Lange called “a permanent war economy *sui generis*.”

Because a true *détente* was ruled out except for averting a nuclear war, the assets of the Soviet state perforce had to be deployed in a permanent state of war readiness. The highest dictate of this state of being included the ideological creation of a universe that could mobilize followers. By defining and organizing a reality in its own terms, Moscow sought to hold that vital political consciousness of its friends and subjects in harmony with the ultimate objective that could only be obtained through a long period of global low-intensity conflict. Fundamental to all Stalinist thought was the notion, derived from Lenin, that class conflict constituted the basic force of both internal and world politics, a notion that logically entailed a dichotomous worldview of two worlds locked in endless struggle and that substituted class for nation—an effect already achieved domestically in 1917–18. Thus, on the international scale, world politics replicated the national struggle at home. Or, to put it differently, the Soviet “solution” to the national question at home replicated itself as the mainspring or ideological basis from which the Soviet state sought to achieve its international aims.

Professor Evgenii Tarle classifies the preferred method Stalin and his successors employed until Gorbachev as a combination of the techniques of both Fascist and Nazi diplomacy on the one hand and bourgeois diplomacy on the other. As Aspaturian comments, these are tactics of Stalinist diplomacy inverted to simulate Western tactics and disguise their original provenance:

1. Systematic employment of lies and extortion—Fascist and Nazi diplomacy.

2. Aggression masquerading as self-defense.

3. Aggression camouflaged by “disinterested” motives.

4. Peace propaganda employed to deceive the adversary.

5. Concluding friendship treaties for the purpose of subverting the vigilance of the adversary.

6. Aggressive plans disguised as a struggle against bolshevism and the USSR.

7. “Localized conflicts” disguised to facilitate the successive elimination of victims.

8. Diplomatic exploitation of internal antagonisms in the camp of the adversary.

9. Exploitation of national differences and conflicts of interest in the camp of the enemy.

10. Demagogic appeal to struggle against the hegemony of the victorious group of imperialist powers.

11. Systematic employment of threats to terrorize the adversary.

12. The “protection” of weak states as a pretext for aggression.³²

Virtually all of these techniques not only involve the effacing of the boundary between war and peace, they also implicate diplomacy as a tool for aggression and demand the ideational overturning of reality as a means towards attaining their objective. The conspiratorial redefinition of reality and its continuous tactical manipulation through a centralized structure of political organization is apparent everywhere. These techniques, combined with peace propaganda at home and abroad, and the subvention of terrorism added after Stalin’s death constitute the abiding hallmarks of a perpetual low-intensity conflict. They constitute the hallmarks of such conflicts because they avoid direct confrontation and unremittingly pursue indirect and long-term attritional strategies.

The Semantics of Attritional Warfare

Recall that Lenin's rivals accused him of launching a state of siege within Russian social democracy. Low-intensity conflict, the cumulative bringing to bear of a series of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures against first remote and then direct targets is also a state of siege—in this case on a global scale—against “imperialism.” In his writings, T. E. Lawrence observed the need in such conflicts for a strategy that finds strength in weakness and attacks the weakness in strength. Insurgencies and revolutionary warfare embrace all means of struggle and conflict. As a contemporary student of the LIC phenomenon observes, the principles of insurgency are motivation or cause, preparation for prolonged struggle, recruitment of both popular and external support, establishment of an alternative society, and a multifaceted strategy to undermine the enemy's power, authority, and morale. By the same token, counter-insurgency's hallmarks are will, time, and patience; initiatives to sustain and extend popular and external support; provision and enforcement of law; minimum resort to force; and superior intelligence.³³

Targets of communist insurgency and political warfare have traditionally been countries short of the required capacities to deal with those challenges, so they have to borrow them from outside—as in Europe (1942–48) with Anglo-American support, or in the third world with American support, generally, or as in Malaya or Indochina (1946–54) with the regimes presently occupying power. Moreover, by resorting to such an indirect strategy, Communist parties foster in Western democracies an ambiguity directly at odds with the cultural pattern of policy-making and force upon the West the onus of seeming aggression, thereby seeking to preserve their own identification with defense and peace.

Despite the fact that Moscow and its satellites always have categorically rejected the status quo until now, they always

have maintained that they are victims of aggression. Imperialism is condemned historically and foredoomed simply because it exists; therefore, war is its fault. This attitude prevails among the Soviet defense establishment to this day, as a 1988 article by Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov indicates. He states,

As for the wars that we have waged, they were imposed on us from the outside by imperialist reaction. They were in defense of the socialist fatherland. And the victories secured by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in these—on our side—wars of liberation were a natural phenomenon. They were in accordance with the vital, crucial interests of all peoples because they heralded the defeat of the forces of aggression and militarism, restricted their potential for unleashing new wars, and strengthened the hope of man's final deliverance from them. Both in their sociopolitical nature and in their worldwide historical significance, they were victories for the sake of progress, for the sake of peace.³⁴

This formulation is a direct result of the ideological mystification indulged in since Lenin seized power in 1917. The tactic is fundamental to waging the attritional warfare that has gone on since 1917. A recent study of terrorism, a major tactic in such warfare, testifies to the global expansion of this process. Donald Hanle stresses two major concepts of Soviet warfighting, namely the “correlation of forces” and the war of national liberation. He quotes academician Sergeev, who points out that, for Moscow, correlation of forces goes far beyond the bean counting beloved by American military analysts. A state's foreign policy potential goes far beyond its own internal and external resources to include the existence of reliable sociopolitical allies among other states, “national contingents of congenial classes,” mass movements abroad, and other worldwide political forces.³⁵ Force, directly applied, is conspicuously absent from this definition. Wars of national liberation are just wars because they mandate a Soviet requirement to help without committing to the direct application of force.³⁶

Hanle's two concepts illuminate the manner in which national revolutionary tactics can be raised to a global level of "stable," long-term, international struggle without major war. In many cases terrorist strikes are substitutes for actions at the operational or strategic level that are rendered both impossible and unnecessary by the revolutions in warfare, media, and political struggle. Additionally these tactics can be taken over from groups that are anything but Leninist and used successfully by them or by non-Soviet forces. The Middle East, and fascist and Nazi foreign policies before 1939 provide many examples of this copying and refinement of Leninist political warfare—a process which continues today, mainly in the Middle East and Latin America.

Inasmuch as Lenin and Stalin mobilized the USSR for perpetual wartime readiness, the USSR was admirably situated to wage such a war. Such "Lawrencian" strategies were relatively cost free compared to the task of keeping a conventional military machine in readiness. The instruments were foreign communist parties and front organizations; financial subventions which were bearable; and the deployment abroad of increasing but always relatively few direct Soviet assets, weapons, technicians, KGB men (or their institutional predecessors), Comintern armies (as in Spain, 1936–39), and small quantities of Red Army men, until Afghanistan.

These techniques, tactics, and strategies of global political conflict, punctured by spasmodic resorts to violence and terror, built upon the original ideological mystifications inherent in Leninism, particularly regarding national questions. As the resort to terror at home and abroad declined in gross figures after 1953, the Soviet Union expanded its covert, intelligence, and ideological-organizational means of warfare abroad as much as it did its conventional and strategic military arms, which were designed to intimidate the West and

hold it at bay. After 1945 the cold war was a war on two fronts—a classic example of attritional warfare.

Redefining Sovereignties

In the postwar period, as in the one preceding it, Soviet leaders and commentators resorted to the time-tested principles of ideological warfare described above. Just as the Soviet government confounded national issues and questions in its own domain, so too did it exemplify the conduct of what had to be an ideological-political and generally nonmilitary war by its approach to those very questions in new areas. Both recent and earlier studies of Soviet handling of these issues illustrate the fundamental slipperiness of Soviet concepts. For Soviet scholars under Stalin and until the advent of new thinking under Gorbachev, the model of the emerging “socialist commonwealth” in Eastern Europe was the model for the new states in their internal policies regarding minority peoples.³⁷

Then, as now, Soviet analysts proceeded from a class analysis of sovereignty and related issues that turned these nationality phenomena inside out. They derided bourgeois concepts of sovereignty for excessively relying upon a formal-legal concept rather than a political-legal concept.³⁸ In 1947 Konstantinov, a Soviet jurist and analyst, observed that “in the present historical situation of transition from capitalism to socialism [in Eastern Europe, sovereignty] is primarily the right of the peoples to build Socialism and Communism.”³⁹ Sovereignty and related phenomena were malleable concepts subject to historical revision depending on the circumstances. The party, given its “superior” insight into history, necessarily had the exclusive rights to revision of these phenomena. As Jones observes, Soviet analysts divided sovereignty into both internal and external manifestations. Internally it meant proletarian (read party) supremacy at home; externally it meant independence from capitalism. In

spite of this denigration of sovereignty and substitution of party for class and state, foreign audiences only received the message that Soviet-type sovereignty was the only authentic form.⁴⁰

The knowledgeable student of Soviet history will recognize that in 1920–21 these same arguments were used to justify the incorporation of sovereign states and unwilling republics into the Soviet Union and were explicitly invoked by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. During this interwar period, Soviet scholars formulated the doctrine justifying military intervention to assist other socialist movements or save endangered ones.⁴¹ By proclaiming that the USSR alone had abolished antagonistic classes and that its sovereignty alone was popular at the same time as the doctrine of proletarian internationalism established the superiority of the interests of socialism—popular sovereignty—over those of national solidarity and sovereignty, the USSR fashioned a formidable instrument of ideological warfare. This instrument became a blanket justification for intervention abroad by claiming that Moscow or its clients alone represented the “democratic will of the peoples.” After Stalin’s death, Soviet spokesmen ruled out the possibility that true sovereignty could inhere in any class state.⁴² Inasmuch as Leninism has rigorously adhered to the notion that war and imperialism are the inherent birthmarks of capitalist states and, therefore, the external manifestations of class struggle, it can only be with their extinction that socialism comes about, as well as the true sovereignty.⁴³

The stress on imparting a class character to sovereignty has allowed the USSR to adhere to a notion of its sovereignty and rights as a state and simultaneously endorse a diminished sovereignty and utterly transformed notion of that concept for other states. Aspaturian cites two sharply contrasted examples indicating the flexibility of the USSR and its effort to assume many guises as a subject and object of international politics.

In 1948 Stalin denounced Tito and Kardelj's attacks on Soviet ambassadors to Yugoslavia for seeking to foment intrigues within the Yugoslav party and to recruit anti-Tito followers on the grounds that they treated Soviet embassy personnel like bourgeois ambassadors. Soviet representatives were socialist comrades who had an international duty to discuss matters with their Yugoslav conferees. In the sixties the Soviets accused Chinese diplomats of doing the same thing, which was then interpreted as a violation of Leninist norms and of international law, despite Chinese efforts to hide behind proletarian internationalism.⁴⁴ Of course, had matters become violent the aforementioned doctrines would have protected Soviet interests outside its legal boundaries by virtue of a doctrine of justified extended deterrence and defense.⁴⁵ Or, as a prominent Soviet jurist of the postwar period, Korovin, stated, "A legal norm that has positive (progressive) value in relations between capitalist states may, in a number of cases, acquire the opposite (reactionary) character when transferred to the relations between socialist states."⁴⁶

It should be obvious that such ideological acrobatics furnished Moscow with an inexhaustible repertoire of tactical instruments for waging incessant ideological-political war during the cold war period. Indeed, Soviet analysts made no bones about the fact that while nuclear weapons ruled out the inevitability of a military clash with imperialism, they only made the ideological-political one more likely and more intense. Peaceful coexistence accepted the danger of war and, after 1977, even ruled out Soviet first strike in a nuclear conflict in Brezhnev's Tula speech, but it expressly affirmed the necessity of carrying on the struggle by all other means wherever possible. Thus, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, the instruments of ideological warfare—the KGB and the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee as well as the fronts and agents they manipulated—were steadily expanded in range, scope, and

number. Further, enormous military spending brought the USSR to at least a point of strategic parity and of conventional superiority to threaten and intimidate Western forces even as the Soviets exploited every avenue of access to Western societies.

Although the USSR accepted an explicit mandate to wage ideological warfare everywhere, the Soviets, nonetheless, staunchly displayed outrage at any such effort directed against them from the outside. The patent to this technique was theirs, and as long as they could maintain it, they would succeed greatly in world affairs. This foreshadowing of the Brezhnev Doctrine was meant to convey the impression that the Soviet bloc was off limits. The struggle was to be waged on neutral or enemy territory, another example of the operational offensive by nonmilitary means under the guise of a defensive and perhaps preemptive doctrine.

This struggle—known as the cold war—may have ended with the revolutions of 1989–90 in Eastern Europe and Nicaragua, but it engendered the worldwide diffusion of these techniques of ideological political warfare so that now every insurgent group has access to them. They are no longer of strict Soviet provenance. Also, there are reasons for suspecting that lurking inside the new thinking of the Gorbachev regime and its policies is much of the old technique uneasily coexisting with a new approach to world politics.

Some Global Implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine

From a cursory examination of Brezhnev's overall foreign policies, we can see the taking up of old ideas and the reworking of them for the purposes of prosecuting the ongoing struggle globally. Khrushchev and Brezhnev built their

policies around the same set of inherited principles concerning the nation and the class as political manifestations, the inevitability of global struggle (if not nuclear war or intersystemic war), and the substantial upgrading of the instruments and techniques of subversion, proxies, intelligence, covert operations, terrorism, and so forth.

Though the Brezhnev Doctrine was the most notorious example of the revision of sovereignty by Leninist leaders, it was hardly created anew in 1968. Indeed, many of the elements that went into its fabrication in 1968 emerged in Soviet commentary about the abortive Hungarian revolution of 1956. These statements portrayed that revolution as an anti-Soviet act of the bourgeois class and not of the nation. Moreover, the revolution was strongly supported and inspired, so commentators said, from abroad; thus, it was essentially an act of class warfare. Such commentary again exposed the Soviet attempt to fuse for itself the idea of nation and class inherent in Italian Fascism while denying the reality of nationhood to its subject states. As part of this ideological operation, the concept of proletarian and/or socialist internationalism was reborn. This concept's touchstones were loyalty and fidelity to the socialist fatherland, exactly as in Stalin's time.⁴⁷ As Jones observes,

In the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet theory of "socialist international relations" was reformulated on the basis of the following assumptions: firstly, the qualitatively superior nature of socialist international relations; secondly, harmony, deriving from an absence of "antagonistic contradictions" between and within socialist countries; thirdly, the "drawing together" of socialist countries, resulting from objective processes of development; fourth, mutual fraternal aid, given disinterestedly and not deriving from motives of self-interest; fifth, the beneficent role of the Soviet Union within the camp. The enunciation of these concepts showed that, far from causing a "retreat from ideology" bloc crises are more likely to precipitate a shift in Soviet theory towards concepts putatively derived from Marxist-Leninism.⁴⁸

Thus, as he notes, innovations in Soviet theorizing tend to derive from crises in the bloc which precipitate a return to earlier motifs, form a relaxation of controls, and enlarge the space wherein public debate may occur—both of the latter being the twin catalysts of Gorbachev's new thinking.

As part of the new doctrine, Soviet international lawyers asserted that socialist internationalism, like proletarian internationalism previously, was a higher sphere whose precepts took precedence over the mundane precepts of bourgeois international law. Thus concepts of political life such as sovereignty meant entirely different things to socialist than to nonsocialist states.⁴⁹ The proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine as rationalization *ex post facto* of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its defense a week later by Gromyko at the United Nations reflected this Soviet effort to graft ideological principles onto established juridical codes of international conduct and transform them into something opposite than what they were. The socialist commonwealth became a distinct ideological and political community that operated under its own dispensation making it immune from normal rules of intervention and sovereignty. Socialist states, individually and collectively, have invisible ideological frontiers which may be violated if it is determined that outsiders, through equally invisible means, transgress against them. Moscow arrogated to itself the right to violate the formal legal state sovereignty to preserve the higher political-legal ideological sovereignty.⁵⁰ In this connection Robert Jones cites several sources which compare the Brezhnev Doctrine to other doctrines legitimating ideological intervention: the Holy Alliance, the Monroe Doctrine after 1900, Nazi doctrines associated with Karl Schmitt, imperial Japanese doctrines, and others of that stripe.⁵¹ The significance is not the fact of their comparability but the fact that this indicates the ideological process of transplantation or borrowing from one brand of dictatorship to the other. Just as

Soviet and fascist doctrine intersected when Soviet ideologists fused class with nation, so too did they begin a process of ideological commingling that has continued with the advent of third-world states whose rulers indiscriminately amalgamate the legacies of Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, and Mao for their own purposes.

The significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine is that it constituted the ideological-political rationale for a policy which married ideology, instruments of subversion, and direct force in Europe, the US, and the third world. The aggressive policies of 1967–82 were all undertaken in the name of that doctrine and those that spawned as a result of the search for means of power abroad, such as states of socialist orientation, vanguard parties, the international mission of the Red Army abroad, and so forth. Although today Brezhnev's policies are under withering attack, it is clear that the instruments he perfected are still being used, and the ideological principles upon which he based himself are, to some extent, only reformulated and partially revised. They coexist uneasily with new ideas that may well be new and, in the Soviet context, revolutionary concerning world politics.

Under Brezhnev, an extensive superstructure was constructed upon the foundations that had previously existed. This "building program," parallel with the "peace program" enunciated at the XXIV Party Congress in 1971, comprised many military, political, institutional, and ideological elements that helped to permanently institutionalize a collective security scheme for the promotion of Soviet aims abroad (revolutionary and nonrevolutionary) and the promotion of the instrumental infrastructure for carrying it out. These elements were as follows:

1. An extensive and continuing buildup of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons systems, both offensive and (in research) defensive, to obtain parity with the United States and

deter the US from using nuclear weapons against Moscow for fear of equivalent retaliation.

2. An equally extensive conventional buildup and modernization that not only sought to obtain an enduring conventional superiority in Europe to intimidate the NATO allies but also invested heavily in the accoutrements of power projection in order to develop a capacity for intervention beyond the USSR's security glacis. This capacity was then used in a long-term, graduated program of increasing military intervention abroad from 1965 to 1979.

3. A similarly extensive and unremitting buildup of both the status and the intensity of the KGB's role in foreign affairs. This systematic effort entailed not only the gathering of espionage agents and information but also gun running; triggering of coups by covert agents of influence; manipulation of various fronts and media abroad; the use of the International Department of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a constant source of contact with foreign Communists; oversight of the satellite states' security services operations to gain control or train new Communist countries' elites in security service operations; penetration of the UN and its associated agencies; the provision of training, financial, and arms support to terrorist groups; and the creation of a "solar system" of organizations to camouflage Soviet involvement in terror operations, drug running, and finally "wet affairs" (i.e., assassinations of enemies of the USSR including heads of state and the Pope).

4. As a result of the isomorphic duplication by satellite states of Soviet institutional structures, those states were called upon to provide major logistic and institutional support along the same lines. Cuba and East Germany particularly distinguished themselves in the intensity and ubiquity of their provision of soldiers or security personnel to new conquests of socialism. In so doing they replicated the structures of the USSR and demonstrated the fundamental continuity with their

predecessors in the twenties who also created secret police and party organizations within the “open” or overt organization to exercise terror and ideological control, and to further extend subversion and recruit covert agents for the *apparat*.⁵²

5. The Brezhnev regime vastly altered Soviet aid programs abroad to place an enormous stress on the transfer of arms to key states and areas both by overt sales and credits and by covert transfers—often done through terrorists or other clandestine operations.

These were the instruments and the players depicted in brief, and from this outline one can see the elaboration of a global struggle of unrelenting steadiness and intensity to expand the Soviet sphere abroad. Despite the critiques of the Brezhnev era and the new policies of the Gorbachev era associated with the new thinking, this infrastructure has only been tuned down in its intensity and frequency, not fundamentally disbanded. For instance, North Korea and Vietnam, not to mention the worldwide fronts providing cash to the Philippine New People’s Army, actively abet the revolution in the Philippines. The same holds true for Nicaragua’s Sandinista front operations and support for El Salvador’s revolution, which may be diverted with the anti-Sandinista election outcomes there.

This strategy—clearly an integrated one—went on despite the sincere protest of Moscow that it was interested in and faithful to a policy of peaceful coexistence. And by its lights, so it was. The difference with our understanding lies in the fact that ideas are utterly subservient to their political meaning and context for Moscow and are thus always relativized to suit the needs of the cause at the time. Any study of the uses or definitions of the term “peaceful coexistence” under Brezhnev demonstrates a wide conformity in policy-making circles of understanding that it pertained only to nuclear and high-intensity theater conventional warfare, not to the advancement of socialism by all means abroad. Moreover,

violence, if needed, was clearly sanctioned as a legitimate instrument for attaining these goals.⁵³

As part of the ramified network of agencies and institutions carrying out these policies, Soviet leaders and commentators also fashioned a series of interlocking ideological precepts which both explained and justified these organizations' activities. The observations on peaceful coexistence were buttressed by the following notions:

1. It was primarily due to the Soviet Union and particularly its rise to military power and parity with America that third-world countries owed their independence—the implication being that Moscow-centered policies and outlooks determined events in the third world.

2. The worldwide correlation of forces was inevitably moving towards the superiority of socialism, and imperialism had been forced to recognize that it could not easily export counterrevolution or compete with the USSR on military grounds alone. Thus “the forces of peace and progress” were gradually conquering position after position.

3. Opposing the “export of revolution,” the USSR nonetheless regarded itself as the exclusive and natural supporter in active terms of the worldwide revolutionary process and also resolutely opposed the export of “counterrevolution” by imperialism.

4. Although third-world states could not become socialist overnight, they could succeed—particularly by control through a radicalized army—in erecting “states of socialist orientation” and forming vanguard parties to rule in these states. These parties and states then qualified for Soviet assistance.

5. They qualified for such assistance because of the mission of proletarian internationalism which subsumed the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty and which granted the right of intervention abroad to Moscow.

6. This right of intervention abroad to materialize proletarian internationalism found its realization in the

“internationalist and liberating mission” of the Soviet armed forces. Now released from inhibitions of competing with the US due to the attainment of parity and American post-Vietnam demoralization, the Soviets could, when conditions were favorable, decide a contest as in Angola and the Horn of Africa, and seek to do so in Afghanistan.

At the foundation of all these outlooks were the fundamental irreconcilability of socialism with the international status quo, the need to devise a total strategy to unhinge this status quo even while using it for maximum advantage, the reliance on political and ostensibly nonmilitary factors in order to militarize world politics and domestic politics everywhere if possible, and the re-creation of a counterreality. This re-creation of reality along imposed ideological lines can be glimpsed from Nicholas Podgorny’s observations in 1977 when, while surveying the lands of Southern Africa, he said that the boundaries of Zimbabwe and South Africa were not national ones but class boundaries. In other words, the usual confusion of class and nation lay at the bottom of Soviet perceptions here as well.

The power such perspectives exercised over not only Moscow but the entire movement globally can be found in a study done for the journal of the movement and the International Department, *World Marxist Review*, concurrently with the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan that sought to explain those revolutions and recommend their successful prosecution. The authors of this study were at pains to refute the idea that the end of formal colonial empires rendered the need for “anti-imperialist struggle” superfluous. The rulers of Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan then shared a common tendency to impose capitalism from above and thereby to tie their countries into the world capitalist system in an artificial, nonindigenous manner. The revolutionary process in these countries is a blend of universal “laws” with national peculiarities in each state.

Among these peculiarities are national relations and religious beliefs of the masses, which are the “new material” of politics, the character of whose political use depends on the stage of the revolution, the alignment of political forces, and so forth. For example, in Afghanistan’s case, its sovereignty was distinguished by its being independent from imperialism, a situation stemming from its ties with the USSR, and one materially influencing the key political actor, the army. The authors of this study emphasized the critical importance of bringing about a national revolutionary crisis in social and economic life to undermine the traditional religious consciousness of Afghanistan while also co-opting Islamic clergy wherever possible, exactly as in the case of Soviet Central Asia. An equal stress was laid on the nationality question there. It was singled out as the motivating factor in antigovernment rebellions which were—as is always the case—stimulated from abroad. “In this situation it is of special importance to achieve real national unity and equality, whose institutional forms can be diverse.”⁵⁴ This unity would result from a comprehensive publishing, education, and socio-economic policy to raise all nationalities to the same socioeconomic level, more precisely, social engineering on a grand, revolutionary, and coercive scale. Such policies are of significance not only for Afghanistan but throughout the Middle East where national issues are salient, particularly the targets of Soviet designs: Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Israel.⁵⁵

The predictable reaction of the Afghans to such programs was not seen officially, at this time, as the fault of Soviet policy or that of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The same concept held true for other regional conflicts. Philip Nel identified six linked notions that supported this ideological superstructure.

1. Stability in the third world is artificial. Anticolonial revolutions are historically inevitable and inherently progressive, and therefore they merit Soviet support.

2. Wars of national liberation have a similar justification and provenance.

3. Imperialist meddling and intervention alone are responsible for the diversion of “the natural course” of third-world development into wars and the stimulation of a threatening international environment.

4. No connection exists between Soviet behavior in the third world (or Europe) and détente.

5. Regional conflicts need not necessarily escalate into superpower confrontations.

6. In some regional conflicts, “political solutions” are desirable.

Since Brezhnev, all of these points have either been refuted or come under serious attack.⁵⁶ But lasting damage was done to the world order by the Brezhnev policies described herein. Two examples are the insurgencies continuing in Central America and in the Philippines. These highlight the collective security or use of surrogates to promote global revolutionary war. In the Philippines there is mounting evidence of North Korean, Vietnamese, and Soviet arms transfers, training, financial subventions, expanded intelligence operations, and massive Soviet propaganda to the area in the last five years.⁵⁷ At the same time, if one examines the revolutionary movements in Grenada to 1983, and El Salvador’s and the Sandinistas’s record in Nicaragua, one finds a long-standing organizational network involving Cuba, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Colombian M-19, the Basque terrorists, Italy’s Red Brigades, the West German Baader-Meinhof gang, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and even—many claim—international drug figures. Manuel Noriega’s laundering of Cuban currency and stock-piling of weapons in Panama may well have been tied in to

this kind of activity.⁵⁸ In Cuba's case the provision of arms, troops, and advisors—both technicians and security services—brought about a situation in both Central America and Africa of *microdependency*, to use Ali Mazrui's term. This microdependency of the host countries upon Cuba was both organizational and ideological. Its explicit aim was to further the "anti-imperialist cause." But inasmuch as Cuba's constitution, in direct violation of the UN charter, calls for open support for wars of national liberation, such a process in effect (and Mazrui's evaluation was a favorable one for Africa) made Africa and Central America ideological and international battlegrounds.⁵⁹ This was Castro's—if not Moscow's—aim; and from 1975 to the present, the wars in both locales decidedly fanned the flames of international conflict. But however one cuts it, dependency remains dependency (i.e., the undermining of national sovereignty, exactly the point we made earlier). Confusing issues on questions relating to national and international affairs lead thinkers and politically influential elites to lose sight of reality and substitute others' terms and definitions for reality or to whitewash what they normally condemn.

Apart from the globalization of the international state of siege and its intensification under Brezhnev, a second major tactic was the creation and support of an extensive terrorist network depicted in works by Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, and many others. For instance, Theodore Draper noted in 1981 that the Soviet embassy in Washington confirmed that Moscow transshipped arms to Cuba for further shipment abroad with no restrictions on their ultimate destination.⁶⁰ Similarly, Spanish officials reported in 1980 that Gromyko told them that Moscow would help with their terrorist problem if they refrained from joining NATO, but Gromyko also implied that entry into NATO might leave Spain vulnerable to more terrorism.⁶¹ By April 1980 the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Stepan Chervonenko, who had served as ambassador to

Prague in 1968, warned a French audience that Moscow could “not permit another Chile” and further stated that any country on the globe “has the full right to choose its friends and allies, and if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat of a counterrevolution or foreign intervention.”⁶² Thus the Brezhnev regime, towards the end of its life, staked a claim to the universalization of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the concepts of foreordained struggle and proletarian internationalism upon which it was based. From this vantage point, one could easily foresee a global civil war—but one fought with psychological, political, covert, and small-scale operations characteristic of low-intensity conflicts or fought by conventional conflicts among superpower proxies—in other words a universal version of the state of siege introduced by Lenin.

Leninism as Permanent Low-Intensity Conflict

A recent article on low-intensity conflict uses the work of Alexander Atkinson and reflections on Maoist doctrines of warfare to make the point that, in our times, war is an invasion of the social order—what Gen J. F. C. Fuller called the “retribalizing of warfare.” In this view the point of warfare is the forcible effort to dissolve one social order and its moral, social, and political foundations. If the insurgent succeeds in tearing apart the fabric of relations upon which a society or the society of states rests, then, in this view, violence can serve as the midwife of a new order legitimized by military success. Thus low-intensity conflict, applied globally, becomes a basis for the raising of this conception of warfare to the global level. If the ultimate goal of such warfare is the creation of a new social order, we encounter a total war targeted against the legitimacy and consensual basis of a society or the international order as a whole, not just soldiers.

Everyone is somehow drawn into this war either physically or psychologically.⁶³ Certainly this kind of warfare is more analogous to the overall pattern adduced above for the Brezhnev period than the scenarios of conventional theater war or strategic nuclear warfare.

The importance of the moral factor so heavily stressed by the Soviets, and now seen to be unraveling rapidly, stems from the awareness that morale is the key to the endurance needed to win such wars. Hence the decision to commit forces in bulk to combat is the most dangerous one of all for a state. For such a war to be successful, it is imperative that the populace be convinced of the justness of the war. Should the opposite be true for the population or the army, disaster is in the air—witness Afghanistan. Accordingly the Soviet Union has tried—generally, with the exception of the Brezhnev period's delusions of grandeur—to limit the use of its troops abroad. As Christopher Jones points out, Soviet writers before 1975 knew that motivating the troops needed for limited wars with the belief in its justness is inherently difficult and problematical. With the aftermath of Afghanistan ringing in our ears as the Soviet army undergoes its greatest internal crisis in decades, the justness of his observation is telling. "The military experts of the USSR come close to stating that, in going to war, Soviet leaders run the risk of a domestic political crisis if Soviet citizens come to view the war as an aggressive unjust campaign."⁶⁴ In Christopher Jones's study of the Russo-Polish War of 1920 as a case in which the Soviets mistakenly underplayed or underassessed the political dimension and stressed military conquest, he states the views offered by the military historian P. V. Suslov in 1930.

What Suslov offers is a demonstration of the proposition of Soviet military theory that war is the pursuit of specific political objectives; that the political objectives of the war determine the moral-political factor on both sides of the battlefield; that this factor has a great impact on the success of military operations; that nationalism is one of the most important components of the moral-political factor; and that

Soviet leaders will not pursue a war that appears to be “unjust” if they are worried about the stability of the home front.⁶⁵

The foregoing analysis indicates just how intimately ideological revisions of national issues are bound to the sole available Soviet strategy of limited but continuous revolutionary struggle on the world scene. As the lessons and techniques of such warfare are diffused to insurgents and terrorists the world over, the opportunities for strikes across borders (terrorism on the high seas or at airports) become too temptingly easy to reject. But the oversight of such a strategy by the USSR on a daily and global basis requires a functioning organization of great scope and extension. Before 1943 this role was played by the Comintern, operating in tandem with the secret services, party, and army; since then it has been the function of the International Department of the Central Committee.

During the Brezhnev years, under the long-time Comintern and ID stalwart, Boris Ponomarev, this organization built up and monitored on a daily basis an enormous infrastructure binding European and third-world parties, fronts, and terrorist organizations into an apparently cohesive network. A recent article detailing the ID’s role in the eighties notes that its activities were so subtle, quiet, “benign,” and incremental that they largely eluded foreign commentary.⁶⁶ Apart from formal state relations conducted through embassies, the USSR, operating through the ID, instituted a regular and extensive practice of party-party ties through which it could exercise much greater supervision over parties as far away as Grenada than it could through state channels. Often treaties of friendship with selected third-world states provided the basis for such regularized party-party contacts and subventions. A veritable solar system—Comintern veteran Otto Kuusinen’s term—of peace and front groups including doctors and rock musicians provides another channel of influence and control. The pervasive tendency towards isomorphic reproduction of

Soviet-type structures found an echo here in that the Grenada regime sought to duplicate these kinds of activities in seeking to establish influence over Belize and Suriname, another instance of microdependency.⁶⁷ The heavy work load led to the increasing bureaucratization of the ID, whose mandate was the expansion of contacts and insertion of agents, as Stanislav Levchenko testifies from his own experience in Japan. This fit in well with Ponomarev's uncompromising adherence of global class war and with the institutional regime that evolved thereby. Thus by the time of Gorbachev's advent to power, a well-oiled—if over-bureaucratic—machine was at his disposal.⁶⁸ The ID, as exemplar of world revolution, remained convinced of the power of Communist ideals and ideology—as does Castro today, sitting in increasingly unsplendid isolation—and missed no chance to use it to win over, or to appear to win over, third parties.⁶⁹

New Thinking and the Crisis of Leninism

In the eighties, crises due to economic and technological stagnation, arteriosclerosis of the *apparat*, the costs of arms, the technological arms race against the US and the entire West, and the failure of the war in Afghanistan forced an accelerated process of reassessment upon the Soviet leadership. This reassessment, the new thinking, was forced upon the USSR as a result of the spreading awareness that not only was its superpower position endangered, but that its competitive status as one of many great powers was equally at risk. This realization, abetted by a vigorously reforming leadership, has led to what Shakhnazarov calls “a ruthless scuttling of dogmas.” As a result, the new thinking and the policies associated with it since 1985 in many ways constitute a revolutionary break with the past. But side by side with those elements, there exist compelling traditional or unresolved

elements that introduce a cautionary or contradictory tone into this thinking. Moreover, as uprisings in El Salvador in November 1989, the continuation of the war over Eritrea, the *intifadah* in Israel, the Cambodian civil war, and Korean tensions raised by the discovery of a fourth tunnel into the Republic of Korea all indicate these techniques and policies of revolutionary warfare are still with us. Should a reversal occur in world politics, there are actors like Fidel Castro who would be only too willing to revert to past practices and policies.

Gorbachev's policies are undoubtedly fundamentally different and more concessionary than what was the case before. The new thinking also lays claim to being a revolutionary departure in policy perspectives. Several ideational strands comprise this fabric of perspectives on international relations.

1. Security is mutual, that is both superpowers' security is interdependent with each other's. The actions of one naturally impinge directly upon the other. Accordingly, they cannot act in isolation from one another. Events in one sector—for instance, the Horn of Africa—affect others.

2. Security cannot be achieved unilaterally by purely military means. Indeed, such a course fuels the arms race and military confrontation, which could lead to nuclear catastrophe, to use the vogueish Soviet term. Instead both superpowers must seek to negotiate and achieve political solutions to problems ranging from regional conflict to conventional and strategic disarmament.

3. Regional conflicts must be resolved by purely political means that sanctify freedom of choice for the states involved to pursue whatever line of domestic politics they choose. The process by which these conflicts must come to an end is renamed a "balance of interests," which means that all the combatants and regional powers affected by conflict in their area must jointly participate in the process of bringing about

solutions. Equally importantly, arms transfers and foreign intervention in these conflicts must be ruled out. The UN and its component agencies can play important roles in the conflict resolution process. These conflicts are seen as dangerous because they could lead to exacerbation of superpower tensions across the board as they did a decade and more ago.

4. All states must enjoy freedom of choice—the Soviet term—in choosing their form of government free of outside intervention.

5. The processes of conflict resolution and intensified dialogue must be buttressed by a deideologization of foreign relations which sees the other side's interests as legitimate ones that merit consideration and serious dialogue. This deideologization entails a rethinking of peaceful coexistence, which is now altered (or so it is claimed) from previous understandings of the term that saw no difference between classes and states in this regard and which also saw détente as furthering class struggle abroad.

6. The process should culminate in a system of universal or comprehensive security, including economic security from foreign intervention, joint cooperation, a strengthened UN, total nuclear disarmament, and greater authority for international legal agencies.

7. Underpinning the entire conception is not only the realization of the changed nature of superpower security outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2, but also an awareness of the primacy of the human interest in peace, which transcends that of the class struggle and obliges the USSR to wage a struggle for peace and take a responsible stance for the common interest of all peoples.⁷⁰

Much of this perspective is a radical departure from past rhetoric. Firstly, no longer is class struggle transposed from internal politics of states to nations, as in Stalin's case.⁷¹ Secondly, no longer is the world fatalistically divided into a struggle based on ideology between two camps. Collaboration

with the United States expands to include a broader agenda than simply averting nuclear war. Not only is reconciliation with the US and the West possible, for many it is positively indicated and necessary. Some analysts like Kortunov go so far as to see the US and USSR as natural partners—his term. Others like Georgii and Aleksei Arbatov also endorse a more collaborative approach to the US ranging from issues of ecology to strategic weapons programs.⁷² This series of views did not originate magically with Gorbachev. They were already present among analysts' writing during Brezhnev's and Andropov's tenure in the less prominent journals where they might elude careful scrutiny by the powers that be. The ideas of economic interdependence and the need to collaborate with the United States to shape a new global order antedate 1985.⁷³

Even so, these ideas came into play as the USSR faced a conjuncture of a profound socioeconomic and moral crisis at home, not to mention an inability to sustain its great-power role in military-technological competition or the ideological one. Indeed, one of the reasons for the new thinking is precisely the need to find a new means by which to manage the terms of ideological debate with the West. Hamann and his interlocutor, Evgeni Novikov, observe that the need to find a language in which to address the West forced this reversion to new thinking which appropriates terms from Western writers, radicals and nonradicals alike.⁷⁴ Soviet military-political commentators agree that the unprecedented threat the USSR faced at the time and the dead end to which previous policies had led forced a revision of the USSR's political thinking.⁷⁵ Indeed, by 1988, Soviet writers were penning apocalyptic essays stating that it was the last chance for the USSR to remain a great power, not a superpower, if they adopted the new spiritual and intellectual perspectives associated with *perestroika*.⁷⁶ Today the signs of a real decline in Soviet international power are evident everywhere

and acknowledged—a fact which underlies the concessionary basis of Gorbachev's policy in Europe.

Nonetheless the points outlined as being the essential ones of new thinking do not validate many of the techniques and policies of the past. Calls for overall denuclearization, claims that Soviet military doctrine is defensive, calls for a common European home, and so forth are all ideas that go back to Brezhnev's time. Indeed, many of the same commentators as then are the ones promoting such goals today. In many cases their mission is just the same as before: disinformation and/or propaganda, telling the West what it wants to hear. Thus, despite calls for denuclearization, the Soviet nuclear arsenal and strategic systems are being modernized and improved; and the same is true of their navy and air forces. Although the ground forces are being reduced numerically, the intention is to upgrade their actual quality and striking power by use of new technologies and automated systems.

The KGB abroad has not been clipped, although its orientation towards technological espionage evidently has been reinforced. The Soviet security service still takes an active role in spreading disinformation through active measures and forgeries. Drug running and arms transfers to third-world clients, though down in some cases, are up in others—Cambodia and Afghanistan. What does seem to be the case in policy terms is retrenchment and retreat, as Kortunov and Izyumov put it, to prepared defensive positions.⁷⁷

Novikov observes that the cardinal tenet in practice of the policy of new thinking is to seek rapprochement with influential elites everywhere regardless of their ideology.⁷⁸ The ideas and practices of the new thinking exhibit the intention to put forth an ideological program and insinuate it into the public debate to advance rather traditional goals. This becomes clear when one examines the words of the leaders of Soviet foreign policy. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze explicitly unlinked peaceful coexistence from class struggle

in his speech to the July 1988 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Class struggles constitute the stuff of domestic politics; but they must not rule interstate politics, which is based on searches for common ground—overall human interests. Although this contrasts sharply with Ligachev's call for continuing the class-based foreign policy, over 20 years ago Brezhnev observed that the struggle for peace had moved to the forefront of the struggle for socialism.⁷⁹ Both Yakovlev and Gorbachev intimate that they see themselves as purveyors of an ideological program that is in a state of contest with the West. Gorbachev, at his Sorbonne speech in July 1989, charged that socialism still had to contend with the misplaced bourgeois belief that socialism was no more than a mistake whose time had come. Instead, while disclaiming an effort to reinterpret history, Gorbachev states that the West even borrowed ideas and concepts from bolshevism to better fight against it.⁸⁰ Yakovlev also charged that the West is seeking to insinuate the destruction of socialism—a charge that he refuses to believe. He points to Western social welfare practices as being borrowed from socialism.⁸¹

This line of argument indicates a consciousness of ideological struggle precisely because it seeks to evade the real issue of democracy versus totalitarian dictatorship. Moreover, the social welfare reforms of the West preceded the October Revolution and far surpass what the USSR offers its citizens in terms of quality of life. Henry Trofimenko, in a recent article, develops this line and exclaims that Marx's thought, untainted by Stalinism, is an integral part of the liberal tradition much as the thought of such Russian thinkers as Herzen, Tolstoy, Dostoevskii, Berdyayev, and so on.⁸² The fact is that none of these men were liberals, and all had nothing but scorn and derision for liberalism—and Trofimenko knows it. Trofimenko and both Arbatovs have, like many others, adapted their line to the instructions of the hour and to the task of talking to Westerners in their own language. The message

is that ideological conflict should be superseded and that all peoples should adopt the new version of peaceful coexistence which rests on the universal acknowledgment of the superiority of general human interests. Similarly, both the Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines should be abandoned, with strict freedom of choice for all peoples being implemented.⁸³

These recommendations and those of many other commentators indicate that new thinking aims to advance many of the same interests as before: a Soviet point of view and Soviet-imposed regimes in the third world. Soviet aid to its clients in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola has grown steadily in the last five years. Deputy Foreign Minister Pyadyshev recently commented to a roundtable of Soviet and American former officials that the key to resolving these regional conflicts is the removal of the foreign element (which does not mean removal of foreign party-party relations) and implementation of the made-in-Moscow formula of national reconciliation governments.⁸⁴

Were the aforementioned sources not evidence enough of an ideological struggle, the fact that Gorbachev and his coterie are so active in engaging the foreign and Soviet media with accounts of new thinking should lead one to suspect that we have a strongly intellectualized approach to political struggle. The relentless attack of Soviet writers against the ideas associated with nuclear deterrence as well as their critique of the Brezhnev era's policies as ideologically unsound should alert us to the tremendous appeal of an attractive, realistic, and Western-sounding program. Indeed, much of the outpouring of argumentation on the part of Soviet military intellectuals and civilian analysts represents an officially sponsored effort to manage the terms of doctrinal debate better than in the seventies when the offensiveness of Soviet doctrine was used against Soviet interests.⁸⁵

Conclusions

The language of freedom of choice in the new thinking has a Western ring to it. But essentially it is an effort to get the West to sign onto a principle that is solidly established in Soviet thought about its national interests, namely that its sovereignty will not be diminished by outside intervention or pressure. Thus while the Soviets desperately seek Western aid and material assistance, the USSR still demands a sanction to do as it pleases and deceive the world about its actions—as in Lithuania, where it is ostensibly refraining from the “use of force.”⁸⁶ Whereas one might point to the Soviet decision to renounce its empire in the course of the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe as evidence of a revolution, it is enough to observe that though the changes are real in Soviet foreign policy, there is much evidence for suspecting that this restraint was a calculated strategy. After all, Gorbachev played a major role in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and Hungary in facilitating change or undermining the old regime, a fact which inclines one to see Soviet policy as a deliberate strategy there. By the same token, the exhaustion of Leninist ideas about foreign relations and the export of revolution coincides with the open bankruptcy of the internal approach to the national question. Thus the dialectics of both sides of this question have dropped away—as in Lithuania—to reveal a struggle framed linguistically not by assertions of proletarian internationalism but by the more traditional language of power and sovereignty. Despite the exhaustion of Leninism as an inspiration in Europe, the prevalence of these techniques of revolution, terrorism, and flouting of traditional norms of international law has migrated to third-world revolutionaries and regimes and has been solidly assimilated into their native traditions.

Though the Marxist-Leninist spirit has departed, its techniques and operational code have passed into history and

thus are available to all who wish to utilize them, a factor which explains the continued intensity of the struggle in El Salvador (until last year), Cambodia, Angola, and Afghanistan, as well as the many conflicts in the Near and Middle East. Analysts who foresee continuing resort to low-intensity conflict in the third world as the distinct form of combat in this decade or worry about higher-intensity forms of warfare among powerfully armed third-world states have reason to be concerned for the future. In international affairs, the main thrust of Leninism was to impose a regime of total war on Russia as a means of putting the non-Socialist world under a permanent condition of a "state of siege." So, too, these potentially belligerent states reject a Western-derived order and impose quasi-Leninist systems of rule upon their peoples in order to remain highly militant and belligerent regimes. In many ways many of these states are in a permanent state of war against their own and other peoples. This condition is not likely to end soon as nationalist and ethnoreligious disputes probably will intensify during this decade.

It would be a great dialectical irony if a doctrine of war and technique of rule whose avowed aim was internationalism becomes the textbook for concurrent conflicts of a fundamentally nationalist basis. But such a turn of events would reflect nothing more than the fusion of class with nation imminent in the October Revolution's "theology" and Stalin's practice. Even in the USSR these techniques of struggle are now harnessed to a system whose leader talks in terms of permanent national interests, not internationalist ones. In any case, the damage is done and probably irreversible given the conceptual confusion and short attention span of Western societies. No consensus on international order exists or is likely to exist soon. Even the idea of such an order resting on shared values seems quixotic for all the talk of new thinking. While the Leninist virus is dying out, its newer strains are

already on the scene, and the continuing inability to uproot it from the third world or even potentially from Eastern Europe suggests a continuing invasion of the Western order by alien germs.

Though one chapter is closing on Russian and Soviet approaches to conflict, there is no guarantee that another is not opening. Its potential, in tandem with what is developing in the third world, does not necessarily inspire confidence. If LIC is the wave of the future and Moscow still supports its clients strongly and arms others, then gentlemen may cry peace, but there is no peace. There are only intermittent truces in a long night of rising and ebbing conflict. The USSR may well retreat from center stage as a sponsor of global conflict, but the drama goes on with other actors. Conflicts and the states of siege they involve may become more localized and less global in scope, but they will be much more intense and stubbornly rooted affairs than previously. Indeed, they may even spread to the soil of the USSR itself; and the outbreak of ethnoreligious and national conflict whose roots are centuries deep, in a land of 25,000 nuclear warheads, portends something far more terrible than a state of siege.

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An Islamic Concept of Conflict in Its Historical Context

Dr Lewis B. Ware

At no time since the end of the Second World War have the basic presuppositions governing the East-West conflict been as seriously questioned as at the present. For the Western democracies, peace has always been a normative category of global political existence. For the socialist countries of the Eastern bloc, on the other hand, revolutionary war provided the conceptual basic for the systematic expansion of the Marxist-Leninist political and economic world order. For a half century these presuppositions have shaped the policy-making of the American and Soviet states, and both have used conventional armed forces as a principal instrument of policy implementation.

In the autumn of 1989, Marxism-Leninism began to crumble in Eastern Europe. The effect on Soviet communism has been profound. The Soviet Union no longer stands in the vanguard of progress towards international communism. The United States no longer has the enemy against which it exercised continual vigilance. The decrease in palpable threat has made it necessary to redefine the concept of conflict.

The easing of superpower tensions may bring about a US-Soviet condominium for resolving third-world conflict. But for now it appears that, partly because of the diffusion of power that has accompanied the readjustment of superpower relations, conflict will increase in the third world before the results of any significant shifts toward global *perestroika* are realized. The attention of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western European powers will be drawn inexorably toward the containment of these peripheral wars. For decades, the

endemic nature of these wars has been veiled by the super-powers' preoccupation with each other.

The difficulty Westerners have in comprehending the nature of conflict on the global periphery lies in the tenacious grip we have on the Europocentric theory and practice of a normative international political order. Our view takes for granted that political life is organized around a secular nation-state, whose citizenry exhibit loyalty to and insure the legitimacy of the state by their ongoing consent to be governed. The Western political order requires national interests to evolve from the necessity to secure the integrity of the nation-state. Consequently, the state is obligated to defend its territory against all invaders. Issues of war and peace are tied to maintaining sovereignty through laws that govern interstate political, military, and socioeconomic relationships. This represents a problem for the third world, where neither the capitalist nor the communist model of political order has successfully taken root.

In countries where ideology is unresponsive to the consideration of political consensus, struggles may be waged under a broad spectrum of unorthodox conditions and therefore may be very destabilizing. These conditions blur the distinction between the national, domestic, regional, and international interests of warring societies, rendering the already weakened secular state highly vulnerable to insurgencies.¹

During the last decade such a conflictual environment has marked events in the third world and may well prevail into the next century.² Adda Bozeman's contribution to an understanding of this environment has been to analyze its nature and development long before its presence impinged upon the consciousness of policymakers. She suggested that the study of the culture of conflict must perforce play a more important role in formulating the future global order.

Today's cultural conflicts accentuate the urgency to refine what Professor Bozeman foresaw almost two decades ago and to present her analysis in a context that clarifies the present-day situation. Moreover, her analysis must be accessible to military thinkers who face the task of integrating the idea of culture into the doctrine, strategy, and tactics of future wars.³

The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the Islamic dimension of conflict in the Middle East and to demonstrate its conformity to the Bozeman thesis. This study will also underscore the usefulness of Professor Bozeman's work in understanding the contemporary political varieties of religious confrontation.

Professor Bozeman keenly appreciates the normative value of conflict in the evolution of Islamic dogmatics and law. From Islamic law flows a dualistic view of the universe. The Muslims, who have submitted to the One God, and the Kafirun, those who have not accepted Islam, share the earth in a state of constant historical tension. Thus the resolution of this tension and the subsequent establishment of peace hinges, in the classical Islamic view, on the Islamization of all human-kind. In terms of international law this dualism posits a religious definition of nationhood which excludes an equality of relationships between states of differing confessional persuasions.⁴ Despite differences regarding the rules for the declaration and the execution of conflict, the same historical tension is readily discernible in both Sunni and Shi'i law. In this way both denominations reinforce the tendency towards Islamic universalism. Yet it is important to note that historical and cultural specificity also characterize the Islamic experience.⁵ For this reason, the expansion of Islam among non-Arab peoples, both territorially and societally, has limited the practical application of a universal Islamic concept of conflict.

By examining Islamic behavior over time, this study lays emphasis on a concept of conflict which evolves in response to

the impact of both Islamic and Western history on the cultures for which Islam defines the predominant worldview. Although this concept informs a theory of Islamic international law that appears in principle to oppose that of the West, in practice that theory makes it possible to mitigate conflict between the Muslim and the non-Muslim worlds. If we bear in mind that history teaches us culture is not static, we will understand better the meaning that contemporary Islamist movements give to the notion of religious militancy. The Iranian, Lebanese, Egyptian, and Tunisian experiences of Islamism will illustrate this assertion.

The secondary purpose of the study is to compare an Islamist concept of conflict with its Hebraic counterpart. This comparison will disengage the component of conflict embedded in the new Israeli nationalism. We will see how traditional Jewish attitudes toward conflict produce not only dogmatic and legal prescriptions for contact between Jewish and non-Jewish peoples but also have a significant impact on an Israeli view of collective security, regional relations with the Arabs, and international political commitments.⁶

Lastly, this study seeks to relate its conclusions to the probabilities for future conflict implicit in a restructuring of the present global order and the role the US military may have to play in defending American national interests in the Middle East. Before those national interests can be expressed in terms of military doctrine, strategy, tactics, and force configuration, they must be redefined to reflect an environment where the concepts of war and peace are more fluid and imprecise than ever. Without policies to address this environment, hasty intervention will surely lead to disaster. It is against such unpremeditated actions that this study sounds a warning.

Religion is everywhere today an ideological force on the march. Even in Eastern Europe it will make its contribution to the new nationalism that is forming in the wake of the collapse of Marxism-Leninism. We in America have celebrated the

defeat of Marxism-Leninism as the triumph of good over evil, of civic virtues over tyrannical vice, and of God's divine plan for the salvation of his chosen people over satanic imposture. The millenarian tones of the American popular reaction conform to the nation's abiding faith in the moral efficacy of its history and the enduring legitimacy of its right to defend for the past half century the global cause of personal liberty. Ironically Marxism-Leninism, which likewise laid claim to universal moral preeminence, expressed itself in the same religious terms transmuted into a secular language. It is fair to say, then, that the civilizational values which both sharpened and simplified the conflict between the superpowers owed much to the religious nature of their respective ideological worldviews. What follows in the future will certainly confirm that in the political acts of men the presence of God remains a factor to be reckoned with.

The Evolution of an Islamic Concept of Conflict

All that is secular is consequently given over to rudeness and capricious violence. The Mohammedan principle—the enlightenment of the Oriental world—is the first to contravene this barbarism and caprice.

—Hegel

Wherever in the world there is a cry for Islam we are obliged to defend it, and we do not regard this as interference in the internal affairs of another country. Our intention is to defend the values and ideals of the [Islamic] revolution in the remotest corner of the world.

—Kayhan, October 1989

The Islamic concept of conflict is *jihad*. Loosely called “holy war,” *jihad* actually means “striving in the path of the one God.” Conceived broadly, *jihad* signifies the obligation of every

Muslim to strive for both the physical and spiritual defense of the *ummah*, the true community of belief and of salvation. Death in the pursuit of jihad assures that the believer will enter paradise absolved of the sins for which he would have accounted before God on the day of reckoning.

The Koran, which is the immutable, eternal, and final revelation of God, enjoins the faithful to accept the burden of jihad. So jihad derives its force from the principle that Islam is universal and true.⁷ Since the Koran is also the principal material source of Islamic law (*sharia*), jihad is more than just sanctioned according to universal religious precepts; it enjoys full legality as just war.⁸ To call jihad “holy war,” as Bernard Lewis asserts, is, nevertheless, a distortion.

In Western parlance the adjective “holy” preceding the word “law” is necessary, since there are other laws of other origins. In Muslim parlance, the adjective is tautologous. The sharia is simply the law and there is no other. It is holy in that it derives from God.⁹

The Sunni Perspective

The various Islamic denominations place a different accent on the martial and the moral aspects of jihad. The classical Sunnism of the Arabo-Islamic empire emphasized the defense of the faith through its territorial expansion while Shi'i traditions demand that jihad “be declared vehemently against the agents of discrimination, injustice, deprivation, oppression, strangulation, ‘*taghutism*’ (acts of Satan) and subservience to other-than-God.”¹⁰ But the result is the same: jihad is both a legal instrument and a means of litigation with which the Sunni and Shi'i ummahs define and conduct their relations with the non-Muslim world.¹¹

The emergence of a concept of conflict from the moral imperative to assure the supremacy of the true and just faith presupposes an idea of peace that achieves permanency only when Islam becomes the universal religion explicit in Koranic revelation. In the Islamic view, the world is thus divided

into two spheres. Where sharia holds sway and right belief is assured, the *dar al-Islam* (abode of submission) guarantees a perfect moral order of which jihad is the instrument of hegemony. Wherever disbelief is, the *dar al-harb* (abode of war) exists, implying an absence of liberty to embrace self-evident truths.¹² These worlds have always been contiguous in historical time and space, but, as the Pakistani scholar Muhammad Iqbal points out, Islamic "like-mindedness" attaches to the *dar al-Islam* the characteristic of "borderlessness."¹³

Inasmuch as non-Muslims have ruled at times over Muslims and have alienated Muslim territory from the *dar al-Islam*,¹⁴ the believer cannot carry out his Koranic duty to "command the good and to forbid evil" without the possibility of enjoying the liberty to avoid the oppressiveness of the disbelievers. In classical terms, then, jihad ceases when the *dar al-harb* is absorbed into the *dar al-Islam*, that is, when universal religious liberty is restored.¹⁵ Until that time, jihad persists as Islam's struggle against "persecutors in order to end persecution."¹⁶ Syrian scholar Bassam Tibi contends that in this permanently evolving cosmic imbalance there can be little latitude for absolute toleration because Islamic tolerance refers exclusively to the Jews and Christians inside and outside the *ummah*.¹⁷ The Jews and the Christians are "Peoples of the Book," scriptuaries whose imperfect revelations prefigure the perfected Koran. Hence they must be respected. But this does not imply that Islam possesses either a concept of, or guarantees the right to, an equality of one religious group with another. This was certainly the case with the polytheists of the *dar al-harb* against whom jihad was applied without the compunctions reserved for the tolerated peoples.

Thus the distinction between defensive and offensive aspects of the concept of jihad is unclear. Likewise a people's absolute right of recourse to violence under a state of war that marks *de jure* and *de facto* aspects of conflict in

Western international law is also absent. Since jihad is a religious duty, it cannot be dictated by contractual conventions defining a legal state of war without hostilities nor by hostilities without a legal declaration.¹⁸ Although jihad certainly possesses defensive and offensive aspects that relate strategically and tactically to the conduct of conflict, jihad is always offensive war in its intention.¹⁹ Therefore to claim that the various reasons for proclaiming jihad are acts of self-defense in the Western sense (such as punishment against Islam's enemies, support of oppressed Muslims in the *dar al-harb*, subjugation of Muslim rebels in the *dar al-Islam*, or idealistic war to "command the good and forbid evil") begs the question of the nature of Islamic conflict.

So long as there was a clear understanding of what constituted internal peace and external war between the two abodes of belief and disbelief, an offensive and defensive concept of jihad was not a matter for great controversy. The authority for the religious definition of peace and war came from God and was declared by God's executor for his *ummah*, the caliph. That authority, as Montgomery Watt argues, gave internal legitimacy to the early Islamic confederation in Medina under the Prophet Muhammad and his successors, while military expansion held it together externally.²⁰ So during the first two centuries of Islam's history, the Muslim faith pushed steadily outward under jihad toward the realization of a "Pax Islamica" which Muslims deemed inevitable for the triumph of God's "best" community.

This is not to say that the Koran decreed, or Muhammad himself demanded, that jihad be waged continually. In the Koran and in the Hadith (sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad) the verses pertaining to jihad often contradict themselves about maintaining truces and armistices indefinitely. The problem was that the method of Koranic interpretation by abrogation permitted the substitution of earlier revelatory verses declaring peace by later ones that

declared war. This led to the “atomization” of the historical situations that jihad was obliged to define. Therefore, by avoiding an examination of the historical context in which the concept of jihad evolved in the Koran, jurists assured that permanent hostility between the *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* could be maintained as the norm.²¹

But history was eventually to have its effect on the norms of jihad. By the eleventh century, Islamic expansion had run its course and a triumphal Christianity took the counter-offensive in Spain and in the Holy Land. On the heels of the Christians, the pagan Mongols followed. While adapting to the nature of its adversaries and the types of wars they fought, the Islamic imperium found itself fighting defensive wars against invaders—an act which departed from the classical doctrine of jihad.²² The result was a shrinking and a stabilization of the boundaries between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. This new stability demanded that Islamic thinkers reformulate the notion of a binomial world to take into account the many non-Muslim states and principalities on its periphery with which Muslims were not actually at war.²³

Thus between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb* there came a “third world,” called the *dar al-sulh* or the “abode of armistice,” which, under treaties of coexistence, was not subject to *sharia* law.²⁴ These arrangements between Islamic and non-Islamic states were undertaken for the protection of the *ummah*. Muslims and non-Muslims crossed the frontiers under protection of personal immunity and negotiated directly with each other. Although these temporary privileges did not imply recognition by Islam of the states the holders of safe-conduct represented, the *dar al-Islam* was able nevertheless to interact directly with the outside under conditions of relative security. With the impetus for offensive jihad effectively dormant, the defensive nature of “striving in the path of the one God” evolved a less ambiguous meaning.

The eminent scholar Majid Khadduri contends that the nearest equivalent to this state of affairs under the Western law of nations was insurgency because Islam's tacit acceptance of the *dar al-sulh*, while not precluding a later recognition of the two parties, certainly did not exclude a return to hostilities on a limited scale.²⁵ But neutrality played no role in this equation, since in Islamic law conflictual relations with a non-Muslim belligerent could not be postponed indefinitely.²⁶

The process of historical interpenetration of the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds inevitably accelerated and brought new ideas to bear on their respective worldviews. Not only did borders form and have to be defended, the universal values of *sharia* and the assumption that the classical Islamic imperium vouchsafed God's political authority within those borders also came under the assault of alien ideas at a time when Islamic imperial power was in a state of rapid decay. The military and ideological challenge from the Christians and later from the Mongol horde was one aspect of that decay; the other challenge occurred when the Muslim periphery attempted to wrest control from the central institution of the caliphate causing both the empire and the unity of the *ummah* it represented to fragment from the inside.

The influence of these events on the concept of jihad was immense. So long as a central Muslim power backed by military force existed, jihad could be accomplished as a collective duty. This meant that certain categories of people were exempt from army service, and the declaration of jihad was limited to the head of state.²⁷ But when the validity of the *sharia* was put into question as the true moral order for society, the attack was perceived to be directed against Islamic values. In this case, jihad came to mean more than simply jihad of the "sword"; it became also jihad of the "tongue and of the heart" and therefore required the individual obligation of each Muslim to prevent further depredations of Islamic society and its true beliefs. Such was the view of the twelfth-century jurist

Ibn Taymiyya, who in later centuries was to have a profound ideological impact on reformist Islam and radical Islamism.

The myth of Islamic unity was further eroded as clashes among Muslims themselves increased over time. These clashes were also called jihad since only jihad is just and no other concept of war was permitted. But the Koran forbids jihad between Muslims. In point of fact, these conflicts were secular. Many Muslim jurists called them simply *harb* (war), disapproved of them, and endeavored to explain them away as social aberrations inconsistent with *sharia*. However, the fourteenth-century North African jurist Ibn Khaldun, who laid the groundwork for Western historical sociology and philosophy of history, saw war as inherent in man. Because Ibn Khaldun believed that human nature made war the norm and not the exception,²⁸ the concept of jihad as the just means for the territorial expansion of God's preordained moral order became more and more a problematical issue.

The Sunni perspective on jihad depended for its cogency on the inseparability of religion and politics. Theoretically speaking, the *ummah* and the state were unified under the divinely instituted caliphal office. The caliphate executed God's design for the universalization of Islam. But once the caliphate was disestablished (when the first Turkish republic replaced the successor state to the old Arabo-Islamic imperium, the Ottoman Turkish Empire) the imposition of an Islamic world order, as an extension of the imperial ideal, was moot. The process of imperial disintegration had in fact spanned the past 500 years of history—during the last century and a half of which European colonialism dominated the relationship of the *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*.

Colonialism offered the Islamic world a vision of the secular state in which dogmatics, *sharia*, and ritual practice were relegated to the domain of personal conscience. Material and human improvement were elevated through science to the status of social virtue. Being a practical rather than an abstract faith,

Islam responded to these new circumstances by attempting to bring the *sharia* into line with modernism. This adaptation extended also to the concept of jihad. To Sunni modernists, jihad was a purely defensive principle of war. They accepted the prevalent Western view that international relations were grounded in a peaceful intercourse between nations. The modernists proposed that disbelief alone was not a sufficient cause for conflict but imposed the additional requirement of physical oppression of Muslims by non-Muslims before jihad could be declared.²⁹ In this way the modernists defended themselves against the Western accusation that Islamic jihad was aggressive. Rather they insisted on a “greater” jihad of the heart and mind, which, through reflection, would defend and strengthen Islamic values under the assault of Western belief systems and lead eventually to the West’s acceptance of the self-evident truth of Islam.

For this to happen, the *ummah* had first to reform itself. Such a reformation did not demand, however, that the conditions of Muslim backwardness be addressed in structural terms. Inasmuch as the normative, moral orientation of Islam remained the decisive element of modernist discourse, the problems of Islam could be solved by behaving according to the literal dictates of holy scripture purified of non-Islamic accretions.³⁰ Thus modernist jihad meant war against the immoral base instincts of the self; it presupposed the individual obligation to make oneself better by defending oneself intellectually against falsehood; it proposed that Islam could master Western science, turn it to the advantage of the *ummah*, and raise Muslims to the ranks of the Europeans while simultaneously preserving their faith. Jihad was the highest form of knowledge. The body of the faithful had complete command over the development of a formula for progress and the elimination, through the reeducation of youth, of pernicious Western influence.³¹ The relationship between jihad and resurrection of the body of the faithful was, as the sociologist

Desroches put it, set out in terms of religiosocial monisms: that is, because Islam had positive social significance, a return to religiosity by means of an "inner" jihad was beneficial for the development of the community.³² To recap, the Sunni view of jihad depended on a ruler who declared war and the instrumentality of a state that executed his orders insofar as they were consistent with *sharia* law. When Islamic lands fell under the sway of Europe and direction by a divinely appointed executor was no longer possible, each Muslim was obliged to view jihad defensively as an individual act to protect the Muslim way of life. Under such conditions Islam could coexist with secular Europe on the legal plane because it, too, was grounded in a just and merciful law of nations. Furthermore, Islam could meet the requirements of European scientific positivism and live under the institutions of popular democracy without the separation of church from state. Therefore, Sunnism emphasized the ethical value of the law as it applied to jihad and not the elaboration of rules for the conduct of conflict.³³ This, in turn, confirmed a civilizing mission for Islam.

The Sunni modernists' view of jihad collapsed with their failure to render compatible the values of Islam and modernism within the institutional framework of the contemporary secular Sunni Muslim state. Radical religious movements responded to the state's inability to provide for the moral and material welfare of the *ummah* by turning to politics. In this way the reformism of the modernists slowly gave way to the activism of the Islamists whose position on jihad was fundamentally militant but not unaffected by the political cultures of the various peoples to whom this new militant jihad was preached. To understand the evolution of Islamist jihad, we must first appreciate its links to the Shi'ite perspective.

The Shi'ite Perspective

The seeds of the Sunni-Shi'ite split were nourished by a political quarrel during the first 30 years of Islamic history as

to who possessed the legitimate authority to exercise both spiritual and temporal successorship to the prophet and to execute God's will for his *ummah*. Those who backed as his successor Mu'awiya, the governor of Damascus, believed that the prophet favored the devolution of his authority on the most qualified of his tribe through an election by peers. Those who opposed the concept of egalitarian election from among the prophet's tribe believed that Ali, the fourth caliph and the prophet's cousin and son-in-law, had the right to govern the *ummah* by virtue of his pious character and his blood relationship to the prophet's immediate family. The "partisans of Ali" contested the pretensions of Mu'awiya to the office of caliph and, in the ensuing struggle, lost a decisive battle to him. Declaring their actions to reflect, after the fact, the prophet's normative behavior (*sunnah*), Mu'awiya's men established egalitarian election as the norm underpinning the institutional legitimacy of the classical Sunni Arabo-Islamic caliphate. Thus the Sunni-Shi'ite split was caused both by a conflict of personalities and of theories of governance.

At the moment when enthusiasm for Ali's political cause was transferred to his person and, after his death, to the persons of his designated successors in direct line through his martyred sons, we can say that Shi'ism has its religious beginnings. To Shi'ites, Ali and his successors are like the Prophet, both caliphs and imams; that is, the epitome in one individual of secular and religious leadership. Although schisms arose concerning the right of the fifth and the seventh imams to lead the Shi'i community, the imamic line continued uninterrupted until the disappearance of the twelfth in the late ninth century. This twelfth imam was said to be in a state of occultation. Out of the sight and hearing of humankind, the twelfth imam was in hiding, but would return at a time of great troubles to right the wrongs of the world. Muslims who adhere to a messianic belief in the efficacy of the Hidden Imam are called Twelver or Imami

Shi'ites. They constitute the mainstream of the Shi'i community and are, for the most part, ethnically Persians.

For centuries the Imami Shi'ites lived among the majority Sunnis without the power to make decisions affecting the political autonomy of their *ummah*. To the Shi'ite mind the Sunni were usurpers who had perpetrated evils on the Shi'ite *ummah* on its own territory. Sunni control over Shi'ite territory made that territory technically *dar al-harb*. The Shi'ite concept of conflict against the *dar al-harb* differed from the Sunni concept as to who could lead jihad and against whom jihad could be waged. With no state of their own and no political leader to serve as the agent of jihad, the Shi'ites were forbidden to wage legitimate war until the Hidden Imam emerged from his occultation and gave his consent to jihad. When the imam reappears, the object of Shi'ite jihad will be to cleanse the world of the injustices inflicted upon the Shi'ite community by the unbelieving Sunnis and other heretics. As in Sunnism this duty conforms with the Koranic injunction to "command the good and forbid evil" in pursuit of which the Hidden Imam will declare jihad. But that declaration can be made only if the unbelievers first refuse a call to accept the true faith, that is to say, if they fail to obey the Imam.³⁴

Not only is the declaration of offensive jihad the prerogative of the infallible Hidden Imam, it is also linked to the concept of *walayah* through which absolute allegiance to the Hidden Imam is expressed. Since all true believers owe *walayah* to the Hidden Imam, a jihad declared without such allegiance could never constitute *iman*, that is, a necessary requirement for salvation.³⁵ Therefore jihad, in principle, has been suspended indefinitely. The suspension of offensive jihad, to the Sunnis, is a response to the end of imperial expansion; to the Shi'ites jihad has been declared in abeyance as an answer to the Hidden Imam's absence.

Early Shi'ite historiography is filled with suffering and martyrdom at the hands of the Sunnis. Suffering engendered pietistic expectation of final vindication and personal preparation for the millennium. Transposed to a spiritual plane, jihad came to mean the greater spiritual struggle for knowledge of right from wrong and of mastery over base instincts. As the noted Shi'ite philosopher Sayyid Hossein Nasr proposes,

Jihad [is] not simply the defense or extension of Islamic borders . . . but the constant inner war against all that veils man from the truth and destroys his equilibrium. The greater holy war (*al-jihad al-akbar*) is . . . like the "unseen warfare" of orthodox spirituality, the very means of opening the royal path to the center of the heart.³⁶

This mystical vision of jihad as self-discipline in the expectation of the imminent end of time favored nonviolence. In giving physical representation to this view of jihad, Shi'ite thinkers envisaged a "frontier" between the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb*. On this frontier, called the *dar al-iman* (abode of faith), Shi'ism would vie for the souls of the infidels.³⁷ In the form of proselytization such conflict was thought to postpone the onslaught of unbelief. But it could not be conceived as aggressive jihad. Rather it was an ethical holy war of defense against those who do not accept the imamic principle (the Sunni world and other heretics); thus, the *dar al-iman* was both licit and commendable in the absence of the Hidden Imam.³⁸ For moral reasons, then, every true believer had the duty to wage a defensive war by resisting the imposition of tyrannical rule.³⁹

The elaboration of true nature and conduct of conflict fell ultimately to the most learned Shi'ite clerics (*mujtahidun*) of each historical period. The authority to explore these questions did not emanate from the incommunicado Hidden Imam, however. Rather it emanated from the clergy who, because of their knowledge of imamic *sharia*, gradually arrogated to themselves—in the absence of autonomous Shi'ite secular power—the right to legislate for the Shi'ite

ummah in all religious and sociopolitical matters. Thus, over the centuries of political powerlessness, the imamic Shi'ite clergy developed a theory of general agency which justified their claim to be the representatives on earth of the Hidden Imam and which necessarily encompassed all manner of speculation regarding jihad.

Until the restoration of Shi'ite imperial power under the Safavid Persian shahs at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the clergy seemed content to assign jihad either an eschatological value or one that encouraged passive resistance to usurping infidel authority. When the Safavid shahs made Shi'ism the official cult of their empire, the rulers assumed the prerogative to declare and execute jihad since they claimed descent from the family of the first imam Ali.

The consolidation of this prerogative within the framework of an imperial Shi'ite state and political culture put the clergy in an ambiguous position. Safavid imperial expansion had reactivated the need for political and military aspects of jihad as the cornerstone of an aggressive foreign policy. In subjecting the concept of jihad to the principle of political expediency, the shahs blurred the classical legal distinction between aggressive and defensive conflict. As long as secular imperial power remained strong and the shahs officially patronized the clerical class, the clergy acquiesced in the usurpation of their right to interpret the Hidden Imam's law. The result was an uneasy accommodation of religion to imperial political ethics.⁴⁰ Yet once imperial power began to wane in the middle of the eighteenth century with the replacement of the Safavids by the Qajar dynasty—which did not make the same claim to imamic descent—the clergy reasserted its primacy in the domain of legal interpretation of jihad.

The decadence of imperial Iran gave the clerics opportunities for greater political influence. The clergy associated

this decadence with the external pressure of Britain and Russia on the frontier and European domination of domestic economic life. The manipulation of jihad was an important key in the pursuit of these opportunities and to the gradual transformation of de facto clerical authority into de jure clerical power.

When the clergy called for jihad against the Russians in the early nineteenth century, they were acting to protect the *ummah* in the absence of a strong state. They reasoned that jihad in times of national danger was more praiseworthy in the absence than in the presence of the Hidden Imam.⁴¹ This reasoning, which was contrary to classical Shi'ite theology, was extended to the struggle against internal domination of an already weakened ruling establishment by foreign powers. Clerical reinterpretation of jihad tended to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the shahs but did not challenge that legitimacy. The clergy now clearly thought of themselves as both deputies of the Hidden Imam and chief guardians of Shi'ite society and its values. Whereas in the past jihad had a single aggressive purpose bound up in the working out of the messianic eschatology of the Hidden Imam, it now had a purpose more in line with the Sunni perspective: to repel the physical and spiritual attacks on the Shi'ite *ummah* from outside and inside the nation. But whatever the circumstances of the various jihads the clergy proclaimed, they considered each to be defensive in intent if not in actual nature.

From the Shi'ite point of view, jihad was to be waged in the service of self-preservation whenever strong secular power proved unable to defend the *ummah*. For this reason Shi'ite doctrine was less restrictive and more flexible in the conduct of jihad than was its Sunni counterpart.

Kohlberg gives the following examples from the abundant Imami Shi'ite literature of jihad.⁴²

1. It mattered little who granted permission to go on defensive jihad, only that a respected *mujtahid* take the responsibility.

2. No exemptions were possible. Under conditions of offensive jihad, where the state had an army at its disposal, jihad was a collective duty; but in the defensive mode, war was every believer's obligation.

3. As opposed to the Sunni conception, Shi'i jihad for the defense of the faith operated under no constraint of time.

4. Everyone had to pay for jihad.

5. The spoils of such a jihad had to be used for its continuation.

6. If adequate funds were not available, they could be coerced.

7. In order to prosecute jihad, treaties impeding it could be revoked.

8. Under defensive conditions, no distinction was made between unbelievers and Muslims who rendered them aid.

9. It was not necessary to call first on the unbelievers to accept the true faith, thus losing the element of surprise.

10. Believers did not necessarily have to outnumber unbelievers.

11. All stratagems were acceptable.

12. All cease-fires could be violated.

From the above we can see that the historical evolution of the Twelver Imami Shi'ite community, even after Shi'ism eventually gained official status in Iran, left traces of a marked minority mentality on its concept of just conflict and defensive and offensive war. Imami Shi'ism placed its emphasis more on right belief, adherence to the law, social justice, messianism, community solidarity, and individual responsibility than on the state's role in the legitimation, protection, and propagation of these benefits for humankind. Imami Shi'ism was encouraging a kind of conflict that approximated most closely what in the West would be called revolutionary warfare. This important

distinction, born from the marriage of Iranian political culture and the Persian ethos to Shi'ite millenarianism, had a profound effect on the development of radical Islamism throughout the contemporary Muslim world.

The Varieties of Islamist Jihad

Khomeini's Shi'ism may be called a variant of radical Islamism. As suggested earlier, Islamism is political ideology. All religions are political ideologies inasmuch as they are intended to control the behavior, mood, sentiments, and values of a society on behalf of the whole community; to this end, religious rituals act as instruments of instruction and direction.⁴³ The ultimate objective of religion, from that perspective, is utopian since it proposes that the purpose of human history may be found in an ideal and perfected cosmic order through which God makes meaningful the chaos of the temporal world. It is when religion rejects expectation for action in its endeavor to overcome an existing situation that faith begins to lose its otherworldly, utopian characteristic. Put another way, when religion includes a program that seeks to resolve a given issue by mobilizing popular sentiment, it crosses the boundary into political ideology.⁴⁴

Jihad and the Khomeinist Worldview

In mobilizing the Persian people behind him in the name of Islam, Khomeini radicalized Shi'ism and put it at the service of sociopolitical transformation. Khomeini's Islamism was nourished by a political culture that evolved from the long struggle between the Persian imperial state and the clergy for social control and which, once Iran fell under the influence of the colonial West, established the clerics as the general agents of the Hidden Imam. But the historical consolidation of this doctrinal tendency in Imami Twelver Shi'ism is not sufficient

to explain Khomeini's worldview. Khomeini's personality, as a reflection of the Persian cultural ethos, played an equally important role in the evolution of his thought.

Khomeini was a radical moralist who applied the literal law (*nomos*) of the twelve Shi'ite imams to Muslim society. From his point of view, the divine origin of Shi'ite *sharia* law rendered all that did not emanate from it satanic. Thus it is every Muslim's duty to participate in nomocratic politics and combat the will of Satan.⁴⁵ If the roots of this view were not imbedded in the Zoroastrian ethos of Persian culture, it would have been possible to have dismissed the Ayatollah psychologically as an aberrant personality.⁴⁶ The prophet Zarathustra was obsessed with the punishment of evildoers. In Zoroastrianism, light and darkness reifies in the free choice of every person to engage in the struggle against the devil and secure the paradise the Lord Ahura promises to the righteous.⁴⁷ Lord Ahura shows his appointed servant, Zarathustra, the pattern of behavior that will cure existence of all its terrors and transfigure the world.⁴⁸ Zarathustra, whose holiness is a manifestation of Ahura's goodness, could tolerate no evil, no division between virtues and their opposites, and no breach between spirit and things material.⁴⁹ Zoroastrianism was a religion of moral considerations *par excellence* in which the techniques of transfiguration took the final form, as in Shi'ite Islam, of esoteric knowledge.⁵⁰

It is not difficult to perceive in Imami Twelver Shi'ism the ethical and cultural legacy of Zoroastrianism, nor in the person of Khomeini an emanation of the Zoroastrian savior transmuted into a holy imam-prophet. Zoroastrian and Shi'ite Islamic ethics both apotheosize justice and make it the moral imperative without the attainment of which there can be no salvation in history. For man to comprehend the significance of justice for salvation in both religions, prophecy is needed because man's corruption disbars him from legislating rationally in his own behalf. Although Khomeini never claimed

for himself such a role—in Shi'ism that would be tantamount to the heresy of proclaiming oneself the Hidden Imam returned—nevertheless he acted as if he were indeed the savior of all Muslims.

Khomeini's view of the place the state system occupies in the international order is closely modeled on this eschatological interpretation of Shi'ite history and the fulfillment of the law as its driving force. Khomeini constructed an international order of three state systems: the liberal, capitalist West; the atheistic, communist East; and the moral, divine Islamic system, neither East nor West. The first two systems may, as sovereign systems, be in competition with each other. But, they are both antithetical to the Islamic third system because they represent political blocs whose ideological roots take nourishment not from the divine source of perfect justice, but from the satanic desire for lust and power.⁵¹ Capitalism and communism both answer to mammon; they must necessarily fail because, as quintessentially human ideologies, they recognize only the physical domination of man over man and his law over God's law.⁵² The divine, universally valid moral law of Islam transcends the territorial and national limitations which an anthropocentric philosophy of history imposes on communism and capitalism. As Khomeini said: "The world is the homeland of humanity," by which he meant a spiritualized, triumphalist *dar al-Islam*, the homeland of all true believers.⁵³

So defined, the international system is in a constant state of flux and conflict. To pursue jihad within such a system is to pursue the permanent revolutionary struggle for universal justice and freedom since only jihad can bring about the moral conditions lacking in Western positivistic international law. This message transparently clothes the classic Islamic argument for jihad in the modern garb of religiopolitical progressivism. But it does not otherwise disguise the correspondence of the sacred and the political, which are the

hallmark of cultures such as Khomeini's that lack domination over their socioeconomic environment.⁵⁴

Since Islam is the only state system based on the morality of divine law, it stands to reason that Islamic law, as an expression of the international order, is clearly superior to its Western counterpart. For if God requires man to defend the superiority of *sharia* through jihad, then the use of force to combat universal evil accords perfectly with the right of every nation to defend itself.⁵⁵ And since every government acts as judge of its own cause, then the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing a step in the evolution of the Islamic state system, has always fought defensive jihads. Thus the eight years of war between Iran and Iraq can be seen as an attempt by the rebellious Baath polytheists of Iraq to destroy the evolving Islamic order. Since a contest between Muslim and non-Muslim nations cannot be arbitrated within the framework of Islamic law, a perpetual state of war will exist between Iran and her neighbor until Iraq accepts Khomeini's faith.⁵⁶ The present armistice in the Iranian war against Iraq may be observed for practical reasons. Furthermore, the moral basis of Islamic international law demands that, under the rules of jihad, all such agreements be honored; but the resumption of hostilities remains inevitable.⁵⁷

The universalism of Khomeinist Islamism, its ideological radicalism, and the absence of a specifically national Islamic territory in which it operates, guarantee the exportation of revolution beyond the Iranian frontier. Yet, if the Iranian constitution forbids interference in the internal affairs of other countries—except as self-defense—under what conditions can Khomeinist jihad foment revolution in the world? Can force be used short of war and be called, at the same time, jihad? Is subversion or terrorism permissible in jihad? R. K. Ramazani remarks that what Khomeini exported abroad was jihad in the form of proper Islamic "behavior." His clerical diplomats propagated Islamic behavior guided by the directives of the Council of the Revolution in Tehran. Their activities were

meant to safeguard the Islamic revolution at home.⁵⁸ The decision regarding the definition of Islamic “behavior” was left to the practical clerical politicians in the field and often contravened the prescripts of *sharia*.

As Mohamed Elbakry says, terrorism and jihad, for instance, are contradictory; terrorism has no religious basis in *sharia* but reacts to despair over civil circumstances. Therefore, terrorists cannot be *mujahidun* (people involved in jihad).⁵⁹ Yet, in Lebanon where Islamic “behavior” has been recently transmogrified into an active ideological force, the Lebanese Shi’ite Hizbullah party called its 1983 terrorist attack on the US Marine compound a defensive jihad against an aggressive military enemy. Mustansir Mir points out that it matters little whether jihad represents an offensive or defensive posture but whether such jihad makes a difference in the quality and character of an outward Islamic movement as it was destined to be.⁶⁰ Put into sociological terms, this means that the dogmatics of jihad are supposed to furnish answers to given situations. These dogmatics deal with functionally unanalyzed abstractions such as “justice,” “revolution,” “aggression,” and “defense” and thus are unreflective categories of thought incapable of “thematizing” social functions. They rest instead on the context-free availability of material, that is, on a distance from the connections dogmatics are supposed to interpret.⁶¹ In the case of Hizbullah, the group’s political aims have led to a moral ambiguity with respect to what the dogmatics of Shi’ite *sharia* render permissible in the pursuit of defensive jihad. Terrorism, permitted as a just military operation against an enemy of the faith under the rules of jihad, was considered an aspect of self-defense. But the issue of suicide, abhorrent to Islamic sensibilities, was somewhat more difficult to justify.

In the final analysis, Lebanese Shi’ite clerics would condone the terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut by a suicide bomber on the grounds of extenuating circumstances, an argument not normally accepted in Islamic law. Sheikh

Muhammad Fadlallah, the head of the Lebanese Shi'ite community and the "spiritual guide" of the Hizbullah, reasoned that because of the imbalance of power between the Hizbullah and American forces and, furthermore, since defense of the Lebanese ummah was mandatory under jihad, suicide was a commendable moral, if not necessarily licit, act. The sheikh argued that suicide differs little from the death of a *mujahid* who knows he will be killed in the service of his cause. Only the circumstances are different. Thus, if the act of suicide will have a political effect on the enemy, it is considered an act of jihad.⁶²

Fadlallah's reasoning not only demonstrates how flexible the Shi'ite doctrine of jihad can be in fluctuating political situations but also underscores the psychological disposition under which the *mujahid* acts. In the Western mind, suicide occurs in a state of mental derangement and moral disengagement; to the *mujahid*, suicide sanctifies the act of annihilating oneself in God.⁶³ If it is possible that the act of suicide can bring success against the enemy, then Fadlallah insists that it is provisionally valid. This signifies that the legitimacy of suicide for jihad rests on the ends it attains but still requires a cleric to disengage the believer from his actions.⁶⁴

From this we see that the *mujahid*'s sacrifice of his life in jihad makes him a martyr (*shahid*). In Shi'ite theology, the death of the martyr puts him on an equal footing with the greatest of all Shi'ite martyrs, the third Imam, Hussein, as an intercessor for believers on the day of judgment.⁶⁵ To take this conclusion a step further, martyrdom is not merely another more spiritualized aspect of jihad; it represents an alternative that remains after jihad because the martyr is able, by making jihad his "mission," to inspire those who follow him with revolutionary fervor.⁶⁶

It is possible here to disengage a notion of the contemporary Shi'ite philosophy of history. Revolution may be defined as the resurrection of the *mujahid-shahid* in every

generation to do battle against the people of *taghut* (evil) so that God may revenge himself on evildoers. Because revolution can only lead to good, God has determined that man is the agent of goodness in history. Therefore, revolution is not only man's obligation; it is his divine inheritance.⁶⁷

It is clear from the above that these ideas conform neatly to Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamist view of the world. Khomeini, too, did not distinguish defensive from offensive jihad, and what he called self-defense he invariably defined as such himself. He acted in this manner because he was a "just" ruler who declared all forms of jihad legitimate in the name of defending God's chosen community.⁶⁸ So long as Khomeini interpreted God's *sharia* without error and applied it to the governance of the *ummah*, the possibility of jihad remained a given in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The fundamental condition for waging jihad was the Ayatollah's rightly guided intention to close the gap between believer and nonbeliever by "drawing the evil-doers nigh to God." In the ethos of Persian Zoroastrianism, in classical Shi'ite Islam, and in Khomeini's Islamist recension, moral intention, especially in the execution of war, distinguishes the praiseworthy from the damnable action.⁶⁹

Egyptian Islamism

Although popular reverence for the Imam Ali and his lineage has engendered in the Shi'ite imagination an unbridgeable chasm of belief between Muslims of the two principal Islamic sects, on the theoretical level no dogmatic and creedal differences separate Sunnism and Shi'ism. As mentioned above, the Sunni-Shi'ite split revolves around the questions of the *ummah*'s nature and purpose and of the political authority to lead God's chosen community. Because of the Iranian Islamic revolution, the Shi'ite clergy has laid exclusive claim to the right to govern the *ummah* in the absence of the Hidden Imam. Command of the instruments of *sharia* legitimizes that

claim. From the Shi'ite clerical point of view, *sharia* does not exist independent of its interpretation by the religious establishment. In Sunnism, on the other hand, *sharia* has evolved as an expression of the *ummah*'s adaptation to historical circumstances. For this reason, its implementation reaffirms the Sunni view that the *ummah*'s solidarity must remain the supreme Islamic social value. Although this view does not preclude clerical interpretation, interpretation of *sharia* must always be subordinate to the perceived need to maintain the *ummah*'s unity. Thus Sunni Islamism goes further than its Shi'ite counterpart in reinstating the primacy and autonomy of *sharia* over all other sociopolitical and economic forms of organization. Sunni Islamists look forward to a renewal of the Golden Age of Islam when the caliphs were rightly guided and just in their application of the perfected word to all aspects of social and political life.

This worldview gives Sunni Islamism its distinctive characteristic. Its fullest contemporary expression resonates in the writings of the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb, who languished and ultimately died in Gamal Abd al-Nasser's prisons. Qutb's magnum opus, *Milestones*, set out the theoretical premises on which Egyptian Islamists would attempt to elaborate a practical program for the regeneration of the Islamic community. Qutb's preoccupation with *sharia* reveals his need to "save" Islam from the depredations of modernity and to return the *dar al-Islam* to a purity purged of the pernicious accretions of Western philosophical values. But Qutb was no reactionary; he had no bone to pick with modernization, which he believed—like Abduh and al-Afghani, the great Muslim reformers before him—was thoroughly consistent with Islamic law. Qutb saw modernity in terms of the degradation of Islamic moral values. He also equated modernity with transcendent political loyalty to the secular Middle Eastern state, which explained his desire to eliminate all vestiges of the *dar al-harb* among Muslims.

Because of his disgust with the secular West, Qutb was unable to tolerate any competing ideology based on Western political tenets, such as Arab socialism, or narrow one-state or pan-Arab nationalisms. These Westernized ideologies, of which Nasserism represented perhaps the greatest travesty in his eyes, were “superstructures without an actual sociological substratum.”⁷⁰ They interfered with the repoliticalization of Islam as the fundamental belief system of native Muslim cultures. But Qutb did not insist, like Khomeini, on Islam’s universalizing mission to purge all mankind of secular, Western evil. He recognized that in the classical Islamic sense, his actions would apply to Muslims alone. Nor did Qutb trust the state-appointed Sunni clergy to take a prominent part in the re-Islamization of the *ummah* since he accepted the clergy only as servants of *sharia* and of a truly purified Islamic state under a rejuvenated caliphate.

Qutb’s concept of jihad portended the “moral rearmament” of Islam for the sake of which Muslims must be determined to wage war against modernity, nationalism, the secular state, and the domination of “official” clerics so that the *sharia* could once again reign supreme in the *dar al-Islam*.⁷¹ In Qutb’s view, the events between the phases of Islamic “spiritual maturation” and the final assault against degenerative Muslim society possessed the potential for nascent violence. Because Qutb saw no peaceful way of dealing with such moral depravity—he likened modern Muslim society to the *Jahiliyyah* or Age of Ignorance before Islam—jihad was to be the weapon of man’s liberation. The Muslim modernists could never succeed in a defensive war against *Jahiliyyah* society through apologetic literature nor could the pietists effect change through an inner, spiritual jihad of the heart; the answer lay with complete, total, and absolute revolution led by a vanguard movement of the saved.⁷²

Qutb’s militancy rejected all possibility of autonomy for Islamists within the *Jahiliyyah*; they had to completely

master corrupt society in order to propagate their message free of constraint, even if they were obliged to apply force to remove the restrictions that impeded their progress. The individual was always free to reject the truth but never to stand in the way of its declaration.⁷³ Legitimate violence raised jihad to the level of a formerly neglected pillar of faith whose practicers must replace *Jahiliyyah* with *Hakimiyyah* (the rule of God's justice) through conflict or death. In the final analysis, *sharia* would regulate society once again after the destruction of the heretical rulers of the ungodly state and their more ungodly Western-inspired laws. Peace ensues when a caliph is reinstalled to administer God's word.⁷⁴

Qutb's philosophy of history made no room for the Islamist's gradual accession to political power. Jihad was Qutb's instrument to proclaim the militant message of revolution in social and political mores. Preaching a "return to the roots" of a true Islamic life by slowly changing the character of *Jahiliyyah* society from within held no appeal for him.⁷⁵ *Jahiliyyah* societies merited complete destruction. This view separated Qutb from the earlier Islamic reformers and from his rivals, the Muslim Brothers, who were prepared to forgo revolutionary transformation in order to accept Anwar Sadat's offer permitting the Brothers limited participation in the Egyptian political process.⁷⁶

The zeal of the Muslim Brothers for the immediate Islamization of society had dissipated over the years of Nasser's and Sadat's repression so that they no longer saw the usefulness of making a collective judgment concerning the moral health of the *ummah* or the rectitude of its leaders. Following in the footsteps of the earliest Sunni legalists, the Muslim Brothers preferred to reserve for God the decision to excommunicate a Muslim from the community for lack of faith. Whether a Muslim was ignorant or not was not a matter for human judgment; and hurling the accusation of *Jahiliyyah* on Muslim societies was, in their view, absurd since they believed

that the *Jahiliyyah* represented a phenomenon relating solely to an epoch in Islamic history and not to a recurrent state of mind.⁷⁷ The gradual reformation of the state through their efforts would ensure the education of the believer in the true faith. The Brothers argued that the carrying out of this obligation was not the exclusive province of an Islamist counterculture nor did Islamists have the right to reserve to themselves the definition of true belief.⁷⁸

The gulf, then, between Qutb and the Brothers existed on both the theoretical and the practical level. The Brothers believed that they could work within Muslim society for its edification, which implied a tentative acceptance of the state, whereas Qutb contended that society must be transformed from without, which implied a separation from the state. As Qutb died before he could fashion for the secular *Jahiliyyah* an Islamist theory of state, the work of erecting a practical framework around his concepts fell to his heirs. Thus the Islamists fragmented into a number of competing factions over this issue of separation from society.

By separation Qutb seemed to have meant a spiritual distance. On the other hand some, like Shukri Mustapha, who took his words literally, strove for total physical detachment. Mustapha's group appeared in the 1970s as a loose organization of Muslim societies among the students at the Egyptian universities. The most prominent of groups was the *Takfir wa Hijra* (expiation and flight) in Asyut, which between 1971 and 1973 pronounced openly their anathema of the state and withdrew from the *Jahiliyyah* to live totally self-contained lives on the fringes of the Egyptian body politic.⁷⁹ This counterculture, in forbidding normal intercourse with "corrupted" Egyptians and in accentuating the interdependence of believers for all the group's needs, was not yet revolutionary. Rather Takfir was living, in Qutb's words, a "phase of weakness" while waiting patiently for conditions that would herald a "phase of power." "Separation" in their lexicon, signaled a political

strategy for dealing with social decadence during this “phase of weakness.”⁸⁰ With the coming of the “phase of power,” jihad would erupt from outside the society. In 1977 radical elements of Mustapha’s group carried out the assassination of an important government cleric for which they were incarcerated, tried, and executed.

The vacuum left by the demise of *Takfir wa Hijra* was filled by a group named simply “Jihad.” Having infiltrated the army, Jihad was able to carry out the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day celebration of the October War. Tried and executed like the Takfir group, Sadat’s killers left behind an extraordinary testimony to the pervasiveness of their beliefs in the form of a treatise called “*Al-Faridah al-Gha ‘ibah*” (the neglected duty). Written by one of the conspirators against Sadat, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, the treatise outlines the ideology of the Jihad organization. In Nemat Guenena’s analysis this document performed all the functions ideologies must carry out to be effective.

It was perceived by a segment of society to be explanatory of its own private sufferings. Objective grievances were acknowledged, and personal shortcomings were minimized by a process whereby blame was shifted from the individual to the collective level: in this case the political system, and to a lesser degree society. Thus, this had the effect of preserving or restoring its adherents’ self-esteem. Hope was infused through a proposed course of action, the “Jihad.” The sense of superiority resulting, the feeling of being chosen, was directly proportional to the commitment entailed by that course of action. Also, the more substantial was the reward promised. In this world, a better society and a more powerful people; in the hereafter, paradise (*al-Janna*). The fact that this reward is not an either/or is characteristic of Islam, which professes to be both worldly and otherworldly (*din wa donya*).⁸¹

We can see, as Kepel points out, that the treatise deals with questions of how to seize power in the state while simultaneously ignoring an analysis of society.⁸² To justify their right to this course of action, the Jihadists had first to declare what

they were not. In *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah* they break with the other Islamists. They deny the efficacy of bringing into being an Islamic state by means of benevolent activities, Islamic reeducation, philosophic reformism, political participation, political influence among the elites, or separation from society.⁸³ For the Jihadists, conflict, which represents the highest form of devotion, is not an alternative to the problem of the *Jahiliyyah*, but its solution.⁸⁴ Consequently, jihad must be waged within the community because the enemy is found in the midst of the Muslims.⁸⁵ The movement was to prepare for the crushing of the enemy by employing the Khomeinist tactic of indoctrination through the use of mass-produced tape recordings, for instance. For once it became obvious to the *ummah* that the secular leaders were infidels and perverters of the *sharia*, the miscreants would be slaughtered, and the victory of the Jihadists would be vouchsafed by God.⁸⁶ In the words of the Jihadists themselves:

To build an Islamic state is to carry out God's order. . . . We do not insist on this or that result. . . . The mere fall of the infidel will bring everything within the reach of Muslims.⁸⁷

When jihad breaks out, nobody will shirk his responsibility. Individual suicide may even be required. The consent of parents to permit minor children to fight as demanded by classical Sunni jurisprudence will be nullified.⁸⁸ A guide will appear to lead the jihad. He need not be from the tribe of the prophet nor of the lineage of the Shi'ite Imams; but he shall not be an "official" cleric because the

vanity of a man of religion makes it impossible for him to command soldiers. . . . Religious types do not form the elite from which military commanders should be chosen.⁸⁹

He need only be the best of Muslims.⁹⁰ And as the struggle develops and enlarges, all stratagems will be acceptable in the eyes of God.⁹¹

What emerges from the Jihadist view of the world is the picture of an alien society far removed from its original source in Sayyid Qutb's writings. The Jihadist lives in a community permanently effervescing, submerged in radical action, with little conception of perceptible boundaries between stages of political "weakness" and "power."⁹² The Jihadist hope is for the fulfillment of God's will to reestablish a perfected order that represents the founding myth of the early Islamic community and to graft the Golden Age of the past onto the prurient present by means of the literal acceptance of God's ordinances. This ahistorical attitude rejects all of the Muslim past between the perfected *Then* and the disquieting *Now*. In so doing, the Jihadist rejects the principle of accommodation by which Sunnism has maintained its remarkable sociopolitical flexibility and mastery of historical conditions.⁹³ Jihadists are not, in the classical Durkheimian sense, alienated types suffering from the anomie of a world in economic upheaval; they are primarily people whose identification and recognition of traditional values have so far decayed under the impact of unassimilable foreign cultures that their sense of self has been impaired, and with it, all notion of legitimate authority and protest.⁹⁴

The resemblance between Jihadist and Khomeinist Islamism should be clear. Both varieties of Islamism claim to interpret the world in a way that mobilizes the energies of the *ummah* toward a redefinition of its role in global civilization and militates for an activist role in social transformation; both substitute the traditional, historical high Islam of clerical consensus for a popular, low Islam which requires unquestioning adherence to textual literalism; both take the moral high road in rejecting modernity as a Western-inspired conspiracy against the true faith and the true community while clinging to the myth that literalism is no impediment to the power that inheres in modernization; both reject Western international law by glorifying jihad as the *ummah's*

revolutionary mission and the instrument of the *ummah*'s inevitable historical rebellion against the nation-state; both suspend the classical Islamic rules of conflictual conduct and level all social distinctions by making jihad a universal responsibility. In so doing, both create a ready supply of martyrs willing to seek paradise for their cause.

The success of this kind of Islamist ideology relates directly to the skill of its followers in manipulating the environment of the political cultures in which they operate and in exploiting the symbols of religious culture to their benefit. The Iranian Shi'ite revolution has imbued the entire Muslim world with the prospect of triumphal historical possibilities. Khomeini has furnished the example of the successful conservative revolutionary.

This being said, bear in mind that the Shi'ite revolution remains anchored in the ethos of clerical leadership as an instrument of messianic eschatology. This idea is foreign to Sunni Islam where the evolution of the clerical establishment rarely occurred independent of the secular state. For this reason Sunni Islamists, although they share with their Shi'ite brethren a basic outlook on the world, still harbor suspicions about the role of the clergy in bringing about the millennium. It is over the issue of leadership that Sunni Islamism no doubt will founder as did the early seventh-century Muslim community before it.

North African Islamism: The Tunisian Model

So far this essay has analyzed jihad as it pertains to the most militant contemporary Islamist movements, explained the development of jihad in classical Shi'ite and Sunni jurisprudence, and examined jihad's continuing historical evolution within specific Muslim cultures. Islamist's extraordinary accommodation of a concept of jihad to new circumstances affirms Islam's flexibility in meeting the challenge of change for contemporary Muslim cultures. In North African societies,

however, and in Tunisia particularly, this accommodation has not implied the appearance of the most radical forms of Islamism nor the most uncompromising attitudes toward jihad.

Former president Habib Bourguiba is responsible for the creation of a modern political personality for Tunisia. Bourguiba was able to make Islam a crucial element in the Tunisian struggle for independence from France. His great genius was to elevate popular Islam to a "political" religion, portraying it as a repository of purely Tunisian values. At the same time he reconstructed "official" Islam as an arm of the secular Tunisian state.⁹⁵ This secular marriage of temporal and spiritual religiosity, with Bourguiba as "imam" of both state and cult, succeeded because Bourguiba understood intuitively the interrelationship between the assimilativeness of Tunisian culture and its liberalism in religious affairs.

Bourguiba accepted the Sunni modernists' view that since peace should characterize the international relations between Islamic and non-Islamic nations, jihad had a "home mission" to transform Muslim social backwardness into progress along Western lines.⁹⁶ Bourguiba's act of turning away from the conflictual meaning of jihad to a notion that jihad offered the means for the realization of justice and equality favored the opinion that the Koran could be preached as a kind of Islamic "social gospel." Modern communications made it possible for Bourguiba to preach the "home mission" of jihad, which equated, in classical Islamic terms, to jihad's external mission of propagating the faith.⁹⁷ When, in the early days of Tunisian independence, Bourguiba appeared on television during the month of Ramadan and drank a glass of orange juice, he was suggesting to all his countrymen that work was more important than the holy fast and that the *sharia* permitted them to break the fast in order to go on jihad against "underdevelopment." In this way Bourguiba was attempting to secularize religion without cutting off Tunisian Muslims from the source of their religious values.

So long as the state could furnish access to the prosperity that religious faith promised but failed to deliver, Bourguiba's ingenious synthesis of Tunisian cultural values, liberal Islam, and Western ways of approaching issues of modernization endured. In the late sixties, however, after the debacle of Tunisian socialism and the state-guided economy, a discernible Islamist trend began to emerge which showed just how deeply even the opposition to Bourguiba had been marked by the modern political culture that he had fashioned from his native roots.

Bourguiba coupled his aggressive modernization program with a psychological assault on traditional Tunisian socioreligious values. His almost monomaniacal prejudice for modernity manifested itself in an obsession to change the Tunisian mental structures. On one hand, he pursued a clear policy of separating Islam from the state by bringing all religious activities under strict government control. On the other, he promised his people political pluralism which assumed an independent role for religion in an expanded multiparty system. Tunisian Islamism drew its sustenance from the cultural impoverishment that followed Bourguiba's failure to furnish an autonomous institutional framework for the transformations he wished to engineer in the Tunisian self-perception.

The reaction began innocently enough in the early seventies as a drive among members of the official religious class to preserve the *sharia* from further depredations and, by extension, to maintain their own position as traditional social elites. But this sentiment quickly affected the disenchanted student population—the very people Bourguiba was grooming to become the next generation of secular elites. Initially Bourguiba encouraged student religiosity as an antidote to the more dangerous secular alternatives that leftist ideology presented. The Khomeinist revolution, the emergence of distinguishable Islamist forces elsewhere in the Middle East,

and the national labor unrest of the late seventies hardened the new Islamic position.

When Bourguiba began to repress the same current he had helped to create, Islamic sentiment took on an Islamist coloration. As a consequence, the Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI) was organized in 1981. The government forced the MTI to function clandestinely whereas it preferred to operate openly in response to Bourguiba's promise to provide the political opposition with access to power.⁹⁸ The MTI adopted this position because it believed that the implementation of *sharia* was the best means to answer Tunisian national needs. In other words the *sharia* could reply to all the needs of the contemporary Muslim by being reformist, melioristic, and humanistic; thus, like Bourguibism, the *sharia* could change mental structures in a truly modern way.

To Bourguiba, however, religion did not complement his political philosophy but offered an alternative to it. The Tunisian state was a Muslim state. Its president was a Muslim. For a party to propose for itself a political identity based on Islam and a program based on Muslim values was a contradiction in terms since Bourguiba's Destourian Socialist Party and the government that expressed the party's will already encompassed those ideals. Bourguiba could tolerate the MTI's political opposition to secularism, but he could not accept it as an alternative national social identity. The paradox was, of course, that when the MTI agreed to contest at the polls the dominance of Bourguiba's secular, nationalistic, one-party system, it was obliged to insist on its fundamental ideological difference with the founding national philosophy lest it appear to be a warmed-over, reformist version of Bourguibism. This resulted in MTI's fragmentation and the formation of a radical wing.⁹⁹

During the decade of the eighties, Tunisian society was infected on three occasions by the virus of radical Islamism.

In 1983 a small cell of the Islamic Liberation Party, a Jordanian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, was discovered in the bosom of the Tunisian air force. In 1986 an army lieutenant and two adjutants claiming allegiance to the “Islamic Jihad” attacked a police post with the intent of obtaining arms for a future revolution. In 1987 a group of Tunisians with alleged Khomeinist connections was apprehended and linked to radical Tunisian Islamists operating from Paris.¹⁰⁰ The relationship of these groups to the MTI remains shadowy, but the government had no doubts about the MTI’s participation in these events. Disgusted with his former prime minister Muhammad Mzali’s appeasement of the MTI and the MTI’s constant badgering for political participation in order to deal with the threat of its own left, Bourguiba decided to extirpate the Islamists root and branch.¹⁰¹ The trials of 1987 that sought to prove the Iranian Islamist connection brought unexpected judgments favorable to the MTI. It is ironic that when Bourguiba tried to retry the Islamists he was deposed by his prime minister and former armed forces security chief, Zayn al-Abdine Ben Ali, the very man on whom he had depended to rid the country of its Islamist menace.

Bourguiba’s legacy haunts President Ben Ali who must decide whether—in the face of the MTI’s extraordinary success in the 1989 municipal and assembly elections as independent candidates—he should legalize their party. For their part, the MTI must decide whether they will continue to demand constitutional access to the political system or whether they will adopt a confrontational position under pressure from their radical left, which has been ready for some time to declare a holy war.

Whatever the politics of the individual Islamists may be, they all agree that the Western model of social organization, based on the rationalism of the Western technological and scientific order, has caused the decay of Western civilization. They feel this degenerate civilization pressing in on them daily

through the proxy of Ben Ali's European- and American-oriented politics. And they seek to reject its consumerist orientation by rejecting its material basis. They do not believe, however, that this signifies a rejection of modernization, which they strive to give a Tunisian-Islamic specificity by returning to a thoroughgoing self-reliant material and social puritanism. Only in this way—and this is ultimately a principal aim of all Islamists of whatever stripe—can they hope to recover their Islamic authenticity. That the majority of Tunisian Islamists have chosen to compete under Western democratic conditions speaks not only of the accommodation of Tunisian-Islamist ideology to secular Bourguibism, however fragile, but of the immense elasticity of Sunni Islam with respect to matters of governance and state power.

While it is true that the majority of Tunisian Islamists contend that democratic contestation of state power for the purpose of re-Islamicizing state and society is the most efficacious way to proceed, a minority holds itself aloof from direct involvement. Among them there exists a progressivist left wing which refuses to pose as a governmental alternative but concentrates on issues of doctrinal reformulation.¹⁰² These Islamists are intellectuals interested more in political culture than in political action. The radical right wing has been described, and the success of its uncompromising revolutionary jihad depends very much on the correlation of forces between government and Islamist moderates. Lastly, the moderates themselves, whose interests center on political accommodation, social action, and the creation of an Islamic society under *sharia*, answer the need for solidarity and unity of the *ummah*. Even though they recognize the urgency to improve the material conditions of the faithful, they have disregarded the practical programmatic issues of social reconstruction. On the whole, then, Tunisian Islamism projects more an image of religious revival than religious revolution.

However radical their position may be regarding the secular state, Tunisian Islamists exhibit the salient Sunni characteristic of a leadership which claims no divinely inspired right to lead the *ummah* in a jihad toward the millennium. This lack of institutionalized leadership contrasts sharply with the Shi'ite view of a predominant role for the clergy and makes Sunni Islamism more prone to political fragmentation. On the other hand, the greater emphasis in Sunni Islamism on worldly, as opposed to Shi'ite otherworldly, preoccupations implicitly rejects a static concept of the interaction of religious and indigenous culture. For this reason, Sunni Islamism may promote a future political culture rooted in the synthesis of secular and religious values. This cannot help but have an important influence on the evolution of a concept of jihad.

Some Observations on Jewish Fundamentalism

The similarity of the Hebraic and Muslim concepts of conflict is striking. In early Israelitic history, war served to extend the faith of the Hebrews over the land of Canaan. God instituted war as an instrument to advance the consolidation of the Israelitic kingdom and its constitution under his law. Therefore conflict defined the relationship of the Israelites and the non-Hebraic peoples living around them and in their midst. As both a *raison d'état* and a *raison d'être*, war represented the Israelitic army's obligations to enlarge the boundaries of the state and each individual Israelite's duty to defend the society from invasion. The code of warfare defined permissible acts during offensive and defensive military encounters.¹⁰³

If jihad represented a legal instrument of Islamic universalism, the preservation and extension of the state through war affirmed for the Israelites their divine election as God's light unto the gentiles. For if God made Jewish history the moral vehicle through which he revealed his design for

cosmic order, chosenness endowed Israel, as a people and as a state, with messianic significance. Thus Israel's temporal and spiritual meaning for human salvation sanctified the state's physical expansion much in the same way that the imperial extension of God's "best" community, the *ummah*, confirmed the value of the Muslims' sociomoral order. When the Israelitic state finally crumbled and the exilic period began, the aggressive aspect of conflict was suspended, just as the offensive drive of jihad waned with the disintegration of the Arabo-Muslim empire. Even so, this did not signal for the Jews a compromise with their chosenness; nor did the collapse of the Arabo-Muslim empire compromise the universality of Islam.

During the exile, the rabbinical institution assumed the task of explaining the inscrutability of God's purpose in depriving his people of a primary role in the unfolding of the eschatological meaning of history. The rabbinate also reinterpreted the meaning of chosenness and its relationship to the concepts of peace and war under such circumstances of powerlessness and adversity. What emerged was a doctrine of divine retribution for Israel's sins and the creative infusion into that doctrine of hopes for a reborn state under the messianic inspiration of rabbinical guidance. Therefore the rabbis could reason that to suffer at the hands of one's enemies was as much a sign of election as the gaining of victory over them. In Shi'ite Islam, the clergy similarly justified their preeminent sociopolitical position in the *ummah* by constructing a theory of general agency that allowed them to speak in the place of the Hidden Imam. The important difference was that under the Safavid state the Shi'ite clergy became an official stratum of imperial society, whereas the rabbis, in their European exile, continued to represent a pariah community among Christians. This accounts in part for the differing attitudes of Jews and Shi'ite Muslims toward secular power.

The growth of European secularism, especially the separation of temporal from spiritual power, had an ambiguous

effect on the Jews. Secularization reduced the political power of the rabbinate because it destroyed the separate corporate Jewish life through which that power was exercised. To many Jews this meant freedom from rabbinical provincialism. But if secularization led to a loss of corporate Jewish identity, by means of which Christendom had determined the collective position of Jews as a “nation” in the medieval synthesis, it did not, on the other hand, compensate the Jewish individual with a guarantee of full political and social assimilation into the modern European nation-state.¹⁰⁴ However great the reliance Jews put on gaining the right to citizenship, periodic anti-Semitism and partially achieved assimilation retarded the process of redefining Jewish status under the secular European state. But just because secularization did not guarantee certain rights and privileges, it did not disqualify secularism as an ideological solution for the Jewish collectivity. It simply meant that political Zionism would answer the need to reconstruct the medieval Jewish collectivity on a Jewish national basis whose goal was the creation of a Jewish state physically and spiritually removed from Europe. This political act returned the Jews to active participation in modern history.¹⁰⁵ However antiseccular its political ideology may be, Islamism similarly strives to insert Muslims into the contemporary historical current.

The founders of political Zionism, issuing themselves from the crucible of European nineteenth-century nationalism, believed wholeheartedly in the secular concept of the nation-state. They wanted to create a Jewish republican commonwealth in no way different from its European counterpart. In seeking the instruments of sovereignty for a “normal” Jewish state, the Zionists thought they could resolve by political means the historical anachronism that had made the Jews the scapegoat of European quarrels and which had created for the Europeans a “Jewish question.” Like good Western thinkers, these Zionists perceived that only national

power could guarantee peace, survival, and international equality for the Jews.

But the evolution of political Zionism was not able to destroy anti-Semitism. In fact, it contributed to an even more savage repression of the Jews. By the same token, the creation of an Israeli state dedicated to a national ethos of survival did not allow the state to be normal but emphasized its continuing abnormality. The wars Israel fought in the name of its powerlessness, particularly the June War of 1967, which exacerbated its problem with the Arabs, seemed to support the opposite image of a state dedicated to aggressive self-aggrandizement. From this perspective, abnormality became the "normal" state of affairs, and the ethos of the struggle for survival became the essence of Israeli national life. On the level of international relations, this struggle for survival had the advantage of explaining to the Jews the behavior of powerful vengeful states toward a beleaguered Israel. On the level of religious belief, it gave further positive significance to what the secularists had hitherto considered the aberration of Jewish historical suffering.¹⁰⁶

It was not difficult to see in the evil the gentiles perpetrated upon the Jews and Jewish resistance to that evil the working out of a messianic design for Jewish redemption. This design, harbored in the bosom of traditional rabbinical Judaism, had been co-opted by political Zionism and given the shape of a state that, by offering a safe haven for Jews, complemented biblical prophecy. Despite the fact that the state was secular, its wars for survival, nonetheless, were considered events permeated by religious expectation. War prepared the terrain for the coming of the Messiah and for the revelation of the meaning of God's covenant with his anointed people. In that war overcame the evil threatening to thwart this messianic design, it hastened the progress of redemption, and was therefore undeniably good.¹⁰⁷ So long as the Israeli state succeeded in winning its wars for security, secularism and religion could

coexist. Together they were cooperating in reifying God's plan for the Jewish people. But when the state failed to provide absolute security for its Jewish citizens, the compatibility of the secular and religious ideals began to dissolve, and national cohesion was seriously weakened.

A watershed was reached after the June War of 1967 when Israel absorbed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which comprised much of what religious Jews believed to be the traditional Land of Israel. The state expected the Arabs to make permanent peace and to offer Israel security guarantees in exchange for conquered land, thereby cooperating in the "normalization" of the Jewish state. However, the war failed to bring the Arabs to the bargaining table; and the continuation of low-intensity hostilities by Palestinian nationalists brought home to the Israeli government and people the realization that there was no ultimate military solution to the security issue. The Arabs intended to fight on by conventional or unconventional means. In the eyes of many Israelis, the state—unable or unwilling to end the Arab threat by force majeure—began to lose its legitimacy. Thus conditions were conducive for Judaism, as a religious response to these problems, to become a radical political ideology.

In Judaism, as in Islam, there had always existed a core of religious modernists who saw no inherent contradiction between traditional values and the modern state. Their number was few in comparison to the majority of conservatives who expressed various degrees of ambiguity toward the Israeli state and the role its secular philosophy should play in the redemptive process. In principle, the conservatives were distributed among the parties of the Israeli religious right according to their understanding of the meaning of secular Zionism. Among those who believed that God's law (*halakah*) reigns supreme over man's law—again a position analogous to Islamism in general—some held that the state was historically providential. But the state only heralded the redemption which

a return to life according to halakic standards would complete. This middle-of-the-road position acknowledged the temporary importance of the state for survival against gentile wrath and invested it with normative moral significance.¹⁰⁸

In addition to believing that halakic ordinances were sufficient for the organization of the state, others denied that the sovereignty of the state possessed any meaning for the coming of the Messiah.¹⁰⁹ This archconservative position was more classically rabbinical because it claimed that secular Zionism failed to recognize that Jewish suffering was the consequence of exilic history through which God punished the sinfulness of his people. The state's effort to establish equal political relations with the gentile world blurred the distinction that gentile oppression was instrumental to God's design for Jewish redemption and, by extension, a confirmation of Jewish chosenness. Hence, the state itself was sin incarnate, could never herald redemption, and was illegitimate because it deigned to disturb God's plan by negotiating with the enemies of the Jews. To such archconservatives the Israeli state furnished an "exile among Jews" who have an affinity not for the state but for the religious Land of Israel. Their hatred of the Israeli state enabled them to identify the state as a Jewish "society" only.¹¹⁰

Seen, then, as a "state of Jews" and not a "Jewish state," Israel will play a minor part in the redemptive drama of reconquering the Land of Israel, much of which fell to the state by virtue of the June War. But even though the archconservative position may consider the state heretical, that position does not allow for the withdrawal of the state from the occupied territories nor does it permit the state to impede the settlement of Jewish exiles in the Land of Israel. In this way, the messianism of the extreme religious right is based partly on Jewish sovereignty over the occupied territories while still negating the legitimacy of the Israeli state.¹¹¹

Since 1967 the settlement of the occupied territories by zealots, organized in a loose federation called the *Gush Emunim* (the Bloc of the Faithful), has proceeded steadily. Members of the Gush belong to the various political parties on the right. Their religiosity, which informs their political attitude toward the land and toward an eventual conflict with the Palestinians over the right to make it totally Jewish, unites them and tends to cut across the well-defined rabbinical positions on the issue of state and its relation to society.

Because they share a broad spectrum of attitudes on this issue, the Gush's politics can be both flexible and inflexible at the same time. But they all agree on certain basic ideological principles. They concur that the identification of the state with Western cultural and political values has gone too far. The state has a religious mission to end exilic history and to prepare for the redemption of the Jews by restoring halakic law. Halakic law cannot be restored without first reabsorbing the biblical Land of Israel and Judaizing it. Because secular Zionists are willing to negotiate issues of sovereignty with their former European persecutors, Zionism has betrayed God's cosmic design for Jewry. This includes negotiations with the Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) over a formula for Arab rights. To the Gush, the Palestinians have no rights; possession of the land by continuous habitation is a secular concept. As such, habitation has no validity measured against the moral imperative to ensure the redemption of the Jews. To work actively against the Abrahamic covenant that confirms Jewish redemption—either by evacuating the land or by yielding it to the Palestinians as part of a peace settlement—is a mortal sin. Only true Zionism, the political value of which is self-evident, acknowledges these imperatives. If the aims of true Zionism bring opprobrium down upon the heads of Jews and upon the state, then Jews must accept that opprobrium because God wills it. The obligation of state is to stand alone and firm against any attempt to reverse God's plan

for Jews in human history. Under international law, normal relationships can be carried out only between equal partners. Given its role in Jewish redemption, the Jewish state cannot be the equal of other states. In fact, to the archconservatives any effort by the state to act as a peer of other states is the work of Satan to subjugate the Jews. This means that the Jewish state must accept its abnormality in the international system as a prevailing fact of Jewish life. The state serves the higher purpose of redemption. Therefore the Palestinians have no other recourse but to accept their role in the unfolding of these millenarian events; otherwise they must be expelled forcefully from the land they occupy. If the Jewish state does not accept its role in the cosmic drama, it must be overthrown. Renewing conflict for this purpose is ordained and holy. For individuals or the state not to take up arms for this cause opposes divine revelation.

In many respects the political ideologies of radical Islamism and fundamentalist Judaism complement each other. Both fear the disintegrative influence of the godless West on human society and make Western sociopolitical values the author of all human woes. Both reject Western modernization while accepting the instrumental value of Western modernity. Both have revived their universalist mission and are endeavoring to impose it on their immediate neighbors. Both show tremendous ambivalence toward the ability of the secular state to improve humankind. Both wish to substitute a culturally and religiously based concept of society for secularism. In response to the weakness of a global political system that at one time was able to impose a relative peace on the international order, both have redefined the efficacy of conflict according to their traditional religious cultures.

It would be instructive to compare the Islamic and Judaic views of conflict with a historical Christian perspective. If Islam preaches a permanent jihad against unbelievers through imperial expansion and Judaism preaches a defensive war for

God's chosen people through the agency of a divinely instituted, nomocratic, imperial state, then we would expect Christianity, as a redemptive and historically nonstate religion, to present a pacifistic face to the world.¹¹² Indeed, Jesus exhorted his followers to exercise humility before their enemies by turning the other cheek. But we know that all religion is influenced by the political and socioeconomic cultures of its practitioners.

Christian pacifism and its nonstate orientation held sway until Paul initiated the process of abandoning the Mosaic synthesis between the historical experience of the Jews and their longing for God. He created a new synthesis which directed Christianity toward its eventual conversion of the Roman Empire; for if Jesus based his glory on his earthly failure, the medieval triumphalist and imperial church, conversely, looked askance at political weakness.¹¹³ Similarly, as noted above, the concept of a Jewish messianic state grounded in postexilic rabbinical tradition compensated for the perception among Jews that they were powerless before gentile persuasion.¹¹⁴ From these newfound historical connections to Roman culture and its imperial tradition of state power arose the understanding in Christendom that legal equality could be established only between Christian nations. Similarly for Jews and Muslims, a legal interest was possible only in their relations among themselves rather than in the relationship between themselves and other religions.¹¹⁵

The long historical struggle between the Roman Catholic church and European secularists forced certain concessions in Christian thinking regarding an aggressive pursuit of Christian universalism. But the decline of secular political culture and values in contemporary Western Europe and of Marxism-Leninism in Eastern Europe has favored a reevaluation of the traditional Christian position. European Christianity is today reasserting its triumphalism and may reassume a posture that

aligns it everywhere in Europe with the forces of resurgent nationalism.

Regarding the present Middle East situation, however, and in particular the Arab-Israeli issue, it is not the Catholic but the Protestant evangelical interpretation of events that represents the dominant Christian position. Like his fundamentalist Jewish counterpart, the Evangelical focuses on millennialist theology and the apocalyptic scenario. In the last days of history all the Jews will return to the biblical Land of Israel, reestablish their political sovereignty over it, and rebuild their temple. Christ will lead a battle between the godly nations—Israel and the United States—and the satanic nations—either communist or Arab Muslim—and in the ensuing struggle 144,000 Jews will be converted. Other infidels will be destroyed. In the evangelical view, Christianity will reign first over Israel and then over an earth purged of non-Christians. Despite long-range conversionist and genocidal attitudes toward the Jews, Evangelicals agree provisionally to Israeli expansion because the Muslims form Satan's cohorts.¹¹⁶

These apocalyptic scenarios, which we find not only among the various Jesus movements worldwide but among the charismatic offshoots of many mainline Christian denominations, do not convince either the Jews or the Muslims of Christianity's traditional benevolence toward the non-Christian. On the contrary, Jews and Muslims suspect that Christendom will embark on new crusades against them once the time is ripe for an open confrontation.

No wonder, then, that contemporary apologists such as the Tunisian scholar Hichem Djait weigh the depiction of Islam as a combative religion against both the ideal Christian view of history and its existential reality. To Djait's mind, the spirit of jihad is "only a military fiction, a source of energy and enthusiasm at the outset, an ideal mobilization of defensive reflexes in the second Islamic period."¹¹⁷ Djait goes on to argue that Islam has always preferred the "cohesion of essence" to the

need for Christian “rationality” but that Muslims were driven by Western Christian colonialism to pursue aggressively the Western option. For this reason, Djait continues, Islam is paying the price of infidelity to itself that the West, in diluting its own Christian spiritual essence for the sake of rational activity, imposed upon the Muslim world.¹¹⁸ Djait’s argument is interesting in that it also plays down the conflictual character of jihad by redirecting its existential energy toward the rediscovery of a Muslim “soul.” Whether Djait’s views accurately describe the objectives of ordinary Muslim religious revivalism or the uncompromising goals of political Islamism is a matter which only future events can determine.

Conclusions

A moral peace . . . armed to the teeth with ideas.

—Robert Musil

In the period between WWI and WWII, Eastern Europe flirted briefly with the nation-state concept before the Soviet Union fixed its populations in the orbit of Leninist internationalism. Free from Soviet domination, the former Russian satellites are working now to reconstruct a democratic basis for their national institutions. There is no certainty that the experiment in interwar democracy sufficed to root the fragile nation-state concept in the soil of Eastern Europe and to protect it from disintegrative values of cultural and ethnocentric nationalism. Can we, then, be more hopeful for the third world where, because democracy has no indigenous roots, it is failing to marshal the necessary political resources for significant social improvement? In Eastern Europe one can be sure that whatever form the nation-state may ultimately assume or whatever content the new nationalism may express, religion will play a dominant role in determining political directions. In

the third world, especially the Middle East, religion is already an accepted factor in the political equation.

This study has demonstrated how deeply Islam has sunk its roots into the cultures of the peoples to whom it was preached and how profoundly those cultures have, in turn, influenced Islam. Islam expresses itself in a universal religious culture that not only has influenced the Muslim's view of state, nation, and society, but has given a decisive political form to the conduct of peaceful and conflictual international relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The political expression of this religious culture has never been static. Adaptive and flexible, it has run the gamut from simple revivalism to a revolutionary Islamist ideology that aims at the complete transformation of Muslim sociopolitical values. Varieties of the radical Islamist message have been the subject of this study because, among all the forms of religious cultural expression, they alone purport to have a blueprint for the future sociopolitical reconstruction of the Middle East. That blueprint makes it abundantly clear that conflict is an essential part of the political process.

Radical Islamism perceives in conflict a legal instrument for the militant revival of Islamic power unaffected by the events that established the historical equilibrium between the Muslim and non-Muslim world. As Elbakry suggests, Islamism does not accept war as a state of law. War for Islamists exists exclusive of hostilities because it is a religious duty which renders null and void the contractual conventions defining legal or national states of conflict. Treaties are temporary. The legal position of a Muslim state under these conditions is irrelevant because conflict defends religious principles, not national boundaries. In a word, war as jihad is a concept totally independent of peace.¹¹⁹

Khomeini's contribution to the Islamist concept of conflict was to raise war to the level of a universal moral crusade by reaffirming the connection between jihad and *walayah*, the

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United States to disengage from the regime and prepare for the transfer of power to more flexible political elements without excluding the possibility of a coalition with the Islamists. Theoretically speaking, this requires American diplomacy to rethink its basic operating principle that so long as a sitting government prevails, it is legitimate. Finally, the use of diplomatic, economic, and intelligence resources to support the regime has to be the adjunctive arm of a policy that eschews under any circumstances massive conventional military intervention in conflicts that cannot be won.

Such conflicts will be waged by Islamists as periodic insurgencies against the regime in both rural and urban areas. If the United States has any role to play in the control of these insurgencies, it will be to support tactically the forces it has trained with the intent of assuring that a US intervention has the object of regime maintenance rather than larger, extra-regional goals. Small US tactical combined armed units can realize such limited political-military missions if backed by over-the-horizon reserves ready to react to any widening of the conflict beyond the country's borders. These units will have special liaison assets. Because liaison between American and local forces will be crucial to every aspect of American involvement, officers and men schooled in the language, ethos, and political culture of the local population will far outweigh the usefulness of those with unidimensional training in weapons systems.

In future Middle East conflicts of these kinds there will be a role for the United States Air Force. That role will be primarily limited to surveillance and information gathering in its low- and high-tech aspects, from outer space, or from small, light aircraft. We may be sure, however, of one thing: No matter what the individual or joint role of the American military services may be in our encounter with Islamism, the conflicts our military will fight must cease to reflect the technological, political, economic, and legal biases that mark our parochial

Western social and intellectual worldview. If we want to win the moral peace that Islamism seems determined to impose upon us, we will have to arm ourselves to the teeth with countervailing ideas on the basis of which the war for the hearts and minds of men can be successfully waged.

Notes

1. Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 61, *passim*.
2. For detailed case studies and projections of the third-world low-intensity environment, see Lewis B. Ware et al., *Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1988).
3. An initial analysis has been made establishing the connection between the low-intensity environment and the formulation of third-world military doctrine, strategy, tactics, and force employment. See Stephen Blank et al., *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1990).
4. Bozeman, 85–86.
5. Ali E. Hilal Dessouki, ed., *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 14.
6. Bozeman, 85.
7. "Djihad," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2d ed., vol. 2 (London: Luzac and Co., 1960), 538.
8. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 57. In international law this is the difference between *bellum pium* and *bellum justum*.
9. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 72.
10. Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, *Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man and the Universe*, ed. Hamid Algar, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1985), 93.
11. Khadduri, 59.
12. Mustansir Mir, "Jihad in Islam," 115; and Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, "A Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern Perceptions of the Counter-Crusades," 44, in *Jihad In Its Times*, ed. Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Center for Near East and North African Studies), series no. 4, forthcoming.

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63. On meeting annihilation in God, see the Ayatollah Taleqani on jihad in Taleqani and Mutahhari, 68.

64. Kramer, 14–16, 22–23.

65. Ayatollah Mutahhari on *shahid* in Taleqani and Mutahhari, 128–29, 137.

66. Ali Shariati on jihad, *ibid.*, 200, 207–8.

67. Shariati on *thawrah* (revolution), *ibid.*, 258, 260–62.

68. *Ibid.*, 20.

69. *Ibid.*, 21.

70. Tibi, 43.

71. Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 25.

72. Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 54–55.

73. Nemat Guenena, *The Jihad: An Islamic Alternative in Egypt*, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 9, monograph 2 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986), 9, 41. Elbakry says that the view of jihad described by Guenena resembles the classical Kharijite conception of conflict which requires the imposition of belief on reluctant people without recourse to debate or to the interpretation of the material sources of revelation. He sums up the Kharijite attitude by quoting one of their principal maxims: “My fate is under the shadow of my spear.” Elbakry, 51–52.

74. Guenena, 43–44.

75. Kepel, 62.

76. *Ibid.*, 126.

77. Sivan, 109.

78. *Ibid.*, 108–10.

79. Kepel, 75–77.

80. *Ibid.*, 84, 90.

81. Guenena, 45–46.

82. Kepel, 193.

83. Johannes J. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and the Resurgence of Islamic Militance in the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 9, 11, 13. Jansen provides a translation of jihad's treatise as an appendix. Also see Elbakry, 62, who furnishes a typology of the forms of Islamist activity that the Jihadists castigate. The trend of preaching and guidance, by which jihad of the tongue is supposed to change attitudes, is to Elbakry's mind the most prominent characteristic of North African Islamism, in particular the Tunisian al-Nahda party. He sees the trend of spreading Islamic thought, by which jihad aims at restoring faith in the correctness of Islamic concepts, as the characteristic of the Egyptian Islamic Liberation Party. The Muslim Brothers exemplify the

comprehensive trend where jihad attempts to force adherence to *sharia* in order to instill proper Islamic behavior. And *Takfir wa Hijra* and the Jihad organization represent the revolutionary trend where jihad endeavors to impose an Islamic regime on society.

84. Jansen, 10; Guenena, 70.

85. Jansen, 10, 21; Kepel, 199.

86. Jansen, 10–12, 16.

87. Kepel, 204.

88. The Jihadists even use the New Testament to justify this contention: “I come not to send peace but a sword . . . he that loveth his father or mother more than me is not worthy of me . . .” (Matthew 10:34, 37), as cited by Jansen, 17, 22.

89. Ibid., 30.

90. Ibid., 25.

91. Like the Shi’ite concept of conduct in conflict, the stratagems of deceit, violation of armistices, surprise, assassination, infiltration, destruction of civilian life and property, and purging from the ranks of the unreliable are all permissible acts. Ibid., 26–29.

92. Kepel, 202.

93. Ibid., 228.

94. Tibi, 45.

95. Lewis B. Ware, “Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East,” in Ware et al., *Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1988), 25.

96. Shaltut, 118–19.

97. Ibid., 119.

98. Francois Burgat, *L’Islamisme au Maghreb* (Paris: Editions Kasrthala, 1988), 213.

99. Ibid., 226.

100. Ibid., 227, 231–33; also see Ware, *Low-Intensity Conflict*, 29–30.

101. Burgat, 243.

102. Ibid., 235.

103. A reading of Deuteronomy, chapter 20, is especially instructive in this regard. See Bozeman, 83–85, and Taleqani and Mutahhari, 5.

104. David Biale, *Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History* (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 110–13.

105. Ibid., 133, 137.

106. Ibid., 164.

107. Ibid., 166–67.

108. Menachem Friedman, “Israel as a Theological Dilemma,” in *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers*, ed. Baruch Kimmerling (Albany, N.Y.: The State University of New York Press, 1989), 183, 187–88.

109. Ibid., 194–95.
110. Ibid., 196, 198.
111. Ibid., 202–3, 208.
112. Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 63.
113. Hichem Djait, *Europe and Islam*, trans. Peter Heinegg (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 58–59.
114. Ibid.
115. Shaltut, 136.
116. The Christian fundamentalist scenario is summarized in Rosemary Radford Ruether, “The Christian Churches and the Intifada,” *Arab-American Affairs*, no. 30 (Fall 1989): 74.
117. Djait, 70.
118. Ibid., 147.
119. Elbakry, 46–47, 57.
120. Taleqani and Mutahhari, 50.
121. Ibid., 53.
122. Korkut Ozal, *Islamic Concept of Security* (London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, 7 February 1979), 6.
123. Maj Gen Mohamed Gamal al-Din Mahfouz, *Military Thought in Islam* (London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, 7 February 1979), 3–4.
124. Ibid., 7.

Cultural and Historical Influences on Conflict in Sinic Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam

Dr Lawrence E. Grinter

Professor Adda Bozeman's insightful analysis argued that people in the developing regions of the world view war and conflict differently than North Americans and North Europeans. Furthermore, Bozeman argued that nation-state driven causes of conflict, so prominent in the West, are less important in the third world than cultural, psychological, and ethnic-racial causes.¹

This study applies the Bozeman thesis to three countries of East Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam. All are "Sinic" or Sino-influenced societies. Some elements of the Bozeman thesis apply to these Sinic countries, some do not. For example, Professor Bozeman argues that the "state," with its Western and legalistic characteristics and boundaries, has a greatly reduced relevance in explaining the causes and conduct of modern warfare, especially warfare in the third world—intrastate warfare, political warfare, psychological warfare, guerrilla warfare, internal warfare, insurgency, terrorism, and so forth. As a more powerful explanatory factor, Bozeman offers "culture"—the ways a society thinks, acts, and reacts that survive change and remain meaningful to successive generations. Cultures go to war; cultures assign values to strife and conflict, not states. Or, in Professor Bozeman's words, "the Occidental model of the state has ceased to be a reliable measure of such phenomena as international war and internal war."² Thus it is cultures which ultimately make war; states simply act out cultural predispositions. In short, cultures—and their broader construct, "civilizations"—are

better variables for understanding how nations behave in peace and war than governments. They are more enduring in time, more comprehensive, deeper. This is Professor Bozeman's basic position.

Sinic Asia presents problems with the Bozeman thesis. Writ large, "Sinic" Asia comprises eight countries: China, the two Koreas, Japan, Vietnam, and the Chinese offshore states—Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. What is so striking about these eight East Asian nations is that each one has *both* a tradition of strong governments ("state") and strong (and usually historic) "cultures." A third commonality is also evident: each of the eight Sinic countries has a population with few ethnic minorities. In a word, state, culture, and ethnicity are essentially synonymous and very strong in Sinic Asia. To be "Korean" is to identify with either the Republic of Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to have recognizable personality and ethnic characteristics. The Vietnamese people are also distinguished by their language and by special cultural/ethnic characteristics. The same is true for the Japanese, the most ethnically cohesive major population in the world. The Chinese are a bit more complicated because the Chinese are a comparatively heterogeneous people. But there is no doubt what is meant by "Chinese civilization"; it is the accumulated characteristics, accomplishments, and unique complexities of the people who developed over a 25-century period in the Yellow River basin, spread to the Yangzi River basin, and affected every society they came into contact with. Chinese civilization embraces one-quarter of the world's population. The attributes of China's Sinic culture (strong governments; bureaucratic traditions; reliance on military force; a reverence for art, nature, and education) strongly affected the historical development of peoples near the Chinese: the Vietnamese, Japanese, and Korean peoples, as well as the Chinese that

populated the offshore entities of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.

Consequently, exploring Sinic Asia's predispositions toward violence and conflict and their historical experiences with warfare must begin with the fact that Sinic societies *have strong and thoroughly intermeshed states, cultures, and peoples*. Thus state and culture are not unrelated or antagonistic variables in explaining Sinic societies' conflict behavior; rather they are complementary and reinforcing. This is the major analytical divergence Sinic Asia presents to Professor Bozeman's thesis and her contrast between state and culture. This divergence also may explain why Sinic societies, when adopting free market economies, have proven to be such extraordinary competitors on the global scene. I have in mind Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

This study examines China, Japan, and Vietnam in two portions: first a short analytical history of each society's experience with internal and external warfare, then, the particular characteristics and style of that society's war experience and for what it has fought. An analytical conclusion completes the study.

China

Chinese history and culture are the oldest in East Asia. While records on the Nile valley, the Tigris-Euphrates area, and the Indus civilization predate Yellow River archives, Chinese civilization is the most continuous and homogeneous major culture in the world.³ This fact is all the more remarkable when one considers that China's frontiers touch the main areas of East and South Asia and that massive mountain ranges internally divide the country. One result has been that China's preeminent national security concern has been its frontiers. China borders on 12 countries, and it has

by far the longest land frontiers in the world.⁴ Yet these border areas have also protected China—the Pacific Ocean to the east, Tibet and the Himalayas to the west and south, the arid deserts of central Asia to the northwest—granting physical barriers to the introspective Chinese culture usually preoccupied with its own affairs. Indeed, where geography was insufficient, the Chinese built walls; the greatest example is over 1,400 miles of them that were linked together in a strategic barrier in the third century B.C.—the Great Wall—to keep northern non-Chinese nomads out of the Yellow River valley. Of course China had contact with the outside: the silk route to the Mideast and Europe, Buddhism from India, seaborne trade with Southeast Asia and then—in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the impact of Europe by sea and land.

But the predominant facts, long recognized and still true, are that China developed her own culture from the beginning in her own way with few decisive influences from abroad.⁵

Basic to the development of Chinese civilization were three important rivers: the Yellow River and its flood basin in north China; the Yangzi River in central China; and the West River flowing in southwest China and separated from the Yangzi by steep mountain ranges. Early Chinese civilization formed along the Yellow River and its contiguous smaller valleys. Connected to Tibetan mountain ranges, the river would often flood, replenishing the soil's fertility but also creating serious crop and irrigation problems. As the river and its floods went, so often did each year's productivity.⁶ Thus the Yellow River was the cradle of Chinese civilization from which the Han Chinese people, who constitute over 90 percent of China's population, spring. This area, which constitutes the modern provinces of Shensi, Honan, Shansi, Shantung, and Hopei, was able to culturally and politically dominate the rest of China, although not, as we shall see, without violent episodes of dynastic warfare and armed foreign intrusions.

By about 1000 B.C. the peasants of the Yellow River valley were working the land in small communities governed by local lords to whom they submitted part of their harvest as tax. By the seventh century B.C. permanent fields began to take the place of temporary clearances. This more stable system of cultivation involved the institution of private ownership of land; large amounts of land were bought and sold.⁷ Thus we see very early the emergence of a Chinese gentry class that became further systematized as all Chinese men, rich and poor, were legally permitted to own land. Yet the gentry class created a rural social structure that became a curse to China: the landlord-tenant relationship whereby rich men bought up land and leased it at usurious rates to indebted and often hungry peasants. The practice was violently shattered in the twentieth century by Mao Zedong's Communist revolution.⁸

Politics, Culture, and Warfare in Traditional China

The start of the first formal Chinese dynasty, the Zhou (1027–221 B.C.), began with warfare. Situated on the western reaches of the Yellow River, Zhou warlords conquered the Shang people where the Yellow and Wei rivers meet. Two Zhou generals, Wen and Wu, led their armies east bringing the Shang territories under their control. Called a “feudal” period, the Zhou period is actually one of nepotism, fief landholding, and decentralized authority. The Zhou period is also the longest in Chinese history; philosophical schools of thought, art, scholarship, and a bronze culture flourished.⁹

Yet it was characterized by violence, intrigue, and shifts in geopolitical power. By 400 B.C., the Zhou had fallen into anarchy, then open warfare, known as the “Warring-States” period.¹⁰

This period of political violence marks a kind of dividing line in Chinese affairs—during and prior to it, warfare was a kind of free-for-all among family-controlled states, not unlike Japan's feudal period 12 centuries later. In China something

like 150 small family-ruled states or areas were gradually reduced to a dozen or so big states, which were finally reduced to a half dozen until the final unification in 221 B.C. Violence was esteemed, and victory in war was the ultimate criteria of a ruler's worth.¹¹ In the midst of this grinding free-for-all Sun Tzu wrote his classic, *The Art of War*, which sums up the ancient military advisor's wisdom on strategy, tactics, and deception. But after 221 B.C., the Chinese man on horseback became a target of political authority; if he was not brought under control, the state would always be at the sword's mercy. Subsequent Chinese dynasties attempted to control the sword with bureaucracy and philosophy—the civil service and Confucianism to be exact—as well as to rewrite history to try and derogate the warrior's role.

The anarchy of the Warring-States period ended with the conquest and unification of the Yellow River feudatories by the warlords of the Qin state in the year 221 B.C. Having achieved unification by the sword, the new Chinese emperor's problem was how to keep the sword tamed—a problem that would bedevil China the rest of its existence. As John King Fairbank, in a little-known work, wrote:

After the appropriately titled Warring States were unified by force in 221 B.C., each of the dozen major dynasties and an equal number of smaller ones were all founded by military means. Central power grew out of the sword. Unity thereafter depended partly on force held in reserve and partly on nonmilitary factors that military historians cannot disregard.¹²

One is reminded of Mao's statement that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

The dramatic conquest of the entire Yellow River basin by the state of Qin (pronounced "chin" and from which the name China derives) and the consolidation of China into an absolutist political system was accomplished by "an efficient military machine under strong leaders, possessing cavalry and superior iron weapons."¹³ The country was divided into

military districts run by representatives of the central government. Sections of walls already built were strengthened and extended, using convict labor, to form the celebrated Great Wall of China shielding the entire Yellow River valley—all 1,400 miles—from northern predators.

With the Yellow River valley secure, the Qin emperor's armies pushed south—into the Yangzi valley and down the coast as far south as Hanoi, securing Canton as well—in a blitzkrieg extension of Chinese frontiers; their “demonic energy” compressed the enterprise into 15 years and extended China's borders almost to their present position. In 206 B.C. another Qin general, Liu Bang, declared himself emperor of the “Han people” and solidified the empire that would last 400 years.

Led by this prudent but forceful man, the Han dynasty prospered; an era of pride, stability, and prosperity was ushered in that motivated the Chinese ever since to refer to themselves as “sons of Han.”¹⁴ Expansion continued to the northwest and to the northeast; into these tribal areas went Han Chinese military expeditions, some numbering 300,000 infantry and cavalry. Millions of other Chinese were sent out to colonize the northwest. Manchuria and northern Korea also were occupied. To the south the empire launched 25 armed expeditions between 136 and 56 B.C., ultimately bringing the whole southern region under northern control.¹⁵ Early Han China was a model of garrison state and empire combined:

The army became organized and developed in Han times to a degree not known before. A garrison was kept on duty at the capital, Changan. Expeditionary forces were dispatched for particular campaigns as required. And a permanent defense of the Great Wall and other frontier posts was maintained.¹⁶

The wall was extended in Han times out to where the Silk Road parted to cross the Gobi desert. Colonies of veterans, pardoned convicts, and mercenaries manned the military supply routes and lonely outposts.

In foreign policy Han energy sent expeditionary forces as far across central Asia as the Caspian Sea, where contact with the Roman Empire increased and the silk trade flourished.¹⁷ But the central foreign policy preoccupation of the later Han period remained territorial stability on the northern frontiers; military expeditions and large sums of financial aid, indeed outright bribes, were paid regularly.¹⁸ Then in A.D. 184 disastrous floods in the north created mobs of homeless, hungry peasants. The Han emperor granted excessive powers to his generals to put down the insurrections—a fatal mistake. Not long afterward the kingdom fell apart in the midst of quarreling and intrigues, the type of which continued for almost 350 years.

The anarchy in the late Han period, which allowed Turkic, Mongol, and Tungus nomads to cross the wall and raid into the Yellow River basin, lasted from about A.D. 280 to 320. Such raids ushered in China's "Dark Age" as nomad horsemen seized the northern half of the empire and ruled it until the early sixth century. This period is called the Six Dynasties era and formally spans the years A.D. 222 to 589. Unlike Europe's Dark Ages, however, in which the Roman Empire was destroyed by the Huns, the Chinese Middle Kingdom proved more resilient.

In China the conquerers soon found themselves outnumbered by the Chinese subjects, and were forced to cooperate with them to retain power. The period of ravage and violence was relatively brief.¹⁹

Chinese society was not fundamentally transformed by the barbarian intrusions. Northern China numbered almost 20 million people; the barbarians were, at the most, two hundred thousand. In southern China weak and short-lived indigenous dynasties occupied the throne as military men rose to

dominate affairs. Chinese historians, adhering to the dynastic and Confucian framework, have tried to characterize these short-lived regimes as typical dynasties invested with the virtues of the Mandate of Heaven. In fact, they were military dictatorships. As the *Horizon* history observes:

Ever since the confused times at the end of the Han dynasty, it had been the military profession that led to power. A young man of ability sought to attach himself to a successful commander and rise in his service. One day, with luck, he might become a great commander himself; perhaps even the throne would not be beyond reach. Some men of this stamp did, in fact, attain supreme power. Even if the military leaders never managed to reach the throne, they established themselves and their families with large landed estates, exercised great influence, and monopolized high command. A new aristocracy emerged, not founded on feudal privilege, but securely based on military power, and only marginally dependent on imperial favor.²⁰

While the old forms of empire survived, the leading warlords dominated China's official posts—civil and military.

China recovered from its dynastic turmoil in the late sixth century with the country's reunification in A.D. 589 under the Sui military family. The Sui pulled together the many separate power centers and laid the basis for the Tang dynasty 29 years later, which opened 300 years of flourishing Chinese peace and economic development at home (including the building of the Grand Canal linking the Yellow and Yangzi rivers), and the expansion of frontiers to the north and west.²¹ But the effort to repacify Korea in the northeast, which had been lost following the collapse of the Han dynasty, was less successful.

Both [Sui] invasions were disastrously repelled, partly by the severity of the Korean winter and partly by the obstinacy with which the Koreans defended their walled cities, cities the Chinese needed to capture in order to winter in.²²

The costs and unpopularity of the Korean invasions broke the back of Sui power, and a new aristocratic warlord family, the Li, took power, ushering in the Tang dynasty in 618.

Early Tang leadership came from the northwest where Chinese cavalymen and Sinicized nomad troops established a strong working alliance.

Fortified by this military system, the Tang emperors pushed Chinese power into Tibet, established suzerainty over what today is Afghanistan, manipulated the northwestern Turkic and Uighur tribes, and brought Chinese overlordship to the Korean Peninsula in 668. Northern Vietnam also came under Chinese protectorate status. Tang power founded a Chinese “Golden Age.” The *Horizon* history of China draws a parallel with Europe:

What happened in China at this time could have been paralleled in the West if the sixth-century Byzantine Emperor Justinian had fulfilled his ambition to reconquer all of the former Roman empire and hand it to his successors intact, enabling Rome to continue down to modern times as a great imperial state.²³

Such a development would have completely altered the course of European history and civilization. In China, unlike Europe, a cohesive central empire thrived, the barbarians were held at bay, and one-fourth of mankind came under one state’s control.

Tang expansion and triumph produced another turning point in Chinese history: Warfare again became disesteemed, and the military caste was seen as representing civil war or frontier defense. The army was labeled the “force of the frontier,” and garrisons were split up and posted on China’s peripheries. Encouraged by the emperor Xuan Zong, the scholar-bureaucrats (called “Mandarins” by Europeans), who despised the warlords, increased in power with profound results for China. Coming from poorer and more obscure families than the warlords, the scholar-bureaucrats’ climb to power was aided by a competitive examination system, the basis of China’s civil service, in which candidates had to memorize classical Chinese literature.²⁴ The scholar-bureaucrats depended for their careers on government. The best became highly competent decision makers; the worst

were simply courtiers and flunkies. Overall this civil service system was remarkable for its quality and stability. Writes W. Scott Morton,

It was a serious attempt to recruit an elite corps for the government based not upon birth or wealth, as in so many other societies [and, certainly at other times, in China], but upon brains and character.²⁵

The year 755 marks the start of decline of the Tang, when—in keeping with the literati disesteem of the military profession and reminiscent of the Han dynasty's decline—a variety of non-Chinese generals were put in charge of Chinese armies. One of them, a Turkic warlord named An Lushan, resentful of the court's wealth, launched a rebellion that lasted eight years and cost the government much prestige.²⁶ The Tang collapsed in the great famines of the late ninth century as hundreds of thousands of desperate peasants, formed into insurgent bands, roamed the country sacking cities and ultimately ruining Changan, China's capital, after an enormous slaughter.²⁷

Once again China devolved into a multiple power center, characterized as the “Many-Dynasties” period (907–1279), with five dynasties in the north and 10 in the south. Governments became puppets of warlords who, in turn, fought each other. The anarchy was temporarily put aside under the unified Song dynasty (960–1126) only to see the country split again into northern (the Jin) and southern (Southern Song) dynasties. The Southern Song became a temporary bastion of Chinese culture and scholarship: poetry, the fine arts, landscape painting, and carving thrived.²⁸

But the literati and their values could not physically defend China, and in the early twelfth century nomads from Manchuria—the Khitan and the Jurchen—precursors of the Mongols, pressured northern China until the dynasty collapsed. Sweeping south, the Jurchen overwhelmed the Song capitol at Kaifeng in 1126 and set up their own capitol in Peking, calling their dynasty the Jin (or “gold” in their language). The Song court retreated southeast and set up a

new government at Hangzhou (near modern Shanghai) paying mercenaries for protection and relying on rivers and rice paddies as barriers against nomad cavalry.²⁹

What followed next was the Mongol conquest of all of China in the early thirteenth century—something entirely new for China: the whole country was brought under foreign domination. The Jin dynasty was overrun in 1215, and Peking was captured. In 1271 Kublai Khan took the Chinese throne. Cities were annihilated; hundreds of thousands of refugees hit the roads. Great areas of land went out of cultivation to become hunting preserves for Mongol khans. But the Mongol interruption was brief. The formal period lasted only 108 years to be exact, and Chinese civilization withstood the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty well. In the end the Mongol occupation made only a slight impression on Chinese civilization. The Mongols found that their ruthless methods of colonization were irrelevant in trying to control a great state in peacetime. Tranquility was needed in China so the collection of taxes there would free the Mongols to conquer other lands. The Mongols ended up adapting to the Chinese more than the Chinese to them.

The Pax Mongolica which Kublai Khan fashioned and which eventually extended from the Pacific Ocean through Turkestan and Tibet to Russia, eastern Europe, and the Mideast, did not last more than 75 years after his death in 1294. The Mongols were a land people; their seaborne invasions of Japan and Java failed or proved unsustainable. Internal dissension among Mongol khans, rising opposition to Mongol rule among the Chinese, and disastrous floods and famines accelerated the collapse of Mongol rule in China.

In 1368 the Mongols fled Peking under pressure from a southern Chinese army of a quarter million troops. Led by Zhu Yuanzhang, an ambitious commoner turned bandit, turned general, this Chinese army threw out the Mongols in 1368 and founded the Ming (“brilliant”) dynasty. General

Zhu made himself emperor and took the name Hung Wu. Hung Wu chose Nanjing as his capital and fortified it with a massive defense wall 60 feet high. Hung Wu's armies pursued the Mongol remnants to the death, eventually dominating all corners of the empire by the late 1380s. As with so many other Chinese generals turned emperor, Hung Wu then settled large portions of his bloated armies out on the frontiers to avoid having them challenge his authority.³⁰

Early Ming accomplishments under Hung Wu justify the name brilliant: the economy was rekindled, huge land areas were brought back into cultivation, fiscal policy was rationalized, and the traditional Confucian examination system was reinstituted. Hung Wu died in 1398, his successor further stabilizing the northern territories in the early fifteenth century. Turning south, the Ming autocrats then went too far and, in a brutal pacification campaign of northern Vietnam, provoked a Vietnamese national uprising led by Gen Le Loi whose troops finally drove the Ming forces off Tonkinese soil in a humiliating defeat in 1427.³¹

Concurrently the Ming dynasty entered into a remarkable aberration for Chinese foreign policy—extensive maritime expeditions. Long a continental people, with an official tradition of disesteem of sea power and maritime commerce, the Chinese, under the Ming dynasty, nevertheless sent out seven major expeditions between 1405 and 1433 led by Adm Zheng He, a Muslim and a eunuch from Yunnan. Zheng's fleets radiated out across the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. The admiral took China's trade and diplomacy out to Muslim South Asia and Southeast Asia. Champa, Vietnam, Java, Sumatra, Malacca, Ceylon, Hormuz, Jedda, even Mogadishu on Africa's east coast were all visited by Zheng's fleets. Then, suddenly, Ming maritime explorations simply ended. In Morton's interpretation:

After these spectacular displays of power, the reasons for the sudden cessation of the expeditions are not much more evident than the

reasons for their commencement. Doubtless motives of economy predominated, for by 1433 the treasury was becoming depleted and external threats were still present. The official class was in any case opposed to the two elements in the state which profited by these expensive overseas ventures, the eunuchs and the merchants. Trade with the not-too-distant regions of Southeast Asia continued, but the technical achievements of voyages across the open ocean thus begun were not exploited by the Chinese and were left, with fatal consequences, to the upstart European nations.³²

Other developments during the Ming period are also notable. Construction of the Forbidden City, seat of the Emperor's throne in Peking, began in 1421, eventually extending for 14 miles in a square with nine gates and walls 40 feet high. Exquisite Ming porcelain and lacquer ware met the demands of Europe and Asia. Jesuit priests and scholars entered China propagating Western science and education to a receptive court.³³ But when the Japanese challenged China's control of Korea in 1592, the Ming government had to put great resources on Korea's defense. Although the Japanese withdrew seven years later, the war cost the Chinese and Koreans a great deal. China was left as suzerain of a badly devastated Korean Peninsula. More importantly, the war enabled Manchu tribes, potentially more dangerous than the Japanese, to grow strong and rebellious. Gradually Ming control of the northern borders disintegrated and enterprising barbarian generals struck at Peking. The principal Manchu leader was General Li Zicheng, who took Peking in 1644 and proclaimed himself "emperor," only to be thrown out by other Manchus. It was 1683 before the internal anarchy ended.

While the new Qing dynasty took 40 years to establish itself, eventually it became stable and prosperous and was consolidated for the long term by two brilliant emperor-administrator-generals: Kang Xi (1654–1722) and Qian Long (1736–95). The Qing (or Manchu) dynasty was the tableau upon which China's confrontation with the West began. Europe's commercial and cultural invasion of China had

started with the Portuguese, who made first contact with the Chinese at the Macao trading post in the early 1600s. Predictably, the Ming Court ordered them walled off from the interior. The British followed next, establishing in the late 1600s at Canton a large trading post run by the British East India Company. The Americans were not to follow until the 1750s. Officially trade with these foreigners was illegal, but it boomed nevertheless. Ming treated it all as a nuisance since his main border concern had swung back to the north, where a new foreign power had replaced the Mongols and was making inroads on Chinese territory: the Russians. Yet it was the seaborne trade invasion from the south rather than the czarist cavalry from the north that had the greatest impact—economic, social, and ultimately political—on the Chinese; the most acute factor in that impact was a drug: opium.

As the Napoleonic wars convulsed Europe and drained the British treasury, London sought substitutes for the bullion it was shipping to China in return for tea, silk, porcelain, and lacquer. Those bullion substitutes ultimately were raw cotton from Bombay then raw opium from Bengal.³⁴ Chinese middlemen jumped to the challenge, everyone made money, and by the early 1800s, millions of new Chinese had become addicted. Peking tried to curtail the opium flow. In 1839 Emperor Qian Long sent a forceful administrator down to Canton to stop the opium trade. His agents seized and burned 20,000 chests of opium. Tensions rose with the British. Several short wars were fought between 1839 and 1842, and another in 1850, over the whole range of trade issues, privileges, and opium. The result was increasing British control of the export trade. Hong Kong was ceded to Britain. Five more coastal cities were forced open for trade. More European countries followed the scramble. Gradually the British took over China's customs and postal services. Shanghai became an international city with protected foreign enclaves from which the Chinese were banned except as

servants. In 1851 British and French troops occupied the Summer Palace near Peking. In 1858 Britain bombarded Canton then captured it outright. In 1860 British and French troops burned the Summer Palace. In 1861 the court was forced to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1884 Japan essentially annexed Taiwan. Ten years later Tokyo won a naval and land war against Peking. In 1900, 20 thousand foreign troops put down the Boxer Rebellion in Peking and occupied the Forbidden City.

In the midst of these European pressures on China, the Taiping Rebellion broke out; this and related rebellions would claim at least 20 million Chinese lives between 1850 and 1864. Both a symptom and a cause of China's dynastic decline, the rebellion combined peasant discontent, religious zealotry, hatred of foreigners, anti-Confucianism, secret-society intrigue, and old-fashioned banditry. Capturing Nanjing in 1852, the Taipings took control of the Yangzi River basin. Ultimately the government was able to put down the Taiping with some help from Western guns, ships, and troop training.³⁵ Relaxing in the 1860s and 1870s, suddenly China was threatened again—this time by Japan.

The shock waves of defeat in 1894 by Japan and her territorial acquisitions reverberated into Chinese politics: Reform was in the air. But the cumulative humiliations at the hands of the West, and now Japan, also stirred rebellion. Like the Taiping Rebellion 50 years earlier, the Boxer Rebellion was peasant-based, lodged in secret societies, and populated by hungry and disposed peasants.

Beginning in Shandong in 1898, the Boxers spread over north China, attacking railways, factories, and shops which sold foreign goods. They killed missionaries and Chinese converts. . . . In Peking itself Christians were massacred and buildings burned.³⁶

Ultimately an international force of 20,000 troops—half of them Japanese, all under a German field marshal—defeated the Boxers. The Manchu dynasty lasted 11 more years collapsing of its own weight and decay on October 10, 1911.

The year 1900 marked the acceleration of China's search for a national revolution. The country could not control its own destiny; the imperial government hardly functioned; and trade, taxes, and military security lay at the mercy of foreigners. Of all the contending Chinese forces which sought to steer China's destiny and put things right, the most prominent grew to be the Nationalists, first led by Sun Yat-sen. Born in Canton, educated in Hawaii, trained as a doctor, and envious of Japan's modernity, Sun became a revolutionary. Accepting the post of province president of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen was inaugurated on 1 January 1912. The successor regime to that republican governor is found today on Taiwan and led by President Lee Teng-hui.

But for all of Sun's promises China soon descended into warlordism as regional military chiefs, gangsters, and peasant-based extortion operations tore at the country. Armies lived off the land while a formal government resided in Peking. In the midst of this turmoil a young student working in the library of Peking University, from a family with a harsh father, became influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx. Soon he was at work in the Hunan province and by 1926 had joined the Communist Party, which already had forces in the field. His name was Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Sun Yat-sen's successor, Gen Chiang Kai-shek, took control of the Nationalist forces and then turned on the Communists. In two of China's great cities—Shanghai and Canton—the Communists had sought to provoke urban uprisings. Chiang's forces retaliated. The Nationalists massacred the Communists in Shanghai in April 1927.³⁷ From that point on the war between communism and nationalism in China would be a fight to the finish.

The period from 1928 to 1937 was high tide for the Nationalists. Although dependent on bankers and industrialists, Chiang Kai-shek—who married the sister of Sun Yat-sen's widow—became China's premier strongman. The Communists, set back five to 10 years by the Shanghai massacre, set to rebuilding their organization in the countryside. Chiang's armies made five separate attempts between 1930 and 1934 to encircle and destroy communist forces. Even the fourth attempt using 250,000 Kuomintang (KMT) troops failed. Finally in 1934 Chiang launched 750,000 troops against the Reds' 150,000 men. Seeing disaster, the Communists broke out of the encirclement; and in the autumn of 1934, some 90,000 began a 6,000-mile Long March to northwestern China and the caves of Yenan, where they ended up with 30,000 survivors under Mao Zedong's political leadership.³⁸

Then two years later, in July 1937, came the event which probably saved Mao's revolution: Japan formally attacked China. The devastation and shock effect on China's population eventually provided an enormous manpower recruitment flow for both the Nationalists and the Communists. Launching their attack from Manchuria, and using bombers against northern Chinese cities while bombarding Shanghai from the sea, the Japanese quickly occupied China's principal cities. The KMT government and armed forces vacated Nanjing, thus moving the seat of government back to China's interior. Nanjing became the scene of horrendous episodes of Japanese-provoked murder, rape, and looting.³⁹ To this day Beijing claims 340,000 Chinese perished in Nanjing's occupation.

Resistance to the Japanese was now lodged in the KMT armies—which controlled the southwestern areas of China and received US aid—and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) armies, which were lodged principally in the northwest and were growing. Both forces used conventional and

guerrilla warfare, although the KMT emphasized cities and roads while the Communists relied on the countryside. Japanese occupation policies gradually strengthened the Chinese resistance: the ferocity of their mopping-up campaigns and reprisal actions played into Chinese hands. As Chalmers Johnson writes:

In actual fact, the devastation and exploitation that accompanied the Japanese invasion produced a radical change in the political attitudes of the northern Chinese. The peasants of north China gave very strong support to Communist organizational initiatives during the war, and the largest number of Communist guerrilla bases was located in the rural area of the north.⁴⁰

And further:

Virtually all on-the-spot observers were agreed that Japanese treatment of all Chinese peasants, both the hostile and the cooperative ones, was disastrous to the long-range Japanese goals and favorable to the development of resistance on a mass scale.⁴¹

One is reminded of Nazi behavior in the Ukraine. In northern China, where Japanese field army general Okamura Yasuji commanded from July 1941 to November 1944, the general issued a “kill all, burn all, destroy all” policy utilizing, among other weapons, poison gas. While creating millions of refugees, this policy also drove the peasants and Mao’s Eighth Route Army together in an environment of sheer survival.

Shortly after the 1937 attack, the KMT and the CCP formed an anti-Japanese Second United Front. While this grouping did produce a few coordinated actions against the invaders, it also allowed both parties to pursue their separate interests and infiltrate each other’s organizations.⁴² By the start of 1941 the two Chinese armies were back to fighting each other again. “The Japanese,” said Chiang Kai-shek in a private observation, “are a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of the heart.”⁴³

As the war stabilized and then appeared to stalemate between 1939 and 1942, Chinese recovery and resistance to

the Japanese threatened to make it an “endless military operation” for Tokyo.⁴⁴ Although the Japanese retained control of the major cities and transportation routes and installed a puppet government, they could not control the countryside. Moreover Tokyo’s Nanjing client government never had any real legitimacy, despite a variety of Japanese peace offers, because the Japanese army continued to treat the Chinese so harshly.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1941, Tokyo extended its attack into Southeast Asia, invading Indochina in preparation to seizing Dutch Indonesia’s oil fields. Six months later Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Manila, and Singapore, hoping to prevent US and British entry into the war as it sought to complete its operations in China. Although the furthest territorial expansion of Japan’s Pacific empire would not occur until mid-1943, by late 1942 Japan’s expansion inside China had stopped and was beginning to gradually slip. The last Japanese massive offensive inside China began in November 1943 with 1.8 million men thrown into the effort.⁴⁶ Eight months later, in July 1944, the Japanese homeland came under sustained US air attack. In the end, 60 Japanese cities were destroyed, Tokyo was repeatedly fire-bombed, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were incinerated. On 14 August 1945, with 1.5 million troops still inside China, Japan surrendered unconditionally.

No sooner had the war ended than in China the KMT and the CCP squared off. In late 1945 the Truman administration sent out Gen George C. Marshall in a continuation of a previous US effort to try to mediate an end to China’s civil war. It would end a year later in failure as the Americans finally realized the struggle between Chiang and Mao was total and without compromise.⁴⁷ American aid to the Chinese nationalists amounted to almost \$2 billion between 1945 and 1948, and the US remained supportive, if also critical, of Chiang’s government to the end.⁴⁸ The final showdown between the Communists and the KMT occurred in the midst

of skyrocketing inflation, heavy corruption, and enormous fighting and casualties. Manchuria and the Huai River basin in north central China were the main battlefields. In October 1948 over 300,000 KMT troops surrendered in Manchuria to the Red Army. In central China, after a prolonged campaign, the Communists captured almost 500,000 KMT troops in December 1948.⁴⁹ As 1949 arrived, China's remaining major cities fell to the Communists: Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai, then Canton. In December 1949 the last ragtag remnants of Chiang's KMT army fled across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan and eventual protection under a US security guarantee. The Chinese civil war was over.

The Chinese Way of War

Traditional China's way of war reflects China's values and beliefs about itself as well as calculations about its security challenges. However, the Chinese have vigorously debated these values themselves over the centuries. One result has been a recurrent tension in Chinese affairs between the warrior and the scholar or, to put it in the framework of the June 1989 Tienanman Square killings, between autocrats and students. For centuries in China neither the warrior nor the scholar reigned permanently supreme, unlike Japan where the shoguns and martial values prevailed for 700 years. In Vietnam and Korea—small Sinic states—the same tension was evident; but the warrior predominated, partly because the two countries were so often mauled by Chinese armies and other armed forces as well. In China, by contrast, society had a choice. The more frequent preeminence of the warrior over the scholar in the founding and collapse of every major dynasty was due less to external pressure than to the character of Chinese society itself, which so often broke down into anarchy and violence.

In sum, Chinese civil-military relations were unstable, and this became the dynamic by which dynasties rose and fell.

This fact has often been ignored in Western scholarship on China, which frequently emphasizes the Confucian, pacifist idealization of Chinese affairs over the warrior-anarchy reality. Western scholarship, in turn, often echoed Chinese official histories composed by the scholar-literati with their own versions to tell. As Professor Bozeman remarked:

With respect to ancient China . . . Westerners have long pleased themselves in imagining a spiritually superior civilization, anchored in Confucianism and Taoism, in which men shunned violence and all things uncouth, if only because their attention was riveted on etiquette, sincerity, civility, humanism, and the search for harmony. Just why such exalted views of Oriental society should have become so fixed in the Western mind may well be a question that only ethno-psychiatrists can answer.⁵⁰

Compared to traditional China's civil-military instability, it is interesting to note Mao Zedong's and the communist approach to civil-military relations. While they did not invent the Leninist model, they soon adopted it (as did Chiang Kai-shek). The Communists saw war and politics as all part of the same continuum of policy. By blending everything toward the goals of their revolution and the administration of the state and by placing civilian authority (the party) over the Red Army (the gun), Mao brought an end, temporarily, to the instability, if not the tension, in the Chinese civil-military system. But with the coming of the cultural revolution and then the post-Mao struggles to remove the Gang of Four and subsequent tensions, we have seen a crosscutting, even confused pattern in party-army affairs. These tensions go deep into Chinese society reflecting questions of expertise versus ideology and market economic approaches versus collectivist command models.

Part of the explanation for the traditional Chinese reluctance to acknowledge the role of coercion in their internal affairs derives from their peculiar ethnocentrism and its official interpretation, which became almost a national ideology: Sinocentrism. Sinocentric thinking prompted the

Chinese to view themselves as the most important (indeed only) civilization on earth, the center of the universe under heaven, and an admirable system of government and society ruled by the Sons of Heaven under conditions of order, justice, and prosperity. When ugly realities crowded in—rebellions, peasant mobs, anarchy, coups d'état, and regional wars—they were described by the Confucian historians as aberrations and abnormal disturbances, as it were, to the natural order of the Middle Kingdom. The scholar-literati wrote (or rewrote) Chinese history arguing that superior men extolled the classics—not warfare. Virtue came from moral conduct and learning—not from violence. The contrast with Japan is striking. As interpreted by Fairbank, in China:

This disesteem of physical coercion was deeply imbedded in the Confucian teaching. The superior man, extolled in the classics as the highest product of self-cultivation, should be able to attain his ends without violence.

This was especially true for the One Man at the top of the social pyramid. For the emperor to resort to violence was an admission that he had failed in his own conduct as a sage pursuing the art of government.⁵¹

Possibly this helps explain why so many Chinese warriors, once they had taken power and proclaimed themselves emperors, sought to disband or quarantine their armies. (We also can understand the sheer practicality of not keeping an unemployed army around.) For all its utility in China, war was not glorified. Ideally, as far as the Confucian scholars were concerned, war should never have happened at all. Unlike Japan and unlike Rome, warfare was not a major industry or honorable occupation in China, even though it became a frequent and necessary occurrence. There was little honor or status (as distinct from money) in it. Chinese youths were not given equivalents of Alexander, Caesar, or Napoléon to admire or study.

However, China's Sinocentrism, when translated into foreign policies and disseminated to other peoples on the

peripheries of the realm, had a way of provoking strong reactions and, indeed, warfare. The Chinese officially defined the Mongols, other nomads, the Koreans, and the Vietnamese as *inferior* people. To legitimize Beijing's view, it was necessary for the outsiders to subordinate themselves, hopefully voluntarily but by coercion if necessary, to the Middle Kingdom's writ. While the military might have been officially disesteemed inside China's Confucian citadels, the frontier armies kept China free. In Fairbank's words:

Emanating outward from the center of civilized order, the emperor's example thus commands obedience not only from his immediate subjects within China but also from non-Chinese rulers roundabout, although this influence may naturally decrease with distance. The result is that any violent armed infractions of the social order that may occur, either within China or abroad, are of concern to him.⁵²

Thus China defined her foreign relations, like her internal society, as hierarchical and nonegalitarian. In China's preferred concentric hierarchy of foreign relations first came the "Sinic zone": Korea, Vietnam, and, for a while, Japan. Second came the "inner Asian zone," consisting of the armed non-Chinese peoples and tribes nearby: the Manchus, Mongols, Uighurs, Turks, and Tibetans. Third was the "outer zone," populated by outer barbarians usually at a distance over land and sea: Europeans, Indians, Arabs, and Southeast Asians. All states were expected to pay tribute and to acknowledge China's superiority.⁵³ The worst calamities occurred when the non-Chinese warriors of inner Asia crashed into Chinese civilization, as in the Six Dynasties period of the fourth century A.D. and the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of 1279–1368. Whereas Europe saw interstate relations as theoretically equal in sovereignty and independence, the Chinese worldview specified hierarchy with China at the top.

In seeking to maintain influence over the Sinic zone, the Chinese, as we have seen, were perfectly willing to resort to physical occupation and military conquest—sometimes of the

most brutal character, which inevitably produced equally brutal retaliations. Military control of northern Korea up to the tenth and eleventh centuries was altered with indirect tribute rule, and then renewed Chinese or Chinese/Mongol invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In the twentieth century, Chinese armies intervened in Korea and Vietnam.

The inner-zone states on the northern rim of China required more careful handling, and accordingly the Chinese used a variety of means—physical separation (the Great Wall), bribes, economic assistance, and colonization, as well as outright punitive expeditions. The inner zone's stability most preoccupied the Chinese over the centuries, close as it was to the Yellow River valley heartland and to Peking. As Gerald Segal writes:

The Manchurian territory just north of the wall was of acute importance because it could serve as a training ground and jump off point for a serious challenge to core China. Thus the Sinicization and control of Manchuria was a special concern. China tended to be drawn into the northern territories rather than seeking them for colonial occupation. . . . In general, though, the pattern was forward defense and expansion of territory so as to create buffer zones.⁵⁴

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth centuries, the Chinese fought numerous skirmishes with the Russians on China's northern territories. To this day the Chinese maintain their largest defense forces on that border. And it was from Manchuria that the Japanese launched their full-scale invasion of China in 1937.

Toward the outer zone, China's ability to control tributary relations and hierarchical order gradually disintegrated as European arms and trade exacerbated Qing dynasty decay. With their attention on the north, the Chinese sought to maintain the boundary between themselves and the barbarians encroaching from the south via rituals of tribute, kowtow, and a variety of compromises on trade and administration

practices. The Chinese also sought to severely limit contact with those foreigners. But China's mistake was to underestimate the technological superiority and cultural-economic aggressiveness of the Europeans. With so much attention focused north on combined territorial and ethnic problems, it is perhaps not surprising that Chinese defense strategy deemphasized maritime security and strategies. "In striking contrast," writes Segal,

to the western use of sea-based travel as a mode of expansion and combat, China was distinctly unconcerned about defense from the sea. . . . In the sixteenth century the Mings had to cope with seabased attacks on China's long undefended coast and they responded with the mentality of the Great Wall. Walled cities and forts along the coast were supplemented by coastal patrols in a passive effort to hold a coastline tightly. . . . In the end the enemy was defeated by bribes and tactics of skill and cunning.⁵⁵

Two centuries later western-based sea power would intervene again in China, and the final collapse of the imperial order would begin.

In the twentieth century, Chinese armed forces have been employed in two major struggles and several minor ones. The war against Japan was both a struggle to defeat an invader and the arena in which the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists was heightened. None of the anti-Japanese war was fought outside of China's borders by Chinese forces. But the Korean War of 1950–53 involved a massive number of Chinese troops—perhaps 2 million entered Korea (of which perhaps 800,000 died). Chinese Communist troops also invaded Tibet in 1950, shelled Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s, were stationed in Vietnam between 1965 and 1972, fought against Indian forces in the Himalayas in 1962, fought Soviet troops in the Ussuri River basin, then returned to Vietnam in a short, putative invasion in 1979. What do these fights tell us about China's objectives and use of force? Are they in keeping with the Chinese strategy of border

maintenance? Were they ideological, geographic, or motivated by national security?

The more limited commitments of Chinese Communist armed forces occurred against Tibet in 1950, Taiwan in 1954–55 and 1958, Indian troops in 1962, Soviet troops in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979. The heaviest of these involved the brief People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of northern Vietnam. Chinese casualties were about 20,000—an important but still small loss compared to the Korean War, which stands in a class by itself for huge Chinese casualties.

PLA operations in Tibet were the first deliberate use of communist Chinese military power beyond China's de facto frontiers.⁵⁶ Certainly the Tibetans were no threat to the Chinese, being an introverted, shamist, mountain people. But their interests were promoted by India, and part of the Tibet tangle can be viewed as Chinese-Indian rivalry for control of the Himalayas. The Chinese were cautious in advancing on Tibet, working a variety of diplomatic, military, and security measures during 1950 and 1951 while simultaneously being preoccupied with the Korean War. In October 1951, when serious fighting commenced in Tibet, the Chinese sent in about 30,000 troops. Resisted by 9,000 Tibetans, the PLA quickly occupied Lhasa.⁵⁷ Chinese objectives in Tibet? Certainly the area, like Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, was a traditional target for internal Chinese colonization.⁵⁸ Also, command of this high-frontier territory and access to its strategic resources appealed to China.

By contrast the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958 were examples of China using force to probe another country's intentions (the US) and then, under foreign pressure (the US and the Soviets in 1958), keeping the crises at acceptable levels of operational risk despite highly inflammatory Chinese rhetoric. In 1954–55 China's pressure against Taiwan provoked the US into signing a bilateral defense treaty with the KMT government on the island. In

1958 China's actions convinced Khrushchev in Moscow that Mao was either unstable, naive, or both, and the Sino-Soviet dispute soon broke out into the open. In each situation China went looking for what it could get. In 1955 it gained the Dachen Islands. In 1958 the US Navy prevented a Chinese blockade of Quemoy. "In both cases" writes Segal,

the Chinese kept their aims, and propensity to take risks, under close control. All the while the military instrument was strictly subordinate to the essential political goals of the Chinese probe.⁵⁹

China's 1962 fight with India was an interstate conflict fought on the Tibetan border where China pushed against a weaker opponent and, finding her wanting, aggressively increased the punishment. It began in Tibet, where Chinese occupation bordered on India's Himalayan frontier. In 1959 Tibet flared into another rebellion against Chinese rule, this time with possible Indian connivance.⁶⁰ For the next two years, India and China claimed territory around the disputed McMahon Line. By the fall of 1962 skirmishes had begun. In October and November, the Indians foolishly launched outmanned offensives and the Chinese, now with 150,000 men in the area, hit back hard breaking the Indian lines. With the Indians in panic, China declared a unilateral cease-fire which the Indians implicitly accepted, thus ending the war.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes and the ensuing threats of nuclear war shook the world. The January–March 1969 events occurred in the Ussuri River basin, an area long disputed between China and Russia. Since 1965 Soviet leader Brezhnev had authorized a determined military buildup on the Chinese border. At the same time China had descended into Mao's Cultural Revolution and Lin Biao's challenge to Mao's leadership. Then, in 1968, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. By the fall of 1968, Chinese decision makers became convinced the Soviet threat on their borders was real. They shifted into aggressive patrolling tactics at the Zhenbao area of the Ussuri River. On 2 March 1969 fighting

broke out with the Chinese losing 20 men, the Soviet guards losing more. On 15 March the Soviets counterpunched with a deadly ambush; in nine hours of fighting, hundreds of Chinese died.⁶¹ On 21 March the Soviets proposed talks. The Chinese held off joining into talks—partly because of continuing Soviet nuclear threats—until October. The fighting pointed up Chinese weaknesses and superior Soviet firepower and maneuverability.

China's short punitive expedition into northern Vietnam in February 1979 revealed that 10 years after being outclassed by the Soviets on the Ussuri River, the Chinese still had substantial logistical and command and control problems. Moreover, they took on Asia's finest infantry on its soil. In late February 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated:

We would not mind military achievements. Our objective is a limited one—that is to teach them that they could not run about as much as they desired.⁶²

So punishing Vietnam for its Cambodian invasion was China's primary objective. And by punishing Vietnam, which Beijing called Moscow's "Asian Cuba," the Chinese also were sending the Soviets a message. After testing the diplomatic waters in Japan and the US, Deng authorized the invasion on 16 February 1979, six weeks after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia. Crossing the Vietnamese border at five points, Chinese troops soon captured Lang Son, the provincial capital just above the plains of the Red River Delta and Hanoi. At the climax of the combat, China had 80,000 troops inside Vietnam faced by 75,000 to 100,000 Vietnamese border troops and militia.⁶³ Notably, however, Hanoi held its best troops in reserve and did not transfer any troops from Cambodia to the theater. Despite initial tactical surprise, the PLA attack quickly ground to a near halt; logistical problems and antique weaponry confronted a sophisticated Vietnamese defense as cumbersome Chinese columns headed down main roads towards provincial towns. Interestingly, neither side employed air power, a deliberate and

mutual restraint. The Chinese admitted to about 20,000 casualties, half of them deaths.⁶⁴ Estimates are that the Vietnamese suffered half that number of casualties. By 16 March all Chinese troops were out with Deng simply quoting Mao that “you can’t know the reaction of the tiger if you don’t touch his arse.”⁶⁵ This was not the first time China had been bitten by the Vietnamese.

The Korean War was an altogether different experience for Communist China. Here she intervened in a traditional “Sinic zone” state against a rapidly advancing foreign enemy who, equipped with nuclear weapons, seemed possibly intent on moving against Chinese territory. China’s motives in entering Korea in mid-October 1950 were different from her subsequent objectives in staying in and enlarging the war. In this regard, both China and the US allowed battlefield conditions to change their original policy objectives, with very painful results for both. China went into the Korean War after US and United Nations (UN) forces under General MacArthur had blunted North Korea’s invasion, achieved complete surprise at Inchon, liberated Seoul, crossed the 38th parallel, occupied Pyongyang, and were racing toward the Yalu River with a UN mandate to reunify all of Korea under Syngman Rhee. Naturally China’s initial objective was to save the North Korean regime and reconstitute North Korea as a buffer state between itself and Republic of Korea, US, and UN forces. From mid- to late October 1950, between 200,000 and 300,000 Chinese PLA “volunteers” crossed the Yalu River at night and then hit the US 8th Army on 26 October.⁶⁶ Withdrawing for three weeks to test Washington’s reaction, the Chinese then struck again on 26 November. US Marines at the Chosin Reservoir barely escaped as allied forces retreated south pell-mell.

Flushed with success, the Chinese changed their objective and sought to push US/UN forces out of Korea. In December 1950 Seoul fell for the second time. Then US air power and

artillery turned the tide in the winter of 1950–51. By March 1951 Seoul was recaptured. Despite serious casualties, the fighting began to stabilize along the territory between Seoul and Pyongyang while the US government actively considered using atomic weapons.⁶⁷ Gradually both sides grew to accept the possibility of a fighting stalemate with reunification denied to either side. The Chinese settled down to what they thought would be a war of attrition; the US, with air and naval superiority, to a war which firepower would win. In terms of sheer casualties the communist forces were decimated, losing perhaps 1.5 million men.⁶⁸ Segal makes a telling appraisal:

US troops took advantage of the fact that the Korean war was a major war fought in a small area. The absence of much room for maneuver meant that defense in depth could thwart Chinese attempts to infiltrate and ambush. . . . Superior US firepower from land, sea and above all air, coupled with superior communications and logistics, meant that Chinese forces were denied any substantial breakthrough.⁶⁹

In March 1953 Stalin died in Moscow and peace talks soon produced a cease-fire in Korea. Chinese casualties were at least 800,000 killed compared to 38,000 Americans. Approximately 2 million Korean civilians died.

In looking back on Chinese Communist's use of force on or outside its borders since 1949, we do not find Beijing pursuing any prominent ideological objectives. Instead territorial and political objectives were paramount. The Chinese sought to teach India and Vietnam "lessons" in 1962 and 1979. They succeeded in the first, failed in the second. Events in Tibet were a natural, if brutal, extension of China's traditional "inner zone" policies. The Sino-Soviet clashes could have been much more serious; here we see the Chinese leadership actively fearing what the Soviets might do on their immediate northern border. Korea was different again. First, attempting to restore the status quo (by saving the Pyongyang regime), then attempting to change the status quo (by destroying the Seoul regime), the Chinese took huge casualties, more than

they could sustain due to eventual US military superiority and tactics and callous “human wave” tactics by PLA commanders. The Chinese eventually settled for a return to a divided Korea, as did the United States. But most impressive about Chinese Communist’s use of force since 1949 is how a totalitarian regime like Beijing, as distinct from democratic governments, can send tens, even hundreds, of thousands of its young men to their certain death with such little accountability. Perhaps, in that regard, we are all fortunate that the Chinese are basically a stay-at-home people.

Japan

Japan is a violent land. It lies across the path of hurricanes and typhoons. Underground there are active volcanoes, and earthquakes shake the islands periodically. Japan’s people also have a violent past. The Japanese have been East Asia’s most ferocious warriors; the Samurai could legally kill other Japanese for the slightest “offense.” Japanese nationalism developed by means of a rough internal politico-military history and was manifested in attempts to conquer other Asian peoples. For seven centuries, from about 1180 to the late 1860s, Japan was organized as police states where absolute values and absolute loyalties were commonplace. When Japan modernized and industrialized after 1868, this was soon accompanied by imperialism and fascism, which propelled the Japanese into the total disaster of WWII. Recovering from the war to become the world’s second largest economy without militarism, the Japanese people continue to display a social cohesion, technical competence, and single-minded competitiveness that can be described as “martial” in intensity.

Fuedalism, the Samurai, and Ethnic Superiority: Underpinnings of Japanese Militarism

The ancestors of the Japanese people emerged some 25 centuries ago as one of several armed tribes near the Altaic mountain range area in what today is the country of Mongolia. Mixed in with other tribal peoples, Japanese ancestral tribes gradually separated from the others and began migrating east and then south, slowly sliding into the Korean Peninsula where they further intermingled with Korean ancestral groups. About the third century A.D., large numbers of mixed Japanese-Korean clans began migrations across the Tsushima Strait to the islands they would eventually call “Nippon.” A distinctive aristocratic and warrior culture emerged among the Japanese in the islands.

These early people were mounted, armed with swords, and used helmets and iron artifacts similar to those used by the Korean and Manchurian people remaining on the mainland.⁷⁰ These primitive, martial Japanese clans contrasted sharply with the more literate, advanced, and geographically sedentary Han Chinese people. The Japanese were Asia’s “Vikings”—accustomed to migration, exploration, and conflict; and they were skilled practitioners of the martial arts. For them, war, conflict, and violence were routine aspects of daily life. As waves of these hardy settlers came across the Tsushima Strait and settled the islands in the third through seventh centuries, they encountered, and quickly dominated, small aboriginal groups and Malay-Polynesian settlers. The Japanese warriors claimed the valleys and crevices of the highly convoluted terrain of Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu.

By the fifth century, write Fairbank and Reischauer, “the Japan that emerged slowly into the light of history was essentially a tribal society, like that of early Korea and perhaps somewhat comparable to the Germanic tribes of Roman times or to the later Scottish clans.”⁷¹ This emerging militarized culture, on the fringe of East Asia, underwent a

long internal pacification and homogenization process. The Japanese would ultimately produce one of the most cohesive, most militant, and more isolated societies in Asia, alternating between closing off all foreign contact and then exploding in militarism or colonial conquest starting in the late sixteenth century and recurring in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The emergence of the precursor of the Japanese state appeared in the fifth through seventh centuries A.D. when the Yamato clan achieved a vague supremacy over surrounding clans and family groups. The Yamato chiefs organized the tribes of the Kanto Plain, and, drawing on myths reaching back a thousand years, made their particular divinity—the sun-goddess—superior to the others; this was the basis of Shinto, which eventually became a national religion and which combined the functions of ruler and cult priest in a single man—the emperor.⁷² But the growing Yamato state also continued to absorb influences from the mainland—particularly émigrés from the Korean Peninsula—who brought to Japan the Buddhist philosophy from China and Korea and a variety of practices and social structures. The Japanese borrowed and absorbed at their own pace—a trait which characterizes them today. This cultural borrowing added sophistication not otherwise attainable to the martial Japanese culture.

By the early seventh century, the Yamato state's leadership was looking for ways to affect a more centralized control of the population, and it adopted a variety of Chinese ideas: divine supremacy of the ruler, centralization of government, a merit bureaucracy, Chinese calendars, taxation, weight, and measures.⁷³ Nevertheless, these were surface adaptations; underneath, Japanese society remained based on clans and personal loyalties, not bureaucracy or gentlemen-scholars.

Moreover, the development of Japanese feudalism—so different from Chinese society with its bureaucratic scholar-

gentry and stratified social characteristics—had striking parallels to the feudalism of Western Europe. But there was no contact between the two; the roots of Japanese feudalism, with its coercive, filial, and violent qualities, were indigenous. Like the Germans in Europe, the Japanese clans were trained in warfare, and they produced a military aristocracy with highly personalized bonds of loyalty. By the eleventh and twelfth century, Japan's emerging feudalism had crystallized; the emperor was essentially a figurehead while real political and economic power was lodged in the localities and protected by armed retainers ("samurai") whom the regional lords employed for battle against their rivals.

Using their fiercely belligerent spirit and aggressive behavior in personal and aristocratic power struggles to protect and enlarge their overlords' control of territory, the samurai were the instruments of hundreds of clan wars that reverberated across the Japanese landscape between the eighth and eleventh centuries. Inevitably, as this free-for-all aggression became organized on larger scales, the most influential warrior groups began competing for control of the fragile central government at Kyoto run by the Fujiwara family. In 1159–60, the first national Japanese struggle, the Heiji Rising, began. The war was accompanied by the emergence of two huge warrior family coalitions—the Taira and the Minamoto—whose battling leagues swept across Japan.

By the middle of the [twelfth] century conflict among these ambitious leagues intensified, and the warrior became supreme; before the 12th Century was over he had firmly imposed on Japan a system of military rule that was to persist, with various modifications, for some 700 years.⁷⁴

Thus the samurai warrior class emerged as the most critical element of Japanese society. Set apart from the rest of the population and owing absolute (if temporary) devotion to their overlords (who competed in hiring and retaining them), the

samurai were armed men for hire, quick to take offense, and able to strike terror in their enemies' hearts.

The final phase of the Minamoto-Taira civil war, formally called the Gempei War, seesawed across Japan between 1180 and 1185 in an orgy of devastation and slaughter. In 1185, the Taira were finally crushed in a great battle, including naval warfare, on the Inland Sea.⁷⁵ The Minamoto leader, Gen Minamoto Yoritomo, set up a warrior-based government for the whole country that was a military dictatorship. Ultimately called the "Kamakura Shogunate," Yoritomo's dictatorship was headquartered at the seaside resort of Kamakura apart from the intrigues of the imperial court at Kyoto.⁷⁶

Beginning in 1185 with the Kamakura, for the next 700 years Japan was ruled by a succession of military-police states called "shogunates." There were three major shogunates, and considerable violence surrounded changes of command. Theoretically, the country's formal government resided in the imperial court at Kyoto, much later at Edo (Tokyo); and the shoguns were careful to preserve this illusion. But the real power rested in the hands of the shoguns and their vassals.

Toward the end of the Kamakura Shogunate (1185–1333) there came a serious external challenge: The Mongols under Kublai Khan had gained control of China and Korea and were threatening Japan. In 1274 and again in 1281, combined Mongol/Korean/Chinese armies attempted seaborne invasions of Japan, the second propelling between 50,000 and 100,000 troops against northwestern Kyushu in the greatest attempted seaborne invasion prior to modern times. It failed due to samurai bravery and due to weather; a monster typhoon roared over Kyushu wrecking the enemy fleets, and most of the invaders drowned or were slaughtered on shore—thus the "kamikaze," or divine wind, whose intervention further convinced the Japanese they were protected by the gods.⁷⁷

At the start of the fourteenth century the Kamakura Shogunate fell into civil war. Great landholders in distant parts of the country, now armed and openly defiant, launched attacks on the government and burned Kamakura to the ground. An ambitious general, Ashikaga Takauji, allied himself with the emperor against Kamakura power. Ashikaga then set up a puppet emperor at Kyoto and set in motion a decentralized feudalism which was to produce a new critical element in Japanese society—the daimyo—noblemen who ruled their fiefs essentially as independent satrapies.⁷⁸

The Ashikaga period (1358–1578) was one of decentralized feudalism—more than 60 semi-independent, often fractious, principalities were involved. Central authority weakened. Emperors were reduced to selling their autographs for money. Shoguns could not collect taxes. Interestingly, however, the country prospered economically. There were no invasions from abroad, and Japanese society transitioned from the extreme militarism and central power structure of the Kamakura period to a more developed society in which an economically productive system was based on the daimyo, or regional oligarchs, who were also entrepreneurs. The samurai moved back and forth between warfare and farming, sometimes provoking serious agrarian unrest.

In spite of these disturbed conditions, considerable economic expansion occurred, spurred by foreign trade with China. Japan's exports were profitable, her swords, lacquer ware, copper, and sulphur sold for many times their domestic value.⁷⁹ Merchants and craftsmen formed guilds. Businesses and trades expanded, goods moved throughout Japan. It was this China trade, coupled with the decentralized political system during the Ashikaga period, that established the basis of a national commerce in Japan.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century the country again declined into regional warfare. Competing strongmen rose to power and one of them—the great warlord Toyotomi

Hideyoshi—ultimately gained control of about two-thirds of Japan's actual land area. By 1590 Hideyoshi was supreme in Japan.⁸⁰

Hideyoshi ultimately allowed his confidence and megalomania to go too far and, believing he could take on China, challenged Chinese suzerainty in Korea. In 1592 Japan launched a 160,000-man invasion of Korea. Opposed by innovative Korean naval tactics, nevertheless, Hideyoshi's troops got all the way to the Yalu River before the Chinese intervened.⁸¹ For seven years the war raged, but not until Hideyoshi's death in 1598 did Japan quit its Korean occupation. The war all but ruined Korea. Shortly thereafter, one of Hideyoshi's vassals, Tokugawa Ieyasu, became shogun; and the start of 250 years of internal stability, uncomplicated by foreign adventures, began. Morton puts Japan's development into perspective:

This period in Japan happened to coincide roughly in chronology with the solidifying of the nation-states in Europe, and particularly with the centralizing power and skill of the Tudor monarchs in England. However in Japan it was not the monarchs but the generals who were the architects of unity. This unification ushered in the most peaceful and homogenous period in Japanese history, the Tokugawa Shogunate, lasting also for 250 years. It must be recognized, nevertheless, that this internal peace was characterized by some of the rigidity of a police state and was purchased at the cost of free development and unhampered intercourse with other nations. Japan went into an isolation that was almost but not quite total.⁸²

The Tokugawa police state was the foundation upon which Japan would modernize in the nineteenth century. The Tokugawa period was characterized by the growth of commerce, migration to the cities, the rise of the middle class, and critical mergers among daimyo and merchants. Large ancestral farms broke into smaller, more manageable units. Kyoto, Edo, and Osaka became major commercial cities. Numerous other towns grew up in the center of regional

fiefdoms. Merchants and commercial activity became the new focus of Japan's economy.⁸³

Nevertheless, sociopolitical life in Japan was rigidly regulated. Taxes were heavy. Laws prescribed types of clothing, permissible alcohol consumption, and procedures for marriages and funerals. Literature was regulated. Nobles attending the shogun at Edo were required to leave their wives and families in Edo as hostages. No daimyo could enlarge or improve his castles without the shogun's permission. Christians were persecuted and went underground. Japan was deliberately cut off from the rest of the world for over 200 years.

Most critically, the samurai began to lose their functions. With Tokugawa class structure freezing the differences between warrior and peasant and warrior and merchant, more and more samurai became *ronin*—masterless wandering men. Morton describes the situation.

Upward social mobility was very difficult, in part owing to lack of money among the lower grades of *samurai*. Indeed fluctuations of the rice market, in which their stipends, paid in rice, were converted to cash, made any social movement for the *samurai* likely to be a downward one. The classic means for a warrior to enrich himself by fighting to gain possession of the lands of others was totally denied to him by the overwhelming power of the Tokugawa police state. It is no wonder there was a deep sense of frustration in the *samurai* ranks.⁸⁴

Then came the shock which changed Japan forever; in 1853 the "Black Ships" of the American commodore, Matthew Perry, steamed into Edo Bay and demanded trade with Japan.

Commodore Perry's visit propelled Japan into the modern world by setting off a political scramble inside Japan on how to cope with the West. The result was that a group of modernizing samurai, educated and talented, toppled the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868 and, under the guise of restoring the emperor's power, began the forced-draft modernization of Japan at breakneck speed. For the next 30 years the Japanese government stimulated and pushed the

industrialization of the country; broke the power of both daimyo and samurai (largely by buying them out); undertook compulsory education; created a national army; adopted a Prussian-style constitution; decreed legal equality of all classes; and set up national banking, transportation, and industrial ventures. This was “revolution from above”: state-directed rapid modernization. It was not a peasant revolution, which ultimately would be China’s reaction to the West. It was an elite revolution that exploited Japanese society’s natural strengths and forced the country’s industrialization.⁸⁵

Twentieth-century Japanese militarism and fascism was, in part, a result of the tremendous “pressure cooker” changes that the revolution of 1868 had wrought. Foreign outlets in the form of trade, territorial expansion, then militarism—all harkening back to Japan’s warrior ethic—were the by-product. In 1875 Japan colonized Taiwan. In 1894 Japan fought China for influence over Korea and won. In 1904–05 Japan fought and beat Russia for deeper control in Korea and rights in Manchuria. In 1910 Japan annexed Korea outright. By the start of World War I, Japan was the dominant power in East Asia; in 1917–18 she led the allied occupation of Russia’s Far Eastern territory, putting 70,000 troops into the Vladivostok area.

These external moves encouraged political radicalism from both the Right and the Left in Japan. The Right won, of course, eventually laying the basis for General Tojo’s military-industrial dictatorship. In the late 1920s, a powerful army and navy emerged with leverage over the civilian cabinets. The major external prize became Manchuria with its huge mineral deposits. The Japanese army staged a series of pretexts to allow them to overrun central and eastern China from their Manchurian base. In July 1937 Japan declared war on China. In September 1940 Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with fascist Germany and Italy. In April 1941 she signed a

neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Tojo became prime minister in October 1941 and on 7 December 1941 Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

The Pacific war saw imperial Japan send close to 3 million troops overseas, most of them to China. In mid-1943 the furthest extent of Japan's Asian empire reached from the western Aleutian Islands in the northeast to Guadalcanal in the southeast, to Burma in the west and the Manchurian/Soviet border in the north. By July 1944, with major armies tied down in China, the Japanese home islands came under steady air attack by the United States Air Force. Thirteen months later it was all over, following the US atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On 14 August 1945 Japan surrendered unconditionally aboard the US battleship *Missouri*.

The American military occupation of Japan lasted seven years. Over 2 million US occupation troops rotated through Japan. They encountered a country in ruins. Over 60 cities had been bombed. There was no heat for two years. One million civilians had perished. Close to 2 million soldiers had died. Two and a half million buildings and homes were destroyed. General MacArthur's administration was only mildly punitive. Japan was completely demilitarized. The rightist political forces were prosecuted. The Communist party was made legal. The United States allowed the Japanese to have a police force of up to 75,000 personnel. This eventually became the basis of the Self Defense Forces. The American-dictated constitution prohibited Japan from maintaining forces "for purposes of war." Thus ended Japan's most recent experience with militarism.

From Bushido to Imperialism and Fascism: The Japanese Style of Warfare

The aggressive, often fanatical, behavior of Japanese troops in World War II, frequently commented upon in allied

accounts and soldiers' personal experience, is traceable to the absolutist warrior tradition in Japan and soldiers' uncomplaining willingness to die for their superiors—be they emperor or feudal lord. Evolving in the seventh through ninth centuries, the samurai became armed men for hire. Protecting their superior's domains and honor to the death, they were the instruments through which thousands of battles were waged between competing oligarchs and warrior clans. Edwin Reischauer described the phenomenon:

Organized to protect their own interests, the local groups were in essence vigilante bands of warriors. Their members formed a petty local aristocracy, somewhat like the knights of early feudal Europe, for they too were mounted, armored warriors. Their chief weapons were the bow and arrow, skillfully used from horseback, and the curved steel sword, which came to be the finest blade in the world.⁸⁶

However, there were important differences between the Japanese samurai and the European feudal warriors. Japan's fierce, grim, aristocratic horsemen, while resembling outwardly the knights of medieval Europe, with their devotion to their overlords, were motivated by principles very different from the Europeans:

The ideal of chivalry and the glorification of womanhood that underlay European knighthood had no counterpart among the samurai. Nor were the Samurai inspired by religious fervor. As a Samurai warrior plunged into battle he was no crusader invoking heavenly aid in his war cries. Instead, he sought to strike terror in his enemies by shouting his own prowess and the names and exploits of his illustrious ancestors.⁸⁷

Thus, we see the roots of the Japanese culture's particular predispositions toward war and conflict. Violence was a profession. Battle was an honorable, spirited enterprise. Warriors rode into battle armed with family ties and clan loyalties and assumed divine protection. This was the fierce "Bushido" spirit; and the aristocratic structure it served was honed and glorified in hundreds of battles. Political and economic power in Japan rested on this martial culture. When

the Japanese invaded other nations, as in the Korean Peninsula expeditions in the late sixteenth century and then in Taiwan, Korea, and China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they brought this uncompromising sense of cultural superiority and fanatical spirit to their imperial and colonial enterprises. They saw themselves as a chosen people, superior in all ways and intent on proving it.

One extraordinary episode of proof to the Japanese that they were protected by the gods occurred when the Mongols invaded in the late thirteenth century. Samurai competed to throw themselves first against the Mongols. For two months they kept possibly 100,000 enemy troops contained on the rocky coasts of Kyushu, and then, when the invaders began to win, the huge typhoon—the “kamikaze”—smashed their assault forces to pieces. The Japanese never forgot that rescue. When another invasion threatened Japan in 1945 and Japanese pilots flew their bomb-loaded planes into American warships in a vain effort to save the country, they were labeled “kamikaze” for the divinely inspired wind of the thirteenth century.

In the 1590s, after four centuries of internal violence and military-feudal national governments, the Japanese warrior state sought to prove its superiority against Korea and China. After all, the Chinese had earlier caved in to the Mongols while they, the Japanese, had not. The Japanese put 200,000 troops into Korea. What turned the tide was a Chinese counterinvasion, and soon the Japanese had both Korean and Chinese hostile forces to contend with—as would the US/UN command in Korea after October 1950. The invasion proved too costly for Japan, and they left the mainland and began an isolationism that would close Japan off for over 250 years.

The seeds of Japan’s twentieth-century authoritarianism and absolutism can be linked to the Tokugawa period. By the midnineteenth century, the country had become a repressive police state. It was illegal to leave Japan, and it was

illegal to return. The population was divided into classes, the classes into families, the families into households. But as commercialized agriculture began to spread across the country, the samurai began to lose their stipends. As Moore describes the change:

Under the enforced peace of the Tokugawa, the warrior had no obviously important social function to perform. In the meantime, other forms of prestige, based on the wealth of the merchants, were beginning to compete with the martial virtues. . . . The loss of their functions as warriors, together with the inroads of commerce, placed a severe strain on the loyalty of many *samurai*, setting them adrift.⁸⁸

As a result, “many warriors simply cut their ties and became *ronin*, wandering masterless men, often ready for violent enterprize . . . a free-floating source of violence, a ‘lumpenaristocracy’ available for a variety of reactionary purposes.”⁸⁹

Thus, by the 1850s Japan was an unsettled agrarian-commerical police state with hundreds of thousands of marginally employed violent young men. She was ripe for revolution or reaction. She would get both and in that order. Commodore Perry’s opening of Japan was the stimulus which set in motion Japan’s extraordinary industrial revolution and modernization. But modernization would not liquidate Japan’s martial instincts, which went back for centuries, as much as it would channel them into big power competition in Asia. The modernizers had a society with a great deal of cohesion to continue working with. Again, Moore:

One gets the strong impression that [Japanese society] when it was working well, consisted of a series of descending and spreading chains of influential leaders and their coteries of close followers, linked all the way from the top to the bottom by patriarchal and personal ties, enabling those in superior positions to know just how far they could push those beneath them.⁹⁰

It is doubtful that this extraordinary social cohesion of Japanese society has changed very much in spite of the enormous stresses

of the twentieth century. They are still the most cohesive, ethnically undiluted, and competitive people in the world.

The recurrence of overt Japanese militarism in the twentieth century coincided with the breakdown of liberal democratic experiments at home and the rise of colonial enterprises on Asia's mainland. Political radicalism at home—in the form of extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties—resulted in the assassination of two prime ministers. The Japanese army developed a vested interest in Manchuria as early as the 1920s. Soon the chief of staff of the Army, General Tojo, became the shadow shogun.

The Japanese attack on China was, of course, where two-thirds of Japan's actual war effort went. It was too often accompanied by particularly brutal Japanese troop behavior toward the Chinese. Beijing maintains that one-third of a million Chinese died at Nanjing, for example. Americans have a view of the Pacific war as largely naval battles, island hopping, and some jungle warfare. In fact, while Japan put out a strong naval and air barrier to shield her mainland operations and protect her economic dependencies—particularly Manchurian coal and iron and Indonesian oil—the bulk of her combat effort and resources were expended in China, where she had to fight both Communists and Nationalists. Although the sustained American B-29 air attacks and then the atom bombs ultimately wrecked Japan's cities, Japan became trapped on the East Asian mainland, overextended in another attempt to prove her superiority over other Asian cultures.

Vietnam

Unlike the Japanese, who became protected from continental East Asia's turmoil by the Tsushima Strait, the Vietnamese people could seldom escape pressure from the

Chinese, the Mongols, and other peoples. Vietnamese territories were repeatedly invaded and occupied by Chinese armies between the third and fourteenth centuries, experienced three Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, were colonized by France in the nineteenth century, and were militarily occupied by Chinese, Japanese, French, and American forces in the midtwentieth century. Today, in the early 1990s, Vietnam's military and economic dependence on another country, the Soviet Union, remains evident.

Caught between and often battered by more powerful forces, and prone to civil wars when free of outside pressure, Vietnamese culture reflects attitudes and behavior characteristic of people who have been victimized: hostility, suspicion, xenophobia, and a negative kind of nationalism. A hardy, tough people who have endured centuries in China's shadow, the Vietnamese often responded by fighting back. When not exacting a high price from foreign occupiers, the Vietnamese sought to colonize or dominate their weaker neighbors.

Like the Koreans, the Vietnamese modeled their official, scholarly, and artistic life after China. The Vietnamese court, the Mandarinate, and the institutions of higher learning all reflected the formal Chinese system and taught the Chinese classics. Hanoi paid formal tribute to Peking in return for the Vietnamese sovereigns' legitimation and investiture by the imperial seals issued in Peking by the Sons of Heaven.⁹¹ However the Vietnamese also retained a fiercely independent national spirit and ethnic identity. "If there is one proposition that unites all Vietnamese, whatever else divides them," writes Dennis Duncanson, the British authority on Vietnamese and Chinese culture and politics, ". . . it is the negative one that [Vietnam] is not to be regarded on any account as a dependency of China."⁹²

The Caldron of Vietnamese Nationalism

Originating like many other Southeast Asian peoples in what is today the hill territory of southwestern China, the early Vietnamese tribes were established there before Han Chinese settlers appeared. Probably about the sixth or fifth century B.C. ancestral Vietnamese pioneers began moving out of the Yunnan hills and south to the coastal areas around Canton. The Yunnan area contained other tribal groups besides the Vietnamese who also eventually migrated into the river valleys of mainland Southeast Asia: the Khmer, the Thai, the Burmese, and the Lao being the most prominent. But the Vietnamese were the southernmost of these original migrators and not as numerous as the Thai. Subsequent Vietnamese-Thai rivalry (continuing today in Cambodia) shows the Vietnamese were not always on good terms with the warrior Thais. Indeed, although the Vietnamese ultimately sharpened their national identity against occupying Chinese and Mongol-Chinese armies, their first immediate enemies were the Thais. This Thai-Vietnamese rivalry, which occurred almost two millennia ago in the Yunnan area, may well be the origin of much of the peculiar hostilities and aggravations reflected in the Vietnamese mind-set. Thai pressure, for example, seems to have provoked the original Vietnamese migrations south to the coasts and ultimately into Tonkin.⁹³

Nevertheless, the emergence of a distinctive "Viet" national area in the eastern corner of mainland Southeast Asia coincides with China's projection, in the third century B.C., of a cultural and political assimilation culminating in an imperial annexation. The little territory of Tonkin and portions of adjacent Canton were long referred to by the Chinese as "Nam Viet," meaning the southern Vietnamese area, and Chinese rule eventually extended down the Tonkin coast to the Annamese midlands.⁹⁴ Then, after 150 years of Chinese tutelage and cultural Sinicization, came the first Vietnamese national revolt. In the year A.D. 39 two titled sisters with the

surname Trung led a revolt against Chinese authorities.⁹⁵ The revolt was crushed, the sisters committed suicide, and with a few interruptions in Chinese rule (which the Viets took advantage of), Tonkin was administratively incorporated into the Chinese state.

By the year A.D. 800 a variety of changes were impacting on the Viets which would reawaken and energize their dormant nationalism—the most immediate being renewed pressures from the Thais. In 862 and 863, as Tang Chinese power weakened, temporarily removing the “Pax Sinica” from the region, Hanoi was sacked by marauding Thai émigrés seeking relief from overcrowding and hunger in upland territories.⁹⁶ The Vietnamese became caught between the temporary rampage of the Thais and the larger strategic presence of the Chinese. Gradually, Vietnamese pioneers began moving south where they encountered a peninsula largely open for settlement.

In the thirteenth century the Mongols invaded Vietnam three times only to be turned back each time; the last resistance battles were led by Vietnam’s illustrious general, Tran Hung Dao. As these threats from the north finally receded, the Vietnamese again swung their attention south; contact and conflict with the Cham kingdom now absorbed their energies. A contest was inevitable: the Sinicized, tough, “chip-on-the-shoulder” Vietnamese versus the Indianized, animist, aggressive Malay-stock Champans. The Viet-Cham contest seesawed back and forth for almost two centuries. Both Hanoi and Indrapura, the Cham capital, were sacked and burned. Before it was over the Vietnamese were reinvaded by a new Chinese army; the brutal Ming occupation took 20 years to dislodge and produced the legendary Viet nationalist leader, Le Loi.⁹⁷ Free to settle the Cham problem once the Chinese had left, the Vietnamese won the contest in 1471 and, using armed settlers and colonies of soldiers, evicted the

Chams from their remaining capital, Vijaya, massacring tens of thousands who could not get away.⁹⁸

With the elimination of the Cham kingdom, the Vietnamese soon came into direct contact and inevitable conflict with the Khmer people. Khmer-Viet animosity actually preceded the Cham's defeat. As early as the 1120s, nearing the height of Angkor's splendor, Khmer forces had invaded Annam. But under Thai pressure from the west in the twelfth century, the Khmers began migrating south and east towards the Mekong Delta at which Vietnamese pioneers (now led by independent southerners) simultaneously were advancing down the coast.⁹⁹ By the midfifteenth century these Vietnamese advance parties were claiming lands occupied by the Khmer; 150 years later they had occupied the Mekong Delta between Saigon and the Bassac River.

Thus ended, with some violent border "adjustments," particularly with the Laotians, the drama of Vietnam's territorial conquests and cultural expansion. This expansionism was the outlet for a strong, nationalistic, and revenge-prone culture harboring centuries of resentment and inferiority feelings at the hands of the Chinese and ready to become regional overlord at the expense of the Khmer, Cham, and Laotians. As the historian Alexander Woodside put it, the Vietnamese expansionist attitude resonates with a kind of Confucian "cultural evangelism" and "hierarchical vision of interstate relations" reinforced by a "psychologically defensive imitation" of the way Vietnam had been treated by stronger powers.¹⁰⁰ Towards the Khmers, in particular, whose territory both the Vietnamese and the Thais have digested chunk by chunk, there always has been a Vietnamese attitude of cultural superiority and paternalism (or maternalism—see below). Thus communist Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, has described the client regime in Phnom Penh as a "child" that Vietnam had to put on its feet and encourage to

walk alone—language strikingly similar to that of Emperor Gia Long (1802–19), who said:

Cambodia is a small country. . . . And we should maintain it as a child. We will be its mother, its father will be Siam. When a child has trouble with its father, it can get rid of suffering by embracing its mother. When the child is unhappy with its mother, it can run to its father for support.¹⁰¹

Given that the genocidal Khmer Rouge have been dependent on Thai (and Chinese) support, Vietnam's "maternal" instincts may have become overpowering in December 1978.

The French encountered the Vietnamese on their way to China in the early nineteenth century. Thinking that the Mekong River would take them to "Cathay," France discovered that the Mekong had created the great rice deltas of Indochina. Diverted from China by this prize, realizing the British had most of China's critical ports, and with Catholicism and profits driving their zeal, the French sailed into Indochina in 1853. French Indochina lent itself to division into five sections: Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Cambodia, and Laos.

Vietnamese bandits and guerrillas quickly opposed the French, and by 1859 they were carving out sanctuaries in the Plain of Reeds north of Saigon and in the Camau Peninsula at the tip of the Mekong Delta—infested swampy areas the Vietcong would thrive in 100 years later. As Admiral Bonard, the French commander in 1862, wrote:

We have had enormous difficulties in enforcing our authority. . . . Rebel bands disturb the country everywhere. They appear from nowhere in large numbers, destroy everything and then disappear into nowhere.¹⁰²

For the next 25 years as sporadic banditry and Vietnamese imperial court resistance occupied the French; rebel groups were hunted down and executed with well-publicized brutality. However, the repression simply sowed the seeds of future resistance. For, while the French built new roads, hospitals, and schools and

introduced rubber and better rice-cultivation methods, the peasants inexorably fell into deeper debt and hunger. Moreover, few natives, however qualified, could rise above very junior positions. Politically, Indochina was the special preserve of Frenchmen.¹⁰³

The Vietnamese *national* revolt against France began in the year 1900 with the emergence of Phan Boi Chau. Born in Nghe An, also the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh, Chau was a radical monarchist who traveled around Vietnam, wrote books, sought foreign aid, and established the first Vietnamese patriotic league: The Association for the Modernization of Vietnam. His radical tracts, including "Letters Written in Blood," made Chau a marked man; French agents finally captured him in Shanghai in 1925. He died under house arrest in Hue in 1940.¹⁰⁴

The most prominent revolutionary to follow Chau was, of course, Ho Chi Minh. A furtive, brilliant conspirator with a dozen aliases, Ho Chi Minh wandered the world before settling in Paris during WWI, where he emerged as the most articulate and dedicated expatriate Vietnamese revolutionary. Propagandizing among the hundreds of thousands of Indochinese who had been shipped to France as soldiers and laborers during WWI, Ho and his colleagues joined the French Communist Party, which had Soviet Bolshevik support. In 1924 Ho moved to Moscow, where he attended Lenin's University of Oriental Workers, an agitprop school for Asian revolutionaries.¹⁰⁵ Later Ho Chi Minh traveled to Canton where, as a deputy to Mikhail Borodin, Moscow's man in China, he mobilized expatriate Vietnamese students, labor leaders, and radicals.

Alternating between Moscow, Paris, Bangkok, and Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh formed the Indochinese Communist Party in 1929. After being arrested in Hong Kong, escaping to Singapore and being rearrested, then escaping to China, by the mid-1930s, he was weakened by tuberculosis and malaria.

When the Japanese tidal wave swept across Southeast Asia in 1940–41, Ho was betrayed and jailed in a succession of Chinese prisons during 1941–42.¹⁰⁶ Finally free, Ho Chi Minh entered Vietnam, his first return in 30 years, to join forces with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, communists who had never left Vietnam and had spent years in French colonial jails. Together they formed the Vietnam Independence League—soon simply the Viet Minh. The final struggle with France had begun.

When Japanese authority collapsed in Indochina in the summer of 1945, the Viet Minh moved into the power vacuum and on 2 September 1945, declared Vietnam independent.¹⁰⁷ The Viet Minh then proceeded to promise democratic elections but began murdering non-Communist nationalists, socialists, educators, and religious leaders. They also sought aid from the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France while seeking to erode the influence of both France and China. Tortuous negotiations with the resurgent French colonial regime endured, but they ended after the 23 November 1946 Haiphong bombardment, which produced 6,000 Vietnamese deaths.¹⁰⁸ On 19 December 1946 the French–Viet Minh War broke out in earnest.

French war aims, prompted by the lingering humiliations of the Second World War, were to achieve the full colonial reconquest and reincorporation of Indochina into the French Union. By contrast the Viet Minh sought to completely liberate and administer Vietnam with friendly governments set up in Cambodia and Laos. By 1947, the political intractability of the situation in Indochina was widening the splits in France's fragile coalition governments. Short of troops and supplies, Fourth Republic prime ministers (there were 13) told the French commanders in Hanoi to improvise in Indochina—using combinations of area pacification techniques and urban security measures. In short, France was

fighting herself as well as the Viet Minh. Bernard Fall remarked on France's unresolved dilemma.

The leveling-off at a minimal level of French effectives in 1948–49 gave the French High Command very little choice of strategy. It cleaned up much of Cochinchina, with the help of the religious sects, whom the Viet-Minh had alienated, and also consolidated its hold on the Tonkin delta by occupying the hitherto-“neutral” Catholic bishoprics of Bui-Chu and Phat-Diem (“Operation Anthracite”). But despite French control, the Sino-Tonkin border had become virtually a sieve through which equipment for the Communist forces filtered at an ever-increasing pace. When Red China occupied all the provinces bordering on Tongking, late in 1949, and thus provided the Viet-Minh with a “sanctuary” where its troops could be trained and its supplies stored and replenished, the war had, for all practical purposes, become hopeless for the French.¹⁰⁹

By late 1949 the French had lost the strategic initiative and were conceding large portions of northwestern and northeastern Vietnam to the Communists. In France political support for continuing the war was beginning to crumble. The French high command went through *eight* commanders in chief in the eight years between 1946 and 1954. With the exception of Viet Minh overconfidence in 1951, when General Giap's forces launched a premature “general counteroffensive” and lost thousands of troops, Viet Minh military strategy advanced fairly steadily.¹¹⁰ The Communists spread out their attacks to draw the French off to the Vietnamese highlands and central Laos. The Red River Delta and the Mekong Delta, while still the major prizes, were no longer the major theaters of operations.

In 1953 the new French commander in chief, Gen Henri Navarre, temporarily invigorated the French effort, but it only delayed the final result. General Giap continued to spread out French forces while holding central and southern Laos hostage. The showdown came at an outpost 200 miles from Hanoi on the northwest Vietnamese-Lao border called Dien Bien Phu. While the French continued to fritter away their

reserves protecting a dozen air strips around Indochina, suddenly in the spring of 1954 the Viet Minh sprang their trap on Dien Bien Phu. General Navarre rose to the bait, and the French increased the men at the garrison to 16,000. The Viet Minh relied on Chinese, Viet, and tribal porters and drivers to haul large numbers of heavy artillery pieces and at least 100,000 artillery shells down from the Chinese border to pummel the camp.¹¹¹ The Viet Minh timed the conclusion of the battle for the Geneva peace negotiations, and US and British air intervention were denied.¹¹² Therefore, the Viet Minh achieved the surrender of the French garrison on 8 May 1954, although at a cost of four times as many dead as the French forces.¹¹³ The war ended 10 weeks later on 21 July with Vietnam being split at the 17th parallel into two states: the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN).

The Second Indochina War may be said to have started as soon as the first war ended—at least politically. Groups of special Viet Minh guerrillas—about 8,000 men—stayed behind in the south as the Vietnamese Communist Party put the north under an iron grip and began emptying Tonkin of class enemies.¹¹⁴ In the south the fledgling regime of Ngo Dinh Diem sought to bring order out of chaos as it battled religious sects, armed bandits, and communist revolutionary actions, as well as a resistant receding French regime.

By what seemed a miracle, the Diem government gradually bested its enemies and put the southern economy and administrative infrastructure back into working order. But at the center of Ngo Dinh Diem's government was his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who relied on coercion, bribery, and police tactics to intimidate the regime's challengers. Nhu and his vitriolic wife would become the government's most hated symbols.

Hanoi waited through the mid-1950s, preoccupied with bringing Tonkin under its Marxist-Leninist order, before

deciding on a policy for South Vietnam. By 1957 Le Duan had emerged as the chief advocate of renewed revolution in the south, and in May 1959 the Hanoi politburo accepted Le Duan's proposals to brace political action in the south with guerrilla warfare.¹¹⁵

Fifteen months later the Vietnamese Communist Party set up its underground organization in the south: the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV). In February 1961 all communist armed forces were merged into a People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), which was soon made a direct appendage of the Communist party's Central Committee—the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN).¹¹⁶ By early 1962 COSVN was exercising control over about 17,000 mainly southern troops with mixed southern/northern cadres—who came to be known as the Vietcong.

During Ngo Dinh Diem's early years, the balance of foreign support for his fledgling regime shifted from France to the United States.¹¹⁷ On the military side, the United States' advisory team, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), operating within the Geneva Accords stipulations on size, focused principally on South Vietnam's army—creating an organizational clone of the recently Korean War-tested American Army. But while US military advisors were edging into an increasing commitment to South Vietnam, they were doing so without related reform by the Saigon government. Again and again the US government brought up the matter of reform with Diem and, later, with his successors, generals Thieu and Ky. Repeatedly, they ignored the Americans. As US ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow cabled Washington in March 1961:

I stated [to Diem] we [were] still receiving allegations and rumors about Can Lao Party [Nhu's organization] secret activities which . . . are harmful to GVN [Government of Vietnam]. I again urged that party come out in open or dissolve itself. . . . Diem made no promises.¹¹⁸

United States Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor told Thieu and Ky after they had overthrown the civilian-led (and carefully US nurtured) High National Council:

I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner that we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. . . . Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this . . . why don't you tell your friends before you act?¹¹⁹

In November 1963 Diem and Nhu were killed by army officers. Three weeks later President Johnson found himself presiding over a US semicommitment to South Vietnam in the wake of President John Kennedy's death. In August 1964, at the time of the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* Gulf of Tonkin incidents, US intelligence concluded that regular North Vietnamese combat units had appeared in the central highlands of South Vietnam. The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) independent 808th battalion was now in the country. In December the PAVN 95th regiment also infiltrated South Vietnam. Between then and May 1965, three more PAVN regiments were detected entering the south, bringing the number of northern-born regulars in the south to perhaps 6,500.¹²⁰

In February 1965 the Johnson administration launched air strikes against the north as reprisals for communist attacks on US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. In March the sustained air campaign known as "Rolling Thunder" began. US Marines went into Da Nang, and by June there were 75,000 Americans in the Republic of Vietnam. The United States' most difficult military experience had begun.

As the Saigon governments went through the political revolving door during the chaos following Diem's assassination, both Hanoi and Washington escalated the violence in the spring of 1965. Led by Gen William Westmoreland, the US advisory effort planned a huge logistical buildup that would take at least a year with a concurrent combat effort in which US and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

main force units would search out and destroy communist main force units while shielding the South Vietnamese population.¹²¹ Hanoi, however, had its own strategy. Bracing COSVN (whose original chief, Nguyen Van Linh, would become secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1988) with more resources, Hanoi sent the charismatic four-star general, Nguyen Chi Thanh, to take over in 1965.¹²² By mid-1965 large numbers of northerners were infiltrating South Vietnam. By late 1966 General Westmoreland's command estimated there were close to 200,000 communist actives—political and military—inside the RVN.¹²³

The war that developed in South Vietnam and the US air war against North Vietnam enveloped all of Indochina. While the conventional military aspects of the war clearly consumed the most physical resources and lives, the war remained at heart a revolutionary political struggle. The insurgency and village-level military actions never disappeared even as the big-unit war and the bombing escalated.¹²⁴

Concurrently with the ground war's escalation in the South was the US air war against the North. Designed by Washington to *compel* Hanoi to drop its policy of subverting South Vietnam, the air war's effectiveness proved limited. Political constraints in the US, North Vietnam's ability to adjust during the seven-year campaign, and overconfidence in the Pentagon and the White House regarding graduated air strikes against an agricultural society contributed to the realization by 1966 that the bombing, as conducted, would not break Hanoi's will.¹²⁵ Gradually, the US changed its goal against the DRVN to one of simply exacting a heavy cost to Hanoi of supporting and directing the war in the South.¹²⁶ Ultimately, under President Nixon, the bombing goals were to force Hanoi to sign an accord which would allow the United States and its captured airmen an honorable exit from the war.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, the US Air Force's and Navy's bombardment set new records in the annals of air warfare. A total of 7.8 million tons of bombs was dropped on Indochina targets—greater than the total US tonnage dropped in both theaters in WWII. One-third of the tonnage was from B-52s which flew against targets in both South Vietnam and North Vietnam. A majority of the bombs, about 4 million tons, fell on targets in South Vietnam, principally in remote areas or in tactical support of ground operations. About 1.5 million fell on logistical targets in Laos, and over 500,000 tons on Cambodia. North Vietnam absorbed more than 1 million tons of bombs.¹²⁸ Although they cost North Vietnam greatly, the bombing campaigns did not fundamentally alter Hanoi's policy; and they actually strengthened the party's control of the society.¹²⁹ In South Vietnam and Cambodia, by contrast, the bombing and related artillery fire contributed to the creation of millions of refugees whose misery and needs critically weakened the Saigon and Phnom Penh governments' legitimacy and control.¹³⁰

The communist Tet offensive of January–May 1968 was the strategic act that forced the American disengagement from Vietnam and sent the two Vietnams down the road of negotiation and fighting which ended in their violent reunification in April 1975. While Tet was a tactical loss for the communist side—they would lose 45,000 men in the first month and perhaps 160,000 killed by the end of the year¹³¹—the shock of Tet broke the back of the Johnson administration's war policy. Ironically Tet also galvanized the South Vietnamese defense effort for several years until the communist forces were replenished. Four years later, in the midst of accelerating American withdrawals, Hanoi laid another great shock on South Vietnam during the so-called Easter offensive of 1972. This time the Nixon administration reacted with tactical, then strategic, bombing of the DRVN

heartland, producing great destruction to North Vietnam's remaining industrial/communications complex.

President Nixon's reaction to the communist offensive of April/May 1972 was to lay an enormous tactical, then strategic, military reprisal onto the DRVN, while at the same time—with creative diplomacy—actually improving US relations with Hanoi's two primary allies: the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In November 1972, following six months of new bombing and Nixon's landslide reelection, the president gave Hanoi an ultimatum: either negotiate seriously or suffer the consequences. When Hanoi balked, the president ordered "Linebacker II," the massive 11-day, December strategic bombing campaign of North Vietnam's heartland. The bombing worked. Hanoi became flexible, and by the second week of January 1973, Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger produced a final version of the peace plan. American POWs were soon airlifted out of North Vietnam to a great wave of relief and patriotism in the United States.

Though the peace accords extricated American POWs from Hanoi, they were seriously flawed regarding political and military realities on the battlefield. First, they did not acknowledge the presence of perhaps 150,000 regular North Vietnamese troops left inside South Vietnam, an issue about which President Thieu in Saigon made furious objections. Secondly, the accords stipulated that while the two Vietnamese regimes could replace war material on a one-for-one basis *in the South*, these restrictions did not apply to military assistance flowing into the North.¹³² Then in the summer of 1973, as PAVN infiltration of the South increased, the US Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment, which forbade any more use of American air power in Southeast Asia.

By late 1974, with US aid to South Vietnam cut by Congress, North Vietnamese combat forces inside South

Vietnam were up to 200,000 with an additional 100,000 support and logistics troops. Communist armored vehicles—mainly tanks—had risen to 700, or twice the ARVN's inventory. In March 1975 as the North Vietnamese divisions began to pour over the border, the ARVN panicked; and in six weeks the 15-year war ended, and Saigon surrendered.

Vietnam's Way of War

As we have seen, the Vietnamese approach to warfare grew out of their long and difficult experiences with outsiders: the Chinese, Thais, Mongols, Chams, Khmers, and later the French, Japanese, and Americans. Few countries have so routinely been the object of other peoples' ambitions and animosities. Vietnamese authorities have reflected thoroughly about warfare and its relationship to politics. They accept struggle and violence as aspects of policy. By virtue of Vietnam's geography, and of the frequent invaders, the Vietnamese have been unable to escape. Unprotected, as were the Japanese, for example, from mainland Asia's turmoil, the Vietnamese fought back, usually relying on guerrilla warfare. In turn, the Viets invaded and occupied other lands to the south, using conventional armed invasions and soldier-colonialist thrusts to take the land. This dual Vietnamese approach to warfare—guerrilla war when defending, conventional war when conquering—defines the spectrum of Vietnam's approach to war. As demonstrated in the Second Indochina War between 1961 and 1975, Vietnam's communist authorities blended both guerrilla war and conventional war in fighting the nationalist South.

Long before the Vietnamese doubled the size of their national territory at the expense of the Chams and the Khmer, they had to defend their Tonkinese homeland from repeated, massive, and brutal Chinese and Mongol-Chinese invasions. Although portrayal of the Trung sisters revolt in A.D. 39–40 has benefited from patriotic embellishment, the real start of

Vietnam's tradition of guerrilla warfare begins in the tenth century when the Vietnamese threw off a Tang Chinese occupation force. At the battle of Bach Dang in 938, in the Red River Delta near Haiphong, Vietnamese guerrillas combatted the Chinese invasion force. As flotillas of armed Chinese junks approached the tidal waterways of the Bach Dang River, General Ngo Quyen, a Vietnamese warlord, resorted to trickery: he had his men drive iron-tipped spikes into the riverbed, their points concealed just below the water's surface. At high tide, Ngo's guerrillas lured the Chinese up the river. Then, attacking the Chinese from the banks, the Viets forced the Chinese to flee back down the river where they became impaled on the spikes while the Vietnamese slaughtered them.¹³³ With victory in hand, Ngo Quyen declared Vietnam's independence.

In 1284, during a fight against 150,000 Mongol-Chinese forces seeking to repacify the southern regions on Kublai Khan's orders, northern Vietnam's legendary Tran Hung Dao mustered every available resource in Tonkin against the invaders. Like Vietnamese generals before and after him, Tran

relied on mobile methods of warfare, abandoning the cities, avoiding frontal attacks, and harassing his enemies until, confused and exhausted, they were ripe for final attack.¹³⁴

In the last great battle in 1287, squads of Vietnamese guerrillas once again drew the Mongol-Chinese flotillas into the heat and disease of Tonkin's river tributaries and, repeating the Bach Dang River debacle of 350 years earlier, used the same underwater-spike technique to trap and slaughter the enemy. Thereafter, the Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in China lost interest in Vietnam.¹³⁵

When the Mongol grip on China was sundered and a new, energetic Chinese dynasty called Ming was in place in Peking, it was inevitable that the Chinese would turn their attention to the rebellious South. In 1407 the Vietnamese fell victim to a major and brutal Ming occupation force which essentially enslaved Tonkin, extracted much of the country's wealth, and

re-Sinicized Vietnam's literature and art. Ming harshness provoked a great insurrection eventually led by a third legendary Vietnamese general, Le Loi, who in a battle in 1418 proclaimed Vietnam free and himself emperor. Wearing down the Chinese, Le Loi's forces ambushed their troops and surrounded their garrisons and forts. Mixing guerrilla warfare with frontal assaults, Le Loi's patriots harassed the Chinese constantly. Adopting defenses that would fail the French five centuries later, the Chinese built fortified towers along the main routes. The showdown came in 1426.

Fighting in rain and mud, the Vietnamese finally routed the Chinese on a field at Tot Dong, west of Hanoi. In an accord signed two years later, the Chinese recognized Vietnam's independence and Le Loi resumed the tributary tie to China as insurance.¹³⁶

In a final face-saving measure, Le Loi's army provided the Chinese with hundreds of junks and thousands of horses to transport them home.

For the next 400 years Vietnam was free of external occupation. Vietnam's Le dynasty and its successors presided over the country as it expanded its writ in an energetic march southward. But by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Vietnamese fell into civil wars as the southern pioneers, led by the Nguyen oligarchs, broke away from the Trinh warlords who were propping up the Le dynasty in Hanoi. One hundred and fifty years of sporadic fratricide followed with the rivals partitioning Vietnam roughly along the same line—the 17th parallel—as was done during the Geneva Accords of 1954. The war between North and South Vietnam after 1954 reflected more of this unfinished regional animosity, although, obviously, it was overlaid with new ideological, technical, and foreign policy factors, as well as the occupation by a half million Americans and the greatest air bombardment between World War II and the 1991 Desert Storm operation.

But despite the introduction of sophisticated warfare technology into Vietnam in the two Indochina wars, the

communists—who harnessed the nationalist cause better than the pro-French and pro-American Vietnamese—never lost sight of the fact that they were fighting a revolutionary political struggle against more heavily armed foreign occupiers. Thus, as Ho Chi Minh predicted after the breakdown of the Viet Minh–French Fontainebleau negotiations of July–August 1946:

It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands still, the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger will not stand still. . . . He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his side, and then he will leap back into the dark jungle and slowly the elephant will bleed to death. That will be the war in Indochina.¹³⁷

In the 16 years since the fall of Saigon in April 1975, communist authorities in Tonkin, the historic seat of Vietnamese nationalism and chauvanism, have employed every technique to try to bring southern Vietnam, that is Annam and Cochinchina, under their political control: encadrement of the southern administrative apparatus, occupation by 10 PAVN divisions, incarceration or elimination of the southern noncommunist elite (and numerous communist cadres too) in a vast prison system,¹³⁸ creation of gulag-style “special economic zones,” and presiding over (usually for a price) the flight from Vietnam of 1.5 million people willing to take their chances on the high seas rather than return to a country whose government’s behavior they could no longer endure. But as the ruined economy, hyperinflation, official corruption, and, later, disastrous war in Cambodia would prove, Hanoi won the war but, so far, has been unable to win the peace.

Conclusions

Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese experiences with internal violence and external warfare show that each of these Sinic cultures produced numerous warrior-leaders who took over the state and redefined its policies. These warrior-emperors established dictatorships and dynasties, passing them to their offspring until a competing family or overlord replaced them. There was, at times, little differentiation between the warrior elites, the state, and the cultures which produced them. In China, the warrior-emperors were the principal agents of change as dynasties rose and fell. The twentieth century's Mao Zedong sought to destroy Confucianism but established a personality cult as intense as anything in Han, Ming, or Ching times. In Japan, the Yamato elite made its deity the national deity, and the three great shogunates epitomized the blend of warrior, state, and culture. In Vietnam, generals founded dynasties in war and peace whether fighting outsiders or each other.

The three Sinic societies investigated here have long military traditions—traditions that began 10, 15, even 20 centuries before the industrial revolution hit Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By contrast, the United States is a European-settled country with a much shorter, and largely Jominian, military tradition that became reinforced in the American Civil War and the accompanying industrial revolution. But Sinic societies had 10–20 centuries of experience with warfare, and the interplay of warfare and politics, *before* they industrialized. Not surprisingly, Sinic peoples seldom think about war in Jominian ways. They think like the Asian strategist Sun Tzu and his interpretation by their subsequent strategists. Sinic cultures acknowledge the often constant interplay between war and politics, rather than their separation. “Peace” is not the opposite of war for Sinic cultures as it tends to be for North American and North

European societies. For Sinic cultures, peace usually has been no more than a temporary absence of anarchy and turmoil because a current leadership—usually absolutist and usually ruthless—happens to be dominating. Such stability carries its own legitimacy, its own celestial mandate, in the Sinic world.

Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese (and Korean) societies are by tradition authoritarian, patriarchal, militarily rooted, and undemocratic. Accordingly, they see conflict as routine, war as legitimate, and power and force as the basis of political authority. Or, as Professor Bozeman writes in a broader context,

Evidence is totally missing that recourse to armed force evokes feelings of guilt and self-recrimination among the intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or that the high incidence of organized and unorganized violence induces doubts about the appropriateness of ruling moral or political systems. Indeed, the strife-filled records of the past . . . point to the possibility that conflict and violence may well be accepted in most areas outside the Occidental world as normal incidents of life, legitimate tools of government and foreign-policy-making, and morally sanctioned courses of action.¹³⁹

In China Mao put it succinctly: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” This is true whether we are talking about the warring-states period of China’s fifth through third centuries B.C.; the Han, Ming, or Yuan dynasties; Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic; or Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping’s Tienanman Square debacle. This fact has also been true in Japan, where political power firmly rested on armed force, whether in the Kamakura, Ashikaga, or Tokugawa Shogunates or in Tojo’s fascist state. In Vietnam, dynastic power and authoritarian political structures depended on coercion, whether in the Le dynasty, or Nguyen Van Thieu’s Republic, or Ho Chi Minh’s People’s Republic. (In Korea, whether we are speaking of the Three Kingdoms period, the Yi dynasty, Syngman Rhee’s First Republic, Park Chung Hee’s Third Republic, or Kim Il-sung’s People’s Republic, political power depended on the armed forces and the police.) Thus, at most

every historic juncture among Sinic societies, political power has depended upon force or the threat of force.

Although Sinic cultures have all incorporated and legitimated the use of force, we find that the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Vietnamese have each used force in special ways for their own unique purposes. The Chinese remain essentially an agricultural people and a “stay-at-home” people. Being Sinocentric by definition, they believed the world should come to them. Gradually it did—and, by force of European arms, gradually it sped their own collapse in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But in spite of the European intrusion, the Chinese always have had serious border problems and a tendency towards internal anarchy. Because China borders 12 other countries, the Chinese security instinct (and most often their strategy) was to use force—after they tried other kinds of policies—to stabilize their borders, freeing them for more important internal tasks. Basically defensive in their approach, in practice the Chinese can be very rough on smaller neighbors like the Vietnamese and the Koreans (and more recently the Tibetans) who have experienced repeated occupation by Chinese armies, including those led by renegade Chinese warlords.

Since China’s foremost external security goal always has been boundary maintenance and border stability, the Chinese paid serious attention to military and diplomatic techniques to secure their borders. The first, and most obvious technique (and one you can visit today) was a physical technique—the Great Wall. The wall was begun in the fifth century B.C. and was expanded and linked up by succeeding dynasties. The wall shields the Yellow River valley, which is the heart of Han Chinese civilization, from non-Chinese, nomad predators. However, predators had ways of getting across the wall, often by killing or bribing the guards.

The Chinese also made punitive expeditions into tribal areas to the northwest and the northeast. Recently one is

reminded of their “Pax Sinica” in Tibet. Chinese colonists were sent out as far as the Silk Road, which allowed contact with Europe. When the Chinese could not protect their borders and barbarians swept in, the foreign conquerors soon discovered they were greatly outnumbered by their Chinese subjects and were forced to cooperate with them to retain power.

In the twentieth century, the Korean and Vietnam wars showed the Chinese again emphasizing boundary maintenance. Chinese forces occupied northern Korea in late October 1950 after signaling Washington that General MacArthur should not approach the Yalu River. During the Second Indochina War, the Chinese put 50,000 to 70,000 troops into northern Vietnam at the request of their Vietnamese ally. In 1979, 50,000 Chinese troops went back into northern Vietnam to “teach Hanoi a lesson” (which proved costly to Beijing) about its meddling in Cambodia. Thus China continues its two-millenia tradition of using force on its borders.

Japan’s experience with war and politics demonstrates how a fringe culture, organized around feudal—later police-state—structures and imbued with martial values and a sense of national destiny, tried to prove itself at the expense of other peoples. Possessing an authoritarian—at times absolutist—culture, the Japanese have known “democracy” for only about 70 years of their 12 centuries of organized social-ethnic identity. Between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries, their internal warfare and militarism were punctuated by limited external contacts—which in dramatic form merged into warfare and colonial aggression on the Asian mainland in the sixteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. For the last 45 years the Japanese have been behaving as international pacifists under American security protection. All East Asia conveys its satisfaction with this arrangement. Given the US

security guarantee, the Japanese pursue, in highly competitive fashion, “pure” economic goals on a global scale.

Was Japan’s ultimately devastating experience in WWII, culminating in the Tokyo fire raids and then the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, sufficiently catastrophic to extinguish the Japanese martial instinct and permanently turn the country away from internal authoritarianism and external military conquests? I believe the answer can only be learned if the American security tie to Japan is removed and a period of time passes—perhaps 50 years—long enough for the security context and power realities of East Asia to completely alter themselves. Fifty years after Pearl Harbor, no East Asian country, nor the United States, seems desirous of fostering a truly independent Japan. Nor, evidently, do the Japanese.

Vietnam’s way of war and the cauldron of national struggle within which the Vietnamese defined their nationalism is a tragic legacy among the Sinic cultures. In the shadow of more powerful countries and with a tendency towards internal fratricide, the Vietnamese were repeatedly subjugated by the Chinese, and later the French, only to throw off those yokes in terrible struggles. In the twentieth century it was again Vietnam’s tragedy that those native patriots, who finally led the Vietnamese to independence against the French and then to reunification against the southern nationalists and their American ally, were totalitarian Marxist-Leninists. Among all the competing nationalist groups which sought to steer Vietnam’s revolution, the most radical and merciless, the communists, won out. The price Vietnam has paid for communist control of its affairs has been terrible. Over a million and a quarter people died in the Second Indochina War, punished by over 5 million tons of American bombs. The industrial complex of Tonkin was completely ruined. Perhaps a half million southerners were incarcerated in communist prison camps. Another million and one-third Vietnamese fled,

taking their chances on the high seas, with one-third of them perishing.

Now that Vietnam has been unified for over 15 years and the moral and administrative bankruptcy of the Communist party is evident to all, perhaps a new generation of Vietnamese leaders will emerge. Hopefully these will be men and women who can put their country's struggle culture behind them and lift Vietnam's deserving people into an economic future commensurate with their demonstrated, if so often squandered, courage.

Finally, what are the implications for the future of these historical and cultural influences on Sinic societies' conflict behavior? And what are the lessons for Western military planners and academics? The United States has been involved in four wars in East Asia in the twentieth century. A fifth experience was the attempt, under General Marshall in the Truman administration, to mediate an end to the Chinese civil war. The record shows mixed results. Japan was totally defeated. The Korean War was at best a draw. Vietnam ended in an American failure. The Chinese civil war did not resolve itself the way Washington wanted. These experiences should tell Americans that culture and society in the Sinic world are very different from ours. They have viewed the use of force as legitimate, warfare as normal and often protracted, and violence and coercion as acceptable means of statecraft. Conversely, the strong desire one finds in North American and North European cultures to avoid armed conflict or to seek quick resolutions of conflict has not been shared in Sinic Asia—a vast area comprising 30 percent of the world's population. I think US security planners and academics would do well to reflect on these facts. American conduct in Asian conflicts tends to validate for that region Professor Bozeman's conclusion that the challenge of understanding the multifaceted nature of modern warfare and how it varies by region and by culture has not been met by the governmental

or intellectual elites of the United States. Or, as Michael Howard, the Oxford University professor of the history of war, wrote: "Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. . . . They are . . . conflicts of *societies*, and they can be fully understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them [emphasis added]." ¹⁴⁰

Notes

1. Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," *Orbis* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976).
2. *Ibid.*, 78.
3. W. Scott Morton, *China: Its History and Culture* (New York: Lippincott & Crowell, 1980), 2.
4. Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 12.
5. Morton, 5–6.
6. Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition*, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 32.
7. Mark Elvin, *The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic Interpretation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973), 24.
8. C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Horizon History of China* (New York: American Heritage Publishers Co., Inc., 1969), 54.
9. Morton, 22–30.
10. Fitzgerald, 50–54.
11. John K. Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 4.
12. *Ibid.*, 2.
13. Morton, 45.
14. *Ibid.*, 51.
15. *Ibid.*, 54.
16. *Ibid.*, 56.
17. *Ibid.*, 59–61.
18. *Ibid.*, 60–61.
19. Fitzgerald, 136.
20. *Ibid.*, 137–38.
21. The mammoth canal runs from Beijing to Shanghai, thus allowing produce and military traffic to flow more easily between the principal

administration centers of north and south China. Morton, 80–81; and Fitzgerald, 141.

22. Fitzgerald, 141.

23. Ibid., 162.

24. Ibid., 163.

25. Morton, 88.

26. Fitzgerald, 168–69.

27. Morton, 96.

28. Ibid., 103–12.

29. Ibid., 102–3.

30. Fitzgerald, 249–52.

31. Joseph Buttinger, *The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1958), 153–58; and Morton, 125.

32. Morton, 129.

33. Ibid., 126–34.

34. Ibid., 151–52.

35. Ibid., 158–60.

36. Ibid., 173.

37. Ibid., 186, 189–91.

38. Ibid., 193–97.

39. Ibid., 198.

40. Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937–1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 31.

41. Ibid., 49–50.

42. Ibid., 113–14; and Brian Crozier, *The Man Who Lost China* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 217–19, 235–38.

43. Crozier, 236.

44. Johnson, 42.

45. Ibid., 43–45.

46. Crozier, 254–55.

47. Ibid., 296–97.

48. Morton, 202.

49. Ibid., 201.

50. Bozeman, 93.

51. Fairbank, "Varieties of Chinese Military Experience," 7.

52. Ibid., 8.

53. John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2–3.

54. Segal, 36.

55. Ibid., 37.

56. As early as 1936 Mao Zedong told Edgar Snow that Tibet and Xinjiang would be brought under Chinese control. Segal, citing Snow, 80.

57. Segal, 81–82.

58. Arthur Huck, *The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 36.

59. Segal, 136.

60. Ibid., 143.

61. Ibid., 180–83.

62. Ibid., 211, citing a 26 February 1979 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) translation of Deng's remarks.

63. Ibid., 219.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 211, citing a 11 March 1979 BBC translation of Deng's remarks.

66. Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 121; and Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), 118–39.

67. See the discussion in Halliday and Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War*, 126–30, 155, 163.

68. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 329, estimates that at least 500,000 Chinese died. Halliday and Cumings put it at 1 million. The South Korean army lost about 415,000, the North Korean army perhaps 700,000. Civilian deaths were at least 2 million. Halliday and Cumings, 200.

69. Segal, 102.

70. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), 325–29.

71. Ibid., 330.

72. Floyd Hiatt Ross, *Shinto: The Way of Japan* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), 16, 26, 29. Although Shinto was to become eclipsed at the court level by Buddhism, it retained its strength as the commoners' religion with all its pantheistic, indigenous, and ethnonationalistic characteristics. Also see Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 330–32 and 334–35.

73. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 336–37.

74. Jonathan Norton Leonard, *Early Japan* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1968), 55.

75. W. Scott Morton, *Japan: Its History and Culture* (New York: Thomas J. Crowell, 1970), 57–58.

76. Ibid., 65–67.

77. Leonard, 63; and Morton, *Japan*, 71–73.
78. Leonard, 64.
79. Morton, *Japan*, 93–94.
80. Ibid., 112.
81. See Maj Karl W. Eikenberry, “The Imjin War,” *Military Review* 68, no. 2 (February 1988): 74–82.
82. Morton, *Japan*, 105.
83. Ibid., 129–30.
84. Ibid., 128.
85. One of the most analytically provocative and powerful, comparative treatments of this phenomena, which includes Japan, is found in Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 228–313.
86. Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 53.
87. Leonard, 57.
88. Moore, 235.
89. Ibid., 236.
90. Ibid., 266.
91. The last Vietnamese tribute mission sent to Peking was in 1877, but traditional sentiment and Vietnamese ceremonial pride in the arrangement persisted right up to the time when the Chinese Throne of Heaven itself went under during the collapse of the Quin (Manchu) dynasty in 1911. Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 24.
92. Duncanson, 23.
93. Ibid., 27–29.
94. Buttinger, 92–96.
95. Duncanson, 33; and Buttinger, 97–98.
96. Duncanson, 34.
97. Buttinger, 153–58.
98. The surviving Cham migrated west en masse, blending into the Indianized Khmer population or assimilated into the Annamese hill tribes from whence they have periodically demanded the revival of an autonomous Cham state. Duncanson, 35–37.
99. Buttinger, 161–72.
100. Alexander Woodside, “Vietnam and Laos: The Continuing Crisis,” a paper presented at the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 1969, as cited by William J. Turley in his “Vietnam’s Strategy for Indochina and Security in Southeast Asia,” in *Security, Strategy, and*

Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim, ed. Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989), 178–79.

101. Turley, 179, citing a quotation of David P. Chandler in Chandler's *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 116.

102. Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 107.

103. R. E. M. Irving, *The First Indochina War: French and American Policy, 1945 to 1954* (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 9–10.

104. Karnow, 110.

105. *Ibid.*, 122–23.

106. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 62.

107. A border patrol of over 100,000 Chinese nationalist troops marched across northern Tonkin that summer. Ho's smaller forces sought to appease them as they kept their eye on the bigger prize in Hanoi. *Ibid.*, 63–64.

108. *Ibid.*, 76.

109. *Ibid.*, 108.

110. *Ibid.*, 116–17.

111. Bernard B. Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), 451–52.

112. Irving, 120–21.

113. Fall, *Hell*, 448.

114. See US Department of Defense, *United States–Vietnam Relations*, vol. 4 A.4, 7–8 and vol. 4 A.5, 16–17, hereafter cited as “The Pentagon Papers.”

115. William S. Turley, *The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History, 1954–1975* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 23–24.

116. *Ibid.*, 28–30.

117. Having already poured \$3.5 billion into the French–Viet Minh War, the US averaged \$200 million per year in aid to Diem. Turley, *The Second Indochina War*, 16–17; and Lawrence E. Grinter, “Bargaining Between Saigon and Washington,” *Orbis*, Fall 1974, 839.

118. Grinter, *Orbis*, 840, citing Pentagon Papers.

119. *Ibid.*, 858, citing a Saigon airgram to the State Department on 29 December 1964 as reprinted in *New York Times*, 14 June 1971, 29–30.

120. Turley, *The Second Indochina War*, 58.

121. Adm U. S. G. Sharp and Gen W. C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 97–100.

122. Turley, *The Second Indochina War*, 69.

123. Sharp and Westmoreland, 100–114.

124. This complexity remains a source of considerable debate about the war's actual nature. The debate is joined and explored in *The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts*, ed. Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987).

125. The DRVN's adjustment to the air attack is treated in excellent detail in Jon M. Van Dyke, *North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1972). Air power enthusiasts' overconfidence is assessed in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "Air Power in Vietnam: The Hubris of Power," in *The American War in Vietnam*, 69–83.

126. Compare, for example, CINCPAC's stated goals for the air strikes at the start of the campaign in March 1965, with its reevaluation of the campaign and statement of more limited goals as the years wore on up to the campaign's end on 31 October 1968. Sharp and Westmoreland, 16, 54.

127. A superb recent study is Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

128. Turley, *The Second Indochina War*, 89.

129. After the war, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) revealed that the bombing had destroyed most of the industrial, communications, and transportation facilities built since 1954 and erased 10 to 15 years of economic growth. Turley, *The Second Indochina War*, 95–96, relying on a VCP Central Committee report of December 1976.

130. Lawrence E. Grinter, "Vietnam: The Costs of Ignoring the Political Requirements," in *The American War in Vietnam*, 37–39.

131. Ibid., 40, 47, citing Richard A. Hunt, "The Challenge of Counterinsurgency," in *Second Indochina War Symposium*, ed. John Schlight (Washington, D.C.: US Army, 1986), 136.

132. Gen Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The Twenty-Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 130–32.

133. Karnow, 101.

134. Ibid.

135. Duncanson, 40–41.

136. Karnow, 104.

137. Ho Chi Minh to David Schoenbrum in Schoenbrum's *As France Goes*, 234, as cited in Irving, 29, 36.

138. Hanoi's totalitarian dragnet in the South threw hundreds, possibly thousands, of *southern Communist party members* into jail as well. See Doan Van Toai and David Chanoff, *The Vietnamese Gulag* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).

139. Bozeman, 65.

140. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters*, March 1981, 14.

Culture and Conflict in Latin America: Myth or Reality?

Dr Bynum E. Weathers

What Rome did for Spain, Spain did for Spanish America.

—Edward G. Bourne

*It has been postulated that war is the normal state of human activity.
Peace is an ideal inferred from the existence of intervals between wars.*

—Unknown

Professor Adda B. Bozeman's article forms the backdrop of this study, which seeks to test the validity of the Bozeman thesis for this region.¹ The Bozeman thesis is focused on cultural aspects of third-world societies that appear to have a propensity for bringing about war. The erosion of the nation-state system as an organizing norm of society is deemed generic to her thesis inasmuch as war in the West is attributed to political and economic causes associated with the nation-state.² Professor Bozeman characterizes the nature of war as obscure and suggests that a conceptualization of war in terms of its cultural components is needed for the purpose of clarification.³

Is the Bozeman thesis applicable to Latin America? Before answering this question, it is necessary to examine developments on the Iberian Peninsula prior to 1492; to gain insight into the culture and characteristics of the indigenous population in the New World during the pre-Columbian era; to reflect on the impact of the clash between Iberian and Indian cultures during the conquest and establishment of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in America; and to review developments in the Latin American republics following

independence—including their relations with the United States. This review seeks to identify cultural determinants, if discernible, that might indicate a propensity for war.

In her seminal article, Professor Bozeman sets forth seven general propositions to support her thesis. According to her sixth proposition:

The fundamental foreign policy-related themes running through the histories of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia and China converge on conflict and divisiveness as norm-engendering realities. The evidence shows, in particular, that peace is neither the dominant value nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from being perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively.⁴

It is significant that this proposition omitted Latin America. The reason for this omission will become understandable as the writer examines the uniqueness and complexity of the region.

The Iberian Connection

In contrast to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, India, and China, Latin America is a product of Western civilization. The Iberian Peninsula was the fountainhead of European culture brought to the Indies in the fifteenth century. It is easier to understand the nature and thrust of this cultural transmission if one examines events that occurred prior to the discovery and conquest of the Indies.

North African Moslems invaded the Iberians in A.D. 711 and deprived them of the exclusive use of their territory, on a gradually reduced scale, until the expulsion of the invaders in 1492. During eight centuries of occupation, inhabitants of the peninsula were the recipients of the rich Eastern and Mediterranean cultures brought over by the Moslems as well as the contributions these cultures made to science, industry, and agriculture.⁵

The recovery of the native lands by the military forces of Spain and Portugal, the *Reconquista*, is quite significant. This event, resulting in Portugal's independence, prepared the way for the monumental voyages of discovery and the establishment of the Luso-Hispanic empires in America. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Moslems had been driven to the southeastern kingdom of Grenada through the combined efforts of the kings of Castile and Aragon. There they remained until their expulsion in 1492.⁶

The crown and the church achieved national unity by working hand in hand, the cape and the sword alongside the gown. Religious fervor was a vital ingredient of the *Reconquista* in the contest between Christianity and the Islamic faith. The purity of the church was as essential to national unity as the dominance of the royal houses of Castile and Aragon in the secular realm. Fernando de los Ríos, a Latin American scholar, has expressed this interdependence most effectively.

Spain was impelled to two kinds of militant action at that momentous period of her history: the one militarist the other spiritual, both combative and eager to conquer; in the former the purposes to conquer power, territory, and riches prevailed; in the latter the prime aim was to win adherence to Christianity. There was an interweaving between the two, a mutual aid that engendered phenomena of social symbiosis of great juridical and political importance. A realization of that permanent interrelation between two organisms, each of which depended for its existence on absorbing a part of the vital juice of the other, is quite fundamental for the understanding of Spanish colonization. The will to power and the will to imperium, in the double dimension so loved by the Renaissance, material and spiritual, reached through Spain to its apex.⁷

Following the first voyage of Columbus, Pope Alexander VI divided the Indies between Spain and Portugal; the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas clarified this division by specifying a line of demarcation.⁸

It is appropriate to examine the impact of the Reconquista on certain cultural traits of the Spanish and Portuguese societies. Although located on the European continent, Spain and Portugal are situated remotely in the extreme southwestern corner of the continent, hemmed in by the Pyrenees to the north and the Atlantic and Mediterranean waters on the west and south respectively, and in close proximity to North Africa. Thus, both Spain and Portugal developed eclectic cultures within the mainstream of Western civilization. For the most part, they directed their energies toward regaining lost territory, establishing viable political entities, and preserving traditional cultural values threatened by alien intrusions. In the process of attaining these national goals, Spain and Portugal were compelled to wage a prolonged war; as a consequence, they experienced a heightened martial spirit that became embedded in their cultures.⁹

This martial spirit was likewise reflected in the actions of the Roman Catholic church, which regarded the Reconquista as a just war undertaken to protect Christianity from Islamic contamination. On the religious front, support of military actions against the Moslem invaders was fully in consonance with Christian doctrine and beliefs. Indeed, such support was deemed essential to ensure control of the church by the faithful. The heretic always ran the risk of being apprehended and subjected to punishment. The inculcation of religious fervor intensified the Iberian fighting spirit and helped them develop a formidable warrior propensity. The military character of the Iberian warrior, molded in the nearly 800-year struggle on the peninsula, was epitomized in the conquistadores and soldiers who would bring much of the New World under Spanish and Portuguese dominion.¹⁰

Conquest of the Indies

The Luso-Hispanic cultural traits were transferred to the New World with the conquest of the Indies and fused with those of the indigenous peoples. In Portuguese America, large numbers of unaffiliated Indian tribes were scattered along the coast from the Amazon River to the Rio de la Plata, but no civilization comparable to those in Spanish America had emerged. In Spanish America, three large Indian civilizations confronted the conquistadores: the Aztecs, the Incas, and the Mayas.

Within the Aztec civilization, the warrior held a position of great honor and prestige as would be expected in a society that thrived on warfare and conquests. The religion of the Aztecs centered on human sacrifice, and one of the major objectives of warfare was the capture of enemy tribesmen for sacrificial purposes. Rewards for the successful warrior included membership in honorific military orders and grants of tribal lands.¹¹

At the time of the arrival of the conquistadores, the Aztec confederation consisted of approximately 30 tributary villages extending from present-day Mexico City to the Gulf of Mexico. Several million Nahuatl-speaking people paid homage to Montezuma II, who ruled from the capital of Tenochtitlán (present-day Mexico City). Their military prowess may be attributed to their service as mercenaries in the armies of a neighboring Indian civilization, the Toltecs. In battle, the Aztecs acquired a reputation for bravery, deceit, and cruelty which spread rapidly and made them feared among neighboring tribes.¹²

As the Aztecs grew in power and prestige, they no longer functioned as a tribal society but rather as a militaristic, aristocratic state. Class stratification occurred with a hereditary nobility at the top and slaves (prisoners of war) at the bottom. Indian subjects were not integrated into the Aztec

culture but remained vassals with the obligation to pay tribute to their masters. The profession of warrior was the highest and most honorable calling in Aztec society.¹³

Some distance to the south, the Incan civilization expanded from its base at Cuzco to encompass an area of nearly 350,000 square miles. Stretching 3,000 miles from present-day Ecuador in the north to Chile in the south, the Incan empire embraced some 6 million inhabitants. Communication between Cuzco and the rest of the far-flung empire was provided by a system of runners or couriers who could cover a thousand miles in approximately one week. Post houses were situated at intervals along the routes. Without a written language (Quechua was the spoken language), the Incas left their heritage in drawings on pottery and designs on textiles and metals, as well as knotted strings (*quipus*) used for numbers and accounting purposes.¹⁴

The success of the Incan empire may be attributed to its superior military organization and strategy. The absence of vindictiveness toward the conquered, in contrast to the Aztecs, was also a positive factor in the growth and viability of the empire. Captured Indians were taken from their scattered locations and settled in communities where they could be controlled and imbued with Incan culture. The captive leaders were systematically removed and taken to Cuzco as hostages to be indoctrinated by royal tutors. Incan society was highly stratified, and a rigid caste system existed.¹⁵

When the Spaniards arrived, the Incan empire was on the decline following its division between two ruling heirs and the eruption of civil war. Although the Incas viewed warfare as a natural activity, their warrior efforts were effective only with those Indians of similar cultural achievements. The superior weaponry of the Spaniards was overpowering.¹⁶

The Mayan civilization, the third of the triad, was the most culturally advanced of any Indian society of the New World

in the pre-Columbian period. Having roots going back to the pre-Christian era, the Mayans reached their cultural apogee during the Classic Period (A.D. 325 to 925) in the central highlands of Guatemala and Belize, and in the southern Yucatán Peninsula.¹⁷

In contrast to the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, the Mayan empires were organized in city-states with few political bonds among them. Operating independently, these city-states were ruled by an elite class of nobles and priests. The surplus of corn produced in the outlying areas provided the necessary revenue for sustaining the nobility, intellectual pursuits, and elaborate religious ceremonies of the city-state inhabitants. In contrast to the Aztecs and the Incas, the Mayas excelled in mathematics, astronomy, cosmology, and hieroglyphic writing.¹⁸

War and conflict were virtually absent from the daily lives of the Mayas. Despite trade rivalries and other disruptive events, the Mayas were able to avoid combat and resolve potential conflictive issues peacefully through negotiations. By the tenth century, however, with the ending of the Classic Period, Mayan society faced a cultural decline that continued until the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores in the early sixteenth century.¹⁹

The Mayan sites in the south were abandoned with the collapse of the city-states, and a new civilization dominated by the Toltecs arose in northern Yucatán. The explanation for the demise of the Classic Mayan civilization has yet to be verified conclusively. Unlike the earlier culture, the new Mayan society was characterized by intermittent tribal wars and violence occasioned by the introduction of militarism.²⁰

By the time the Spaniards arrived, the warrior concept was well established in the Indian civilizations of the Indies. The encounter between these divergent cultures, both imbued with a military propensity, served to reinforce the fighting spirit in each. In the ensuing combat encounters, however, the

numerically larger Indian forces were no match for the conquistadores, whose superior weaponry and equipment were overwhelming. The horse, previously unknown in the Indies, served not only as a means of transportation but as a psychological warfare element for the conquistadores. While the Indians' weapons consisted of spears, clubs, bows and arrows, slings, and stones, the Spaniards were equipped with crossbows, muskets, broadswords, and artillery—basically steel versus stone.²¹

Beginning as early as the voyages of Columbus, the Spaniards adopted a confrontational attitude toward the Indians. Having an aversion to manual labor, the new settlers looked to the Indians for their labor supply on a compulsory basis. Large-scale exploitation and, in a number of cases, extermination of native laborers occurred in the process of subjugating the indigenous population. Exposure to European diseases, overwork in mining operations, and lack of proper food and shelter contributed to the decimation of the Indians. The conquest of the Indies dispossessed the Indians of their sovereignty and the free use of their territory; violated their freedom of choice in the determination of their way of life; deflected their historical evolution by mixing their lineage with that of an alien people (the Spaniard) and producing a new ethnic group, the mestizo (a mixture of Spaniard and Indian); and undoubtedly traumatized large numbers of the inhabitants in the process.²²

In view of the mass extermination of the Indians in the first 25 years of colonization, Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas recommended—and the crown agreed—that African slaves should replace the Indians as laborers. The African slave traffic to the Spanish colonies had begun in 1510, but traffic to Brazil began some two decades later. The Spanish and Portuguese, who had earlier monopolized the slave trade to the New World, were joined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the British, French, Dutch, and Danes. Following

the Wars of Independence, the heaviest concentration of African slaves was in the Caribbean islands, Central America, the northern coast of South America, and Brazil.²³

In contrast to the exploitative type of colonies Spain established in the New World, the British settlements in North America were farm colonies. The farm colonies were situated in temperate zones where agricultural products were similar to those produced in the home country. The settlers were refugees fleeing from undesirable conditions in the Old World and seeking a new start in life. They were usually accompanied by their families and acquired freeholds to maintain themselves economically. The Indians in North America were less numerous and had not attained the level of cultural development found among the Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs. In addition, settlers continually pushed the North American Indians back and confiscated their lands. The North Americans believed in the work ethic and, unlike the Spaniards, had no objection to manual labor. The Indian was not integrated into North American society and remained outside the mainstream of cultural development.²⁴

Yet, in terms of the motives for colonization, the English and the Spaniards did not differ. The discovery of the unknown and the desire for adventure have been compelling forces from time immemorial. The quest for wealth, if successful, could move individuals up the socioeconomic scale and could enhance the power and prestige of the governments abroad. Spreading the benefits of national cultures or civilizations to remote regions would justify religious proselytism and the establishment of institutional controls practiced in the mother country. Dissatisfaction with life in the Old World played a major role in English migration, but not so much in the case of Spain.²⁵

Colonial Society

From the beginning of their colonizing efforts in the New World, the Spanish crown and legal scholars were concerned with resolving several key issues. Did the king have just title to dominion in the Indies? Was the conquest of the Indies a just war? Was the Indian inferior by nature or a rational being? Should the Indian be reduced to slavery? These questions gave rise to a number of debates among theologians and laymen and were the subject of several convocations called by the crown.²⁶

In regard to the question of dominion, the crown had no doubts about this right since it was based on the famous bulls of Pope Alexander VI, issued soon after Columbus's first voyage to the New World. With respect to the free-versus-slave status, a crown committee of jurists and theologians pronounced the Indian free by nature and not a candidate for slavery. As to the matter of a just war, the chief crown jurist concluded that while the Indian should not be deprived of his property, generally speaking, the sanctioning of the conquest by the church eradicated preexisting political sovereignties and justified such deprivations.²⁷

In order to ensure the conduct of a just war, the chief crown jurist prepared a curious document, known as the *Requerimiento* (requirement). All Spanish conquistadores were directed to have it read to the Indians before hostilities could begin and to have a notarized certificate of compliance forwarded to the crown within a specified period. The *Requerimiento* was a recitation of biblical history from creation to the donation of Pope Alexander VI. At the conclusion of the recitation, the Indians were given the option of acknowledging the supremacy of the pope and the king or engaging in battle with the Spanish forces.²⁸

The interrelated problems of labor supply for the settlers and the protection of the rights of the Indians continued to

plague the crown throughout the colonial period. The Indians were placed under the crown's special protection with provision for severe penalties against those who might restrict their freedom. Compulsory labor was permitted in the royal mines or public works, and the Indian was not exempt from the payment of tribute—a requirement for all Spanish subjects in the Indies. The Indians reacted by fleeing into the interior and isolating themselves from the Spaniards. In the royal order of 1503, the crown responded to the protests of the settlers over the loss of labor, tributes, and candidates for conversion to Christianity by permitting free Indians to be subjected to forced labor under conditions of moderation and for the payment of fair wages. It was further stipulated that the Indians would be brought together in villages where their secular and religious needs could be accommodated. The only Indians who were allowed to be sold in slavery were the cannibals captured in combat.²⁹

The interpretation and execution of the royal orders of 1503 resulted in the development of the *encomienda*, a controversial socioeconomic institution that survived to the end of the colonial period. Originally employed in Spain during the *Reconquista*, the *encomienda* conferred on the holder patronage over prescribed Indian villages with the right of the *encomendero* (patron) to receive tribute or labor from the natives. In return, the *encomendero* was required to defend his charges and see to their care, education, and religious instruction. The *encomienda* was a means of rewarding the conquistadores or crown favorites for their colonization efforts in the Indies and was inheritable for a generation after the death of the recipient. In practice, the *encomienda* became an instrument of oppression and led to wholesale destruction of Indian populations throughout the Indies.³⁰

The fundamental question of the nature and legal status of the Indian became entwined with disputes over the legality of the *encomienda*. The Laws of Burgos (1512–18) represented

the first effort by the crown to ameliorate the condition of the Indian under the *encomienda* following complaints by the religious orders to the king. In effect, the *encomienda* system was sanctioned even though safeguards were included which served to prevent unlimited exploitation.³¹

The most persistent champion of native rights was Friar Bartolomé de Las Casas—awarded the title of Protector of the Indians by the crown—who supported the liberty of the Indians and the establishment of a free labor market. The high point of his efforts was the royal order of 1520 calling for the abolition of the *encomienda* throughout the Indies. In keeping with its vacillating course, the crown rescinded the order soon thereafter in the face of strong opposition on the part of the settlers, but the crown remained uncomfortable with its toleration of the *encomienda*. However, as Spanish control was extended into South America with the conquest of Peru in 1535, the *encomienda* once more came into royal favor. The need for a labor supply and other rewards emanating from the institution to attract settlers received a higher priority than the removal of impediments to Indian freedom.³²

The continued efforts of the religious orders on behalf of the Indian cause were rewarded in 1537 by the issuance of a papal bull and five years later by the promulgation of the New Laws of 1542. In both cases, the Indian was declared to be a free and rational being and not a subject for enslavement. The New Laws also prohibited the further granting of *encomiendas*, required existing *encomenderos* to live in the same provinces with their *encomiendas*, and forbade the collection of tributes above the amount owed to the crown. One of the most controversial provisions eliminated the right of the *encomendero* to bequeath legal title to the *encomienda* to his heirs.³³

Efforts to enforce the New Laws came to naught. A civil war resulting in the death of the viceroy in Peru and the threat of rebellion in the viceroyalty of New Spain made it necessary

for the crown to compromise on the bequeathment provision and to permit the *encomienda* to be passed to the wife or child. In the event of no heirs, the *encomienda* reverted to the crown. Until the end of the colonial period, two trends may be discerned in the operation of the *encomienda* system: (1) efforts continued to be made by the crown and viceroys to prevent abuses, and (2) the number of privately held *encomiendas* decreased at the expense of those reverting to the crown.³⁴

Throughout three centuries of the Spanish-American Empire, the crown emphasized order, stability, and protection of the Indian; the Creole settlers engaged in conflict, self-aggrandizement, and exploitation of the Indian; and the Peninsulares (born in Spain), who came as government or church officials were caught up in the corrupt colonial environment and helped to perpetuate it by their unwillingness or inability to change it. Christianity represented the only cultural element that provided a common ground on which the Spaniard, the Indian, and the African slave could meet. The emergence of the mestizo, the mulatto, and the zambo (a mixture of Indian and African) served to diversify the ethnic composition still further and to introduce a new cultural outlook, which was unique to the Americas and decidedly different from that of Spain. The participation of the church alongside the crown was essential for the conquest to be successful. Religious unity coupled with Spanish political uniformity paved the way for the development of the nation-state systems that emerged following independence.

Of all the social classes in Spanish American colonial society, the Creoles were the ones who portrayed incipient nationalism. They were quite open in identifying themselves as Americans, not Spaniards. This nomenclature was reinforced by the attitude of the Peninsulares who looked upon the Creoles as second-class citizens. The higher

positions in the government and society were reserved for the Peninsulares. Only at the municipal levels of administration could the Creoles participate to any substantial degree. Yet, even among themselves, the Creoles felt a difference. They identified themselves as Peruvians, Mexicans, Colombians, and so forth according to their national residence—not as Spaniards. Under these circumstances, it was logical that the Creoles would be the leaders in the revolt against their mother country.³⁵

Formation of the Nation-States: The Nineteenth Century

Independence was achieved from Spain in the early nineteenth century following a bloody conflict that lasted some 15 years. The new Hispanic states began the long, tortuous struggle to establish order and stability in their societies. Brazil's smooth and virtually bloodless transition to independence stood in marked contrast to its Spanish neighbors.

Under the umbrella of empire, Brazil gained the backing of the landed aristocracy in return for protecting their economic interests and providing a secure and orderly government. Pacification was achieved in scattered, short-lived revolts; and a civil war in the state of Rio Grande do Sul was brought successfully to an end. The emperor, Dom Pedro II, succeeded in attaining victory in the war with Argentina (1854–59) and with Paraguay (1864–70). The controversy over slavery resulted in its abolition in 1888. One year later, the emperor was overthrown and forced into exile by revolutionary forces, and the Brazilian republic was proclaimed. Again, as in the achievement of independence, Brazil donned the republican mantle with practically no bloodshed.³⁶

In contrast to Brazil, Hispanic America failed to consolidate its new fledgling states and weld them into a single nation. Following the Wars of Independence, 16 nation-states emerged from the Spanish American colonial holdings; the liberation of Cuba after the Spanish American War and the secession of Panama from the republic of Colombia in 1903 raised this total to 18. When Portuguese Brazil and French Haiti were added to this number, a total of 20 Latin American nation-states had emerged. One of the most divisive issues to arise in the national period was the delineation of boundaries between the new states. The process of boundary settlements was directly related to the growth of militarism and the development of intensive nationalism in these republics.³⁷

Following independence, the colonial way of life remained largely intact. The Creole aristocracy occupied the positions of importance and responsibility. The Indians and the Africans continued to perform menial tasks and to live barely at a subsistence level. The mestizo was a little better off both socially and economically. Even though republican constitutions were adopted in the new states, such features as factionalism, despotism, and the lack of experience in governmental affairs served to make a mockery of the republican ideal. Progress was impeded by difficulties in establishing orderly political, economic, and social institutions.³⁸

Political life was dominated by the *caudillo* (strong man), who relied on violence to gain power and governed as if his constituency were a personal fiefdom. Whether military or civilian, the *caudillo* depended on personal loyalties for his tenure of office. With respect to economic life, the change from colonialism to independence had little effect on the status of the lower classes. Although the *encomienda* ceased to exist, it was replaced by debt-slavery and a lack of landownership, creating a dependency on Creole *haciendas* (plantations). From the viewpoint of social life, the caste

system and the array of special privileges so prevalent in colonial society survived and were carried over into the national period. Slavery was not abolished in many of the Latin American republics until after the middle of the nineteenth century.³⁹

After the midnineteenth century, the accelerating industrial revolution in the United States and Europe called for increased supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs from Latin America. This demand had the effect of making political institutions in the region more stable so that production quotas could be met. Capital investments also poured into the area from Western sources. Because of their one-sided nature, however, the economies of the Latin American states became subject to fluctuations in the price of commodities. In addition, foreign corporate control over sectors of the regional economy increased, and the profits from these endeavors were not widely disbursed throughout society. Instead, the local and foreign entrepreneurs monopolized these returns.⁴⁰

Peace and Security

As the Latin American republics continued to react to internal political and economic challenges, the concept of nationalism grew rapidly during the nineteenth century. Disputes over boundaries were a manifestation of this growth. Likewise, contests between rival political factions and attempts to consolidate political units by force revealed the citizens' strong attachment to their native lands.

Although the embryonic Latin American states were involved in numerous skirmishes, those skirmishes were generally minor in nature and seldom escalated to full-scale warfare. The exceptions were the conflicts between Argentina and Brazil (1825–28); Chile and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation (1835–39); Mexico and the United States (1846–48); the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay) and Paraguay (1864–70); and Chile versus Peru and

Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879–83). In addition, there were several instances of European interventions in the region. Mexico defeated a Spanish expedition seeking to regain its former territory in 1829; Great Britain seized Argentina's Malvinas Islands in 1833; between 1838 and 1850, France and Great Britain on several occasions intervened in the Rio de la Plata estuary, threatening Montevideo, Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina; France, Great Britain, and Spain intervened in Mexico in 1861 (after the departure of the British and Spanish forces, the French remained until their expulsion in 1867); Spain regained control of the Dominican Republic through diplomacy in 1861 but was expelled in 1865; and, finally, Spain seized Peruvian offshore territory in 1864 but was driven out after a few months of occupancy.⁴¹

Contrary to other third-world regions, which viewed war as a normal and legitimate activity, Latin America, reflecting its adherence to the nation-state concept in the Western tradition, after independence sought to avoid war through the pacific settlement of disputes. Appeals to such procedures as conciliation, arbitration, and mediation through the good offices of other states became a standard practice of the Latin American republics. Pacific actions were taken before parties to the controversy made an appeal to arms. European countries—most often Great Britain—and the United States were usually called upon to act in the resolution of conflictive issues. By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the boundary controversies had been settled—some 16 by arbitration and approximately eight by direct negotiation.⁴²

The Pan-American Movement

A much broader, more systemized, and decidedly unique approach to preventing war in the Americas was contained in the Pan-American movement. Beginning at the Congress of Panama in 1826, immediately following the conclusion of

the Wars of Independence, the Pan-American movement continued for nearly a century and a quarter until it was formalized as the inter-American system at the end of World War II. Again, recalling their Western cultural heritage, the American republics reasserted their belief that war is abnormal and illegitimate.⁴³

During the nineteenth century, there were four general conferences and a number of specialized, ad hoc convocations conducted under the banner of Pan-Americanism and devoted to mutual security problems. The movement was bolstered in 1889 when the United States joined all of the Latin American republics in the first International Conference of American States, held in Washington, D.C. Its significance rested more with the establishment of the International Union of American Republics and the conclusion of the first in a series of meetings than with the accomplishment of arbitral matters.⁴⁴

Development and Modernization Practices: The Twentieth Century

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Latin American republics continued to strive for political stability, economic development, and social justice with the United States and, to a certain extent, Western Europe as the role models. Between 1900 and 1950, Latin America integrated itself more fully with the global community and experienced both the positive and negative effects of the special relationship with the “colossus of the North.” Pan-Americanism, World War I, the Great World Depression, and World War II had profound effects on the nature and direction of Latin American society during this half-century. Modernization became the goal of the 20 Latin American republics as they strove to cast aside the cloak of colonialism. Evidence of modernization could be

seen in the economic, social, political, and military transitions.

From an economic viewpoint, Latin American countries increased the production of commodities for export to Europe primarily. In turn, manufactured goods were imported from the more industrialized nations, particularly Great Britain. Also, European investors placed their funds in profitable Latin American ventures. For example, British investments in the region increased ninefold in the four decades prior to World War I, and by the outbreak of this war, two-thirds of Latin America's total foreign investments rested in British hands.⁴⁵

The impact of modernization efforts on social change was significant. As late as World War I, the upper social stratum of society sought to imitate European culture rather than rely on its distinctive native heritage. With the growth of nationalism and an appreciation of their own indigenous culture, the elite began to view the accomplishments of their own society in a different light. An entrepreneurial spirit began to replace that of a provincial outlook. Although a middle class was slow in development, the outlines of change could be discerned. The rumblings of discontentment among the laboring force began to be heard but received little attention from the elite until the post-World War I era. European immigration was encouraged to fill the labor gap and to make contributions to the national culture. The vast majority of the population, some 90 percent of the total, remained on a bare subsistence level with little prospect of change.⁴⁶

Political modernization resulted in large part from the changes taking place in the economic and social sectors of the Latin American states. Such attitudinal characteristics as elitist privileges, family cohesiveness, and nepotism continued to be reflected in political circles even as observable changes were taking place in political institutions.

The large landowning elite, formerly content to remain within the confines of their *haciendas*, began to seek political power. Heretofore, political power was controlled by a *caudillo* or chieftain who had gained a local following, then established dominance over neighboring chieftains, and finally obtained control of the central government by revolution. As the twentieth century progressed, the traditional nineteenth-century *caudillo* was passing from the scene.⁴⁷

The new ruling elite in their quest for political power in the twentieth century usually adhered to two state models. The first was oligarchical but blended with shades of democracy, such as in Argentina. The other model was strictly dictatorial with the strong backing of military forces to ensure the maintenance of law and order, such as in Venezuela. In both cases, the route to the presidential palace was limited to a small privileged group. Thus, the creation of dominant nation-states with highly centralized powers and immune from the throes of public opinion became the alternative to *caudillismo* and regional fragmentation. Political stability was deemed essential to the attraction of investments and the promotion of trade abroad.⁴⁸

The Mexican Revolution of 1910, the most comprehensive reform movement in the region, sought to remove those aspects of the colonial heritage that impeded progress and to ameliorate social justice for the inhabitants. Although idealistic in its objectives, the Revolution of 1910 sought to come to terms with foreign economic interests, to alleviate the ills of industrial and peasant workers, and to cripple the power of the Roman Catholic church in secular matters. The reformist constitution of 1917 provided the framework of a representative, republican government and incorporated the socioeconomic safeguards achieved during the revolution. According to Professor Alfred B. Thomas, the 1917 constitution “not only laid the basis for the reconstruction of

Mexico's national life; it also opened the way for a flowering of Mexican culture." ⁴⁹

Before World War I, large numbers of European immigrants settled in Latin America. Some 3 million Spaniards became permanent settlers, principally in Argentina, Cuba, and Mexico. Approximately 700,000 Germans migrated, primarily to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Substantial numbers of Italians moved their households to Argentina and Uruguay, and smaller colonies settled in Brazil. The European immigrants provided the nucleus of an emerging middle-class sector and applied their much-needed skills to enterprises in the embryonic stage of development. ⁵⁰

World War I and Pan-Americanism

The outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914 presented a crucial challenge to the Pan-American movement. Although four general conferences had been held up to this time, none had been concerned with contingency plans in the event of foreign war. Despite the absence of such plans, eight of the Latin American republics joined the United States in a declaration of war, and five broke diplomatic relations with Germany. Even though the United States did not join the postwar League of Nations, all of the Latin American states eventually became members and at various league meetings did not hesitate to champion the Pan-American movement and the concept of inter-American cooperation. ⁵¹

As a result of World War I, Latin America began to move from its earlier position on the margin of international life to a more active interface with foreign governments. Not only did the Latin American republics become more interdependent, but they also became more self-reliant in view of the severance of contacts with Europe during the war. In addition, they gained a pronounced sense of national responsibility and public conscience since the severance of European economic ties made it necessary to rely on their own

resources and ingenuity. At the same time, the Latin American republics sharply increased their economic relations with the United States. During the period from 1913 to 1919, US commerce with Latin America jumped from some \$750 million to almost \$3 billion as the region eagerly sought investment capital and manufactured goods from the United States. In essence, World War I was the watershed for US displacement of Great Britain as the major trading partner in the region.⁵²

The subsequent Great Depression accelerated the growth of economic nationalism as the Latin American states attempted to remove the yoke of economic colonialism. The positive effect of the depression was to bring about the genesis of industrialization in Latin America through import substitution—a process that would receive even greater impetus during and after World War II. Since many countries in the region had monocultural economies, the drastic drop in prices for the one or two staple commodities during the depression meant poverty and destitution and deprived these countries of funds to purchase finished goods abroad. Consequently, industrialization was fostered and imports restricted in order to build up foreign exchanges. The thrust of industrialization set into motion developmental undertakings that impacted on the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the Latin American societies. In short, it simultaneously bolstered modernization efforts and enhanced self-sufficiency in the region.⁵³

Pan-Americanism reached its nadir during the 1920s due largely to US domination of the general conferences and US refusal to include political issues on the agendas. An upward turn occurred in the closing years of the Hoover administration. With the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 and his proclamation of the Good Neighbor Policy, the Pan-American movement headed toward its apogee. The formal renunciation of the right of intervention

in the Latin American republics and the institution of favorable trade agreements with several of the countries in the region served to underscore fundamental political and economic changes in US policy toward the southern republics.⁵⁴

World War II and the Inter-American Security System

The first half of the twentieth century also witnessed the acceleration of efforts, begun in the latter part of the nineteenth century, to professionalize and modernize the armed forces of Latin America. German, British, French, and Italian military missions were dispatched to Latin America to assist the fledgling services. The expansion and improvement of the regional forces, however, did not result in an epidemic of interstate conflicts. Except for border skirmishes between Peru and Ecuador in 1941, the only outbreak prior to World War II was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932–35), which was settled peacefully through mediation by outside nations.⁵⁵

With the outbreak of World War II in Europe in the fall of 1939, the United States began the process of replacing the German and Italian missions with its own. The Latin American governments were amenable to these replacements. The shortage of US Army and Navy officers with the prerequisite mission training initially presented a problem; after 1938, however, US missions in the region were expanded from two to seven and by December 1941 had reached 12 with some 32 officers on board. More success was achieved in providing military attachés, with their number increasing threefold between June 1940 and Pearl Harbor day.⁵⁶

The true test of Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy arrived with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and the United States' entrance into World War II. Hemispheric solidarity had progressed to the extent that, in contrast to the eight Latin American republics that

declared war on Germany in the First World War, all of them eventually did so in World War II. The contributions of the Latin American countries to the defeat of the Axis powers were forthcoming and multifarious in nature. These consisted of actual military operations (Brazil and Mexico), the provision of strategic metals and raw materials, the use of military bases by authority of the host governments, and cooperation in defense against espionage and subversion engendered by pro-Axis elements. Thus, by the end of World War II, continental unity had been achieved and the American republics looked to the perfection of the inter-American system to meet the challenges of the postwar era.⁵⁷

With the coming of the cold war, the American states gave priority to hemispheric security through the promulgation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in the fall of 1947. Based on the “one for all, and all for one” principle, the Rio Treaty has the dual distinction of being the first regional security pact included under Article 51 of the United Nations charter as well as the prototype for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and similar collective security agreements. The Rio Treaty was considered the capstone of the inter-American military system that took shape during World War II.⁵⁸

Earlier, in January 1942, an Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) had been created with advisory powers but not enforcement powers to serve as a coordinating agency for the United States and Latin American military arms. Chaired by a US general officer, the board consisted of representatives from the armed forces of the Americas, usually the defense attachés assigned to their embassies in Washington. In addition, Joint Mexico–United States Defense Commission (JMUSDC) and Joint Brazil–United States Military Commission (JBUSMC) were established to further military cooperation bilaterally. Both Brazil and Mexico engaged in

Allied military operations abroad while most of the other Latin American republics were supportive in noncombative endeavors.⁵⁹

At the meeting of the American republics at Bogotá, Colombia, in the spring of 1948, two treaties were signed that were to have an important bearing on the future of the Pan-American movement. The first was the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) which formalized the inter-American system and ensured its permanency. The Council of the OAS and its secretariat, the Pan-American Union, were located in Washington, D.C. The second treaty sought to bring together those treaties, conventions, and declarations related to the peaceful settlement of disputes previously executed and to place them in a single instrument. Known as the Treaty on Pacific Settlement, it might have been implemented if the drafters had not departed from their original purpose; however, the addition of controversial measures such as obligatory peaceful settlements in disputes among the states, doomed its ratification. But all was not lost in this regard. A few months following the meeting in Bogotá, the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), originally set up in 1940, was incorporated in the OAS. The Council of the OAS chooses its membership, consisting of representatives of five member governments; and the IAPC is charged with "keeping constant vigilance to insure that states between which any dispute exists or may arise . . . may solve it as quickly as possible . . . and [with] suggesting the measures and steps that may be conducive to a settlement."⁶⁰

At the Bogotá Conference of 1948, the delegates also considered the replacement of the IADB with a permanent military organ under the direction and control of the OAS. The result was the establishment of a watered-down version, known as the Advisory Defense Committee, that could function only when called upon to do so by the Rio Treaty apparatus. Significantly, this committee has not been

convened or asked to furnish military advice since its establishment.⁶¹

The Cold War and the Communist Challenge to Hegemony

For some four decades after World War II, the cold war provided the setting for an upgrading of the Latin American armed forces. Beginning in the early 1950s, the United States, through military assistance agreements, became the predominant supplier of professional/technical training and arms for the regional military forces. In view of the large stockpiles of military arms and equipment remaining from World War II and the Korean conflict, the United States was able to supply the Latin American republics with significant quantities of military hardware required in the modernization process.⁶²

Yet, the expansion, modernization, and professionalization of the Latin American armed forces did not result in an epidemic of interstate wars. On the contrary, Latin America continued, even up to the present time, to resolve interstate disputes by pacific settlements rather than resorting to war. Latin America has the lowest per capita expenditure on arms of any region of the world. Except for the Chaco War (1932–35), minor skirmishes stemming from boundary controversies have characterized the region's military involvement in the twentieth century. These include the conflicts between Peru and Ecuador (1941, 1981), Nicaragua and Costa Rica (1955), and El Salvador and Honduras (1969). The only arms clash with extraregional opponents in the twentieth century occurred between the United States and Mexico (1914, 1916) and between Argentina and Great Britain (1982) in the Falkland/Malvinas War.⁶³

As the cold war progressed into the 1960s and early 1970s, US hegemony in Latin America was increasingly challenged and the inter-American system was subjected to additional stress. The Latin American military let it be known that the outdated arms of World War II and the Korean conflict were obsolete and difficult to maintain and adversely affected their modernization process. The success of Fidel Castro in establishing a communist regime less than 100 miles from US shores and the subsequent shipments of sophisticated military weapons to Cuba by the USSR gave substantial credibility to the regional arms concern. The ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation and the Cuban missile crisis further underscored these concerns.⁶⁴

The United States had used the criteria of cost, balance, and limitation in the supply of armaments to the region. By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the demand for more modern conventional weapons, particularly sophisticated aircraft and weapon systems, by such nations as Chile and Peru was followed shortly by similar requests from the republics of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Nationalistic pride and traditional rivalries appeared to play a great role in the desire to acquire modern arms by the Latin American governments.⁶⁵

A complicating factor from the viewpoint of the United States was the availability of alternate weapons suppliers. For example, when the United States refused the requests of Chile and Peru for supersonic aircraft, the former turned to Great Britain and the latter to France for delivery. Of greater concern to US security interests was the purchase of Soviet fighter-bombers in the mid-1970s by Peru—the first American republic, except for Cuba, to acquire armaments from a communist state.⁶⁶

The availability of alternate weapons suppliers, combined with President Jimmy Carter's linkage of human rights performance to arms sales in Latin America, brought an end

to US domination of the regional arms market. During the five-year period between 1975 and 1979, total US arms sales to Latin America amounted to \$725 million, compared to \$1.5 billion by the Soviet Union and a combined total of \$3 billion by Western Europe and Israel. Soon after taking office, President Ronald Reagan reversed Carter's arms policy and focused attention on security assistance and arms sales to Latin America. In the next five-year period between 1980 and 1984, US arms sales to the region increased to \$1.3 billion while Soviet sales catapulted to \$5.7 billion. Western Europe and Israel provided approximately \$7 billion in arms to Latin America during the same period. The previous domination of the arms market by the United States continued to recede.⁶⁷

Low-Intensity Conflict

The 1960s ushered in a concept of warfare that would continue to rage throughout Latin America, even up to the present time—low-intensity conflict (LIC). Even more than the loss of regional arms markets, LIC was to present a challenge to US hegemony in Latin America. Spearheaded by Fidel Castro's expert on guerrilla warfare, Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, and backed by huge Soviet subsidies, Cuban-trained and -equipped insurgents were dispatched to the Latin American republics for the purpose of overthrowing existing governments and replacing them with communist regimes controlled from Havana. The multilaterally sponsored Alliance for Progress, initiated in 1961, sought to counter the guerrilla movement by a two-pronged attack. First, a heavily financed program to stimulate economic growth and institute social reform in the Latin American republics would be undertaken during the decade of the 1960s. Second, increased emphasis on internal security would be implemented by bolstering counterinsurgency capabilities in the region.

Conventional military forces would have to be augmented with counterinsurgents employing new strategies, tactics, and force composition, somewhat akin to the successful British campaign against the guerrillas in Malaya.⁶⁸

The proliferation of low-intensity conflict in the 1970s and 1980s has caused serious problems throughout Latin America. While the goals of the Alliance for Progress were not accomplished insofar as economic growth and social reform were concerned, the Alliance did provide a platform for the launching of concerted counterinsurgency efforts in the region. In 1989, more than two dozen recognized guerrilla organizations composed of some 25,000 regulars were operating in nine Latin American republics. Only one country, Nicaragua, capitulated to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, and that country's Sandinista regime recently has been replaced by a popularly elected government. El Salvador is presently engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the *Farabundo Marti National Liberation* (FMLN) insurgents, and Peru has been brought to the brink of collapse by the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and *Tupac Amaru* guerrillas.⁶⁹

LIC operations in Latin America continue to receive support from external sources, primarily the Cuban-Soviet bloc, in return for ideological compliance. Internal factors—such as inflation, unemployment, substandard living conditions, and heavy debts—exacerbate unrest and ill feelings toward the national authorities. Economic and social conditions in the region have worsened during the 1980s, and constantly rising expectations among the populace remain unfulfilled. A more recent phenomenon, drug trafficking, has become a major factor of internal dissension, terrorism, and disintegration of national authority as guerrillas and drug dealers form linkages.⁷⁰

Furthermore, the three major underpinnings of Latin American society in the colonial period—the landowners, the military, and the church—are now in a state of flux. The threat

of confiscation, nationalization, and land redistribution as well as the growth of the business, finance, and investment sectors have served to reduce the power and influence of the large landowner. The military has been compelled to reexamine and modify its role as almost all of the Latin American republics make the transition to democracy. The authority of the church has been weakened by the emergence of liberation theology—a movement away from its close alliance with the elite to a position of preferential concern for the dispossessed—and the upsurge of secularism in Latin American society.⁷¹

Conclusions

Except for certain aspects of the early colonial era, the Bozeman thesis is not applicable to the Latin American region. An analysis of the region reveals that the nation-state continues to grow stronger and more institutionalized as the years pass. Growth and expansion rather than erosion and contraction would more accurately describe the modern Latin American nation-state system. Conflict in the region, as in other Western societies, may be attributed to politico-economic crises resulting from such causes as unstable governments, underdeveloped economies, and unfulfilled social aspirations instead of a clash of ideas among divergent cultures.

Latin America, in contrast to other third-world regions, reflects the Western heritage. It is not faced with having to resolve a “complex of irreconcilable norms.” Prior to the conquest of the Indies, the inhabitants viewed war as a natural and legitimate activity. The colonization process incorporated the Indians into an alien society, repressed their warrior propensities, and reduced them to a subservient way of life. Transculturation brought about by the conquest served to

divert the Indian civilizations from their natural course by such practices as intermarriages with the conquerors, forced work requirements, and replacement of native religions with Christianity. On the other hand, the Spanish crown and church leaders carried out a relentless search for ways to ensure the proper treatment and care of the Indians, although the needs of the colonists for labor overrode many of the palliatives. Rationalization for the importation and employment of African slave labor was based on the need to spare the Indians from further abuse.

The behavior of the Latin American republics toward the settlement of disputes and their avoidance of conflict further illustrate their Western-style belief that war is an aberration and peace a major goal to maintain. The birth of the Pan-American movement in the early independence era gave validity to this concept. The formalization of the movement in the post-World War II period with the establishment of the OAS and the inter-American security system further underscored adherence to this concept. In the contemporary era, the efforts of the OAS and the UN to reach a peace settlement in the Central American conflicts serve as a continuum of this process.

Although the military has played a prominent role in Latin American affairs since independence, wars have been infrequent, and the armed forces have become increasingly professional. Whereas in the earlier period entry into the officer corps was limited to the elite, in more recent times membership has been open to the best-qualified candidates regardless of social status. Furthermore, the rapport between the military and the populace has increased over the years despite accusations of human rights violations. The implementation of civic action programs and the involvement in community projects on the part of the armed forces in several Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Guatemala, account in large measure for this attitudinal change.

For the past three decades, Cuban-Soviet initiatives have resulted in a proliferation of LIC throughout Latin America. Economic deficiencies, developmental problems, social unrest, and political rigidity, among other factors, have made large numbers of the inhabitants restive and amenable to insurgent propaganda. Revolutionary ideology from abroad has acted as a catalyst in the organization of guerrilla forces to undermine and overthrow national authorities in the region. Countermeasures running the gamut from diplomatic and economic sanctions to the use of military force have been employed as responses to LIC. Yet, insurgency continues in several of the Latin American republics, not as a result of clashes of culture but rather as a derivative of external ideological pressures. In sum, the premise that cultures in Latin America make war for the promotion of values that are purely cultural in nature cannot be substantiated.

Notes

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4. *Ibid.*, 102.

5. Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 69–72.

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25. Herring, 96, 104-6.

26. Haring, 36-41.

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28. De los Ríos, "The Action of Spain," 55-59; de Madariaga, 12-14; Haring, 8-10.

29. De los Ríos, "The Action of Spain," 55-59; de Madariaga, 12-14; Haring, 8-10; Leslie Bethell, ed., *Colonial Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 287-339.

30. Haring, 42-44.

31. Ibid., 44-47; de Madariaga, 16-17; de los Ríos, "The Action of Spain," 66-68.

32. Haring, 44-47; de Madariaga, 16-17; de los Ríos, "The Action of Spain," 66-68.

33. Haring, 47-50; de Madariaga, 12-14.

34. Haring, 51-57.

35. Ibid., 57-67, 71-73.

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Culture and Conflict in Africa's History

The Transition to the Modern Era

Dr Karl P. Magyar

There is no dearth of literature regarding violent conflicts in Africa today. Whether insurgencies, rebellions, lawlessness, secessionism, military mutinies, coups d'état, or transnational wars, Africa ranks as the most unstable continent. Historians relate in substantial volumes accounts of Africa's traditional indigenous wars, and the colonial period and the rush to independence produced many devastating and protracted anticolonial battles.

A compendium of international crises notes that 41 percent of crises during the period 1963 to 1979 occurred in Africa. The great powers were more likely to intervene in crises in Africa than on any other continent.¹ In the 30-year period following 1948, nine African countries ranked among the top 20 in the category of "deaths from political violence." That list is headed by Nigeria with nearly 2 million casualties. However, conflict may also have a nonpolitical dimension, and if we include the data of standard violence stemming from lawlessness, we have a portrait of a continent perennially ablaze and verging on the point of perpetual anarchy.

Available analytic sources are only now unraveling the quantitative dimensions of such volatile social relations. The statistical stress is on numerical evidence, and the gravity of the problem has not been assessed in sociohumanitarian terms. In essence, wide media coverage is given to the consequences of violence expressed in terms of hunger, disease, and refugees. But analyses of the direct, as well as the broader, underlying causes of these conditions are sadly

in short supply and certainly not in sufficient agreement to offer a basis for a massive response. The dark continent may have become independent and the subject of many academic and institutional studies, but interpretations of events are no less controversial today than they were before these analytic efforts got under way.

Many questions concerning Africa's conflicts need to be answered. Were such conflicts endemic features throughout Africa's history? Did the conflicts begin at the time of initial contact with Muslim and European societies? Are Africans more prone towards violent conflicts than other international societies? Can we elicit from the psychology of individual Africans a unique attitude towards conflict? Are Africans' wars against each other more vicious than they were against their colonial masters? Finally, what are the consequences of this conflict syndrome, and what are the interests of external powers in this milieu? Certain conflicts such as those in Rwanda and Burundi, although resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties, have hardly involved external intervention. But other conflicts such as those in Chad, Ethiopia, and Angola have introduced substantial levels of foreign participation—direct and indirect.

Clearly, to understand conflicts in Africa, we need to go beyond statistical data and a few speculative attempts to explain them. If the future of Africa's perennial instability is to be addressed, explanations of such violence would be most helpful. As we are dealing with a problem well known throughout the history of all cultures, we should not expect to attain a definitive statement. What we can expect, however, is a greater understanding of the environmental context of such violence and, perhaps, a synthesis of prevailing analytic theories that may advance our understanding another notch. With these we may hope to better inform our own policy-making apparatus regarding potential intervention.

Africa's Conflict Environment

The Analytical Context

Whether traditional, indigenous, tribal conflicts or modern-equipped, externally allied, full-scale, transnational wars, Africa's conflicts can be analyzed within a universal theoretical framework. The categories presented here are not absolute or exclusive; rather, a certain mix should elicit the unique character of each African conflict and its relation to the conflicts of other societies.

The categories chosen reflect broad typologies of explanations offered by the analytic literature, although few would discount the conclusion of a composite perspective. Of course, analyzing one individual may be more easily accomplished than analyzing entire societies, but no psychoanalytic explanation will be attempted. Three categories of explanations may be identified in the attempt to explain Africa's conflict history.

1. *Global Structuralists*. Global structuralists maintain that violence today—and much of it during the thousand years of contact with first Arabic then European civilizations—is the result of the coercion exercised by these external invaders. Arabs sought to develop the trade routes along the east coast of Africa and across the Sahara Desert. Europeans then penetrated inland from the coasts of west and central Africa. Finally, Dutch colonists expropriated the lands in southern Africa and moved inland from the Cape of Good Hope.

Today, all of Africa has attained independence, but the first three decades of this new era have been shaped by continued external interests—be they private traders, European former colonial governments, or the great powers and their surrogates. Africa is the unwitting victim of international financial, ideological, and strategic interests, all of them manipulating African people against each other regardless of the ensuing wars and social disruptions. Africa presents

primarily geographic and material value for which external interests compete in total disregard of the human dimension. Arms, training, and leadership are offered by external powers, but it is the Africans who do the dying—and who bear the reputation of being aggressive.²

2. *Evolutionists*. The evolutionist perspective offers explanations that do not single out Africans as being particularly or inherently violence prone. All societies that undergo a rapid transition from traditional to modern forms experience the disintegration of their established social institutions, which offer communal security when undisturbed. Africa's transition suffers from a greatly compressed time frame which exacerbates the impact of such disruptive forces. Early contacts with external civilizations merely engendered this process. Unlike European or American societies, which allowed for a slow and progressive evolution of balanced social structures, Africans are expected to leap over centuries in only a few decades and under very constrained socioeconomic conditions.

Africans became independent not as the result of gradual sociopolitical development, as did the American colonies, but due to Europe's debilitating involvement in World War II. Africans are presently in only the initial stages of their consolidative phase—the most volatile and often the most protracted period in the evolution of all nations as they advance towards the rank of major powers. In the absence of established internal legitimacy, opposing factions and diffused concentrations of power are fertile ground for external intervention, which retards the nationwide emergence of indigenously balanced and legitimate structures. The United States fought its own Civil War nearly one hundred years after attaining independence; only thereafter did politically induced internal violence cease. In Africa, there is an equally troublesome challenge as the countries were created arbitrarily by colonial interests, and

national borders do not coincide with indigenous national or geographic divisions. Violence will no doubt abate as Africans evolve towards political legitimacy and socio-economic viability.³

3. *Historicoculturalists*. Advocates of historical and cultural determinism argue that violence in modern Africa is the display of continuous historically based cultural attitudes towards conflict. Such attitudes are ingrained in the psychosocial makeup of a people and, as such, are not easily transcended. Africa's pervasive inclination towards war and violence was well established before contact was made with outsiders. Outsiders only offered greater opportunities for alliance and for more technologically advanced weapons. But the proclivity to inflict damage remains the same. Historicoculturalists identify Africans as being particularly violent. They discount the negative influence of external powers and the analysis by the evolutionists. Hence their assessment of the future of the African continent remains bleak.

These are not mutually exclusive categories, as certain dimensions of all three can be incorporated into a synthesized version. The utility of these categories emerges in their differing emphases, which facilitate philosophical and methodological attempts at explanation. The global structuralist perspective is especially of interest to neo-Marxist analyses and to developmental theories emphasizing the center-periphery paradigm. On the other hand, those who argue along the orthodox bipolar system theories of international relations would also accept the "victimization of the third world" argument, as the third world serves the requirements of the global strategic balance.

By contrast, historicoculturalists represent an analytic position which may be excessively dogmatic in its assertion that the fundamental nature of humans does not change and that evolution is only of technological means, not of

psychological foundations. Historicoculturalists make a valuable contribution with their anthropologically derived analyses of Africa's societies, which may be difficult to challenge. But they are vulnerable in their transference of such historical characterizations to the modern era, which depicts most instances of violence as irrationally based and nonproductive, as judged by our own present-day Western standards. Yet we may demonstrate that Africa's contemporary conflicts are indeed rational and goal oriented, and that these goals do not differ from those of other societies at this particular stage of development. Certainly there are elements of traditionalism manifest throughout Africa today, but these hardly characterize official state policy in all but the exceptional cases of a Bokassa or Amin. We can also argue that conflict and violence today is hardly unique to Africans. The great powers also have exercised such official violence periodically since 1945, and in light of their voluntary extrications from Vietnam and Afghanistan without victories, more than a touch of the irrational and a tinge of atavistic urges may have been in evidence.

Conflict and War: The Adda Bozeman Thesis

To the issue of conflict in Africa, Professor Bozeman has offered an entire volume: *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities*.⁴ She treats the same topic in the article "War and the Clash of Ideas."⁵ In the article, she addresses more than the African context—she seeks to illuminate the broad role of conflict in international relations. Bozeman cautions against the misguided assumption that war elicits universally negative attitudes. Few modern theorists "have bothered to explore the value content of conflict, war, and violence." The prevailing Western bias in the study of war misleads, as elsewhere one does not "encounter the overriding desire to avoid armed conflict and to seek peaceful settlement of

disputes that leading peace-minded scholars in our society assume to be present.”⁶

Professor Bozeman's analysis of Africa's conflict environment touches on numerous aspects of Africa's contemporary attempts at state building. She questions if we are justified in thinking “that the territorially delimited, independent nation-state is still universally accepted as the core norm of political organization.” For Africans especially, this is a relevant point of inquiry due to the almost totally haphazard construction of such states, if viewed from their own perspective. Indeed, many cultural traits cut across most of Africa's borders as they are established today. Most current conflicts in Africa are between neighboring social groups within the modern national borders, and very few wars are fought trans-nationally. Wars such as those fought in Ethiopia, Angola, and Sudan are between opposing sides within countries whose cultural differences are as diverse as those of Europe's nations. In this environment, we may justifiably expect that before the continent stabilizes, the concept of nationalism will undergo severe transformation—in accordance with Bozeman's analysis.

Professor Bozeman's characterization of Africa's warfare ranks that continent alongside other societies whose historical militarism is well established. War was endemic throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and “it did not elicit moral qualms.” In fact, war was “necessary in terms of certain deeply held beliefs.” Participation in war ensured group identity with traditional myths, customs, rites, and one's ancestors. Fighting affirmed man's essence at the cosmic level, which was rent by malevolent forces. Bozeman refers to Africa's prevalent tendency towards group identification; hence, she maintains, “death was not personalized,” nor was it “objectified.” One died not at the behest of a weapon but due to “superior, surreal causes.” Even life was enabled by

magical powers, ancestral spirits, or witchcraft. Society as an institution was perpetuated by continuous struggle for rule among its own internal aspirants, thus ensuring that perpetual conflict prevailed. Violent conflict was tolerated, if not encouraged, for the acquisition of cattle, slaves, women, grazing and watering rights, and vengeance. Bozeman stresses that material gain as the object of war may have been valued, but the fight had innate value.

Such militaristic behavior was exhibited within a unique metaphysical context according to Professor Bozeman. This includes different time concepts and spatial characteristics, the unity of temporal periods, and strategic thought unencumbered by the usual needs to service the requirements of the nation-state. Bozeman observes that what is to us a vital concern—the distinction between victor and vanquished—is within the traditional African conception greatly obscured. War was a continuous business; as such, victor and vanquished would be part of a greater alternating rhythm of the universe.

“War and the Clash of Ideas,” as summarized above, offers the essence of Professor Bozeman’s contention that African societies—as do other international societies—demonstrate ideas about and attitudes towards violent conflict that are different from ours and that these attitudes are shaped by nonoccidental cultures well grounded in their own histories. Her book, *Conflict in Africa*, is a lengthy investigation and elaboration of the same theme and offers more detailed empirical and theoretical bases. The book must be appreciated within the context in which it was formulated and written—at a time when African states were attaining their independence under some very volatile conditions. (Of course, we may contend that Africa was attaining its independence once again. This more precise wording buttresses the claim regarding Africa’s historical continuity, in contrast to those views

which hold that Africa had no respectable history prior to its coming under the influence of the Europeans.)

Professor Bozeman offers her contentious observation that after independence had been gained, “the goal of transcending tribalism was indeed the most intractable of the many problems faced by all African governments” and that occidental types of democratic rule and public law would be “fundamentally incompatible with long-established native patterns of transacting politics.”⁷ The fact that the new political institutions introduced by the departing colonial powers soon faltered is not disputed here; the reasons offered for this demise are. We may question once again whether imported institutions tend to have a short life span in most, if not all societies, or whether this characteristic is unique to Africa. Regardless of the answer, Bozeman notes the inherent incompatibility of certain modern occidental practices with Africa's own traditions.

Despite the availability of Western-style political institutions such as parliaments, political parties, and elections, political succession and relations between rival leaders in modern Africa is not a peaceful matter according to Professor Bozeman, but is marked by “plot and counter-plot, assassination or regicide, abduction, expulsion, or arrest, and . . . changes of regime have usually been brought about by coups d'état.” This characteristic feature, which Professor Bozeman points out, remains uncontestably true to this day. Only a half dozen of over 50 countries in Africa have not experienced a successful or attempted coup as of 1990.⁸ The military plays an active role in running governments and engaging in wars or counterinsurgency exercises throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa. Bozeman observes—again correctly—that today, it is difficult “to isolate a military coup from the mutiny, rebellion, movement of secession or liberation, civil war, interracial massacre, or other flight into violence with which it was entangled.” She also notes that in

modern Africa, “warfare of one kind or another has been conducted on a prodigious scale” and that fighting in Africa tends to be “uninhibited, ruthless, and protracted.”⁹

The discourse on Africans’ mythical vision, states, society, order and disorder, ritual violence, war and identity, and the problems posed by linguistic communications of modern concepts applied to a traditional context are all explored in great depth and with impressive scholarly authority. Her concluding comments bear emphasis: “Africans are more at ease with conflict in its multiple manifestations than their contemporaries in Europe and the United States.” Furthermore, Bozeman notes, Africans view conflict “positively, as a source of major values and as a determining or integrative factor in life.” Africans don’t see as mutually exclusive our distinctions between “conflict and accord, aggression and defense, and war and peace,” and conflict in Africa is traditionally accepted as “ongoing or latent in social and interstate affairs.”

These are Professor Bozeman’s major thrusts, which offer an unglamorous portrait of an entire continent’s present dilemma. Nor are the future prospects cause for more positive expectations. A wealth of evidence and a number of other analysts support her interpretation. But the historicoculturalists also have their detractors.

Historicoculturalist Perspectives on Conflict

Ali A. Mazrui ranks as the most notable African writer who presents a historicoculturalist perspective. His analysis, as well as those of other African and non-African writers, are developed in the volume *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa*.¹⁰ Subjects he reviewed include the state, warriors, masculinity and war, cultural roots of aggressive behavior, dance and the warrior tradition, and warriorhood and sex.

These topics alone form a substantial portion of the agenda of the historicoculturalist perspective.

Mazrui attacks the notion that Africans lack a continuous history apart from that of Europe's historical determinism on the African continent. The problem, he notes, lies with political scientists and economists, while the anthropologists and historians are better informed. This, of course, validates the central thesis of the historicoculturalist category. Mazrui observes that "political scientists were so preoccupied with studying political change that they virtually forgot how to study political continuity." Mazrui also offers a useful identification of the warrior tradition as

that sub-system of values and institutionalized expectations which define the military role of the individual in the defense of his society, the martial criteria of adulthood, and the symbolic obligations of manhood in time of political and military stress.¹¹

The eligible individual is ready to sacrifice his life for society, and each household is linked to the wider community. The warrior tradition also links culture and war. A man becomes a man when he kills an opponent. "Armed struggle, dance, romantic courting, betrothal, the right to sire children, and protecting cattle and status in the community can all become one interrelated subsystem of values." Mazrui also notes that the mere formation of a tribe is sufficient politicization to engender militarization.¹²

With reference to Buganda, Bunyoro, Oyo and the Yoruba states, Kikuyu, and the Zulu states, G. N. Uzoigwe develops the notion of the traditional African state as a fusion of state power with the warrior structures. "The warrior, in a traditional society, was a political animal," he says. Uzoigwe stresses the formation and maintenance of the great kingdoms at the behest of devoted warriors, among which the king himself was "the great warrior, larger than life." In South Africa, Shaka, the famed Zulu ruler in the early nineteenth century, epitomized such a chief of a military state. In what

is today Nigeria, the Oyo empire also federated a number of hitherto dispersed Yoruba chiefdoms when its ruler, Oranyan, combined them with forces centering on his own personal bodyguards. The African warriors, contends Uzoigwe, were “an indivisible element of the central government.” They were the leaders as well as the administrators.¹³

Socializing the individual into the warrior culture was a well-established tradition—with variations—but recognized throughout most of Africa. Uzoigwe refers to Kenya’s Tikiri tribe in which a boy became a man in a ceremony usually lasting up to six months and signified by circumcision. In such a social transformation, “communal undertakings were encouraged; individualism was discouraged.” Entry into warrior status took another 15 years of demonstrated martial abilities. Only at the age of 40 would a man be eligible, on the basis of his record, to become a member of the “elder warriors” who ruled the state. The two notable features of this episode are that the individual is rigorously socialized into communal conformity and that the community standard concentrated almost exclusively on warrior values. We also need to be aware of the size of such armed forces lest we be lulled into assuming that these were not substantial efforts. W. E. Abraham contends that the Ashantis, who defeated the British on several occasions in the Gold Coast, “could field a hundred thousand men at a time.” They failed only at adapting rapidly to the new weapons the British introduced.¹⁴

In general, the traditional African state and the military were inseparable, as is convincingly argued by the historico-culturalists. But there were other cultural characteristics contributing to this alleged “warrior tradition” in Africa’s rich history. However, we are confronted with a caveat: it is dangerous to range broadly across such a diverse continent in order to elicit uniform patterns. The choice of one set of examples may lead to conclusions quite contrary to those of

another set being investigated.¹⁵ The mere identification of what is Africa can be a sufficiently contentious geographic exercise, as Mazrui so expertly demonstrates.¹⁶ Africa's societies may be divided into a number of racial, linguistic, historic, tribal, and other characteristics referring to their traits such as herders, gatherers, pastoralists, and stateless or centralized societies. Many Africans have been notable migrants, a characteristic which leaves little evidence of their historical social patterns and usually results in continuous syntheses of various cultures; this obscures the very notion of "traditionalism."

Allowing for this analytic impediment, if we are to generalize broadly, most analysts agree on the fundamental underlying unity of all African cultural values, divine and secular. Janheinz Jahn quotes Abebayo Adesanya, a Yoruba writer, in his reference to the harmony of African conceptions, which Jahn notes is valid for most of Africa. There exists a coherence of all disciplines; God cannot be removed from the secular daily world. Adesanya notes:

Philosophy, theology, politics, social theory, land law, medicine, psychology, birth and burial, all find themselves logically concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one item from the whole is to paralyze the structure of the whole.¹⁷

This unity of Africans' worldview has the effect of reducing the responsibility of an individual's actions as his behavior is inevitably the result of a wider social purpose, or alternatively, the product of the surreal causes—as Professor Bozeman offers. Axel-Ivar Berglund presents an analysis of the two conceptions of death in Zulu society. He notes that a "timely death" is an expression of passing on—a continuation—and an "untimely death" implies a breaking off of life. In the former case, a timely physical death is a natural continuation of man's existence. When old people die, they are not mourned.¹⁸ As is common in Islamic nations,

a warrior dying honorably on the battlefield is eligible to move to the head of the line for his heavenly rewards.

Africa's indigenous animist religious tendency, according to Mazrui, blurs "the distinction between man and nature, between the living and the dead, between the divine and the human, between the natural and the supernatural."¹⁹ From this, it follows that the traditional resort to violence is not a rational act calculated by an individual to enhance personal advantage. On the contrary, the individual derived his status as well as his existential relevance and personal legitimacy from the collective fortunes of his society—including those who have gone before him and those who are yet to follow. But once again it is advisable to allow for the evolution of changing perceptions. Paul Bohannon and Philip Curtin note that "it is impossible to overemphasize the influence that Christian missionaries have had in Africa." They suggest that the major influence was not felt by the theological replacement of traditional beliefs, but by the accompanying cultural baggage of the Christian proselytizers.²⁰

Much as we would be mistaken to stress the impermeability of Africa's traditional culture, we must also guard that we do not make rash assumptions regarding modern Africa's total rejection of the past and unquestioned adoption of foreign systems of thought. What we will encounter is a synthesis whose evolutionary direction points to an elite-fed modernization tendency which uses—and at times capitalizes on—the vestiges of traditional style and exuberance for martial activities. Episodes of this have emerged in the darker days of protracted conflicts with the accompanying deterioration of the modern symbols of state. This has been demonstrated first in the anarchic environment of the Congo rebellion following independence in 1960. Thereafter, occurrences of reversions to traditionalism were exhibited in the Rwanda and Burundi civil wars; in Uganda under the despotic days of Amin; in the complex antagonisms of southern Sudan; and

currently, by the savagery of the *Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana* (RENAMO) movement which operates in a near-perfect state of nature. Within South Africa, the absence of effective law in the larger black townships has facilitated the occasional emergence of similar atavistic practices. Meanwhile Chief Buthelezi, as the modern, government-backed leader of the government-created KwaZulu homeland, skillfully manipulates his rural-based Zulu followers by an impassioned appeal to their traditional cultural and warrior identities. In essence, traditional forces emerge in the absence of a decisive and early resolution to a conflict or when the effective rule of the central state does not directly extend to the outer provinces.

Modern African institutions often demonstrate their finite limitations and their inability to exert effective controls over the state. This naturally results in the reversion to parochialism as it can more likely offer immediate security to a specific community than can the distant and ineffective symbols and the paltry efforts of the national state. In the case of most countries in Africa, the evolutionary process has been strained by the limitations of time and by the magnitude of rising expectations. But in South Africa the government has incorporated traditionalism in its unfortunate attempts to exploit ethnic divisions and to ensure, thereby, its own predominance.

Africa's Conflict Environment

The Evolutionary Context

Professor Bozeman's elucidation of the African *weltanschauung* is superbly portrayed and should inform all interpreters of Africa's conflict history. However, for purposes of addressing Africa's conflict potential at the modern global systemic level, Africa's conflicts must be

viewed within historical parameters on which global-structuralist and evolutionist perspectives may also shed light. Such a presentation will not detract from the insight offered by the historicoculturalist view; it will, however, aim at a synthesis which should provide an understanding of the nature of Africa's modern conflicts as they impinge on the security interests of external powers.

We need not take issue with the extant interpretations of Africa's conflicts if they are waged at a purely parochial level as in the case of the present-day nonpolitically motivated faction fights among historically rival clans of South Africa's rural Zulus. However, as Africans respond to externally originated military involvement and interference on the African continent or wage full-scale transnational wars among themselves using modern arms and battlefield tactics, we need to go beyond traditional explanations for violence in this new environmental context. At the micro-level, an individual warrior may still perceive his mission within a mythical worldview derived from ancestral cultural values and attitudes towards conflict. But at the macrolevel, such traditional characteristics may not be sufficient bases for explanations of vital strategic responses today. Have African attitudes towards conflict changed as the result of external influences? If so, how? Such changes, if evident, should provide a stimulus to arguments favoring the global-structuralists' and the evolutionists' interpretations.

Conflict in Africa's history corresponds to evolving environmental circumstances as external forces penetrated the continent. In this respect, Africa did not differ fundamentally from most other traditional societies as they advanced to the transitional phase on the way ultimately towards modernity. In this respect, academic analyses that compare the development of societies as they progress through certain identifiable and pervasive patterns present an evolutionist perspective.

Monte Palmer offers a useful characterization of three phases based on the scholarly work of numerous analysts who have “dichotomized human society into antithetical ideal types: the traditional and the modern.” The period in between is the transitional phase.²¹ Traditional societies are universally marked by a number of characteristics. Palmer summarizes some of the more important general features of such traditional societies.

1. They are marked by affectivity. They view others in emotional terms, colored by personal values. Social relations are never neutral, but are reduced to questions of good or bad.

2. They are self-oriented. Social compliance is out of fear of punishment. (There is no conception of a rational social contract.)

3. They tend to be particularistic. The universal society holds no superior value to particular segments ranging from family to tribe or even to a religious group.

4. Status accrues via ascription. Regardless of age, sex, or lineage, status is not based on individual competitive achievement but on birthrights.

5. Different rules emanate from kingship and custom. Relations among individuals are regulated by norms and not by codified laws.²²

Palmer notes that these descriptions apply to traditional societies, which are identified today as the world's least economically developed countries. Modern societies, by contrast, are the more advanced industrial societies. They are marked by being affectively neutral, collectively oriented, and achievement-based, and by having greater social universalism. Modern-day social obligations are marked by specific legal and contractual terms. There are, of course, a series of other characteristics which differentiate traditional from modern societies as well. In general, these differences flow from the physical environment and technological

attainments. A few examples characterize modern societies as being those with high urbanization and literacy, horizontal and vertical mobility, low disease and birthrates, and high differentiation. In addition, modern societies have very different economic systems, socialization characteristics, and political practices.

Palmer's framework is instructive as it reflects the academic study of political development and modernization which is ultimately based on an evolutionary paradigm. These are broad characteristics. At the individual societal level, he concedes that "vestiges of traditional behavior are clearly evident in economically advanced societies."²³ This admission is vital for the analysis of conflict in modern African society, which could perhaps be described as an amalgam of traditional and modern attributes. In order to develop an evolutionary perspective, we may divide sub-Saharan Africa's history into five distinct periods when analyzing the changing nature of the purposes of conflict.

Traditional Period

Mazrui refers to Africa as a "cradle of civilization," a historical reference alluded to by many writers of African history.²⁴ There existed an isolated African culture at one time, but Africa today is the product of that ancient heritage, of Islamic culture, and of Western influence. No uniform continentwide developmental pattern can be discerned. Areas of sub-Saharan Africa were penetrated as early as A.D. 800, with the Sahel experiencing wide Muslim contact the following century. Arab traders had also made extensive contacts along the coast of East Africa, where trade ties had been established long before European contact was made in West Africa. Yet some obscure parts of Africa have hardly been incorporated into the modern state system to this day.²⁵

As of today, most of Africa has been penetrated for 12 centuries. However, direct Islamic and Arab influence was limited initially in its geographic scope to the Sahelian belt, the Nile valley, the Horn region, and the coastal areas of East Africa. That left the greatest part of the continent untouched and in pristine traditional cultural condition. Certainly the trading influence of Arab commercial interests was felt inland, but only indirectly. Foreign traders did not at first penetrate inland, and goods were assembled only at certain sanctuaries in the Sahel or along the East African coast, especially on the island of Zanzibar.

Unfortunately for the analyst, there remains little reliable historical evidence of social relations, political systems, economic activities, or relations among the various tribes. Oral history and early accounts of Muslim writers, and subsequently of Europeans, do offer valuable insight into what must have been impressive social systems—if judged by sparse archeological evidence. But on the whole, our knowledge of traditional Africa emerges only in the last 100 years by direct observation and studies of Africans who have had only minimal contact with external cultural influences.

European Exploration and Trade Period

The Portuguese began the explorations of the West African coast in 1482, and within five decades they had sailed as far as the mouth of the Congo River. For the next 350 years, Europeans traded along the coast, and the strong African rulers rarely allowed them to penetrate inland. As M. Kwamena-Poh et al., note: “Until the 19th century, Europeans were the masters on water, but Africans were the masters on land.”²⁶ Although the Europeans initially came in search of gold, ivory, and spices, they would subsequently capitalize on commercial slavery. And though Africans traded for a variety of European products, Birmingham,

England, was soon producing 100,000 guns a year for sale in West Africa alone.

For our purposes, this European penetration of Africa, although purely commercial in origin, introduced both foreign cultural contacts and technologically superior military weaponry. Little evidence indicates that the Africans altered their social relations as the result of initial contact with foreign literate and Christian societies. But the hitherto prevailing conflict environment would soon change as the vast commercialization of slavery resulted in wars being fought solely for the acquisition of slaves. Previously, wars had usually been the by-product of conflicts. The availability of guns plunged Africa into a vortex of requiring guns in order to supply more slaves who, in turn, would be sold for more guns. New purposes for fighting, as well as new means, were introduced. Of course, guns could be acquired from Arab traders, who were also the source for horses. Horses accounted for military successes such as that of the Yoruban Oyo state's cavalry, which defeated several other surrounding states, as well as powerful Dahomey in the late eighteenth century.²⁷

At this stage, we may still speak of a traditional culture of conflict. But this culture was rapidly adapting to a new conflict environment which saw traditional African social systems greatly disrupted. Political and economic structures were radically altered to accommodate foreign commercial influence and the introduction of foreign military weapons and fighting tactics. Where foreign cultures and religions left no major impact in the initial stages, guns and commerce would soon accomplish this. In the Sahel of West Africa, Islamic influence altered traditional societies as much as Europeans increasingly influenced the coastal areas. In between these two belts were powerful kingdoms with communications and trade links to the Arab and European contact points, but these kingdoms steadfastly pursued their

traditional hegemonic interests. In most cases, Africans were quick to adapt the availability of Europe's technological weaponry in pursuit of traditional objectives but also in pursuit of modern economic requirements. Or, on occasion, Africans would ally with the British against their own old enemies. This was the case of the Fante in their battles with the Asante in what is today Ghana. Both foreigners and natives used each other in pursuit of their varied objectives.

European Colonization Period

Official controls by Europeans were extended over all of Africa in this period, culminating in the Berlin conference of 1884–85, which formalized Africa's division. Africa's "triple heritage," as identified by Mazrui, was firmly established. The continent's indigenous cultures had mixed with Islamic and European elements, but each respective component demonstrated some diverse orientations. Africans still pursued predominance over traditional enemies; Muslims sought expansion, consolidation, security, and conversions; Europeans pursued commercial expansion, lands on which to settle, pacification of warring tribes, and Christian souls.

Of the three cultural components, that of Europe was perhaps the most problematic. Private interests would be ensured, but by governmental intervention. Slavery was developed as a commercial enterprise, after which it was actively curtailed. European armies would take African lives while missionaries would save their souls. Guns were introduced in vast quantities, after which colonial administrations launched wars to attempt to quell their use. Traditional economic patterns were totally altered and replaced with systems that did not address native needs. The colonial powers never envisaged the outcome of it all, nor its actual purpose. Could the colonies produce the fabled

profits? Would Europe's surplus population be exported to Africa? Was the fate of the natives to be sold, killed, or saved? And, did "greatness"—which was to accrue to all those with overseas empires—lead to the ultimate weakening of the imperial powers? Is not Portugal today paying for her imperial ambitions?

The popular image of Africa's colonization episode fails to portray the almost universal pattern of resistance to Europe's process of subjugation. Kwamena-Poh et al., identify two types of resistance in this phase: that which preceded formal establishment of controls and that which resisted the effects of such controls, once imposed.²⁸ Active resistance in the subjugation period was offered by the traditional warrior structures, especially of West Africa's well-established tribal kingdoms. Their armies were at times large in number, formidable, equipped with European weapons and cavalry, and configured in a professional style often copied from the French. Europeans lost several major engagements such as the British encounters with the Asante or the battle of Isandhlwana in South Africa in 1879 against the Zulus—one of the worst defeats for the British up to that time.

Invariably, superior military weapons technology, better training and battlefield tactics, and the notorious Maxim guns would wreak decisive revenge where an initial encounter with African warriors had resulted in defeat. Africans resisted Europeans for very rational reasons such as their aversion to the imposition of forced labor and hut taxes, or their displacement from their lands. Although Europeans demanded compliance with colonial administration and European standards such as the abolishment of slavery and sacrifices and the termination of incessant warring among inland tribes, they also began to respect native structures and customs. This was manifested most notably in Lugard's policy of "indirect rule," which introduced an economic

method of extending controls. By our standards today, Africans' resistance to this infringement of their rights to self-determination and an independent existence was a more rational act than was the European acquisition of far-flung empires for the sake of dubious glory and high-risk economic ventures.

Preindependence Formative Period

That Africans would organize to oppose colonial subjugation with its ambiguous goals, but ruthless exploitative means, should not be surprising. Americans had set the precedent almost two centuries earlier. Africans began to organize political movements whose objectives included greater political autonomy, indigenous political participation, and independence.

We believe that Africa's greatest export in the modern period was minerals, but we are popularly less aware of Africa's major export in this century—namely, its men who would fight as soldiers in distant battles in Europe and the Far East. The precedent for this had been the standard colonial practice of utilizing native troops to overcome resistance in colonies other than those of their own origins. Brian Catchpole and I. A. Akinjobin list 160,000 West African soldiers as having been sent to fight in Europe during World War I, with other West Africans being used militarily in other parts of Africa.²⁹ Ruth First noted that the French had used Senegalese troops throughout the nineteenth century in the Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War, in Madagascar, and even against Mexico.³⁰ Four-fifths of the troops killed in the French subjugation of central Africa were African troops. Fifteen thousand African troops fought in the French Indochina War, with other Africans having been used at Dien Bien Phu and Suez and in Algeria. Several hundred thousand Africans fought for the British as far afield as

Burma and Europe, as well as in Africa, during World War II.

With Africans becoming cosmopolitan by exposure to the external world of Europe's battlegrounds and universities, it was only a matter of time before Europe's devastated war economies ran headlong into Africa's political ambitions. In most cases, especially in the French territories, independence was gained after only minimal agitation. The British had encountered the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the early 1950s, which did exhibit some traditional characteristics of ritualistic war—but in the modern pursuit of lands that had been confiscated from the native populations.³¹ In fact, Philip Curtin et al., note that it was this European encroachment which unified the hitherto dispersed members of the Kikuyu tribe and thereafter built the foundations for Kenya's independence movement.³² But it was the Portuguese who were to encounter the greatest independence wars by Africans who were equipped with a full arsenal of modern weapons, guerrilla tactics, allies, and Marxist ideology. These latter wars continue in Mozambique and Angola to this day, long after the inhabitants attained independence.

Independence Period

Independence came rapidly to Africa once Ghana was set free in 1957. The formative period had been well spent on developing the intellectual foundations for self-determination, but its final translation into reality soon demonstrated that Africans, once again, had adapted rapidly. Liberation was mostly by negotiation, but force utilized by purely modern insurgent methods was an available alternative in the recalcitrant region of southern Africa. Liberation forces such as those in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa were constituted along modern guerrilla structures reflecting

Asian and Latin American influences. Certainly particularistic tendencies were present as geographic regionalism played an important role. Zimbabwe's two separate movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union, were an example of this. But in general, at the leadership level, revolutionary ideology did not officially tolerate such divisions, and most movements worked to overcome such potential natural divisiveness. *Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique, South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in South-West Africa, and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa demonstrated this tendency.

Where regionalism did manifest itself—as in Angola, where *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) did come to represent mostly the Ovimbundu people—one must not automatically conclude that tribal forces were at play. Any protracted liberation struggle may naturally bifurcate as the fortunes of war change. In the case of Angola, the *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (FNLA) movement of Holden Roberto was heavily tied to Zaire due to geography and common ethnicity. The *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA) was heavily urban-based and soon allied with the Cuban foreigners. That left well over half of that huge country unrepresented until Jonas Savimbi organized his UNITA movement. All three movements attracted external alliance, and all utilized modern weaponry and battlefield tactics extensively.

The present independence period of Africa is characterized most concisely by the phenomenon of sociopolitical consolidation. This is usually a protracted period in which an indigenously derived, equilibrated power distribution emerges. In many African countries, the governments at the time of independence were either hurriedly formed by the

departing colonial power or were virtually installed by external interventionists. Comparatively few attained nationwide legitimacy before challenges emerged from geographically based insurgencies, or the military staged the first of a series of coups d'état. As the state faced the dual threats of internal violence and economic deterioration, central authority then gave way to parochialist identities. The result was the urban-rural split, center-periphery division, the emergence of dualistic economic structures, the introduction of external allied interests by ideologically opposing forces, and the disintegration of nationwide political authority. In this unstable environment, violent conflict is demonstrated in various forms, including coups d'état, attempts at secession, insurgencies, transnational wars, and a variety of forms of domestic lawlessness. The objectives are unequivocal: the seizure of power and control of modern political institutions, but not the reversion to or the retention of a traditional historical system.

Recalling Monte Palmer's analytic model of societies in evolution, his description of traditional society is an apt paradigm of the social culture on which the historico-culturalists focus. External contacts advance these societies to Palmer's transitional phase, which, in the case of Africa, is divided into several distinct periods corresponding to the external contact and trade phase, the colonial period, and the preindependence formative phase. Independence itself does not offer entry into Palmer's "modern society" category as that is reserved for those societies which have attained de facto advanced socioeconomic modernity, and not mere de jure sovereign status in the world of nations. Hence, independence only introduces these fledgling countries to the early stages of the consolidative phase, which for many countries proves to be a period of insurmountable and incessant internal conflict.

As for the issue of violent conflict, its most notable characteristic is that its rationale and method changes fundamentally in each of the evolutionary stages. We cannot take issue with the historicoculturalists in their descriptions of the structure of traditional conflict and attitudes towards war. However, in the subsequent phases, they may have greatly underestimated the influence of external ideas, weapons, military forces, education, economic interests, and political interference, which have totally and permanently changed Africa's traditional conceptions of conflict. The atavistic underlying psychosocial belief system of the individual warrior may occasionally reflect in good part traditional values; but the organized military efforts, whether those of the conventional armies of today's states or of their insurgent enemies, are best understood within a modern global context. This may be even more so the case for Africa and Latin America than for South and Southeast Asia, which have not experienced the great disruption and penetration of their traditional societies by distant foreigners in such a short time frame.

As the modern African governments fail to answer the pervasive security, political, and economic challenges, the greatly deteriorating conflict environment does facilitate the reemergence of residual atavistic forces such as those demonstrated by Uganda's Amin or Equatorial Guinea's Macias Nguema. But those aberrations do not describe the fully modern conflict context as those exhibited in Nigeria, Angola, Chad, or Ethiopia. In fact, if we consider the great degree of ethnic fragmentation, artificial boundaries, number of countries, and the generally poor state of Africa's economies, we can just as easily be struck by the relative paucity of violent conflict on the African continent. Until recently, this was especially the case in West Africa where the population density, ethnic fragmentation, and history of traditional warrior kingdoms are the most extensive but

where peace has reigned mostly since independence. Only Nigeria offered the major exception, in the form of the Biafran war.

The Historical Legacy in Africa's Contemporary Conflicts

This study's objective is to gain insight into Africa's historical conflict environment in order to better understand our contemporary global security situation. That Africa has had a tumultuous conflict history is well established, but disagreement centers on the explanations for the causes of the perennial and multivariied conflicts.

Historians and anthropologists take interest in the premodern wars as they may contribute to the full portrait of Africa's historical societies. However, the modern strategic analyst must develop an understanding of Africa's conflict history. Only with an assessment of Africa's role in the global security situation can policies be made regarding intervention in newly emerging conflicts. Also, the foreign private sector, so vital to today's developing states, needs to be informed about the prospects for stability in order to guide economic transactions.

It is reasonable to argue that not all conflicts in Africa are grounded in the same originating causes and that, ultimately, different responses may be counseled. A proper assessment may avoid the pitfall of involvement in a war with only limited external implications. A common tendency among the great powers during the last three decades has been the failure to distinguish between liberation conflicts and ideologically inspired modern third-world revolutionary wars. A liberation conflict suggests that historically evolutionist forces are in evidence while ideologically inspired wars imply global-structuralist origins. Different

responses may be counseled for these types of conflicts with their fundamentally different (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) characters.

A comprehensive review of Africa's varied contemporary conflicts cannot be undertaken in this study, but to place the threefold explanatory framework into a productive analytic context, we may allude to certain conflicts under way in Africa.³³ Several protracted full-scale conventional wars have been raging in Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia, while Somalia, Sudan, and Mozambique have faced substantial insurgencies with little prospect for their early termination. Numerous less-intense conflicts prevail, either between at least two countries or, more likely, between several protagonists within the same country.

Global structuralists point to the dissolution of the colonial empires in the midst of the cold war as the major problem. This environment encouraged neocolonial forces to exploit the fragility of these new countries either for economic or strategic purposes. Evolutionists express no surprise at the contagious conflicts following on the heels of independence. But they lament that so many neighboring countries have undergone the same developmental phases simultaneously; hence, entire regions are influenced by the same phenomena. Historicoculturalists see the continuity of Africa's historical social behavior in this modern period. They point to repeated instances of traditional behavior and modern references to tribally grounded beliefs today as proof of traditional martial forces at work.

In fact, all three categories of explanations offer insight. Most present-day conflicts in Africa experience extensive international involvements at a time when Africa's fragile states are working towards internal consolidation. Traditional forces may be involved in certain conflicts, but in most cases, these emerge only after the conflict has

gotten bogged down or has deteriorated without resolution after a protracted time span. In other cases, traditional forces help to form a conflict environment based on cultural clashes, but within the context of modern political forms in order to shift or to reverse an existing power distribution. The means employed may reflect traditional cultural attitudes and warrior styles, but the objective remains the pursuit of modern political power.

Somalia

In Somalia, the combatants are not different ethnic/linguistic units; both sides are Somali people representing distinct clans. These clans form the base of the warring factions. Somalia is comprised of only a part of the territories traditionally occupied by Somalis. In Ethiopia, one of the conflicts concerns irredentism in that substantial numbers of Somalis live on a large part of neighboring land that is formally part of Ethiopia. Somalia's objective does not include the ouster of another government nor does it concern tribal warfare. Somalia is trying to build a modern nation-state—indeed, a rare instance in which the state would be populated by only one ethnic nation.

But Somalia's internal conflict also has a more traditional veneer, and evolutionists may draw a parallel with the American Civil War. The aged president, Siad Barre, established his power base around the southern Marehan clan—that of his family. This clan was opposed in the south by the Hawiye clan and in the distant north by the Ishaq clan. The Ishaq clan formed the core of the Somali National Movement (SNM), an insurgent force that engaged the government in large-scale battles resulting in thousands of casualties and 1 million refugees.³⁴

Evident in the war against Ethiopia has been substantial external involvement in which the Soviets and Americans

switched sides in the mid-1970s. Cubans also participated directly in combat-related activities on the side of Ethiopia. In this respect, Somalia's external conflict seems to be a modern war in pursuit of nationalist objectives, within global structuralist dimensions. Somalia's internal war, however, may be described more in terms of evolutionist theory in that the utter poverty of the country has exacerbated the central government's inability to integrate the disparate regions into a cohesive political community. The evident north-south split in the country also reflects the colonial division of this region into Italian and British Somaliland. Under the circumstances of external and internal conflicts, the consolidation of Somalia and the establishment of widely accepted legitimate modern political institutions should not be expected in the near future.

Liberia

Liberia's internal conflict of 1989–91 represents most acutely the problems of unsuccessful internal consolidation. Independent since 1847, the country has been ruled by an American-Liberian oligarchy, comprised primarily of ex-slaves from America who had returned to Africa and who constituted only 5 percent of the population. In 1980, Samuel K. Doe overthrew the elitist government in a particularly brutal military coup and installed himself as the country's first indigenous native-descended ruler. The following decade of incompetent administration and lack of economic progress contributed to a deteriorating domestic situation. Several anti-Doe coup attempts failed, but a full-scale insurgent movement was introduced into Liberia at the end of 1989 with surprising ease.

The international dimension of Liberia's conflict involved several participants. The US had extended Doe considerable financial and expert aid, which had the effect of supporting

his incompetent regime. Then Charles Taylor, an exiled former government official, entered Liberia with allegedly but 100 Libyan-trained troops from the neighboring Ivory Coast.³⁵ Rumors also implicated Burkina Faso as playing a role on the side of the insurgents. Taylor, himself half American and half Liberian, capitalized on the deteriorating situation and on the broad dissatisfaction with Doe's regime ever since Doe's military men brutally put down an attempted coup in 1985. As his regime began to falter, Doe increasingly relied on his own tribal people, the Krahn, who were allied with the Mandingo. The relatively small Krahn tribe benefited inordinately from governmental advantages. This caused great resentment among members of the Mano and Gio tribes, who were the victims of loyalist Krahn troops who had dominated the military at the time of the attempted coup.

Before Doe overthrew the American-Liberian elite, the major ethnic tensions concerned relations between the elite and the rest of the indigenous population. But the ascension to power of an indigenous leader, and the commensurate general deterioration, opened the contest among competing indigenous social groups.³⁶ The Krahn, who comprise only 4 percent of the population but dominated the weak and inept government, would soon face limitations to their authority. Taylor was easily able to ally with the hitherto victimized Gio and Mano people near the border of the Ivory Coast. With the newly attained authority of Taylor's insurgent status, the Gio and Mano evened the score against the Krahn government troops and officials.

It may be ironic that in Liberia, the only outpost of America's historical influence in Africa, the historico-culturalists find great evidence of traditional forces at play. When Doe toppled the government in 1980, 13 top government officials were killed in a public execution on the beach in Monrovia for "high treason, rampant corruption, and gross violation of human rights."³⁷ We may contend that the

language was modern, but the beatings, humiliation, torture, and finally the executions—all in public—were a display of historical forces at work. Subsequently, the usual attempt by a new government to consolidate legitimate power and to address the desperate need for socioeconomic progress encountered the realities of the lack of development. The ensuing deteriorating climate exposed the government's vulnerability to internal dissident forces, to sheer opportunism, and to external interests in line with global-structuralist configurations. The opposing combatants in Liberia aligned along tribal lines, but they represent only four of the 16 ethnic groupings. The leader of the insurgents is an American-Liberian whose commander of rebel forces, Prince Johnson, had served in the American forces and reportedly participated in the US invasion of Grenada in 1983.³⁸ The conflict in Liberia is an excellent example of the problems associated with protracted conflicts in an environment of general socioeconomic deterioration and of the influence of foreigners—including the American-Liberians who were perceived as a colonial elite despite years of residence in Liberia. Finally, Liberia illustrated the ease with which an unresolved protracted conflict can degenerate into tribal animosities, where the initial objective had been a contest for the domination of modern political institutions.

Uganda

Perhaps the most perplexing of Africa's conflicts has been that of Uganda. While a colony, this territory had the reputation of being the "Switzerland of Africa"—an allusion to its scenic beauty and general tranquility. However, after attaining independence, the attempt to consolidate modern rule, especially over the historic Buganda kingdom, led to a vortex of warfare. Ieuan Ll. Griffiths sees the origins of modern conflict stemming from the colonial period, which

suggests a global structuralist perspective. But he also lists other sources of instability which include Idi Amin, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, policemen, and political party thugs who were “corrupt, greedy, ruthless, and cruel.”³⁹

The disruptive role of British colonialism included the introduction of an alien sectarian religion; the extension of imperial protection; the administration of various kingdoms and tribal areas as one unit, in disregard of traditional differences; and the submission of independence to the colony. The modern Uganda People’s Congress party vied for authority with the hereditary ruler, the kabaka of Buganda. Modern constitutional engineering had created a federal constitution and distributed power between the kabaka and the new prime minister, Milton Obote. But the modern army, which was northern-based, soon put an end to the kabaka’s attempt to retain his traditional authority. That army was led by a northern Acholi: Idi Amin. He subsequently overthrew Obote in 1971.

Amin’s dubious rule included the ouster of most Asians, and he soon embarked on the wholesale decimation of political opponents and previous government officials. Griffiths writes: “Virtually a whole elite disappeared. . . . Thousands were killed, their bodies thrown into the Nile or Lake Victoria, or simply dumped into a forest.”⁴⁰ The foreign element also manifested itself when Amin employed a Palestinian bodyguard, and the Libyans offered aid and intervened militarily on his behalf. Amin’s territorial ambitions then involved him in a war with Tanzania, which, surprisingly, invaded Kampala, the capital, and ousted Amin from power. Kenya too had been involved as that country cut the flow of supplies to Uganda—a landlocked country.

Amin’s ouster hardly quelled Uganda’s conflicts, which, if anything, intensified during the state of anarchy

that ensued. A succession of rulers failed to exert effective central control while remnants of various armies and insurgent groups remained armed and pillaged a number of regions.⁴¹ Nor were the disturbances caused only by the poorly controlled government military and by rebel groups. The bizarre Holy Spirit movement, founded in 1987 by a visionary, Alice Lakwena, mixes pagan beliefs with quasi-political objectives in the lawless northern region. Hundreds may have been killed to date in Holy Spirit movement attacks on noncompliant villagers and on Sudanese refugees who had escaped civil war in their own country. The movement's members use supposed magic ointments to ward off bullets of the government's soldiers.⁴² Recently, this peculiar rebel group adopted a more political name: United Democratic Christian Movement.

President Yoweri Museveni has had his hands full in combating this group. Several simultaneous but independent rebel attacks on a variety of targets—often against each other—inevitably have led to alignment along tribal lines. The largely unknown National Resistance Army has been responsible for an expensive 5,000 deaths of members of the Teso tribe as part of the ongoing history of retaliation for acts emanating from the two-decade-long chaotic situation.

Perhaps Griffiths is correct in pointing to British colonial practices as the major problem, since that period gave rise to a poorly constructed modern state. Elements of traditional authority confronted modern political national institutions in an open conflict, which in other African states had not been won by the traditionalists. But, as in the case of Liberia, the fragile structure of modern authority soon exposed the government to a series of armed opportunists with only vague political programs. This is an unfortunate characteristic of the early consoli-

dative stage in which the attainment of institutional legitimacy constitutes the major challenge. Once under way, and exacerbated by external interventions, the conflict degenerates and facilitates the reemergence of traditional forces. Individuals, recognizing the ineptitude of the government, seek security in their traditional, parochial community, which closes ranks in the face of adversity. We may conclude that the origins of the modern conflict in Uganda lie in history, but the immediate objectives are modern: power, survival, socioeconomic advancement, and the pursuit of institutional legitimacy.

Mozambique

Mozambique's protracted conflict originated as an anticolonial struggle in 1964 when FRELIMO insurgents crossed into the northern region of Mozambique from Tanzania. They had been inspired by the independence movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, two other Portuguese colonies. FRELIMO organized itself with help from China and the Soviet Union into a guerrilla force intent on establishing a modern third-world socialist society.⁴³ Just as they succeeded in making territorial gains in Mozambique's central region, Portugal's empire collapsed and FRELIMO took power—although it was poorly prepared to do so. Then, shortly after independence in 1975, the Rhodesian central intelligence organization formed the *Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana* (RENAMO)—a bush-fighting force that was to serve Rhodesia's military purpose in Mozambique, where one of the two main Rhodesian black guerrilla movements had been based.

FRELIMO's policies were ambitious, poorly supported, and resisted by many peasants in the distant rural areas where Portuguese colonial rule had barely been extended. RENAMO took advantage of this opportunity and, after

reorganization, extended a loosely knit guerrilla movement throughout the land. (The degree to which the movement is in fact a cohesive insurgent force is disputed.) The ensuing conflict between the government and insurgents soon became a confrontation between a modern, internationally affiliated, third-world socialist regime and an opportunistic collection of dissidents, gangsters, and semifeudal warlords parading under the guise of insurgent respectability.

Both sides in the conflict have relied on external support; hence, the global structuralists find ample evidence that the essence of the conflict was motivated by external interests. Besides Portugal and Rhodesia, other major participants included the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, East Germany, and North Korea, which supported the government side; and South Africa, the primary force behind RENAMO.⁴⁴ Others who played a role at various points include Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania—all of which had troops in Mozambique—Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States and, allegedly, even Ethiopia, Morocco, and Comoros, which were involved in training, advising, supplying arms, or financing one or the other side. Obviously, this is neither a tribal nor a traditional war.

Considering the vast size of Mozambique and the fact that Portugal exercised effective administration over only a restricted area of cities and farming lands, that RENAMO was able to expand its conflict came as no surprise. A Mozambican official assessed the conflict: "This is a war from the Middle Ages. In some areas the government is seen as an intruder into a world of age-old traditions. It breeds a very vicious reaction, a desire to destroy any vestige of central or modern authority."⁴⁵ It is appropriate to speak of the Mozambican situation as a continuation of tribal life, but now disturbed by the movement of marauding guerrilla bands

armed with modern weapons and characterized by an all-but-total absence of humane considerations.

If Mozambique's distant northern tribes harbor resentment towards the government, it is because they are Muslim and because the government embarked on an antireligious campaign after altering independence. Other rural inhabitants are Christians, and they, too, expected that RENAMO would eventually be in a position to reinstate freedom of worship. Afonso Dhalkama, RENAMO's leader, stresses his devout adherence to Christianity in sharp contrast to the original atheistic position of government officials. Still, the allegedly devastating brutality of RENAMO belies such religious pretensions. What little and sketchy information emerging from Mozambique's rural combat zone suggests that RENAMO uses an opportunistic interpretation of modern third-world guerrilla and terrorist tactics. Ostensibly, these tactics are implemented in pursuit of an antisocialist revolution, but, realistically, these tactics are implemented in pursuit of the advantage presented by the state of virtual anarchy.

Although both FRELIMO and RENAMO pursue the same objective—modern control over the entire country's political affairs—the two protagonists exercise different approaches in dealing with traditional institutions. During its initial anticolonial struggle, FRELIMO had barely extended its influence over 20 percent of the country. In fact, large areas of Mozambique were never effectively brought within even Portuguese colonial control. In power, FRELIMO moved quickly to eradicate all local authority and to replace it with modern, centrally dominated rule. This included the weakening of religious institutions, the collectivization of agriculture, and the incorporation of large tribal areas into an ambitious socialist plan. These changes were very disruptive of traditional structures which had offered personal security to its hitherto politically neglected members. FRELIMO

had gotten its start in the far north of the country, but once in power, the ruling elite quickly assumed a southern tinge and an urban power base resulting in the disproportionate influence of whites, Indians, and mulattoes of the cities. Within months of FRELIMO's ascension to power, 400 (northern) Makonde soldiers attempted a march on the capital as an early demonstration not only of the new country's fragility but also of dissent emerging along ethnic lines.⁴⁶

RENAMO capitalized on this early resentment towards FRELIMO's heavy-handedness and ineptitude. RENAMO established itself as a national rural-based organization in defense of traditional structures. While this may have been little more than a pragmatic strategy, it did respond to the widespread disenchantment with FRELIMO's rigorous ideology-driven requirements for the creation of a socialist society. Some estimates list 70 percent of RENAMO's operational structure to be comprised of rural Shona speakers, especially Ndaus, but regional tribal commanders also represent the Macuas and Shangaans. RENAMO keeps its forces largely in their traditional areas of origin; this portrays them as locals who are aware of tribal concerns. Traditional chiefs and animist religious figures also are respected; hence, it is not difficult to perceive FRELIMO as a distant, ambitious, disruptive, and almost foreign force.

There is no firm indication of any value in such traditional authority structures since RENAMO also adopted third-world revolutionary strategies to attain power, and their leaders speak of modern political and economic forms. But little can be certain in this regard in view of the lack of information concerning that organization.⁴⁷ Their modern organizational structures, guerrilla tactics, and weaponry hardly suggest that RENAMO would reintroduce traditional African culture. Nor can we expect that RENAMO would

have had an existence were it not for the Rhodesian war and had South Africa not subsequently sponsored them.

The Mozambican conflict demonstrates a particularly disturbing example of a colony that had been poorly administered then abandoned in the midst of a liberation struggle. The formative period preceding independence had not solidified before foreign interests quickly aligned with the respective internal protagonists, thus making available sufficient arms to ensure a protracted war. Consequently, the present, early consolidative phase is extremely painful. Historicoculturalists may find the tribal alignments of interest, as well as the magnitude of the atrocities—most of which are attributed to RENAMO and to other anti-government dissidents.⁴⁸ However, such brutality must be appreciated within the contest for power between two irreconcilable adversaries, each bent on the extension of controls throughout the land. The evident anarchic element and the ruthless subjugation of rural areas attest to an ineffective central authority. In such an environment, sheer terrorism and the possession of guns determine political legitimacy. One side futilely seeks to govern while the other side prevents this. But neither side respects traditional structures for other than pragmatic tactical reasons.

Somalia, Liberia, Uganda, and Mozambique are but four countries that have suffered extensive social disruptions emanating from protracted civil wars. These countries hardly exhaust a list of Africa's currently raging battles. Wars in Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan, Angola, and Western Sahara match or exceed the intensity of those in the former group. Each case offers a unique mix of underlying motives, and each is characterized by foreign interference at a time of great internal fragility which marks their early consolidative phases. But another source of disturbance needs comment as it also belies, in part, cultural attitudes, namely, religious/

ethnic differences. These factors may play an increasing role in the future and bear watching closely.

Except for the Coptic Christian northeast corner, Africa had been animist prior to the introduction of Islam more than a thousand years ago. Christianity was introduced in the fifteenth century with the arrival of Europeans along the western and central African coast. Islam had brought with it a well-developed war culture that inspired Islamic control throughout the Sahel, into the northern reaches of west and central Africa, and along the east African coast. But equally important, Islam coincided in large measure with Afro-Asiatic people who ranged from the Sahel of West Africa to the Middle East. West African Negroes and the Bantu of central and southern Africa were distinctly different racial types and cultures. Colonial boundaries, however, did not respect such geographic and historical factors; hence, today the legacy of such divisions is conflict in Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, and emerging tension between Mauritania and Senegal.

Ethiopia

In the case of Ethiopia, the predominantly Muslim dissidents in Eritrea seek not to secede but to regain their traditional independence from the Coptic Christian Amhara rulers. This country was pieced together in the early 1950s by a combination of external interests, a four power commission, and a United Nations commission.⁴⁹ The conflict in Ethiopia is, of course, much more complex in that other regions, such as Oromo and Tigre, are also pursuing various degrees of autonomy or outright independence. But for our purposes, Ethiopia's conflict may best be seen in the context of the continentwide disruptions introduced by colonial wars or imperial controls followed by the sudden departure of the Europeans after

having pieced together very tenuous political units out of greatly disparate parts. Thereafter, ethnic/religious animosities emerged, with each side supported by external interests. Eritrea is heavily backed by Middle Eastern Muslim interests, while Ethiopia had been allied with the US until 1974 when the Marxist government, in a radical turnabout, opted for the Soviet Union. The subsequent protracted war saw the reemergence of age-old ethnic, religious, and tribal animosities, with the dissidents seeking power reversals—in many cases, just sheer survival. The central government, on the other hand, is buttressed by a history of being the only African country to have defeated a European power in the modern era.

The Eritrean war, which has been raging for 30 years, has allowed the Eritreans to develop one of the most capable armies in Africa and has solidified Eritreans' feeling of national union. The Ethiopian government forces occasionally have resorted to brutal retaliations against nonmilitary villagers out of sheer frustration as their battlefield tactics failed. Perhaps these retaliations could be a reflection of a distinct historical or cultural attitude towards war and human life rooted in tribal traditions. But the battle is very much a modern one, as are the weapons, and the number of casualties has been immense. In most other newly formed countries such civil wars have been no less brutal. We need not go beyond America's Civil War or the Bolshevik Revolution for examples.

Sudan

A similar ethnic/religious division characterizes the Sudanese civil war, a protracted conflict whose brutality easily matches that of the Ethiopian conflict. All the continentwide disruptive elements are present: race, religion, tribal animosities, refugees, starvation, external intervention,

and prolonged fighting. The external analyst will quickly conclude that Sudan is poorly equipped to comprise an integrated political unit—the largest one in Africa, at that.

Sudan ranks among the top of a list of African countries whose conflicts are best explained in global-structuralist terms. Long before British subjugation, the northern Arabs enslaved the Nilotic peoples of what is today Sudan's southern regions—an area which ought to be considered more a part of black Africa than of Arab Africa. Even the British recognized the fundamental distinction between Khartoum, the seat of the governor-general, and the southern provinces, which the British mostly ignored during the colonial era.⁵⁰ Even in places where the Christian missionaries were allowed in the south, they were assigned to different regions. The British encouraged the retention of traditional institutions and kept the Arab and black portions administratively separate. However, in 1946, in a hurried decision, the country was united in its present form largely to serve British political interests in the Middle East. After independence, the Arab-dominated central government attempted to extend the Arabic language and Islamic influences in the south. In the early 1980s, in response to Islamic fundamentalist pressures in Khartoum, the government tried to impose Islamic *sharia* law even on the non-Muslim provinces.

In a sense, despite Sudan's independence, the country is still in its formative stage because of never integrating into a coherent political unit. The origins of this country lie firmly in the colonial days when the inhabitants came under the control of foreign interests. Foreign influence is still evident in Egypt, Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, Cuba, Israel—and various Arab nations involved on one or the other side of a conflict—with each foreign power pursuing its own interest, but in the process, only fueling the extended war. The superpowers sense the dismal prospects for direct intervention; hence, they are concerned more with

humanitarian aid and a diplomatic presence than with massive direct military involvement.

Traditionalism is obvious in the Sudanese conflict and is a deliberate government tactic. The southern region has been dominated by the Dinka tribe, one of whose members, John Garang, is the able leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)—which also finds support among the black Nuer people. Government forces have been unable to extend peace in the southern region. Meanwhile the SPLA's strategy of frustrating food deliveries to the starving rural masses has resulted in hundreds of thousands of southern refugees fleeing towards Khartoum—which in turn, exacerbates racial tensions there. The 2-million-strong Dinkas have been by far the most active dissidents to Khartoum's nationwide domination, but the Dinkas in turn have been distrusted by other black southerners. In 1988 the government armed various tribes in order to encourage them to do its bidding against the Dinkas. Several thousand died in subsequent clashes between the government-armed Fertit and the Dinkas.⁵¹ This renewed tribal conflict led to the emergence of several other dissident movements. One such movement is the equatorial province's Imatong Liberation Front, which pursues secession in contrast to the SPLA, which seeks merely to redress grievances against the Arab north.⁵²

Khartoum may be described as intransigent in its adamant stance towards centralized, nationwide domination and Islamic political culture. The south remains isolated, impoverished, and fragmented. Khartoum focuses its foreign policy on a pro-Egyptian stance that respects Egypt's vital Nile water requirements and on Middle East financial resources. The south has welcomed aid from a variety of sources. In the mid-1960s, a preceding dissident movement had received military support from Israel at a time when Sudanese troops participated in combat against

Israel in the Sinai as allies of Egypt.⁵³ More recently, the SPLA has received its most important support from Ethiopia, a country that is retaliating against the Sudanese government's support of Eritrea and Tigre.⁵⁴ John Garang has also had successful meetings with several black African states which, in view of his status as the leader of an insurgency movement, could portend the emergence of tensions between Arabs and black Africans in other parts of the continent.

The fighting in Sudan has been intermittent but has extended over three decades. In Sudan—as in many protracted African conflicts—when the conflict environment deteriorated, atrocities were committed by all protagonists.⁵⁵ Airplanes reportedly have bombed southern villages with chemical weapons, while the SPLA has been accused of starving whole villages as one of its tactics of war. A century ago, the Arabs had enslaved the southern black populations; now slavery has reemerged in all but pure form once again.⁵⁶ The conflicts between southern tribes facilitated by the government have resulted in large massacres. Yet Robert M. Press observes that the most notable conflict among black southerners was among two tribes “with no previous record of inter-tribal hostilities.”⁵⁷ Though we may be tempted to reduce the conflict to a religious war, the SPLA's John Garang has openly called for the toleration of all religions and states that “worshipping Allah is not the issue, but political elitism and the national constitution is.”⁵⁸

Sudan is an excellent example of what appears to be a conflict grounded in historical forces, yet the essence of the various disputes is modern. Even so, some of the military means employed resemble historical forces because of the war's protraction.

It is tempting to assume the existence of irreconcilable political differences between Africans of Islamic and

non-Islamic persuasions, but this would not be correct. At issue is the coincidence of such religious differences with ethnic, historical, and often racial differences. In history, Christians have confronted other Christians in Europe, and Muslims confront other Muslims in the Middle East. If Muslims were to confront non-Muslims on religious issues in the future, however, it would probably be in Africa.

Nigeria

In northern Nigeria during the Kano riots in 1985, thousands died in clashes between the Muslim followers of Maitatsine and troops of the secular government. Maitatsine's sect disdained any aspects of modern life and considered him to be the true prophet of Allah.⁵⁹ Nigeria also encountered large-scale civil disturbances at the ascension of Ibrahim Dusaki to the position of 18th sultan of Sokoto—an event traditionally marked by violent clashes among supporters of competing claimants to that powerful position. Dusaki's family ties to Usman Dan Fodio, responsible for the founding of the Sokoto caliphate, and rumored intrigues with top government officials fused this religious event with the affairs of state. The government could not help but take an interest in the outcome, despite its avowed secular mandate.⁶⁰

Dusaki's ascension, the Muslim domination of the military's ruling circle, the occasional government threats to extend Islamic *sharia* laws to the southern Christian and animist states, and the legacy of the Biafran war in the late 1960s all combine to keep religious and ethnic relations in Nigeria tense. An ill-conceived coup attempt of April 1990 was ostensibly explained by its perpetrators with reference to ethnic and religious differences and resentment towards Muslim political domination.⁶¹ Christians and Muslims confronted each other in violent clashes in Kaduna in 1988 and in Bauchi in 1991. Obviously, religion plays an

important role in Nigeria's recent history, but underlying the religious differences are also vital ethnic factors which, when combined, carry political implications. In the Biafran war, for example, the Muslim northerners combined with the Christian Yoruba to defeat the secessionist attempt by Christian Ibos—who would have profited immensely from exclusive access to the vast oil deposits on their territory. Hence, we see that mere religious differences are not an automatic basis for clashes; often they combine with other factors.

Senegal and Mauritania

Another conflict, that between Senegal and Mauritania, is based on ethnic differences, but both sides are predominately Muslims. Historical forces are at work—but within the context of modern border violations by Mauritanian herders. Citizens of each country residing in the other country become targets for revenge. Mauritania was once ruled by the Beydane, descendants of the “White Moors.” The Harratine, blacks who were also Muslims, were enslaved by the Beydane until only recently (some say to this day).⁶² Today's overt conflict between Senegal and Mauritania concerns border transgressions and violations of each other's citizens residing in each other's countries. But the conflict would well reflect historical legacies and an attempt to break the traditional master-slave relationship. Complicating the conflict is a political secessionist movement in Senegal's south and an active dispute with neighboring Guinea-Bissau over possible oil resources along their common border. Should any one conflict break out full-scale, there is little doubt that the other conflicts would quickly break out as well. Again, there is evidence of historical forces underlying the disputes, but secessionism, border transgressions, and oil are all very much modern concerns that characterize this dispute

more properly as a mix of some traditional, but mostly modern, forces.

Rwanda and Burundi

If judged by sheer ferocity, the civil wars in Rwanda and in Burundi may be Africa's clearest cases of a national conflict motivated by tradition. Such an evaluation is validated by the fact that two combatants, aligned along tribal lines, face each other with minimal external involvement. Before the independence of both countries, the minority Tutsis had dominated. They excluded from power the 85-percent-majority Hutus, who had traditionally been subservient to the Tutsi overlords in a classic African tribal symbiotic relationship. Colonialism and independence brought modern Western institutions to the two countries, along with a modern struggle for power. In the face of continued Tutsi monarchic rule, Burundi soon experienced a military takeover from a new Tutsi king who had himself deposed his father. An attempted but failed Hutu coup against the Tutsi-dominated military government led to an outright violent confrontation between these two ethnically distinct tribes in which hundreds of thousands of people were massacred or dispossessed. In neighboring Rwanda, by contrast, independence had come with the majority Hutus dominating the modern political institutions. But they were soon opposed by a Tutsis guerrilla movement. The ensuing war saw thousands of Tutsis slaughtered by government troops and in public confrontations between members of the two tribes.⁶³

The two combatants in each country were aligned along purely tribal lines, and each suffered accordingly. Involved were issues such as traditional Tutsi monarchical affairs, historical master-servant relations, ethnic and cultural differences, the traditional warrior nature of the

Tutsis, and tribal subgroup rivalries on each side. This is the pure stuff of the historicoculturalists. However, we mis-assess the nature of the conflict if we fail to go beyond the tribal dimension. First, Hutus and Tutsis had lived together for centuries; indeed, each relied on services provided by the other. Hence, violent conflict between them is mostly modern. Second, the colonial power—in this case Belgium—fabricated a modern state along with modern institutions in which the domination of central government ensured great advantage to those who managed to assume control. Understandably, the Tutsis preferred to retain their traditional authority, but that had derived from the protection they had exchanged for mostly labor services of the Hutus. Now the modern police and armed forces would supply such protection. With the introduction of foreign ideas concerning majority rule, the Hutus saw no need to maintain their traditional subservient position. They would be qualified to rule by virtue of their majority and would relegate the Tutsis to the obscurity of minority status in a very impoverished country.

In this conflict, certain social patterns reflect historical and traditional forces—the ensuing atrocities being one—yet the reason for battle was indeed a modern one. Another problem is the unfortunate continuation of this conflict without resolution. In 1988, the conflict in Burundi flared anew, based this time not on a calculated political objective but on the failure to achieve peace in this country. It appears that in the ongoing state of mutual suspicions, Hutus and Tutsis attacked each other preemptively or out of revenge. The Hutus believed that the Tutsi government troops were about to embark on another campaign as must have been evident to them by renewed military exercises. After the Hutu attack began, the Tutsi soldiers struck back massively to discourage a repeat of their near extermination in the early 1970s. Other factors played a part, such as smuggling rights, high coffee

profits, and returning refugees; but the polarization that had been introduced in the early postindependence clashes demonstrated the fragility of Africa's social relations in the consolidative period.⁶⁴

South Africa

Finally, South Africa requires comment as that country demonstrates yet another dimension of tribal-based animosities. Occasional analytic reference is made to the alleged violent struggle for black power between the Xhosa and Zulu peoples. Many analysts maintain that after majority rule is attained, animosities between the 10 different black ethnic groupings will break out into violent conflict. Others argue that the whites keep the peace among blacks in the land, and that indeed the Afrikaners are the great white tribe of Africa.

Thousands of blacks died during the last few years in prolonged clashes in South Africa's central Natal region. In fact, the protagonists are all Zulus and not distinguished by any tribal or clan alignments. Instead, the two opposing sides represent, on the one hand, members of the United Democratic Front aligned with the ANC and, on the other hand, Inkatha, the political movement of Chief Buthelezi, the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland—a government-created institution. That the ANC has many Xhosas among its top leadership is true, but that does not make the conflict a tribal confrontation.⁶⁵ Buthelezi relies for his appeal primarily on the traditional, rural, impoverished sector of Zulus who respect his traditional title as one chief (among many chiefs) and his government-derived authority in the homeland. This respect is denied him by the UDF, which is comprised of the young, more urbanized, and educated Zulus, who denounce Buthelezi's authority and who do not recognize

the legitimacy of the homeland. In this regard, the conflict is within the same ethnic group and is motivated by the struggle for modern power. Inkatha has had a history of encouraging the retention of traditional warrior symbols—as heirs to the bloody legacy of Shaka. Few in South Africa would dispute the existence of this atavistic martial character for a substantial portion of pro-Inkatha Zulus. But, as elsewhere in Africa where a conflict is not resolved (in this case the conflict inherent in apartheid), modern-day leaders find it advantageous to exploit this vestige of traditional attitude towards war, but in pursuit of modern objectives.

A lesser-known ongoing conflict in South Africa, which does indeed reflect a much greater degree of traditionalist forces, concerns “faction fights.” These conflicts kill dozens or more annually, and most participants are Zulus. Typically, bands of warriors representing families or clans fight these battles in distant rural areas, usually during the holiday season when men return from their jobs in the distant cities. They bring with them a variety of modern weapons, but they also employ spears, machetes, and traditional fighting sticks.⁶⁶ Their numbers may comprise all the men of a village who confront their enemies in equal numbers in protracted, hit-and-run tactics, which occasionally include pitched battles. The motives are obscured due to the revival of such ongoing battles at yearly intervals, but occasional analyses suggest that such battles are fought in revenge for losses in the previous year. Perhaps the precipitating cause may have originally concerned women, cattle, or a transgression on valued grazing lands.

Observers of this phenomenon have noted that the emphasis is more on the need to continue the battles than on supplying articulated justifications for them. Men and boys confront credible enemies in well-planned

preparations for war and battlefield tactics. Certainly, historicoculturalists find a great deal of evidence of Africa's warrior legacy in these periodic conflicts.

It is ironic that these faction fights occur in South Africa, a country that popularly advertises its advanced level of social welfare. As such, they affirm that South Africa's progress does not necessarily filter to all social sectors. Whites in South Africa refer to these fights as proof of the blacks' general lack of modern standards and their natural proclivity towards uncivilized martial conduct.⁶⁷ However, critics of South Africa's racial policies point to apartheid as the cause for the perpetuation of these battles.

In South Africa's system of labor, black men leave their rural homes for a great part of the year, which disrupts the traditional social patterns and old systems of traditional authority. With whites owning 87 percent of all lands in South Africa, there is an obvious scarcity of good lands for blacks. This pits the rural farmers against each other in competition for grazing lands for their traditionally valued cattle. The white-dominated government has seen little reason to step into the fray as their interests are not directly threatened. Critics of apartheid have pointed to the government's abstention from the political battles and faction fights in Natal as another reason for the government's illegitimacy as it does not serve the basic security needs of all members of society. The ANC, as the most visible liberation organization in South Africa, has vehemently denounced all vestiges of traditionalism in KwaZulu and has laid the blame for the faction fighting at the government's door, citing its unwillingness to bring them to a halt.⁶⁸

This analysis of different types of conflict within the context of several examples is not meant to serve as a comprehensive review. This analysis does, however, illustrate the complexity of African conflicts and attempts

to strike a balance between the various explanations for them. Most conflicts—including those which threaten external security interests—have origins which may not be traced to Africa's history of traditional warfare. However, elements of such tradition-grounded behavior do manifest themselves during the course of many conflicts, especially where they become protracted. In other cases, governments have encouraged the reversion towards traditionalism, usually as a last resort or in their frantic search for survival. Younger leaders universally condemn any retention of tribalism as, invariably, it serves non-African interests, and it decimates the masses but does not touch the offending governments.

This review of Africa's diverse conflicts today has verified the contention of the global structuralists who focus on the active and destructive role of foreign interventionists. Yet, other than Cubans, few other external interventionists have lost their lives in Africa's wars, while African casualties have numbered in the millions. Whether interventionists supplied arms, training, battlefield advisors, or nonlethal economic aid to prolong a war, the result usually has been to fuel the war, which allowed Africa's warrior tradition to reemerge. The historico-culturalists contend that this is proof of the continuity of Africa's warrior culture. Adda Bozeman states it most concisely: "Today, Africans in all walks of life continue to be guided by many of these traditional values and institutions, even as they affirm new interests and commitments associated with the lifestyles of the modern age."⁶⁹

The evolutionists have stressed the general tendency of all states, as they transit from the traditional to the modern era, to enter into prolonged tumultuous periods. Neither peace nor development will be attained until the inner equilibration process advances these states through well-

established evolutionary stages. Ideally, states should experience no external interventions as these pervert a society's purpose by serving external interests. Guns and finances are introduced, and the course and the outcome of the battle is dictated by foreign objectives with Africans paying for it not only in lives but also in terms of a thoroughly negative image.

If both the global structuralists and the historico-culturalists are right, there is little basis to hope for an early resolution of Africa's conflicts. Evolutionists expect that eventually the conflicts will end—as they did in the developed world. However, in light of Africa's serious developmental problems, sociopolitical differences in their multinational societies, and their vulnerability to external influence, the evolutionists also expect that African conflict may intensify, rather than diminish, in the future.

Conflict in Africa American Policy Implications

As befits a global power, the US properly takes an interest in all conflicts. This, of course, does not imply intervening in all of them, but does suggest that monitoring the vicissitudes of the changing international strategic environment is essential. Strategic planners must be aware of the growing capabilities of emerging actors. New issues take on new values and can lead to disruptions of regional balances. The employment of new weapons and tactics by a host of new expansionists requires intelligence and a constant analysis of power shifts.

Sub-Saharan Africa poses no great challenges to America's nuclear might nor to vital American strategic interests. But the continent serves as an important opera-

tional base for conflicts in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and for international shipping routes and communications links. Sub-Saharan Africa is the location of some of the greatest human tragedies and the most numerous active wars in the world today. Africa has become very vulnerable to a variety of external forces, which seek their own advantage in this delicate security environment and which may disturb the balance of power and threaten our security interests.

Fidel Castro has been an energetic presence on the continent since the first contingent of Cuban troops arrived to buttress their ideological allies in the Algerian war for independence. Muammar Qadhafi has been an active interventionist in over a dozen African countries, often using his Islamic legion troops. The Israelis have given substantial military aid, and the Palestinians have offered bodyguards and military training. French troops have installed or protected several governments. The Soviets have sold huge quantities of arms to numerous African countries and have deployed thousands of military personnel, some of whom have been captured by forces opposing Soviet-backed governments. China, North Korea, East Germany, and Bulgaria all have supplied military and security aid along with technical personnel. Now in the postcontainment world, with a receding Soviet presence in Africa, new powers are already moving into the apparent void. Both Iran and Iraq have embarked on aggressive diplomatic initiatives that may result in their next confrontation being fought in Africa via surrogates. No other area of the world offers so much constant active external intervention and new development as does Africa. No other area is as vulnerable to and as defenseless against such new encroachments.

How can the US identify conflicts that impinge on our security interests and require intervention? The analytic context presented in this study may be of particular utility.

The historicoculturalists argue that the basic cultural nature of Africans will ensure that conflicts of one type or another will continue. They suggest these conflicts will be mostly local ones among members of the same communities or within single states. However, whether secessions, transnational wars, insurgencies, coups and mutinies, or civil disturbances sparked by a variety of pretexts, the instability of the continent is assured. Hence, Africa will attract external interventions by powers with their own agendas.

Global structuralists focus on Africa's position in the world and on the immense attraction of the continent for those seeking economic, strategic, political, cultural, and religious objectives. Africa is constantly manipulated, external financial interests induce African governments to support their economic activities, and the cold war introduced greater interest in the continent's physical resources than in its human resources. Little will change in the new era. Should the Soviets vacate the entire continent, there will be little reason for the US to sustain its substantial strategic interest there. But this will only invite new powers to fill the gap, and the victimization of Africa will continue. In fact, these new external interests lack the financial resources to seriously engage in anything other than military involvements.

The evolutionists also see little prospects for improvement. For them, Africa is in the early consolidative stage, an inherently tumultuous period. Africa is weak with no prospects for the early provision of its own security capability. Where other societies in their early stages had developed mostly in isolation on the distant periphery of global concerns, for Africa this period is made especially

violent by the combination of extracontinental interests and the availability of substantial quantities of modern arms. These ensure the continuation of conflict and that Africa's political evolution will not reflect its own internal power equilibration. Cuban, French, and Middle Eastern financial support have already determined the existing complexion of a good portion of Africa.

The US would do well to monitor each conflict in Africa and to evaluate the sources of disturbances. In the rare cases of tradition-based animosities or cultural origins of such wars, we may counsel the need for those countries to modernize rapidly and to transcend hostilities. But a policy of abstention from direct or even supportive involvement may allow the natural internal forces to emerge in which the victors may also be suitably equipped to introduce stability into the country. Installing our preferred contestant into power will require the perpetual support of his regime and assure popular resentment towards that regime. The East European governments that were put in power and supported by the Soviets are excellent examples of this. In Africa, few Soviet-backed regimes have survived for prolonged periods despite the massive costs expended in their support.

White rule has all but disappeared from Africa, and relations between Arabs and blacks may yet be redefined. Should Eritrea succeed in its total separation from Ethiopia, several other countries could face similar internal disruptions. Leading candidates include Sudan, Chad, and Nigeria, while several others could experience periods of tension among religious and ethnic factions. This religious/ethnic issue, more than any other, could begin to divide Africa into new political units. Our natural tendency will be to involve ourselves in the retention of the status quo, but again, evolutionists would argue that this may only exacerbate tensions and consume funds that

could better be put to developmental use. We must face the fact that Africa's present nations have not been constructed to suit their own needs.

Beyond that, we will hardly encounter traditional African martial forces of sufficient magnitude to threaten a major realignment or regional balance which would determine our need to intervene. We demonstrate our ignorance, however, and risk misassessing more important underlying forces when we mistakenly label some conflicts in southern Africa as "ethnic tribal conflicts," as does the January 1988 issue of the National Security Strategy of the United States. (In fact, no tribal conflicts were raging at that time, much less any that would pose a threat to our security interest.)

Our historical evaluation of events on the African continent has focused too much on the anthropological factors coloring our public perceptions of events that have shaped modern Africa. Africans fighting each other with allegedly primitive weapons in frequent small-scale skirmishes were of greater interest to writers of travel and adventure books than to our scholarly audiences. Yet as we demonstrated, the introduction of modern guns, fighting tactics, foreign political systems, economic competition, subjugation, and the cold war all greatly disrupted Africa's traditional societies.

We must also be sensitive to modern Africa's own perceptions. In a review of francophone Africa—until recently, a traditionally stable area—made in early 1990, the Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Niger were listed as exhibiting various forms of internal tension. Yet in none of them was there evidence of tribal or traditional rivalries as the precipitating cause.⁷⁰ All their conflicts reflected the problems of modern rule, succession, and impatience with the slow pace of development. Similarly, the University of Lubumbashi in Zaire experienced violent campus turmoil in April 1990. A certain

element of tribalism was in evidence in that, allegedly, students attacked members of President Mobuto's own tribe whom the students accused of spying on behalf of the police. Still, the students' major concern was the advancement of pluralistic democracy, the right to wear western clothes of their choice, and the improvement of conditions at the university. On their placards they had written: "Down with tribalism, down with corruption, long live freedom, long live democracy."⁷¹ The US must guard against allying with the occasional African governments who do capitalize on tribalism in order to advance their immediate fortunes, as was the case with Doe in Liberia during the insurgency in 1990. We must appreciate that in the event those governments resort to that tactic, backing them will hardly endear us to the younger generations but will ally us with the weak governments—ones which have to resort to dubious means to stay in power.

A different policy may be counseled with respect to external interventionists in Africa's conflicts. Foreign involvements may be of the type wherein an external power expends its own military, financial, and human resources. This has occurred numerous times, especially in the case of Cuban and Libyan interventions. At best, they make few permanent gains, they do not threaten our vital security interests, and they expend enormous resources of their own. Africans have hardly remained gratified by such largess for long. Such incursions may require US monitoring but may need no response. Other interventions may demonstrate more comprehensive ambitions, such as economic and strategic objectives. These require responses, and the first should be to seek an immediate end to such advances by diplomatic and economic means before balancing or neutralization measures are introduced. Such a policy can be presented to Africans

as being one which respects their sovereignty, until their actions—motivated for whatever reasons—carry with them the consequences for not only their own national interests but also for other external powers. At the same time, Africans must appreciate the inherent interests of a global power.

The evolutionists counsel that Africa will be beset by a variety of conflicts for some time to come. Most of these conflicts will emanate from the lack of a sufficiently long formative phase that would have enabled African societies to form into viable national units. Attempting to direct the course of such consolidative efforts may be utterly futile. Yet, to let the ongoing violence take its course and respond after the fact is to risk eventually responding to a global crisis. We may find it more productive to encourage Africans to redesign their national boundaries, develop regional cooperative structures, establish economic integrative institutions, and introduce new political and economic forms than to deal with the consequences of conflicts which often begin as little more than elitist or oligarchic self-perpetuation measures. Can we accept repeated instances such as that in which Liberian president Doe's prolonged resistance to rebel demands that he leave office resulted in thousands of deaths and wrecked the fragile economy?

Finally, policymakers must be sensitive to another factor: the problem of perception and bias. We lament the violence in Africa, which the historicoculturalists inform us is an all-but-inherent African cultural attribute. However, we must recall the sordid practices the white man introduced into Africa. Colonial accounts are replete with barbaric practices in Africa where whites engaged in the genocide they so frequently accuse Africans of perpetrating. In 1904, the German general Von Trotha issued an extermination order against the Herero people who were native inhabitants of the colony of Southwest Africa: "Every Herero, whether

found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women and children.”⁷² White South Africans were no less generous to the bushmen they encountered, nor towards many blacks to this day. In the current tense racial situation, the leader of the most vocal right-wing extremist movement expressed his historically well-grounded sentiment regarding blacks: “They want war. We will give it to them and chase them . . . back to the homelands. War is the only answer for such people. There are only winners or losers.”⁷³

These are hardly isolated occurrences. History awaits African historians’ evaluation of the white man’s culture of violence. Writing of Nigeria’s civil conflict, Colin Legum observes:

To dismiss them simply as acts of political vengeance or as another example of “African savagery” is Monday Club mumbo-jumbo. In the last two decades, the Asians have shown greater savagery than the Africans, and in the decades before that the Europeans in Germany surpassed all.⁷⁴

Above all, these latter observations suggest that we reevaluate our own established perceptions of Africa. This may be essential before we embark on a new relationship with that continent.

Notes

1. Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, *Crises in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 4.

2. Some analysts who belong in this category include Kenneth W. Grundy, who observes: “Thus Africa has been penetrated, ruled, exploited, and proselytized.” Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O’Meara, “The Impact of Region on Contemporary African Politics,” in *African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985), 99. In the same volume, Richard L. Sklar writes: “Despotic forms of government were imposed upon Africans in the Belgian Congo, Portuguese Africa, and the white settler states of Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa.”

"The Colonial Imprint on African Political Thought," in *African Independence*, 12. Crawford Young portrays African nationalist thought which depicts Africa's "economic incorporation as a subsidiary part of the complex of western economic institutions and relationships collectively labeled as capitalism." "African Relations with the Major Powers," in *African Independence*, 119.

Walter Rodney assumes a dogmatic ideological position in his analysis of Africa's colonial history. His position is summarized: "African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries." Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), preface.

3. The evolutionist strain in historical analysis is evident in both economic and political interpretations. Karl Marx offered his historical dialectic as a comprehensive universal model of political economy. Eugene Rostow presented his well-known "stages of economic growth" model. Much of the thinking regarding evolutionary development I've presented in this study derives from my attendance at lectures offered by Professor George Liska, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 1964-1966.

4. Adda B. Bozeman, *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

5. Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas" *Orbis* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976): 61-102.

6. *Ibid.*, 63, 65.

7. Bozeman, *Conflict in Africa*, chap. 3, *passim*.

8. Karl P. Magyar, "Intervention and Withdrawal in Africa: Problems and Perspectives," in *Military Intervention and Withdrawal*, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

9. Bozeman, *Conflict in Africa*, 369-72.

10. Ali A. Mazrui, ed., *The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1977).

11. *Ibid.*, 1-2.

12. Ali A. Mazrui, "Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State," in Mazrui, 10.

13. G. N. Uzoigwe, "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa," in Mazrui, 23ff.

14. W. E. Abraham, *The Mind of Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 84.

15. Christian P. Potholm refers to this problem in "The Impact of Traditional African Political Systems on Contemporary Political Patterns," in *African Society, Culture and Politics*, ed. Christopher Chukwuemeka

Kojekwu et al. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), chap. 7.

16. Ali A. Mazrui, *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1986), chap. 1.

17. Janheinz Jahn, *Muntu: An Outline of the New African Culture* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), 97.

18. Axel-Ivar Berglund, *Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1976), 79.

19. Mazrui, *The Africans*, 135.

20. Paul Bohannon and Philip Curtin, *Africa and Africans*, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: National History Press, 1979), 186–87.

21. Monte Palmer, *Dilemmas of Political Development*, 3d ed. (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1985), 23.

22. *Ibid.*, 42–43.

23. *Ibid.*, 43.

24. Mazrui, *The Africans*, 41.

25. Philip Curtin et al., *African History* (London: Longman, 1978), 90.

26. M. Kwamena-Poh et al., *African History in Maps* (Essex, England: Longman Group, 1982), 12.

27. Curtin et al., 242–43.

28. Kwamena-Poh et al., 52.

29. Brian Catchpole and I. A. Akinjobin, *A History of West Africa in Maps and Diagrams* (London: Collins Educational, n.d.), 106–7.

30. Ruth First, *Power in Africa* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 74–75.

31. A sordid description of atrocities is offered in the preface of Robert B. Edgerton, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

32. Curtin et al., 580.

33. A typology of current conflicts in Africa is offered by Karl P. Magyar, “Low-Intensity Conflicts: The African Context,” in *Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1990), 177–243.

34. John Laffin, *The World in Conflict, 1989, War Annual 3* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), 89–99. Also, refer to Georg Brunold, “The Horn of Africa: Trembling on the Brink,” *Swiss Review of World Affairs* 39, no. 6 (September 1989): 22–24.

35. Richard Mackenzie in *Insight* 6, no. 21 (21 May 1990): 34–36.

36. *Ibid.*; Kenneth B. Noble in *New York Times*, 5 June 1990 and 13 June 1990.

37. *The Arizona Republic*, 22 April 1980.

38. *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, 7 June 1990.

39. Ieuan Ll. Griffiths, *An Atlas of African Affairs* (London: Methuen, Inc., 1984), 70–73.
40. Ibid., 72.
41. A listing of the numerous political factions and rebel leaders is offered in *New African*, no. 273, June 1990.
42. *Washington Times*, 12 April 1990; and *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Africa* (hereafter cited as *FBIS, Africa*), 20 October 1989, 18 April 1990, 30 April 1990.
43. Thomas H. Henriksen, “Lusophone Africa: Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau,” in *Politics and Government in African States*, ed. Peter Duignan and Robert H. Jackson (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), chap. 9.
44. Laffin, 167–73.
45. *The Independent* (London), 24 February 1988.
46. Edward P. Cairn, “Mozambique’s Hidden War,” in *Combat on Communist Territory*, ed. Charles Moser (Lake Bluff, Ill.: Regnery-Gateway, 1985), 45.
47. A report in Lisbon’s *Diario de Noticias*, 6 December 1988, indicated a split in RENAMO due to the nomination by Ndaus. See also *FBIS, Africa*, 30 January 1989, 23.
48. The “Gersony Report” has had the widest circulation in Washington on the topic of RENAMO’s atrocities. “Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experiences in Mozambique,” US Department of State, 20 April 1988.
49. Laffin, 89ff.
50. International Security Council, *The Strategic Stakes in Sudan* (New York: International Security Council, 1985).
51. See the reports by Jane Perlez, *New York Times*, 20 October 1985, and by Robert M. Press, *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1988.
52. Reported in *Africa Confidential* 31, no. 2 (26 January 1990): 5–6.
53. Robert O. Collins, “Civil War in Sudan,” *Journal of Third World Studies* 5, no. 1 (1988): 77.
54. *The Economist* 310, no. 7592 (4 March 1989).
55. Carol Berger, “Khartoum Loses Its Grip,” *South*, May 1988.
56. See the report by Robert M. Press, *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 July 1988.
57. Press, *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 August 1988.
58. Lucy Hannan, “SPLA Victories in the South,” *New African*, no. 261, June 1989, 11–12.
59. *Natal Mercury*, 1 May 1985.
60. Reported in *Africa Confidential* 31, no. 7 (6 April 1990): 3–4.
61. *FBIS, Africa*, 4 June 1990, 28.

62. *The Economist* 311, no. 7601 (6 May 1989): 41–42.
63. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa*, ed. Roland Oliver and Michael Crowder (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 226, 248. See also A. T. Grove, *Africa*, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 255–58.
64. See the excellent analysis by Jane Perlez, *New York Times*, 29 August 1988.
65. See “The Buthelezi Factor,” *The Economist* 314, no. 7642 (17 February 1990): 43.
66. One report, which includes reference to the weapons employed, is presented in *FBIS, Africa*, 28 March 1989, 8.
67. Graham Linscott, writing of the faction fights in *Star* writes: “Whites tend to ascribe the conflict of the Zulu ‘warrior tradition’ to an innate propensity for violence.” Reproduced in *FBIS, Africa*, 20 July 1989, 10.
68. The ANC’s position on tribal chiefs is complicated as they do make distinctions between those chiefs who cooperate and those who do not cooperate with the government. See Thando Zuma, *African Communist*, reproduced in *FBIS, Africa*, 25 June 1990, 51.
69. Bozeman, “War and the Clash of Ideas,” 83.
70. *FBIS, Africa*, 6 March 1990, 1.
71. *FBIS, Africa*, 2 May 1990, 9.
72. *Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story* (Pleasantville, N.Y.: Reader’s Digest Association Press, 1989).
73. *FBIS, Africa*, 15 June 1990, 8.
74. Irving Leonard Markovitz, “The Tragedy in Nigeria,” in *African Politics and Society: Basic Issues and Problems of Government and Development* (New York: Free Press, 1970), 250.

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